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ABSTRACT
GOVERNING COMPLEX COMMONS ESSAYS IN REGIONAL TUNA 
MANAGEMENT IN THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL PACIFIC OCEAN
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) is the world’s largest and most 
productive fishing ground for four commercially important species of tuna—yellowfin, 
skipjack, albacore and bigeye—and is an important economic resource both to the 
region’s ‘coastal states’ and to the global tuna industry who view it as the as the last 
great tuna ‘commons’ available for exploitation. Despite almost 30 years of active 
regional management amongst the Pacific Island states, there remains significant threats 
to future stock sustainability on key commercial species and strong concerns have been 
raised about fleet over-capacity. Concurrent with these fisheries management issues are 
a set of complex and dynamic political and economic aspirations held by the developing 
countries of the region, who view the tuna fishery as a key part of their future growth 
strategies.
This thesis presents a diverse collection of essays that examines the recent experiences 
and implications of regional level tuna management in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean (WCPO), as a collective action problem, with particular focus on the design of 
policy frameworks under the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WCPFC). Drawn together through the common methodological rubric of the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and a policy philosophy that 
draws heavily on the analytical insights of the ‘adaptive management’ and ‘incentive 
based’ fisheries literatures, this thesis has two significant aims. The first is to critically 
evaluate the evolution of regional governance, interpreted as a set of institutional rules, 
in light of the aspirations that Pacific Islanders hold for their tuna resources and the 
sustainable management needs of this multi-species fishery. The second is to propose 
specific management models that could be used in the implementation of the WCPFC 
Text that may better meet the objectives of members.
Weaving together a diverse narrative across six analytical chapters, the research 
outcomes of this thesis suggest that that an explicit framing of fisheries management 
agreements as incentive structures and adaptive management frameworks that guide 
fisher behaviour, can offer something ‘new’ to policy makers in terms of providing 
alternative, and novel, insights into the relative merits of current policy, as well as being 
sources of new policy ideas. Within this thesis, this perspective was used to offer two 
substantial insights into the policy making process.
Firstly, the historical and current approaches to policy making have not fundamentally 
addressed the central incentives that drive behaviour within a common-pool fishery and 
this underpins the difficulty in progressing conservation measures that both reflects the 
available scientific and economic advice and the risks involved in fisheries 
management. Secondly, that some conservation and management measures, and the 
framework of the Convention itself, have introduced into the policy mix some key 
concepts from the ‘incentive-based’ approach to fisheries management and further 
development along this path appears possible. This is particularly true for the Vessel 
Day Scheme, which provides some significant design improvements, but serious 
challenges to its implementation remain. The thesis then builds on these observations by
This thesis also provides novel insights by undertaking a study of the ‘aspirations’ held 
by Pacific Islanders that underpin their negotiating positions, along with some 
preliminary analysis of its significance to understanding WCPFC negotiation positions. 
The analysis concludes that the tuna development aspirations held by Pacific Islanders, 
and strategies pursued to achieve them, are significantly more diverse than is usually 
assumed, and this provides a key challenge to the continuing unified bargaining position 
for the FFA within the context of the WCPFC negotiations.
This thesis concludes by a reflective examination of this research for scholars of policy 
analysis through a discussion on the challenges in ‘upscaling’ commons frameworks to 
large scale commons resources and the role of path-dependency in formulating policy 
proscription
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PART ONE
FRAMING THE ‘PROBLEM’ OF THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
FISHERIES COMMISION
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The Sea hath fish for everyman
William Camden
The agony o f international relations is the need to try to practice politics without the
basic conditions for political order.
Bernard Crick
1.1. The Unfinished Project of International Fisheries Management
Throughout the twentieth century a new vision of collaborative fisheries management 
emerged within the international community. Responding to the relentless growth in 
fishing activity on key commercial stocks, and its impacts on resource sustainability, 
this vision was primarily directed towards breaching the centuries-old doctrines of 
‘freedom of the seas’ and ‘mare clauseum’—sovereignty over the oceans resources— 
and found its strongest expression in the great legal codification projects of the Third 
United National Law o f the Sea Convention and the related Fish Stock Agreement 
(Anonymous, 1998).
Preceded by an extended history of human efforts to control, govern and manage the 
ocean and its resources (see Buck, 1998), a central question in this twentieth century 
movement was how to effectively control access to and extraction from the world's 
most valuable oceans fisheries resources—arguably the most complex of the global 
commons. Since the post-war period significant achievements have been made in 
developing the international legal regime, particularly as applied to fisheries, which is 
summarised by Tsamenyi et al. (2004) as comprising of four interrelated strategies:
• Globally binding fisheries treaties adopted to address the conservation and 
management of fish stocks, particularly straddling fish stocks and highly migratory 
fish stocks.
• International voluntary' instruments to promote a framework of principles and 
standards for responsible fisheries.
• Regional institutional framework for the management of tuna and tuna-like species 
(and other species).
• Global environmental treaties that, while being negotiated outside the international 
fisheries management framework, provide useful tools and principles towards 
sustainable fisheries management.
Although ‘cooperative’ management is now an accepted ‘norm’ in international law, in 
many ways the international fisheries project is an unfinished collaborative project and. 
at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the core management issue of over-fishing 
remains more pressing rather than less. Despite its legal comprehensiveness, evidence 
so far suggests a mixed success in terms of outcomes for this collaborative project and 
one that is increasingly open to criticisms of insufficient progress, and at times, failure 
to improve sustainability of key fish stocks. As noted recently by the FAO (2009):
An overall review of the state of marine fishery resources confirms that the 
proportions of overexploited, depleted and recovering stocks have remained 
relatively stable in the last 10-15 years, after the noticeable increasing trends
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observed in the 1970s and 1980s with the expansion of fishing effort. In 2007, 
about 28 percent of stocks were either overexploited (19 percent), depleted (8 
percent) or recovering from depletion (1 percent) and thus yielding less than 
their maximum potential owing to excess fishing pressure. A further 52 percent 
of stocks were fully exploited and, therefore, producing catches that were at or 
close to their maximum sustainable limits with no room for further expansion. 
Only about 20 percent of stocks were moderately exploited or underexploited 
with perhaps a possibility of producing more. Most of the stocks of the top ten 
species, which together account for about 30 percent of world marine 
capture fisheries production in terms of quantity, are fully exploited or 
overexploited (added emphasis, p7).
A key question arising from the FAO analysis is whether the situation with global 
fisheries could have been worse without the significant effort directed towards 
international oceans management. The breadth and depth of that question posses a 
significant analytical challenge to fisheries policy scholars and, consequently, remains 
outside the scope of this thesis. Instead, this thesis examines a related issue: if it is 
apparent that global fish stocks have, at a minimum, not improved significantly due to 
international cooperative management, why is this so and how can these management 
regimes do better? Several authors both within the academic and ‘grey’ literatures are 
now actively examining these and related issues (see for example Grafton et ah, 2008; 
Trondsen, 2006; Bjorndal et ah, 2000a; Lodge, 2007; High Seas Task Force, 2006; 
Chand et al, 2003; Greboval. 2000). This thesis contributes to this growing literature 
through a specific focus on examining the experiences of collaborative governance of 
the third type of international law identified by Tsamenyi (2004)—that of a regional 
institutional framework—and for a specific region: the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean.
1.2. From Roman times to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission: A brief history of international fisheries management
Throughout human history, management of the global oceans has primarily been 
conceived of as a political and legal construct, and therefore a history of management is 
essentially a history of the evolution of international law as it relates to fisheries (and 
which in turn reflects the underlying political and economic drivers). The key 
dichotomy of access to the high seas—control over specific areas versus freedom of the 
seas—was a central issue in international affairs at least since the middle ages and the 
history of oceans governance charts the uneasy parallel development of both doctrines 
through the development of customary law and, in contemporary times, to the great 
codification projects of the UN Law of the Sea Conferences. This may be classified as 
both an 'enclosure’ movement on a grand scale and a 'cooperative movement’ based on 
the key international law concept of national sovereignty.
Declaration of the 'freedom of the seas’ reaches as far back as Roman times and was 
progressively replaced, after the collapse of the Roman Empire, by efforts of 
governments to ensure the safety of their maritime merchants (see Buck, 1998; 
Steinberg, 1999, for an overview). This, in turn, gradually evolved into claims of 
territorial control, and subsequent charging for access, by powerful mercantile sea 
faring states in the Mediterranean and in the North and Baltic Seas. Although the 
principle of territorial control came to be generally recognised between states, no 
agreement was to be found about the distances to which nations may lay claim.
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In 1494 the Treaty o f Tordesilla served to settle territorial disputes between the 
Portuguese and Spanish through an audacious decision to effectively divide the earth, 
including the oceans, into two equal hemispheres for the purposes of "stewardship' and 
"missionary activities' (Steinberg, 1999). The Treaty was indefensible both morally and 
physically and these sea-based claims quickly came under pressure as the English, 
Dutch and French expanded their oceanic empires. In the ensuing century, claims and 
counter claims between coastal nations, and disputes over the extent of territories 
including that of the high seas, was gradually formalised into the founding concepts of 
international maritime legal regime: mare clausum (closed seas) and mare liberum 
(freedom of the seas). However, as time continued countries found it increasingly 
difficult to enforce territorial claims on the high seas and, instead, turned their attention 
to coastal waters (Buck, 1998).
These debates culminated in the work of Hugo Grotius who wrote his famous Freedom 
o f the Seas in 1604-05, to demonstrate freedom of access primarily in defence of Dutch 
commercial interests in the East Indies. In response, John Seiden, upon request from 
James I from England, counter-argued with his Mare Clausum, which argued for the 
right and dominion of the sea. The apparent differences between the two were 
somewhat resolved by a more general acceptance, upon initial suggestion by Grotius in 
a later work, that ‘lordship' over some ocean territory was possible in so far as a nation 
were able to enforce the claims from a land base, usually via forceful means (Steinberg, 
1999; Buck, 1998).
In the seventeenth century, this ‘definition' of enforcement was linked to the length of a 
cannon shot—a characterization supported in turn by the Dutch, Belgians, French and 
later in the eighteenth century by the English, Italians, Spanish, Portuguese, the United 
States and Russia. However, this was not without controversy and the Danes, amongst 
others, proposed competing definitions. Although none of the various principles for 
measuring control received widespread acceptance, during this time it was gradually 
accepted that national jurisdiction extended only as far as a nation could defend it from 
shore. Beyond that range, the high seas were open to all. This principle—primarily for 
pragmatic reasons—eventually evolved into general acceptance that the boundary of 
territorial seas was three nautical miles—a standard further reinforced first by its use in 
treaties by the US and by continual confirmation in British maritime laws, influential 
due to the pre-eminence of Britain as a sea power in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Gradually throughout the nineteenth century, other countries followed suit in 
recognising the three-mile limit, although the adoption was by no means uniform and 
some countries, particularly in Latin America, implemented other standards.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it became increasingly apparent 
to maritime nations that the inter-relationship between the high seas resources and 
resources found within territorial waters could not be easily separated due to biological 
and ecological factors. In effect, nations began to recognise and accept that that 
cooperation on the management of international resources between nations was in the 
interest of each. An early controversial, and ultimately successful example of this was 
the North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty of 1911. Signed and ratified between Russia, Japan, 
Canada (and by proxy Britain) and the United States, this Treaty was used to reach 
cooperative management of the valuable Fur Seals found on and near the Pribilof 
Islands in the Bering Sea, whose life cycles took the animals in and between the 
territorial waters of each state and the high seas. For discussion of this case see Barrett 
(2003) and Castree (1997) and Birnie and Boyle (2002).
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By the early to mid-twentieth century the recognition for more active conservation 
management continued to grow. Initial attempts to codify international law on marine 
matters—that is, to bring regularity and predictability to ocean governance—began with 
the League of Nations after World War One. The inter-war period, however, was 
marked with on-going disputes over territoriality and no consensus was reached prior to 
World War Two.
Driven by concerns over fishing and oil exploration more robust attempts were 
developed after World War Two with the initiation of the UN Conferences on the Law 
of the Sea. The primary aim of the three UNCLOS agreements was to codify existing 
international law into a treaty regime, an ambitious program that proceeded in stages.
UNCLOS 1
During the immediate post-World War Two period two incidences began to undermine 
the accepted three-mile territorial limit and highlighted the need to develop the ocean 
regime. The first of these was the declaration by the US over the natural resources on its 
continental shelf and extended jurisdiction of the high seas for fishing purposes—a 
move replicated by several Latin American countries. This was followed by a 1951 
ruling by the International Court of Justice, which found acceptable the Norwegian 
policy of extending territorial waters to four nautical miles and to redefine how 
baselines are drawn.
These developments culminated in the formation of the first United National Law of the 
Sea Conference (UNCLOS) in 1958 which met to consider these questions and to pass 
four conventions: the Convention on the High Seas, the Convention on the Continental 
Shelf, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the Convention 
on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas.
These conventions were not considered successful and ultimately did little to stem 
international conflict over territoriality. This was partially due to their limit of codifying 
existing customary law (that is, progress was not made on advancing positions on new 
issues) as well as a sense of a distant water fishing state bias in their provisions and a 
failure to balance those interests against the interests of coastal fishing states (Birnie, 
2002; Buck, 1998).
UNCLOS 2
The second UN conference—UNCLOS 2—was motivated by the ‘cod war' between the 
UK and Iceland that was sparked the establishment of a 12-mile nautical limit by 
Iceland — effectively cutting British fleets from their traditional grounds. With the 
failure of UNCLOS 1 to reach agreement on territorial sea, Iceland effectively 
proclaimed sovereignty over 12 nautical miles through the use of the Norwegian 
baseline technique, a procedure already accepted by the International Court of Justice.
Convened once again to address the issue of territoriality, UNCLOS 2 was unable to 
reach an agreement and tensions again rose between Britain and Iceland. A compromise 
was reached in 1961 and eventually the two parties agreed to a gradual phasing in of 
Iceland's claim.
UNCLOS 3
Negotiations for UNCLOS 3 began in 1973 with the immodest aim of designing a ‘new 
legal regime for the oceans’ (Buck, 1998). The motivations for this conference were
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twofold: by the mid-1970s, economic issues around fishing, sea bed mining and 
territoriality in general could no longer be satisfactorily addressed through existing 
international law. A second consideration was to operationalize the idea o f the ‘common 
heritage of mankind’ for ocean management, which had recently been adopted as a 
guiding principle by the United Nations.
The of UNCLOS 3 -  the Law o f the Sea Convention (hereafter ‘ LOSC’ ) -- was an 
ambitious omnibus treaty dealing with a wide range of issues including: sea bed 
minerals, territoriality, high seas zoning and right o f access, ocean pollution, scientific 
research, and dispute resolution (Anonymous, 1998). For the purpose o f fisheries 
management. Committee II— examining in international law on territoriality, high seas 
for living and non-living resources— was the critical component o f UNCLOS. 
Influenced by broader environmental treaty making, and a fear that technologically 
advanced fishing nations would ‘strip mine’ a fishery for locals, LOSC firmly linked the 
issue o f territoriality, fishing rights and fishing conservation. In this area, its primary 
achievement was the clarification o f territorial limits and recognition o f the growing 
practice in setting limits: 12-mile limit for territorial seas, a contiguous zone o f 24 
nautical miles and an Exclusive Economic Zone not to exceed 200 nautical miles. In 
doing so, LOSC effectively enclosed 90% o f the world's commercial fisheries into the 
managerial control o f a single identifiable nation but contained the condition (Clause 
63(2)) that obliged ‘coastal states and states fishing stocks beyond EEZs to seek to 
agree on the measures necessary to co-ordinate and ensure the conservation and 
development o f such stocks’ (Kaye, 2001; Stokke, 2001; Bjorndal et al., 2000b). This 
directive was left open to allow cooperating parties to pursue this either ‘directly’ or 
through an appropriate regional or sub-regional organisation (Birnie, 2002).
Post UNCLOS: the Fish Stocks Agreement; FAO Code o f Conduct; International Plan 
o f Action
Despite the success o f UNCLOS 3, there remained several outstanding issues for 
fisheries management in the international community. Primary amongst these was what 
to do with the remaining fish stocks that were not encapsulated within EEZs— that is, 
those that existed on the high seas— and those fisheries that ‘ straddled’ jurisdictional 
areas: that is, those species whose biological range existed both within an EEZ and the 
high seas or more than one EEZ (Tsamenyi, 2004). Driven by several high-profile 
collapses in valuable fish stocks (for example, cod), by the early 1990s it was 
recognised that further progress on addressing these issues was urgently needed 
(Nandan, 2005). Initiation for this came not from the fisheries community itself but 
from the environmental sphere. In 1992, the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) formally adopted ‘Agenda 21’ which 
contained an explicit chapter on fishing and which called on, amongst other things, for 
countries to convene a new treaty to address high seas and straddling fish stocks. The 
resulting Treaty— colloquially known as UN Fish Stocks Agreement1— was designed 
primarily to build upon and elaborate key aspects o f UNCLOS 3, but ultimately went
The full title of this agreement is Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.
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further than this through the introduction o f several key innovations in international 
fisheries law making including:
• The precautionary principle including the use o f reference points in fisheries 
management.
• Emphasis on conserving marine ecosystems as well as fish species.
• Ensuring compatibility between EEZ and high seas areas when developing 
conservation measures.
• Places on parties stronger obligations to cooperate within regional fisheries 
bodies (Birnie, 2002; Nandan, 2005; Gall, 2007).
UNFSA came into force in December 2001 and its influence and importance to the 
development o f international fisheries law is difficult to over-estimate. For example, the 
Chair o f the UNFSA negotiating process, Ambassador Satya Nandan from Fiji states:
Perhaps the most important achievement o f UNFSA is the way... it develops the 
concepts o f cooperation, compatibility and responsibility inherent in the 1982 
Convention [UNCLOS 3], It does this by both articulating the necessary balance 
and reciprocity as to the concurrent rights and obligations o f coastal states and 
high seas fishing states by introducing the notion o f compatibility and by 
developing the concepts o f biological diversity, ecosystem approach and 
precautionary approach...necessary for the effective implementation [of the 
LOSC] (Nandan, 2005).
UNFSA was not the only ‘ implementing' instrument constructed at this time and 
several parallel and complementary ‘hard’ and ‘soft' law instruments were negotiated 
during this time as mechanisms to elaborate on the terms and provision o f UNCLOS. 
Key achievements during this time were:
• The Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (Compliance 
Agreement)— designed to encourage the promotion o f legal and responsible 
management o f fishing fleets operating on the high seas.
• Code o f Conduct for Responsible Fishing— calling for the sustainable fishing 
practices (Stokke, 2001).
• International Plans o f Action (IPOAs): for seabirds, sharks, over capacity in fleets 
and illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing. These separate agreements were 
used to address specific aspects o f fishing and its impacts on the ecosystem. They 
are voluntary agreements.
See Tsamenyi (2004) for a summary o f these arrangements. Tsamenyi et al. (2004) 
argue that while together these post-UNCLOS agreements and treaties formulate a 
comprehensive and elaborate and sufficient framework for addressing fisheries issues, 
but continuing problems come not from lack o f effective policy and frameworks but 
from lack o f effective implementation.
1.3 A NEW CHAPTER IN INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: THE WESTERN AND
C e n t r a l  P a c if ic  F is h e r ie s  C o m m is s io n
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This implementation task rests on a range of institutional arrangements but a critical 
focal point is that of the role played by regional fisheries management organisation as 
envisaged in UNFSA. If UNSFA was essentially constructed and utilised as an 
‘implementation* tool for certain aspects of LOSC, given its global coverage, it could 
not by necessity provide the level of operational detail required by nations wishing to 
implement its terms and conditions. UNFSA explicitly left this task to the formation of 
regional cooperative mechanisms, in particular regional fisheries management 
organisations, to craft arrangements suited to the circumstances of individual regions 
and individual fisheries.
Various chapters in this thesis describe the history of fisheries management in the 
Pacific and so only a few brief comments are provided here.
In the Western and Central Pacific Ocean it had been recognised since the 
implementation of the LOSC that such a regional organisation was required but that the 
membership of existing regional cooperative fora—such as the Forum Fisheries Agency 
(FFA)—was unable and unwilling to expand its original mandate to meet this goal 
(Tarte, 2002). An important driver of this position was the reluctance of small relatively 
poorer Pacific nations to enter into negotiations with larger cosmopolitan powers with 
whom they felt they were not on equal power footing (Tarte, 2002).
As noted above, UNFSA was an important advance in international fisheries 
management, but for the Pacific Islanders it became a critical catalyst for them from 
about 1994 to overcome their intransigence to a regional RFMO and to enter into 
negotiations. The reasons for this are considered elsewhere (see Tarte, 2002) and go 
beyond the scope of this thesis but essentially can be summarised as both a regional 
response to considering the implications of UNFSA (and other international 
mechanisms such as the FAO Code of Conduct on Responsible Fishing) and to answer 
growing regional calls for improved ‘multilateral approaches' to fisheries management. 
Pacific Islanders were also concerned that if they did not take the initiative in 
developing a regional arrangement, DWFN would do so for the high seas on their own 
terms and pressure the Pacific Islands nations to join (Tarte, 2002).
These negotiations—called the Multilateral High Level Conference (MHLC)— 
ultimately led to the development of the main topic of this thesis: The Convention on the 
Management and Conservation o f Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean. Signed in 2000 and coming into force in 2004, this Convention, 
like UNFSA before it, represents not a new initiative in international relations but a new' 
phase in the ongoing story of international cooperative fisheries management. The link 
between the WCPFC Convention and UNFSA and earlier developments is not just 
historical. By deliberate design, the negotiations for the WCPFC were chaired by the 
same Pacific nationality diplomat (Ambassador Satya Nandan from Fiji) who 
represented in both symbolic and practical terms the connections between the two. This 
is most obviously seen in the language of the two texts, which are at times almost 
indistinguishable, but was also evident in the nature, and content, of the debates within 
the WCPFC, which will be discussed throughout this thesis.
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Table 1.1: Chronology of the Law of the Sea as It relates to fisheries
management
Date U nknow n Roman declaration o f  ‘ freedom  o f  the seas’
M id d le  Ages G overnm ent o f  m ercantile  sea fa ring  nations assume respons ib ility
(date unknow n) fo r  safety against p iracy. Th is evolves in to te rr ito r ia l c la im s o f  
va ry ing  sizes.
1449 Treaty o f  Tordesillas, d iv id in g  the w o r ld ’ s oceans between Spain 
and Portugal
1588 B ritish  defeat o f  the Spanish A rm ada
1608 Freedom o f  the Seas (G ro tius)
1635 M are C lausum  (The r igh t and dom in ion  o f  the seas) (Seiden)
1818 F ish ing C onvention o f  1818 ( firs t recogn ition  o f  the three m ile  
te rr ito r ia l waters)
V arious years C la im  o f  te rr ito r ia l seas o f  d iffe ren t sizes by m ajor coastal states
1911 N orth  Pacific  Fur Seal T reaty
1958 First U n ited N ations Conference on the Law  o f  the Sea (U N C LO S  1)
1958 C onvention  on the H igh  Seas (Conservation C onvention) ( in force 
1962)
1958 C onvention  on the C ontinenta l S h e lf (in  force 1954)
1958 C onvention  on the T e rr ito r ia l Sea and the C ontiguous Zone 
(T e rr ito r ia l Seas C onven tion ) (in  force 1964)
1958 C onvention  on F ish ing and Conservation o f  the L iv in g  Resources o f  
the H igh  Seas) (in  force 1966)
1960 Second United N ations Conference on the Law  o f  the Sea 
(U N C L O S  II)
1982 U nited Nations T h ird  C onvention on the law o f  the Sea Treaty (in  
force 1994)
1987 US M u ltila te ra l Treaty w ith  Forum  Fisheries Agency Countries
1992 U nited N ations Conference on E nv ironm ent and Developm ent 
(Agenda 21)
1992 Parties to the N auru Agreem ent/Palau A rrangem ent
1995 U nited N ations ‘ Fish S tocks’ Agreem ent (in  force ??)
1996 Federated States o f  M icronesia  Agreem ent
2000 C onvention  on the Conservation and M anagement
2004 C om ing  in to force the Conservation and M anagement o f  H igh ly  
M ig ra to ry  Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific.
Source: (Buc c, 1998, Aqorau and Berg in , 1997, Aqorau, 1997, Lodge, 1998).
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1.4. Research problem
Upon coining into force in 2004, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(hereafter the 'WCPFC') opened a new chapter in the collaborative vision of 
international fisheries management and a new era in international fisheries law. 
Focusing specifically on the regional needs of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, 
the WCPFC can be interpreted as a “mid-level’ governance institution that provides the 
governance space for bridging the higher aspirational goals of fisheries management 
(for example under UNFSA) and the shared decision-making responsibilities of the 
region's coastal states and the distant water fishing nations (DWFNs or so-called “flag 
states'). Balancing the twin legal principles of ‘national sovereignty’ and a “duty to 
cooperate’, the WCPFC can be interpreted as the first meaningful stage of encouraging 
collaborative management between nation states and incorporating its consequences 
into national management of fleets that operate throughout the range of the stocks.
The central problem facing the WCPFC is how to progress and facilitate the 
implementation of its resource sharing principles—that is, how is the resource to be 
shared amongst stakeholders, how much tuna should be harvested, where should it be 
harvested and who should be allowed to harvest it? As will be discussed in Chapter 3 of 
this thesis, the existing literature on Pacific tuna fisheries and management provides 
excellent background and some insights into these problems. For example, a great deal 
is known about the biology of tuna stocks and their movement across the Pacific and the 
legal structures, and some of the political dynamics, of fisheries management problems 
are well understood. Moreover, there is a significant amount of literature on the 
development aspects and potential for fisheries to underpin the Pacific Island economies 
and broader notions of economic issues in the fisheries—using formal bio-economic 
modelling—is beginning to be developed. However, seen in the context of the problems 
facing the WCPFC, a significant gap in the literature is how to combine these 
perspectives to produce novel insights into the policy problems in the fisheries and 
potential ways forward to resolve them. It is to breaching this gap that the aims of this 
thesis are addressed.
1.5. Aim of study
The aim of this study is to evaluate the performance of international fisheries 
management within the Western and Central Pacific Ocean and to propose, test and 
elaborate on possible future management strategies that could be used within the 
context of the region's newest management regime: the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission. The particular focus of this study is to explore the institutional 
aspects of regional management—the organization and development of policy signals 
that create incentives for fishing nations and fishers themselves and thus differentiates 
itself, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, from other studies that adopt a singular 
disciplinary approach in law, science or politics.
Towards this aim, the specific objectives of this study are to:
• Critically analyse and evaluate the recent historical experience of collective 
regional fisheries management in the WCPO tuna fisheries, using an explicit 
institutional and economic framing of the policy issues.
• To use insights from the fisheries economics and the “resilience* management 
literature to explore potential changes to governance structures in the WCPFC.
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• To elaborate on potential allocation models in the WCPFC as one of the key 
tools in achieving an 'adaptive' approach.
1.6. Structure of thesis
This thesis was developed as a series of individual journal articles, written as ‘stand­
alone' works for publication, and Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 10 have already been accepted as 
journal articles and book chapters. This approach was adopted for two reasons. First, 
during the writing of the thesis it became apparent that the issues emerging from the 
analysis and field work—while thematically linked through common use of literature, 
and common analytical assumptions—were quite distinct from each other and required 
different analytical approaches. That is, each chapter was a ‘mini' thesis in its own right 
with each containing its own distinctive research questions and, to some extent, 
methodologies. Second, some of the chapters were written as publishable works in 
response to invited publication opportunities that arose during the research period— 
Chapters 8 and 9 were written this way—and continuing this approach, given the use of 
different research questions in each chapter, seemed a natural way to proceed. These 
publications are:
Chapter 5: Hanich, Q., Parris, H., Tsamenyi, M. Sovereignty and Cooperation in 
Regional Pacific Tuna Fisheries Management: Politics, Economics, Conservation and 
the Vessel Day Scheme. Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs, 
forthcoming.
Chapter 6: Parris H. Tuna Dreams and Tuna Realities: Defining the term "maximising 
economic returns from the tuna fisheries" in six Pacific Island States. Marine Policy, 
Vol. 15, No. 3 January 2010
Chapter 7: Parris FI. Is the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission meeting 
its conservation and management objectives? Ocean & Coastal Management, Vol. $3, 
No.l January 2010
Chapter 8: Parris H, Wright, A., Cartwright, I. The Challenges of Fisheries 
Governance Post UNFSA: the case of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission. In: Grafton RQ, Hilborn, R., Squires, D., Williams, M. and Tait, M. 
Handbook of Marine Fisheries Conservation and Management. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010.
Chapter 10: Parris H, Lee A. Allocation Models in the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission and implications for Pacific Island States. In: (Ed) Hanich, Q. 
and Tsamenyi, M. (2009) Navigating Pacific Fisheries: Policy and Legal Trends in the 
Implementation of International Fisheries Instruments in the Western and Central 
Pacific Region Ocean Publications, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources 
and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong
Nevertheless, this thesis draws these, and the remaining unpublished 'individual works’ 
through the key themes, research problems and assumptions outlined in this chapter and 
in Chapter 3. In doing so, for the purposes of this thesis, these articles have been 
modified to explicitly highlight the link between chapters, and to provide more detail 
regarding analytical methods used and in the results. However, in the main, they remain 
as they were in the published form. It should be noted that, in some instances, there 
appears to be only tenuous links between the chapters and central themes of this study -  
for example, Chapter 6 on aspirations of Pacific Island communities seems a long way 
from a theoretical analysis of institutional regimes. Similarly, Chapter 9, with its
1 1
discussion on governance does not clearly relate to Ostrom's schema of the Institutional 
Analysis and Development Framework. However, the reader is reminded that:
• Ostrom encourages scholars to seek to contextualise their analysis, and 
chapter 6 provides a focuses, albiet limited, analysis that is intended to 
provide some contextual understanding of FFA positions expressed in the 
WCPFC.
• Chapter 9, in total, is interpreted as an in-depth examination of the ‘rules’ 
that govern the 'positions’ within the 1AD Framework.
This thesis is presented in five parts. Part 1 comprises this chapter, Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3, and serves the purpose of reviewing the existing literature and the key 
contribution of this thesis. Chapter 4 then presents an overview of the theoretical 
literature used in the remainder of this thesis.
Part Two comprises two ‘contextual’ chapters that seek to provide historical 
background and context for the analysis of the WCPFC in Parts 3 and 4 through an 
examination of two different aspects of Pacific fisheries management. The first is 
through an evaluation of the history of regional purse seine management pursued by the 
so-called ‘ PNA' Group of the Forum Fisheries Agency countries prior to the 
development of the WCPFC. The purpose of this chapter is to understand in more detail 
the ‘institutional’ inheritance of the WCPFC and the commons problems created or 
ameliorated by prior institutional development. In explicit recognition of the 'path- 
dependent’ nature of policy development, this analysis also assists in understanding the 
institutional history and expectations that Pacific Island states brought to (and continue 
to bring to) the WCPFC negotiating table. The second chapter on aspirations takes up 
this theme of expectations and views and explores in more detail the significance and 
meaning of an often-stated Pacific ambition to 'maximise returns’ and the active 
strategies being pursued to achieve them. This chapter, therefore, provides a more 
detailed analysis of some of the key economic and political drivers underpinning FFA 
negotiating positions in the WCPFC.
Although primarily written as ‘context' chapters for this thesis, both chapters stand as 
contributions to the literature in their own right. Chapter 5 provides the first data-driven 
attempt to evaluate the FFA purse seine treaties and presents a preliminary analysis that 
confirms initial analysis by Lodge (Lodge, 1998) and Aqorau (Aqorau and Bergin, 
1997; Aqorau, 1997) on the performance of these treaties. The chapter also highlights 
the role of mitigating circumstances that explain performance and argue that, on 
institutional terms, these treaties provide strong 'political capital’ for the PNA states 
during the implementation of the WCPFC. A further contribution of this chapter is the 
brief analysis of the Vessel Day Scheme and its potential to address or ameliorate the 
perceived and actual problems of the original Palau Arrangement. The contribution of 
Chapter 6 clearly links to the ‘survey’ literature of Pacific fisheries management by 
focusing on industry development, but extends beyond it by providing some insight into 
how Islanders themselves define this politically important concept and considers its 
implications for the WCPFC.
Part Three of this thesis comprises of two chapters explicitly evaluating the 
performance of the WCPFC through the adoption of two different analytical 
approaches. Chapter 7 adopts an explicit 'institutional’ analysis and examines a 
particular component of the WCPFC—the conservation and management measures 
themselves and their effectiveness in meeting explicit and implicit scientific and 
economic goals of the Commission. This chapter also begins to analyse and tease out
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some of the underlying issues that seek to derail the implementation process. This 
theme is taken up in Chapter 8 where a more generalised evaluation of the WCPFC 
performance is presented. This chapter explores the issue of why implementation 
progress is so slow within the Commission and looks beyond the traditional arguments 
of ‘different interests’ to consider how issues such as ‘textural interpretation’ and ‘day- 
to-day’ governance issues have a significant impact on the Commission’s work 
programme.
Part Four takes up the ‘implementation’ issues set out in Part Three and explores 
potential mechanisms that could be used by the WCPFC to address these. Chapter 9 
looks explicitly at how governance arrangements in the WCPFC could incorporate 
relatively ‘new ideas’ in international fisheries management—fisheries economic and 
adaptive management theory—into its implementation processes. Building upon 
existing governance approaches, this chapter sets out a potential future implementation 
agenda for the Commission. Chapter 10 examines in detail a specific aspect of the 
implementation agenda: allocation. Arguing that, in practice, most reform agendas fail 
because they do not sufficiently address equity issues this chapter proposes, tests and 
discusses potential allocation models based on key issues within the current political 
debates in the Commission. Part Five of this thesis presents a discussion, in Chapter 11, 
of the key findings of this thesis and considers the key lessons for policy makers and for 
governance scholars more broadly.
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CHAPTER 2
TUNA FISHING IN THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL PACIFIC OCEAN
2.1. Introduction
Spread out roughly between the Hawaiian Islands, French Polynesia, and mainland 
Asia, the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) and the Convention Area to the 
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC-CA) forms one of the 
world’s largest fishing grounds for four commercially important species of tuna— 
yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares), skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis), albacore tuna 
{Thunnus alalunga) and big-eye tuna (Thunnus obesus) (Gillett et al, 2001; Cordonnery, 
2002; Williams and Terawasi, 2008). See Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Map of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission
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Source: WCPFC Secretariat (2008)
It is a complex, multi-scaled fishery comprising of four species, three main gear types 
(and other minor gears)—which together exhibit complex gear and stock interactions— 
and draws in participants from all around the world, making it a truly international 
fishery’ (Williams and Terawasi, 2008). In turn, these stakeholders place simultaneous 
complex demands on the tuna resources, from those who seek to operate their vessels 
amongst its waters or, alternatively, those who see the fishery as a key source of raw 
product for the globalised canned tuna or sashimi market. For some of the developing 
island coastal states in the region, the tuna fisheries represent valuable opportunities to 
raise revenue through charging access fees to their national waters, while many 
countries in the region also rely on the tuna resources for food security for growing 
regional populations (Gillett, 2003; Gillett and Lightfoot 2001, Gillett et al, 2001). The 
region also has a complex institutional history that underpins the management regimes 
that existed prior to, and leading up to, the formation of the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (for an overview see for example Tsamenyi, 1999; Aqorau, 
2002) .
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To understand the management issues facing the WCPFC, this chapter seeks to provide 
a brief overview of the biophysical, industrial and governance dimensions of the fishery 
prior to considering several key contextual factors in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6 
and to serve as ‘background material’ to Chapters 8, 9 and 10.
2.2. The biology and harvest of the physical tuna fishery
Roughly 82.5 million km2 in size, the physical dimensions of the WCPFC Convention 
Area—Figure 2.1—equate to about one-fifth of the world’s ocean area. Within this area, 
the total annual tuna harvest in 2007 was approximately 2.4 million tonnes (see Figure 
2.2)—an all-time record catch, which represented 55% of global tuna production (SPC, 
2008; Williams and Terawasi, 2008). General trends in species and gear composition 
are set out in Figure 2.2, which shows that total catch, and growth in recent periods, is 
dominated by skipjack tuna taken predominately by purse seine gears.
Figure 2.2: Catch (mt) of albacore, bigeye, skipjack and yellowfin in the 
WCP-CA, by longline, pole-and-line, purse seine and other gear types
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Source: Williams and Terawasi (2008).
Although each tuna species shares the common biological characteristic of being highly 
migratory, each has unique biological and ecological characteristics creating an overall 
heterogeneous distribution of species throughout the region. Key features of each 
species are summarised as follows.
Skipjack tuna is a surface schooling fish that reaches its adult stage at about 40cm fork 
length or approximately 10kg. Considered a single stock in the WCPO, skipjack have a 
distributional range of about 4 0 ^  (near northern Japan) to 40°S (near Australia), due to 
the moment of warm, pole-ward flowing currents, although the overwhelming majority 
of stock is found in the tropical zone in the west of the region extending from the 
Philippines, through the Pacific Islands (see Figure 2.3) (SPC, 2008). Skipjack is 
targeted predominately for raw material for use in the canned tuna market, mainly by 
purse seine gears, but is also harvested by the (decreasing) pole-and-line fleet for 
premium canned and katsuobushi production (a speciality product for the Japanese 
market). Due to its reproductive characteristics, most skipjack have the opportunity to
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reproduce before they are recruited into the fishery, and it is considered to have high 
resilience to fishing (Langley et al, 2005). Current stock assessments find that skipjack 
can support annual catches at the current level (1.7 million tonnes) (Langley and 
Hampton, 2008).
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Skipjack Catch in the WCPFC-Convention Area
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Source: Williams and Terawasi (2008); Gillett (2006).
Yellowfin tuna are relatively fast-growing fish that have a maximum fork length of 
around 180cm or around 70kg in size. They are distributed throughout the tropical and 
sub-tropical waters of the Pacific Ocean (see Figure 2.4) although the majority of catch 
is taken in the western equatorial region of the WCPO by purse-seine and the domestic 
fisheries of the Philippines and Indonesia (Langley et al, 2007; SPC, 2008).
Yellowfin tuna are harvested in their juvenile stages by purse seine gears operating on 
‘FAD’ fishing gears (see Section 4.1 in this chapter) and adult stages by both the purse 
seine fishery (operating on ‘free-school’ techniques) for the canning market and long 
line vessels for the sashimi market. Yellowfin tuna is the second most common species 
harvested with current catch levels at 400,000-450,000 tonnes—an amount that is 
considered to be the largest able to be sustained by the stock (i.e. stock is ‘fully 
exploited’) and recent stock assessments have found that there is a 50 per cent chance 
that overfishing is occurring, particularly in the equatorial areas (Langley et al, 2007).
Bigeye tuna are relatively fast-growing fish that reach maximum size of around 200cm 
fork length or around 120kg and live to about 12 years of age (Hoyle, 2008b). Of 
smaller stock size than yellowfin tuna or skipjack tuna, bigeye tuna are distributed 
through the tropical and sub-tropical waters right across the Pacific (Figure 2.5), 
although the extent of mixing between areas of the Pacific is unclear.
While the biggest component of the catch is larger fish caught by longline, significant 
exploitation of juveniles occurs in the purse-seine fishery in the domestic fisheries of 
Philippines and Indonesia which have a high negative impact on the adult population 
(Langley, 2008b). Recent stock assessments show that overfishing of bigeye tuna is
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occurring and that fishing mortality should be reduced by a minimum of 30 per cent 
from the average levels for 2003-2006. The current impact on the fishery represents a 
depletion of adult biomass of ~87 per cent from unexploited levels. This impact is 
attributable to the longline fishery and, to a lesser extent, fisheries that capture juvenile 
bigeye tuna’ (Langley, 2008b).
Figure 2.4: Distribution of Yellowfin Catch in the WCPFC-Convention Area
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of Bigeye Catch in the WCPFC-Convention Area
Source: Williams and Terawasi (2008); Gillett (2008).
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Southern Albacore tuna make up a discrete stock in the South Pacific Ocean and are 
considered biologically separate from Northern Albacore tuna stocks. These tuna grow 
to about 80cm fork length or about 10kg and move through both the tropical and sub­
tropical waters of the Southern Pacific throughout their life stages (Hoyle, 2008a).
Apart from a minor troll fishery targeting juvenile albacore, most of the catch is by 
longline taken either as table fish or for the production of ‘white meat’ canned product 
for the specialized US market (Clark, 2006). It is thought that relatively small amounts 
of juvenile albacore tuna are taken, indicating that spawning occurs prior to recruitment 
into the fishery. This suggests that stocks have some protection from overfishing (SPC, 
2008) and while overfishing is not estimated to be occurring, recent stock assessment 
has suggested that expansion of catch or effort would not be advisable (Hoyle, 2008a).
Figure 2.6: Distribution of Albacore Catch in the WCPFC-Convention Area
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Source: Williams and Terawasi (2008); Gillett (2008)
2.3. F ishing technologies in the WCPO
Common to other tuna fisheries around the world, tuna fishing activity in the WCPO is 
differentiated according to the three main types of ‘gear’, each of which form a separate 
fishery in terms of location, fish species targeted and type of boat used (see for example 
Williams, 2008 for a general overview) and a summary set out in Box 2.1.
Overall patterns in operation tend to mirror the physical location of the tuna fish, as well 
as the institutional regimes of the region—which allow vessels to enter into ‘national’ 
waters or access to the high seas areas. Like the fish themselves, patterns of vessel 
operation are fluid and dynamic, but in general three broad patterns of fishing 
operations can be observed as follows.
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Purse seine gears Operational patterns for purse seine vessels differ within the region 
depending on the 'fleet* (that is, flag) but the vast majority of fleets operate mainly 
within the western part of the region where the rich skipjack tuna fisheries reside 
(Williams, 2008). Approximately 80 per cent of the purse seine skipjack tuna fishery 
resides in the 'national waters* of the tropical coastal states of the WCPFC—although 
Japan also has a domestic purse seine fishery operating in its national waters (for an 
overview of aggregated catch statistics see Reid, 2007). Vessels either offload their fish 
directly to canneries (Japanese, US and some domestic Pacific Island fleets) or, more 
commonly are ‘transhipped* to carrier vessels which consolidate harvest from several 
vessel in order to reduce transport costs.
Significant size and technological variation exists between fleets as well as in fishing 
‘styles’, depending on the nationality—and therefore training—of the skipper 
(anonymous industry comments). Each operational fleet tends to differ in their search 
techniques, which represent the 'competitive* edge for a vessel. However, in practice all 
fleets will tend to use a mixture of 'free school’ fishing and the use of fixed or floating 
FADS to identify potential schools of tuna. See Figure 2.8 for a description of FAD 
fishing.
Raw product from the WCPFC-CA competes on price and quality with tuna sources 
from around the world and raw product for the canned market originating from the 
WCPFC can be and is marketed internationally. Tuna from the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean can therefore be processed at any location although there is a tendency 
for major ports and/or processing locations in the region (Japan, Thailand, American 
Samoa, Philippines and to a lesser extent PNG, Fiji and Solomon Islands) to be the main 
offloading points (see Sabatini, 2008: Campling et al, 2007).
Longline gears form the basis of two distinct fishing fleets within the WCPO that target 
in turn yellowfin tuna and bigeye tuna for the sashimi or fresh fish (that is, table) 
markets or albacore tuna for the canning market (Williams and Terawasi, 2008). The 
first of these are the so-called ‘fresh’ longline vessels that target bigeye tuna and 
yellowfin tuna (and other species such as swordfish, marlin and ‘other bycatch*). 
Caught and retained in a 'fresh* or ‘chilled* state for the high end sashimi market, these 
vessels typically operate in association with on-shore offloading and/or processing 
facilities that enable rapid transport to market usually within ten days of the fish being 
harvested (to meet market freshness requirements). The second type of longline fleet 
uses ultra-low freezing technology (ULT) to target yellowfin tuna and bigeye tuna for 
the lower price range in the sashimi market. This fish is caught then frozen on board. 
Taking advantage of the ULT to maintain catch, these vessels are often larger in size 
than ‘fresh’ longline vessels and are able to remain on the fishing grounds for periods of 
up to several years, a feat facilitated by ‘transhipment’ vessels that deliver the necessary 
periodic supplies and changes in crew—as well as taking catch back to end markets. 
Frozen longline vessels also target albacore tuna for the canning market using the same 
technology and gear types, and vessels reportedly switch between targeted species 
depending on prices, catch rates and company strategies (anonymous industry sources).
Pole-and-line gears is the smallest gear type used in the WCPO and, although once 
numerous throughout the region, is now only operated by Japan, with some smaller 
domestic fleets operated in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, Indonesia and French 
Polynesia (Williams and Terawasi, 2008). Targeting skipjack tuna and yellowfin tuna 
for canning and skipjack tuna for the katsuobushi markets in Japan, it has experienced
19
significant declines in use as a gear in preference to the cheaper operating costs of the 
purse seine fleet.
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2.4 Brief History of Fisheries M anagement in the Pacific
Evolution o f regional fisheries management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean 
over the last 25 years has seen the development o f two key themes in tuna management: 
firstly conditional ownership rights provided to coastal states, through the establishment 
o f the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime under Law o f the Sea Convention 
(LOSC)2 established in the late 1970s and second, in more recent times, the acceptance 
that tuna stocks, as highly migratory species, are shared resources requiring cooperative 
management over their entire biological range (for an overview see Aqorau, 2002).
Prior to the conclusion o f the LOSC, the rich tuna grounds o f the Western and Central 
Pacific was institutionally structured as an ‘open access’ regime beyond the traditionally 
recognised 12-mile nautical limit, and Distant Water Fishing Nations, (DWFNs)— 
initially Japan, then the US (Gillett, 2006)— actively developed the fishery with little 
indigenous involvement. The development o f EEZ rights fundamentally changed the 
political and economic relationship between the ‘coastal states’ o f the region and the 
involvement o f DWFN’s in the region’s fisheries because it changed the basis o f the 
foreign fleets access from being open access to one where the managerial and economic 
rights o f coastal states were recognised in political and practical terms. This LOSC 
regime change effectively split the governing institutions for the fisheries, for almost 20 
years, into two parallel institutional structures for fisheries governance. The primary 
structure was that o f a common-property institution that covered the shared tuna 
resources that flowed between the EEZs o f the region’s coastal states, and was actively 
managed by them either independently or on a cooperative basis (e.g. through the 
coordinating efforts o f the FFA). On the high seas, by contrast, the lack o f defined 
jurisdiction created an open access property right regime available for use by any 
fishing nation.
Quickly recognising the potential of their EEZ rights, the independent Pacific Island 
Countries responded to the anticipated economic benefits o f the EEZs with a two­
pronged strategy o f asserting their in-zone sovereign rights, in order to gain 
economically from tuna through fishing access agreements (Schurman, 1998; van 
Santen and Muller, 2000), as well as coordinating the administration o f foreign and 
domestic fishing fleets across the region through the formation o f the Forum Fisheries 
Agency3 (Tsamenyi, 1999; Aqorau, 2002; Cordonnery, 2002; Wright et al., 2006). The 
Forum Fisheries Agency is a subsidiary body o f the Pacific Island Leaders Forum and is 
governed by Forum Fisheries Committee, which is comprised o f political 
representatives from all Forum countries (Aqorau, 2002). The mandate o f the FFA 
ranges broadly around its motto o f ‘Strengthening National Capacity and Regional 
Solidarity for Sustainable Tuna Fisheries’ (FFA, 2009) and has developed substantially 
over time in response to the changing international economic legal and political 
environment fisheries management and according to the needs o f its member states. 
Through its Secretariat, based in Honiara, the FFA key areas o f work are:
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, done at Montego Bay on 10 
December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994.
The Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency is the regional fisheries management 
organization formed as an active response to the granting of EEZ rights. The following countries 
are members of the FFA: Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu. It is noted that not all Pacific Islands are members of the FFA—for example, 
the FFA membership does not include French Polynesia, New Caledonia or Wallis and Futuna.
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• Promotion of fisheries policy coordination and cooperation between members— 
primarily through the development and administration of sub-regional purse 
seine treaties under the ‘PNA' Group. Each of these institutional arrangements 
have different configurations regarding membership, scope of influence and 
subject matter and linkages with other relevant organizations and agreements. A 
full discussion of the performance of these Treaties is the subject of Chapter 5 of 
this thesis.
• More recently, this role has expanded to provide a forum for the development of 
joint negotiating positions which the FFA states take to the WCPFC.
• Development and implementation of monitoring and enforcement services 
underpinning licensing arrangements—primarily through the operation of Vessel 
Monitoring Services as well as observer programmes and technical training for 
vessel inspectors.
• Provision of technical advice covering issues such as international legal 
arrangements and responsibilities, domestic fisheries legal reform, economic and 
market advice and industry development advice.
The PNA/Non-PNA split within the FFA is reflective of the different geographical, and 
consequently, resource diversity between two groups. In general, the PNA countries are 
those to the north/central and west of the region that expand across the rich skipjack 
tuna fisheries, as well as having sizeable quantities of yellowfin and bigeye tuna, 
usually harvested by purse seine vessels, although longline gears are also active in this 
region. Non-FFA countries tend to be to the south and east of the region and have more 
abundant access to the albacore fishery as well as harvesting bigeye and yellowfin via 
longline fleets. In general, the PNA Group operate both domestic fleets (longline and 
purse seine) as well as enjoying substantial revenues from the collection of access fees 
through DWFN fleets plying their waters. By contrast, the relatively less rich tuna 
grounds found in the EEZs of the remaining FFA countries tend to be fished by 
domestic fleets only—although the US Treaty does allow US purse seine vessel access 
to these Zones. The key characteristics of each group are summarised in Table 2.1
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Table 2.1: Key Characteristics of the PNA and Non-PNA Members of the
Forum Fisheries Agency
PNA Non-PNA
Which country PNG, Solomon Islands, 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Federated States o f
Micronesia, Palau, Nauru, 
Tuvalu
Vanuatu, F iji, Cook
Islands, Nuie, New
Zealand, Tonga, Samoa. 
Australia, Tokelau,
Approximate location in 
Pacific
Central and Western
Pacific region
Southern and south east 
region
Primary species o f interest skipjack albacore
Primary gear type o f 
interest
Purse seine Long line
Is DWFN access fees 
important?
Yes DWFN generally absent 
from non-PNA country 
waters
Membership o f
international treaty
Palau Arrangement, FSM 
Arrangement, Nuie Treaty, 
US Multilateral Treaty, 
WCPFC
US Multilateral Treaty, 
WCPFC
Source: Authors’ own analysis.
Another important feature o f the FFA is that it does not have participation by all 
important coastal states in the Pacific region— most notably Indonesia, Philippines and 
the French and US colonies (for example, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and 
Futuna, American Samoa, Guam, and so on). This arose out o f the historical context 
within which the FFA was developed: it was never the ambition o f participating 
countries to fu lfil the role o f a truly regional fisheries management organisation, but 
rather an institution designed to foster cooperation and pooling o f resources between 
relatively poor countries who shared common cultural linkages— that is, they were 
identifiably 'Pacific Islanders’— and who were sharing the experiences o f emerging into 
post-colonial forms o f government.
In addition to the FFA, the Oceanic Fisheries Programme o f the Secretariat to the 
Pacific Community (SPC) also serves the region through the provision o f scientific 
advice on stock status and related issues that underpins national domestic tuna 
management plans. The membership o f the SPC has always been broader than that of 
the FFA— for example, it includes France and the United States— but generally played a 
similar service role as the FFA secretariat to participating Pacific countries.
2.4.1 .Development o f the WCPFC
Since the implementation o f the LOSC regime, the need for a region-wide cooperative 
regime for the collaborative management o f highly migratory and shared fish stocks 
throughout the Western and Central Pacific Ocean was recognised by all major coastal 
state and fishing nation stakeholders. This view developed during the mid-1990s, as an 
explicit recognition that although the FFA Pacific Islanders (and other coastal states in 
the region) have technical ownership over tuna resources within their territorial waters, 
by virtue o f the fact that tuna move between EEZ, and the high seas, they were, in 
effect, a jo intly owned resource (Tsamenyi, 1999); in particular see also the ‘Majuro 
Declaration4'. Such a regime was necessary for ensuring broader regional cooperation 
between the FFA states and other coastal states as well as developing effective
4 A copy of the Majuro declaration can be found at http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/maiuro.htm
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coordination between the management within the EEZs and on the high seas area. This 
view was both the product of, and was reflected in the Pacific region’s participation in 
the negotiations o f the UN Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement (Tarte, 2002)r' -- see 
comments in chapter 1 o f this thesis.
However, progress was delayed by the FFA states who resisted pressure from DWFNs 
to broaden FFA membership and activities to reflect the kind o f management regime 
envisaged under Article 64 o f LOSC (Tarte, 2002). The primary reason for this was 
their concern that the negative experiences o f small developing states in other RFMOs 
would be replicated in the Pacific and their interests subsumed by the more powerful 
fishing nations. During the 1990s this position began to change in response to the 
conclusion o f the United National Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA)6 which the Pacific 
Island Countries felt was progressing on terms favourable to them. Interpreting the 
UNFSA as placing them in a stronger legal position to negotiate a WCPFC that reflected 
their interests (Tarte, 2002), the FFA countries overcame their reluctance and agreed to 
participate in a broader regional negotiation for a Western and Central Pacific fisheries 
management organization. Starting in 1994, with the Multi-lateral High Level 
Consultation (MHLC) process, negotiations culminated in 2000 with the agreement to 
the text for the Convention on the Conservation and Management o f Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (hereafter WCPFC).
The objective o f the Commission is ” to ensure, through effective management, the long­
term conservation and sustainable use o f highly migratory fish stocks" (Article 2 of 
WCPFC convention text) and the governing Convention Text carries with it explicit 
instructions to, inter alia, take measures to prevent or eliminate over-fishing and excess 
fishing capacity and to ensure that levels o f fishing effort do not exceed those 
commensurate with the sustainable use o f fishery resources, as well as providing a 
range of tools that could be used for this purpose (see full text o f the Convention 
(WCPFC, 2000). In essence, the WCPFC broadens the scope o f collective decision 
making, compared to the existing regional arrangements, in four different dimensions: 
first, it covers all highly migratory species in the Convention Area (except saury); 
second, it incorporates all fishing gear types; third, decisions apply to stocks across their 
entire biological range; and fourth, it provides a collaborative governance space for 
regional management beyond those nations that self-identify as ‘ Pacific Islanders’ . The 
later is important in the sense that countries geographically located outside the region 
are now, by virtue o f having active fleets within the fishery, considered legitimate 
stakeholders in decision-making processes, and that ‘new entrants’ to the fishery should 
be considered as eligible for equal rights (see Hanich, 2008 for some implications of 
this).
Several other significant innovations have been introduced within the Text of the 
Convention that differentiates itself from previous regional arrangements. Primary 
amongst these is an explicit recognition o f the ‘special’ position o f ‘ small island 
developing states”  within the region— which, although remaining largely undefined in 
detail, is generally understood to mean that governance decisions w ill not impede their
fo rm ally , this treaty is called the “Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks". 
The term “UN Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement” is used for the sake of brevity.
The full name is: The 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.
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‘right to develop' (Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, 2008). A 
second innovation is found in the explicit recognition of an ‘ecosystems' based 
approach to management—a view that actively recognises and manages for the 
ecological externalities associated with fishing activity.
In total, the governance regimes within the WCPFC represented a ‘nested’ hierarchy of 
institutions which have, over time, not replaced each other but evolved to operate 
alongside each other. Table 2.2 sets out the membership of each organisation and 
Diagram 2.9 (replicated from Chapter 7) in this chapter provides a visual representation 
of this hierarchy and of particular importance to note is the relationship between the 
FFA institution and the WCPFC. As noted in this discussion, the FFA management 
institution pre-dated that of the WCPFC, but since the development of the WCPFC it 
has continued to develop and implement policy relating to areas under its jurisdiction, 
particularly the Vessel Day Scheme (Dunn et al, 2006). Since the FFA areas of 
jurisdiction comprise a subset of the WCPFC-CA, this ‘discontinuity’ between 
management strategies across jurisdictions has been resolved primarily through the 
adoption by the WCPFC of FFA policies.
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Table 2.2: Overlapping Membership of Regional Management 
Organisations in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.
M e m b e r sh ip  o f  th e  F F A M e m b e r sh ip  o f  th e  S P C M e m b e r sh ip  o f  th e  W C P F C
A u s t r a l i a A u s t r a l i a A u s t r a l i a
C o o k  I s l a n d s C o o k  I s l a n d s C o o k  I s l a n d s
Fij i F i j i F i j i
N e w  Z e a l a n d N e w  Z e a l a n d N e w  Z e a l a n d
N u i e N u i e N u i e
S a m o a S a m o a S a m o a
T o k e l a u T o k e l a u T o k e la u
T o n g a T o n g a T o n g a
V a n u a t u V a n u a t u V a n u a t u
F e d e r a te d  S ta te s  i f  M ic r o n e s ia F e d e r a t e d  S t a t e s  i f  M i c r o n e s i a F e d e r a t e d  S t a t e s  i f  M i c r o n e s i a
K ir ib a ti K i r i b a t i K i r i b a t i
N a u ru N a u r u N a u r u
P a la u P a l a u P a l a u
P a p u a  /Vew G u in e a P a p u a  N e w  G u i n e a P a p u a  N e w  G u i n e a
R e p u b lic  o f  th e  M a rs h a ll  Is la n d s R e p u b l i c  o f  t h e  M a r s h a l l  I s l a n d s R e p u b l i c  o f  t h e  M a r s h a l l  I s l a n d s
S o lo m o n  Is la n d s S o l o m o n  I s l a n d s S o l o m o n  I s l a n d s
T u v a lu T u v a l u T u v a l u
A m e r i c a n  S a m o a A m e r ic a n  S a m o a
G u a m G u a m
N e w  C a l e d o n i a N e w  C a le d o n ia
F r e n c h  P o l y n e s i a F r e n c h  P o ly n e s ia
N o r t h e r n  M a r i a n a  I s l a n d s N o r th e r n  M a r ia n a  Is la n d s
P i t c a i r n  I s l a n d W a llis  a n d  F u tu n a
W a l l i s  a n d  F u t u n a U n i t e d  S t a t e s
U n i t e d  S t a t e s F r a n c e
F r a n c e C h i n a
C a n a d a
C h i n e s e  T a i p e i  ( T a i w a n )
K o r e a
J a p a n
P h i l i p p i n e s
I n d o n e s i a
B e l i z e
S e n e g a l
M e x i c o
E l  S a l v a d o r
Note:
• Countries italicised indicate those who are members of the PNA Group
• Countries which are bolded are participating territories in the WCFPC
• Countries underlined are cooperating non-members o f the WCPFC.
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2.5. Management challenges of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission
The large scale and multidimensional nature of the fishery forms not only the 
background to the analysis of the WCPFC but the confluence of these factors 
themselves create important factors that inform the remainder of the analysis in this 
thesis. These ‘background’ issues are discussed briefly below.
2.5.1 FAD Fishing
Figure 2.8 sets out the two basic methods of FAD fishing used by the purse seine fleets 
either in the form of ‘fixed’ FADs or ‘floating FADs’. FADs in themselves can promote 
a more efficient fishery as they significantly reduce search costs and therefore decrease 
fuel costs for vessels—considered a major part of operating costs—and this is 
particularly important for smaller domestic fleets based in Pacific Island countries who 
tend to operate older, less fuel efficient vessels. Purse seine operators indicate that there 
is some trade-off with the use of FADS—although it reduces search costs, fish 
harvested on FADs tend to be smaller than those fished using the ‘free-school’ method, 
and consequently attract a price penalty when marketed.
Despite their advantages, the current level of FAD use is considered problematic on 
sustainability and economic grounds because of the tendency for this type of fishing to 
facilitate the harvest of juvenile yellowfin and bigeye tuna by the purse seine fishery 
(Langley et al, 2008; Hampton and Harley, 2008). Yellowfin tuna is considered a target 
species by purse seine fleets, but is most profitable when larger adult yellowfin tuna are 
taken in ‘free schools’. Bigeye tuna are not targeted in any form by purse seiners and 
this species caught using FADs are essentially considered a by-catch of little economic 
value. FAD use therefore creates a stock externality with the longline fleets: the more 
juvenile yellowfin tuna and bigeye tuna caught by purse seiners, the less adult stock 
there is to take by the longline fleets for the sashimi markets.
FAD use has been linked to increasing tendencies for these species to be subjected to 
‘overfishing’ (that is, fishing mortality is now considered greater than F at MSY levels) 
and bigeye tuna (Langley et al, 2008), at least, is considered to be in an overfished state 
(that is, biomass is below that which would be expected at MSY). This sustainability 
impact is mirrored in economic impacts where analysis suggests a significant loss to 
fishery profitability as a result of taking yellowfin tuna and bigeye tuna in the purse 
seine fishery compared to the value of retaining this stock for the more highly valued 
sashimi market (Kompas and Che, 2006).
However, assessing the overall worth of FAD use is complicated by several factors:
• Purse seine fishing on bigeye tuna has contributed to overfishing for this species, 
but scientific analysis demonstrates that longline fishing presents a bigger 
contribution.
• Scientific analysis indicate that the ‘hot spots’ for bigeye tuna/yellowfm tuna 
interactions on FADs are within the domestic fisheries of FFA states—particularly 
the archipelagic waters of PNG and Solomon Islands where questions arise over the 
applicability of WCPFC measures.
• Reduction of FAD use by purse seine vessel will disproportionately affect PNA 
countries due to their over reliance on them—and significantly reduce skipjack tuna 
catch, a stock that is considered relatively healthy.
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2.5.2 Increasing demand for access to the WCPFC-CA
Comprising one of the largest raw material sources for the globalised canned tuna and 
sashimi markets, the WCPO tuna fisheries are physically and financially interlinked into 
industry networks along several different dimensions: in the number of vessels from 
many countries that operate fleets; in the diverse number of production facilities that are 
supplied with WCPO tuna; and in the varied number of end markets that consume its 
products.
These linkages are the key source of economic value in the fishery but in turn exposes 
the WCPO to the growing global demand for raw materials, and, as a related matter, to 
the demand for allowing increased access to new operating fleets, particularly those 
targeting skipjack tuna for the canned tuna markets. Figure 2.10 sets out the growing 
production in canned tuna exports in major exporting countries and recent industry 
analysis suggests that the drivers of this trend are likely to continue, provided that 
sufficient raw materials can be sourced.
Additional pressure to increase access is driven by migrating vessel capacity from other 
tuna-producing regions around the world that have been subjected to overfishing. For 
example, several countries have made several attempts to enter in the fishery, while 
others, such as the EU, have made strong signals that they wish to increase their 
participation and the means with which to address this pressure is under active 
discussion by the WCPFC. During the fourth annual meeting of the WCPFC, the FFA 
states actively took opposing positions on this issue—with some FFA states seeing new 
entrants as increasing the demand for access (and access fees) to their zones, while 
others see it as increased competition for increasingly scarce fishing opportunities (see 
Hanich (2008).
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Tuna Processing Locations
2.5.3 Aspirations of Small Island Developing States
The issue of new members is one component of a broader debate within the WCPFC 
regarding the ability and rights for SIDs members to use tuna resources within their 
EEZs to promote domestic development. As noted above, the Convention Text has 
explicitly recognised the special needs of SIDS members and the practical 
implications—as discussed in this thesis—are being defined and refined over time.
While most members and observers recognise the developmental aspirations of SIDS 
members, tensions arise over the expansionary aspects to this agenda when considered 
in the context of the recommended reduction in overall fishing effort for bigeye and 
yellowfin tuna (and consequently for skipjack tuna).
The FFA states resolve this tension by arguing that, in essence, their domestic fisheries 
are not subject to the same effort restrictions as set out in the WCPFC and that they 
should be allowed to pursue "responsible’ levels of development within their national 
waters. The corollary of this argument is that DWFN needs to undertake most, if not all, 
of the required reduction in fishing effort. This is complicated by:
■ The purse seine fleets based in the PNA countries—and the baseline for the 
VDS—are not sustainable and have experienced the highest growth since 
2000.
■ Regardless, the PNA countries have adopted unilateral conservation 
measures and hence a recognition of a responsibility for these issues.
This issue forms the focus of discussion in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 3
CURRENT APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING PACIFIC FISHERIES 
AND CONTRIBUTION OF THIS THESIS
Relatively little academic attention has been devoted to the developments o f fisheries 
management in the Pacific and the role o f fisheries more generally in Pacific 
development, although a significant amount o f 'grey’ literature, written by consultants 
for particular clientele, have somewhat addressed the later issue (see for example Clark, 
2006b; Gillett, 2003). The purpose o f this chapter is to provide an overview of the 
existing scholarly literature in Pacific fisheries with a view to identifying the 
contribution o f this thesis through a discussion o f the key gaps and presentation o f the 
research approach and objectives o f this thesis.
The structure o f this chapter is as follows. Section 1 reviews the current literature on 
Pacific fisheries and international fisheries as considered o f relevance to this thesis 
while Section 2 examines in detail the contribution o f this thesis by considering the 
"research problem' and how the research problem is conceptualised for the remainder o f 
this study.
3.1. Current literature on Pacific fisheries and international fisheries 
3.1.1 Current Literature On Tuna Fishing in the Pacific
The small literature analysing tuna fishing activity and fishing management in the 
WCPO is divided into two parts: a scientific literature examining the biological and 
ecological facts o f the tuna stocks themselves (for example Hampton, 2001; Lehodey, 
2003) and a ‘social sciences’ based literature primarily drawing on the fields of 
international law and politics, and to some extent economics, usually with a strong 
focus on tuna fishing activities (for example Tsamenyi, 1999; Reid et al, 2003; Reid et 
al, 2006; Ram-Bidesi and Tsamenyi, 2004; Miles, 2002). Although the quantum of 
analysis is growing in both fields, there appears to be little cross over between the two.
The biology and stock dynamics (that is, scientific analysis) o f tuna populations appears 
to be reasonably well understood by fisheries scientists, although gaps remain in some 
critical stock issues related to the margins o f the biological range (for example, 
Indonesia and PhiIippines)(SCTB, 2003) and technical questions remain over key 
biological parameters (Leroy et al, 2008) and methodologies in stock assessments (see 
for example Hoyle et al, 2008). Extensive research undertaken by the Oceanic Fisheries 
Programme (OFP) o f the Secretariat o f the Pacific Community (SPC) has yielded 
significant information on stock size and movement throughout the Pacific region and is 
regularly used in management processes7 (see for example Langley and Hampton, 2008; 
Langley et al, 2008; Hoyle et al, 2008; Langley et al, 2007). In addition, the OFP 
undertakes ecosystem-based research examining issues such as the influence o f 
ecosystem parameters on tuna stocks, and the impact o f tuna fishing on other marine 
species (by-catch and discards) (see for example Kirby, 2008). The core message from 
this research is that tuna stocks are, in some cases, experiencing increasing stress and 
declines in numbers and advice o f this nature is regularly conveyed to the WCPFC— a
For example, in the WCPFC scientific body has contracted the provision of technical 
scientific analysis to the OFP and standard processes within the Commission ensure that 
relevant scientific information is sourced and fed into Commission activities.
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summary o f stock assessment provided to the Commission since its formation is set out 
in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Scientific Advice to the WCPFC
Yellowfin Bigeye Skipjack Albacore
2004 FoFMSY; B4BMSY.
Reaching full exploitation, 
no
further increase in fishing 
mortality.
F = FMSY; not
overfished. No increase in 
fishing mortality from 
current levels.
No assessment No assessment
2005 ^curren t ^ F m SY»
B c u rre n t> B M S Y - Reduction in 
fishing mortality, esp. in 
western equatorial region.
Fe u r re n C f  M SY t B current-> B y|<5Y '
Reduction in fishing
mortality, esp. in
equatorial regions.
F c u rre n C F M S  Y , 
B c u r re n C B ^ iS Y
Current fishing
mortality
sustainable unless 
recruitment falls 
persistently below 
long term average.
F  c u rre n t^ p M S Y ,
B c u r re n C B ^ is Y  Current 
fishing mortality
sustainable and yield 
increases possible
although may have 
implications for
CPUE.
2006 F c u rre n C b M S Y >  B current ^ B ^ s Y *
Reduce fishing mortality 
by
10%.
F c u ire n C F M S Y ’  B c y r r e n i^ B fo is v
Reduce Fishing mortality 
by 25%.
No assessment 2005 assessment
updated with recent 
data. No change in 
overall conclusions.
2007 F  = F m s y ; B > B m s y - Reduce 
fishing mortality to 
maintain biomass above
B m s y -
Not assessed, reiterated 
2006 advice.
No assessment No assessment
2008 Not assessed, reiterated 
2007 advice.
F c u rre n C F M S Y »  B current > B M S V
Reduce fishing mortality 
by 30% from 2003-2006 
levels.
F c u rre n C F M S  Y , 
B c u r r e n C B \ is Y
Current fishing
mortality
sustainable unless 
recruitment falls 
persistently below 
long term average.
F c u r re n C F  viSY ,
B Cu r r e n t>  B  msy Current 
fishing mortality
sustainable. However 
due to uncertainty 
current rates o f fishing 
should not increase.
Source: Various reports to the WCPFC Scientific Committee. For access see: 
http://w\vw.\vcpfc.int/meetings/2
In contrast, relatively little research has been undertaken into tuna management per se, 
with the literature focusing on one o f four themes: general surveys o f the current and 
past management practices as a ‘development’ agenda (see for example Petersen 
(2006), Barclay (2007a, 2007b, 2000); studies that assess and evaluate tuna 
management institutions operating at the regional level (see Tsamenyi, 1999; Aqorau, 
2002) to a certain extent (Ram-Bidesi, 2002); theoretical explorations o f alternative 
management arrangements or narrowly focussed technical/modelling studies examining 
either specific micro-behaviours (for example see Chand et al, 2003) or, increasingly 
bioeconomic models aimed at exploring fishery-wide ‘macro’ management questions 
regarding appropriate levels o f fishing effort or harvests (see Kompass and Che 2006 or 
Grafton et al, 2007).
The key theme in the survey-type literature is the extent to which Pacific Island 
Countries (PICs) have, or have not been, successful in transforming their EEZ tuna 
rights into opportunities for economic development. The predominant insight is that 
PICs have generally been unsuccessful achieving these opportunities, or that success 
has been limited (Petersen, 2006). A number o f factors are thought to be at play: 
unequal market power for negotiating licences with DWFNs, an initial reluctance to 
collective bargaining by both PICs and DWFNs and poor investments in domestic
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fishing activity (Schurman, 1998; Petersen, 2003, 2006) as well as poor policy and 
business environments on the islands (Barclay, 2007a). This theme has also been well 
served by the ‘grey’ literature comprising numerous consulting reports setting out an 
analysis of the potential economic wealth of the tuna resources to Pacific states as well 
as potential opportunities for ‘maximising returns’ from their tuna resources (see for 
example Clark, 2006a). This literature underscores the importance of tuna as an 
economic resource to the region and highlights the potential gains to PICs through 
improved management, particularly through greater cooperation (see for example Hunt, 
1997; Chand et al, 2003; Campbell, 2000, 1996). However, a key weakness is the 
almost unquestioning acceptance of the rhetoric of ‘maximising returns’ as the key 
objective for tuna management, without a more detailed and context-driven appreciation 
of what this actually means for Islanders.
Casting the tuna management problem as a ‘domestic development' issue for Pacific 
Islands in isolation, this literature also speaks to a domestic or at best regional level 
policy agenda focused on identifying ways and means for Islanders to increase their 
share of the wealth generated by the tuna fisheries. It is, therefore, a different research 
agenda to that posed in this thesis, but nevertheless provides an important background 
literature to the attempts in this study to incorporate an explicit ‘Pacific view’ in 
evaluating policies and models of resource allocation under the Commission.
Another broad theme in the ‘survey’ literature are those scholars who have presented 
critical surveys or critically evaluated the growing number of regional and international 
legal mechanisms that operate to influence regional tuna management in the Pacific. 
Examples of general treatments of this topic can be found in Tsamenyi (1999) and 
Wright et al. (2006) (and for the eastern Pacific see DeSombre, 1999). Other scholars 
working in this tradition provide more focussed analysis of pre-WCPFC managerial 
and/or legal regional arrangements, in particular with a focus of analysis on the FFA 
purse seine treaties (see Lodge, 1998. 1992; Miles, 2002; Aqorau 2002, 1997; Aqorau 
and Bergin, 1997). Carried out, as they were, towards the beginning of the 
implementation period of these Treaties, these later studies lay the ground work for 
some of the analysis carried out in this thesis through developing an understanding the 
strengths and weakness of the management regime inherited by the WCPFC—a theme 
taken up in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
Somewhat surprisingly, this literature gives little attention to analysing the WCPO Tuna 
Convention itself although the Convention itself has been in development in some way 
since 1994. Cordonnery (2002) and Tarte (2008; 2002) both provide excellent 
summaries of the history, context and content of the Convention, but provide only a 
brief analysis of its strengths and weaknesses. Similarly, Ram-Bidesi and Tsamenyi 
(2004) provide an excellent summary of the Convention and some analysis of 
implications for domestic industry development in PICs. Aqorau (2002, 2001) gives the 
most complete treatment through an analysis of the ambiguities within the Convention 
text and undertakes an analysis of the Convention in the broader existing institutional 
arrangements in the WCPO. Importantly, Aquoru outlines the main features of the 
challenges facing the WCPO Tuna Convention— including the heavy reliance on future 
interpretation of the Convention by the supporting Commission to give effect to many 
of its provisions—insights confirmed by more recent work by Tarte (2008). Analysis of 
Hanich (2008) on ‘new entrants’ or Clark (2008) on the use of reference points in the 
WCPFC are beginning to extend this type of analysis to examine specific issues about 
implementing the terms of the Convention Text, while work by Langley et al.(2009) 
have begun the process of developing overall evaluations of implementation of the
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WCPFC convention. These works are important to the present study because they set 
out the problems facing the WCPO Tuna Convention and explore specific aspects of 
their implementation—two key themes that form the basis of Chapters 7 and 8 in this 
thesis.
An interesting characteristic of this survey literature is its grounding in the academic 
disciplines of law and/or political science. Implicit in this literature is the assumption 
that regional fisheries management regimes are primarily legal texts negotiated through 
a political process. For example Hanich (2008) frames the issue of ‘new entrants’ as a 
legal obligation under the Convention and the controversy over them as a political one, 
although some recognition is given to the underlying economic driver of the debate.
This thesis does not dispute the assumptions of the legal/political perspectives offered 
by these analyses and recognises that they are valid. But an argument can be made that 
the sole legal/political focus ignores the analytical possibilities of interpreting these 
treaties as economic instruments for the management of common-pool resources (that 
is, the tuna). The small theoretical economic literature and bioeconomic literature takes 
up this challenge and explores possible alternative institutional arrangements that could 
improve economic outcomes from the tuna fisheries. For example Chand et al. (2003), 
and Petersen (2006) discuss the operation of a centralised governance institution 
controlling harvesting rights and Campbell (1996, 1989) highlights the possible 
advantages of forming cooperative approaches to rent seeking and a tuna cartel. More 
recently, analysis by Yamazaki et al. (2008) explores the relative merits of a total 
allowable catch versus a total allowable effort policy tool for use in the skipjack tuna 
fishery of the WCPO. These analyses provide additional insight into theoretical 
understandings of Pacific tuna fisheries in the sense that they explore more fully why 
the current institutional and managerial arrangements may not be optimal. In addition, 
they provide further material about how reforms, using concepts drawn from economic 
disciplines, could theoretically improve outcomes. The primary focus on these studies is 
consistent with that of the ‘development’ literature in that the focus remains on how 
FFA countries could ‘maximise returns’ from their tuna resources and leaves as an 
unanswered question the role of an economic approach to policy on broader issues of 
regional fisheries management.
Another relatively small theme in the economic literature focuses on specific economic 
models of particular policy questions or particular economic phenomena within the tuna 
markets themselves. Studies in this area tend to cover a broad range of topics and no 
clear singular focus of issues have emerged, but rather appear to target particular 
interests of authors. For example studies by Reid et al. (2003) apply ‘envelope analysis’ 
to estimate excess capacity in the purse seine fishery to approximately between 7 per 
cent and 23 per cent depending on the modelling assumptions used, while Squires et al. 
(2008) undertake an econometric analysis to determine ‘price leadership’ between the 
key canning markets in the Pacific—Thailand, American Samoa and Japan (See also 
Herrick et al., 1997; Campbell, 1996; Campbell, 1994; Campbell, 1989).
An interesting variation on these themes that has emerged in recent years is a growing 
interest in the political economy of key economic issues arising from tuna management. 
Focused predominately on issues of trade in tuna products from the WCPO region (see 
for example Campling and Havice (2007) or Campling et al. (2007). These studies link 
the WCPO tuna industry to the broader politico-economic context of the globalised tuna 
market and highlight the practical difficulties for Pacific Islands who wish to engage in 
the industry. Similar to the survey literature, these works provide important background
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pieces to this thesis through consideration of the range of factors that influence the tuna 
industry, and consequently, the range of management actions open to WCPFC 
members.
Somewhat surprisingly there are relatively few studies of the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean tuna fisheries using formal techniques found in the bio-economic 
modelling tradition of fisheries economics, with only two major studies undertaken 
during the course of researching this thesis. Initial studies by Bertignac et al. (2001) use 
a multi-species and multi-fleet bio-economic model to indicate that rental returns from 
the fishery could be increased through a reduction in effort levels by 20 per cent and a 
parallel decrease in harvesting costs (through improved CPUE) and an increase in 
revenues, based on the assumption that the ‘FFA region' was a 'large supplier' in the 
world market (that is, a one per cent reduction in supply leads to a 0.55 per cent increase 
in prices received). Interestingly, this study also found a range of bio-economic inter­
relationships operating between the different fisheries, so for example, increases in the 
level of purse-seine activity had an adverse impact on the longline fleet and this work is 
consistent with the ‘survey’ field of literature that examines the issue of improving 
‘economic returns’ to Pacific Island countries. Updating this work using the same 
model, Reid et al. (2006) revised the structure and data of the bioeconomic model used 
in Bertignac et al. (2001) and found less optimistic results. In particular, Reid indicates 
that an across the board effort reduction would increase the total level of rent generated 
but that the disproportionate benefit accrues to the high seas longline frozen fishery with 
the least amount of gains by the FFA members’ purse seine fisheries. This study 
however, does not attempt to optimise the level of effort operating within the fishery 
and therefore leaves open this policy issue.
Taking up the analysis, Kompas and Che (2006) presents another attempt at developing 
a bioeconomic model across the relevant geographical range for the fishery, and similar 
to the Bertignac model, seeks to determine optimal levels of fishing effort subject to a 
profit maximisation objective function. Similar to the earlier efforts of Bertignac, the 
bioeconomic model is applied to purse seine, frozen longline and fresh longline fleets 
for the skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye tuna stocks. Key results from this study, set out in 
Table 3.1, indicate that optimal levels of effort—defined as ‘profit maximising'—can be 
found at lower levels of effort across all gear types, with purse seine gears effort 
needing to reduce the most. These results are consistent across an intermediate time 
period (defined as the first five years) as well as in the long run steady state, with the 
later representing a smaller reduction in effort compared to the status quo.
From a policy perspective, these results confirm the earlier work of Bertignac—that 
fishing effort across all fleets is too high—but make a further contribution by providing 
analytical evidence that biomass stocks, at profit maximising levels, should be greater 
than stocks consistent with MSY (that is, greater than that required by the Convention), 
and that profit maximisation requires a redistribution of effort between species. This 
recasts the management problem as not just an issue about targets, but also as an issue 
about appropriate levels of biomass and appropriate distribution of targeting between 
fishing gear types.
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Table 3.2: Optimal results from Kompas and Che (2006)
(Discount Rate = 0.05, T = 50)
Fleet Optimal E ffort Level Optimal Effort A llocation (%)
(%)
Base Year= 100 Base current effort = 100 per species
Total effort (Et) =300 (3 species)
Total effort (Et) =200 (2 species)________
__________________________________________ Yellow fin______ Bigeye________ Skipjack
Purse seine
In the first 5 years 64 93.3 71.4 135.3
Steady state 
Frozen longline
68 98.0 88.3 113.7
In the first 5 years 88 103.0 97.0
Steady state 
Fresh longline
92 100.0 100.0
In the first 5 years 81 114.0 86.0
Steady state 83 116.0 84.0
Biological status for species
Ratio Denotation Yellow fin Bigeye Skipjack
Biomass at steady B */BM SY 1 .JJ) 1.81 1.90
state to
biomass at MSY
Source: Kompas and Che (2006)
This work was further expanded by Grafton et al. (2007) who conducted bio-economic 
modelling using stock biomass, rather than effort as the presentational variable. The 
results for bigeye and yellow fin are presented in Diagram 3.1.
Figure 3.1: MEY estimates of Yellowfin and Bigeye Tuna in the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean
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Source: Grafton et al. (2007)
An interesting outcome o f the Grafton et al. analysis was that the MEY outcome was 
robust to several different assumptions regarding costs and discount rates— for example,
39
a 30 cents increase in fuel was used to differentiate between two potential profit curves. 
Another interesting feature was the results for yellowfin indicate that the increase in 
overall fishery profit from moving towards MEY biomass levels is relatively small— 
less than $5 million for the entire fishery— which may challenge the acceptability of 
these results to policy makers who could interpret relatively marginal financial gain 
against the large political and institutional costs involved in altering the basis of 
fisheries management.
Economic modelling is an inherently uncertain exercise and, depending on the 
assumptions used, it is unlikely that different studies w ill necessarily produce the same 
results. However, consistency across studies on the conclusions— that fishing capacity 
operating in the WCPO is significantly higher than the bioeconomic estimate o f profit 
maximising levels— strongly imply a broad consensus on the economic performance 
and the general direction for policy attention. There are, however, serious gaps in this 
analysis, most notably in the absence o f bio-economic assessment o f the economically 
important albacore longline fishery.
3.2 Literature on the economics of international fisheries management
While many sub-national fisheries have successfully introduced fisheries management 
approaches located in the ‘ incentive-based' tradition (fora summary see Sutinen, 1999), 
these ideas have been typically ignored or only slowly or partially embraced (with a few 
exceptions noted below) in the context o f international fisheries. However, like the 
analysis o f the WCPO discussed above, has received considerably more attention from 
political and legal disciplines (see for example Hanich, 2008; Ram-Bidesi and 
Tsamenyi, 2004; Aqorau, 2001) and in the formal grey literature developed by FAO and 
other semi-government organisations (for example Lodge, 2007).
Set against an analysis of failures in current approaches, several theorists and policy 
analysts have begun to actively consider the implications o f an economic approach to 
international fisheries governance. Similar to the Pacific-based literature two broad 
themes can be identified within this discourse.
The first o f these themes is found in the ‘ technical' economic literature pioneered by the 
work o f Munro (1978, 1982; 1985; 2002) in his game-theoretic analysis o f international 
fisheries cooperation. Munro re-cast the fisheries economic problem from simply a bio­
economic analysis and linked those insights to a game theory approach which explicitly 
examines the consequences o f cooperation or non-cooperation between fisheries 
stakeholders. For other examples o f this type o f work see Anderson (1975) and Bjorndal 
et al (2000). A key insight from this research is the policy design principle that, under 
negotiated resource sharing situations, successful and enforceable allocation of 
resources should be determined in such a way that no one party should be made “ worse 
o f f ' compared to the status quo. In practice this is only possible through the use o f side- 
payments created either as explicit financial transfers, or implemented through the use 
o f value-creating instruments such as tradeable quotes o f harvest rights. The emphasis 
on value, rather than physical transfers, is an important issue in the WCPFC context 
where the multispecies nature o f the fishery means physical trade offs between harvests 
o f interacting species are required.
Over time the work o f Gordon Munro was absorbed into a broader political economy 
literature whose aim was to provide a more explicit paring o f the game theoretical 
approach with extensive practical case studies drawn from field o f international
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environmental agreement making (see Barrett, 2003; Young, 1989 or Barkin and 
Shambaugh, 1999; De Sombre, 2005 and De Sombre, 1999 for an application to the 
pacific tuna fishery). For example, in his book Environment and Statecraft, Barrett 
(2003) uses the case study of the North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty to demonstrate the 
application of key game theoretic concepts -- such as payoffs, strategic behaviour and 
credibility — in analysing the success of this treaty as well as the process and outcomes 
of a range of other international environmental agreements such as the Montreal 
Protocol. Barrett’s empirical based conclusions are similar to the theoretical insights 
provided by Munro: the rules, or institutions, which structure the nature of the 
agreement are the key to seeking a mutually beneficial outcome.
Another interesting application of this approach is undertaken by De Sombre’s (1999) 
application to the pacific tuna fisheries. Adopting a more descriptive approach to Pacific 
fisheries management, De Sombre ties in this international game theoretic approach to 
the ‘commons’ approach to fisheries management by highlighting the mismatch in 
incentives between the profit motivation of fishers and the collective objective for 
conservation. Commons theory is discussed more fully in Chapter 4.
As discussed below, a key contribution of this thesis is its interpretation of international 
treaties as economic instruments -  a theme used throughout this thesis. However, 
beyond it’s descriptions of international environmental agreements using game theoretic 
language, this stream of literature, along with the more pure game theoretic work, is 
limited in it’s application to empirical case studies by the heavy reliance on the 
mathematical tools at the core of game theory. The basic game theory set up of two 
well defined players in game is too simple to act as a useful analogy , and the more 
sophisticated mathematical formula for multi-player, multiple equilibrium games 
presumes a level of knowledge (for example related to costs or preferences) that is both 
beyond the scope of one thesis to collect and produces results that bear little 
resemblance to the needs of policy makers. For this reason, while recognising the role 
of this literature, this thesis adopts the related, but nevertheless separate Common Pool 
Resource framework of Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom et al (1994) as discussed in the next 
chapter.
Other economic scholars working on international fisheries issues have retained the bio- 
economic approach and have undertaken modelling of international fisheries on much 
the same basis as a domestic fishery, with analysis undertaken by Grafton et al. (2007) 
as one example of this approach (see also Bjorndal et al., 2000; Herrick et al., 1997; 
Bjorndal, 2003). In general, both approaches to international fisheries are—like their 
domestic counterparts—largely complementary in the sense that bio-economic analysis 
provides insight into appropriate levels of fishing, while the work of Munro and others 
seek more specific insights into the allocation of benefits and stable regime formation to 
achieve sustainability outcomes.
More recent work in international fisheries have begun to look beyond the technical 
issues towards the ‘political economy’ of fisheries governance and the role that 
economic ideas can play in international fisheries management. This stream of analysis 
arises out of the perceived failures of international governance regimes—particularly 
the performance of regional fisheries management organisations—and a desire to 
evolve them in new directions. Although specific topics vary, in general this literature is 
aimed towards three analytical tasks:
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• Using economic frameworks and theories to discuss and analyse key management 
problems in international fisheries, such as capacity growth or allocation.
• To develop ‘comparative’ analysis o f ‘best practice’ across international managerial 
experiences.
• To make recommendations on policy reforms for international management.
Early work in this field can be found in Joseph and Greenough (1979), who discusses in 
specific detail the management problems—and potential institutional responses—to 
tuna management in the Eastern Pacific, managed under the auspices of the Inter- 
American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC). They identify four problems with 
fisheries—scientific analysis of fish stocks, catch allocation, rapid increases in fishing 
capacity and enforcement of agreements—and propose a series of policy reforms, 
grounded in the fisheries economic approach to management that could address these.
More recently this work has been updated through several parallel streams of research 
and analysis both in the ‘grey-literature’ and undertaken by scholars working in the 
field. One discernable stream is the work undertaken by the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO) and in particular its work on the economic drivers of fishing 
capacity (see for example Joseph, 2003; Trondsen et ah, 2006, Ward et ah, 2004; FAO 
2005) which mirrors broader FAO work on port state measures and so-called ‘plans of 
action’ on specific fisheries issues (Greboval, 2000).
Another stream was developed by the so-called ‘High Seas Task Force’ comprising a 
coalition of government and non-government organisations interested in developing an 
agenda for addressing illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing on the high 
seas. Of particular relevance to this study is a key recommendation of the Task Force 
for the development of ‘best practice’ studies for regional fisheries management 
organisations, which was implemented through the development of technical studies on 
the application of bio-economic modelling to RFMOs, analysis on the ‘non-member' 
problems and ecosystem-based management (Bjorndal, 2007; Mooney-Seuss, 2007; 
Owen, 2007). This work programme culminated in the release of the report 
Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 
(Lodge et ah 2007) which presented a comparative analysis of ‘best practice' 
performance across existing RFMOs with a view to highlighting and transferring 
‘lessons learnt’ between ocean regions. In all, this report promotes the concept of a 
‘model RFMO’ through the presentation of seventy recommendations across seven 
classes of identifiable issues in RFMO management, including conservation and 
management practices, allocation, compliance and enforcement, decision making, and 
dispute settlement. Work programs looking at similar issues can be found in recent 
work by the OECD, and from a scholarly standpoint in the work of the Pisces Forum 
(2007).
The significant contributions from these different strands of literature—and one which 
is followed in this thesis—is the explicit recognition of RFMOs and their international 
treaties as economic agreements in addition to their traditional interpretation as 
instruments of international law and politics. This directly links the management 
problem of RFMOs—still notably the same as that identified by Joseph and Greenough 
(1979)—to the more generic problem of a ‘commons management’ and the 
institutionally created incentives that underpin non-compliance and non-cooperative 
behaviour. This perspective therefore provides a new source of analysis for gaining 
additional insight into international fisheries management as well as a new source—that 
is, non-legal and non-scientific source—of considering policy development. This
42
contribution is reinforced by the significant effort directed towards non-technical 
analysis designed for policy makers (see for example Grafton et al., 2008) as well as 
technical treatments oriented towards ‘ knowledge* creation (See for example Munro 
1990, 1985a, 1985b, 1982, 1979).
However, like the international environmental literature o f Barrett and others, a key 
drawback o f this mainly “grey' literature is it's generic tone. Many, although not all, of 
the studies provide analytical insight into alternative policy options but fail to relate 
them to the specific contexts or situations facing RFMOs, or other international fisheries 
management issues.
3.3. CONTRIBUTION OF This thesis 
3.3.1 Research Problem
The contribution o f this thesis to the literature on Pacific fisheries studies is to evaluate 
the performance, using an explicit economic framing, o f regional level (that is, 
‘ international*) fisheries management within the Western and Central Pacific Ocean and 
to utilise key insights in the economics and adaptive management literature, to propose, 
test and elaborate on possible future management strategies that could be used within 
the context o f the region’s newest management regime: the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission.
The central problem facing the WCPFC is how to facilitate the implementation o f its 
resource sharing principles— that is, how is the resource to be shared amongst 
stakeholders, how much tuna should be harvested, where should it be harvested and 
who should be allowed to harvest it? The existing literature on Pacific tuna fisheries and 
management provides excellent background and some insights into these problems. For 
example, a great deal is known about the biology o f tuna stocks and their movement 
across the Pacific, and the legal structures, and some o f the political dynamics, o f 
fisheries management problems are well understood. Moreover, there is a significant 
amount o f literature on the development aspects and potential for fisheries to underpin 
the Pacific Island economies and broader notions o f economic issues in the fisheries—  
using formal bio-economic modelling— is beginning to be developed. However, seen in 
the context o f the problems facing the WCPFC, a significant gap in the literature is how 
to combine these perspectives to produce novel insights into the policy problems in the 
fisheries and potential ways forward to resolve them. In addressing this gap, the specific 
aims of this thesis are to:
• Analyse and evaluate the recent historical experience o f collective regional 
fisheries management in the WCPO tuna fisheries, using an explicit institutional 
and economic framing o f the policy issues.
• To use insights from the fisheries economics and the ‘ resilience’ management 
literature to explore potential changes to governance structures in the WCPFC.
• To elaborate on potential allocation models in the WCPFC as one o f the key 
tools in achieving an ‘adaptive’ approach.
3.4 Conceptualising the research problem
To proceed with the analysis, this thesis acknowledges the legal and political 
dimensions o f previous scholars but proposes to add two other interpretations to the
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observed phenomena. These interpretations, set out below, underpin the 
conceptualisation of the research problem and consequently are carried through the 
analysis in the rest of this thesis.
3.4.1 The fisheries as a commons resource governed by cooperative management 
institutions
Fishing resources have long been conceptualised as common-pool (or even open- 
access) resources (CPRs) (starting with Gordon, 1954) because they embody the two 
main characteristics of theoretical CPRs—it is expensive (and difficult, although not 
impossible) to exclude users from the resource, and resource use is rivalrous. Tuna 
fishing grounds in the WCPO exemplify this model of resource use and ownership 
because while some of the tuna is ‘owned' by the region's coastal states under 
international law, the 'high seas' areas are open to all fishing nations, the nature of the 
resource means that it is difficult and expensive (although not impossible) to exclude 
other resource users and, of course, tuna harvested in one location is not available in 
another.
This thesis therefore proposes to characterise the WCPO tuna fisheries as a 'commons’ 
resource and, consequently, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
itself, as a commons resource sharing institution comprised of sovereign stakeholders 
required under international law to enter into cooperative arrangements for the 
management of tuna resources.
Conceptualising the tuna fisheries, and the Commission in this way is desirable because 
it directly links the practice of the Commission to an active area of scholarly research 
called ‘commons' research. In turn, the 'Commons' field of literature directly addresses 
the heart of the Commissions’ practical problems through its articulation and 
exploration of ideas about cooperation and non-cooperation over resource sharing that 
may occur within a common-pool resource such as a fishing ground and through the 
development of useful analytical frameworks to do so. From a 'commons' analytical 
lens, the problem facing the WCPO is that of a CPR in danger of being exhausted 
through the phenomena of the ‘tragedy of the commons'. That is, the tuna fishing 
grounds, open to use by many (but not all potential) users, faces the risk of over-use as a 
consequence of interconnected fishing fleets acting in their own self-interest without 
regard to their consequences of their actions on others, and with out regard to social 
benefit of coordinating action (Hardin, 1968; Marshall, 2005; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 
1994; Ostrom, 1999). Avoiding this problem is a matter of constructing and 
coordinating collective action from regional governments, acting through regional 
management bodies operating across the Pacific, who, in turn, coordinate the actions of 
their national fishing fleets.
3.4.2 The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission and its governing 
convention as an economic treaty whose core function is to secure economic returns to 
individual Members.
In addition to viewing the WCPFC as a commons resource sharing institution this thesis 
also proposes that the WCPFC and the Convention itself should also be interpreted as 
an economic treaty whereby the dominant discourse centres around the distribution of 
costs and benefits associated with stock conservation and effort management.
The review of existing analysis of the WCPFC highlights the predominance of legal and 
scientific perspectives in understanding the WCPFC. Observations made during field
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work, and a subsequent reading of formal positions taken by Members, suggest that 
while these are instrumental in framing the debate, the underlying issue for Member 
countries is to secure access to valuable economic resources for the purposes of 
ensuring continuation (or development of) economic infrastructure in the form of 
processing facilities and/or to protect access of markets to resources (see for example 
Government of Republic of the Marshall Islands, 2006). In practice, therefore, this 
economics discourse melds with domestic political agendas to provide a fundamental 
“political economy’ rather than a ‘technical’ economic undercurrent to the debate.
Under this interpretation, while scientific advice and legal interpretations of the 
Convention provides valuable guides for determining the range of conservation actions 
that could be adopted, and reasons for implementing them, both ultimately serve only as 
linguistic instrumentalities to the broader political economy and discourses which drive 
actual decisions within the Commission—and which are not always implicitly stated 
(usually conveniently).
Adopting this interpretation has implications for understanding policy development 
within the Commission because it argues for an understanding of the broader incentives 
facing WCPFC stakeholders and allows for an explicit economic framing of key policy 
questions, topics that are explored most explicitly in Chapters 5, 7, 9 and 10 of this 
thesis.
3.4.3 Policy is a path-dependent process
North (1991) and other scholars working in the economic history and institutional 
economic tradition have long envisaged economic development as a dynamic process 
embedded within particular, culturally specific, institutions. In this literature, policy 
development is not only drawn from context but is critically dependent on the current 
institutional environment—that is, policy development exhibits some source of path- 
dependency. This thesis adopts the view that policy development within the WCPFC 
progresses in the same way—that is displays path-dependency—and that policy options 
are therefore constrained by institutional history. This view may be justified on two 
grounds. First, the governance capacity within the region, (Pacific islanders and others) 
is highly limited and consequently policy development faces high institutional transition 
costs (for example, the costs of negotiation) (Flanich 2008b, Barclay and Cartwright 
(2007a). Second, the FFA group within the region and the Commission has developed a 
strong political identity and political discourse that shape particular attitudes to issues, 
and which is unlikely to be significantly altered over the short to medium term, if at all. 
Taken together, this suggests that an approach which builds on ‘what’s there’ could be 
more acceptable to a policy community conscious of the political and actual costs of 
institutional change.
3 .5 . Notes on Structure of this thesis
As pointed out in Chapter One, this thesis is written as a collection of articles that are 
drawn together through the key themes, research problems and assumptions outlined in 
this chapter and in Chapter 4. In doing so, for the purposes of this thesis, these articles 
have been modified to explicitly highlight the link between chapters, and to provide 
more detail regarding analytical methods used and in the results. However, in the main, 
they remain as they were in the published form.
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In perusing through the thesis, a reader may be given the impression that, taken as a 
group, the chapters represent a melange of different ideas, with only some chapters 
taking on the theoretical frameworks discussed in these earlier chapters. For example, 
Chapter 6 on aspirations of Pacific Island communities seems a long way from a 
theoretical analysis of institutional regimes. Similarly, Chapter 9, with its discussion on 
governance does not clearly relate to Ostrom’s schema of the Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework. This is not the case. It was not the intention for every chapter 
to closely incorporate, simultaneously, the all the theories presented in Chapter 4. 
Rather it was, and remains the intention for individual chapters to consider in detail 
different aspects of these theories: to do anything but this approach would have resulted 
in over complex treatment of the experiences of the WCPFC resulting in less light and 
more heat. In particular, the following two points are noted:
• Ostrom encourages scholars to seek to contextualise their analysis, and 
chapter 6 provides a focuses, albiet limited, analysis that is intended to 
provide some contextual understanding of FFA positions expressed in the 
WCPFC.
• Chapter 9, in total, is interpreted as an in-depth examination of the ‘rules’ 
that govern the “positions’ within the IAD Framework.
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CHAPTER 4
INSTITUTIONS, INCENTIVES AND THE GOVERNANCE OF NATURAL
RESOURCES
4.1. Introduction
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis provided a description of the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean tuna fisheries and set out the research questions for the remainder of this study. 
By seeking ways of analysing regional policy issues in the tuna fishery of the WCPO 
this thesis is placed firmly within the field of natural resource governance. Although it 
is a multidimensional, and somewhat contested concept, in this study governance is 
interpreted as the super-architecture of rules established at a broad regional scale—that 
is, at the level of regional fisheries management framework set within the context of 
international fisheries agreements—against and within which actors at smaller scales 
can make decisions and enact specific fishery-related tasks. It is thus consistent with 
Paavola and Adger's view of governance as the 'resolution of environmental conflicts’ 
(Paavola and Adger, 2005) and Lemos and Agrawal's (2006) definition that 
'environmental governance is synonymous with interventions aiming at changes in 
environment-related incentives, knowledge, institutions, decision making, and 
behaviors. ...[it is]., the set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations 
through which political actors influence environmental actions and outcomes' (p.298). 
(see also Bromley, 1990)
This is a somewhat more specific meaning of governance than that adopted by other 
scholars (see for example Adams, 2002, Dengler (2007; 2008) and is more outcome, 
rather than process, oriented than other approaches to theorising governance. Although 
the ‘governance as process' approaches are acknowledged as being a valid and valuable 
contribution to natural resource management, this ‘outcomes’ approach was chosen for 
its utility in meeting a pressing need within the Western and Central Pacific Ocean 
stakeholder community: to provide an evaluation of current policies and to develop 
contextually driven examples of how alternative governance approaches could operate 
within the WCPFC.
Tackling the problem of evaluating governance design and exploring new modes of 
governance is an inherently subjective, interdisciplinary and multi-dimensional process. 
For example, in the course of this study, empirical fieldwork highlighted the many 
‘subjective’ perspectives different participants in the tuna industry attached to the 
concept of a 'good' policy outcome. To navigate this problem, this analysis follows the 
long established tradition in natural resource management policy literature (see for 
example Adger et al., 2003, Costanza et al. 1993, Costanza (2001), Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002) of using multidisciplinary approaches in considering the policy-oriented 
research questions set out in Chapter 3. While many alternatives were possible, this 
study draws explicitly upon three inter-related literatures— institutional economics, 
fisheries economics and the so called ‘adaptive governance’ literature—as well as a 
broad range of contextual issues discussed in Chapter 1, to develop the analysis. 
Conceptualised as drawing together the key insights from each literature, and focusing 
on areas of overlap, the purpose of this chapter is to briefly review these theoretical 
literatures and to set out how they are used in the remainder of this thesis. The purpose 
here is not to provide an in-depth critical analysis or review of each of these literatures 
but rather to sketch out the constituent components of key theories and their relevance 
and use in the current study.
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4.2. COMMON POOL RESOURCE INSTITUTIONS AND FISHERIES 
INSTITUTIONS
Analysis o f human action in the use and management o f commons resources focuses on 
the incentives faced by individuals as they make resource-use decisions, and the societal 
institutions that underpin the structure o f these incentives8. In this literature institutions 
are defined by Commons (1931) as a ‘collective action in control, liberation and 
expansion o f individual action’ (p. 19) and thus covers a broad range o f informal and 
formal rules as well as organisations o f humans (for example, firms, governments and 
so on) (see also North 1990; and Libecap, 2003).
Traditional thinking in the commons literature was that individuals w ill, in the face of 
inadequate institutional constraints, inevitably over-exploit the resource and be drawn 
into a "tragedy o f the commons’ situation, with the only remedy being the external 
imposition o f alternative rules, enforced by a third party (Marshall, 2005; Ostrom, 
(1990, 1994); Barrett, 2003 ; Hardin, 1968). This view of common resource use was 
popularised, both in the popular and academic literature, with Garrett Hardin's (1968) 
‘Tragedy o f the Commons’ article that captured the imagination o f its readers through 
its provocative metaphor o f environmental destruction. As Hardin famously states in his 
‘Tragedy o f the Commons’ article in 1968:
..the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue 
is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another...But this is the 
conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. 
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to 
increase his herd without lim it— in a world that is limited. Ruin is the 
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a 
society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons 
brings ruin to all (added emphasis).
This prevailing CPR wisdom captured by Hardin was deeply pessimistic: individuals 
caught up in a cycle o f increasing resource use, as they race each other to capture 
economic benefit, w ill ultimately end w ith total ruin o f the resource to the detriment of 
all. This has often been formalised into the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ game (Ostrom, 1990) 
whereby non-cooperative and non-communicative rational agents, armed with 
‘complete information’ are unable to secure binding cooperative resource-sharing 
agreements and thus individually choose, as their dominant strategy, to defect regardless 
o f the choice o f others. Like the herder choosing to always add another animal to the 
commons, this situation, under these assumptions, always leads to the third-best result 
for all commons users— over use o f the resource— although they may be aware o f the 
existence o f better outcomes by cooperation (hence ‘the Tragedy').
This perspective on CPR heavily influenced the type of policy prescriptions that arose 
from the analysis. I f  individuals were unable to do anything but race ‘ inexorably’ 
towards tragedy, policy makers had one o f two options: for the government (or some 
other central authority) to take control and impose an ordered use o f resources, or for a 
private individual to take on this coordination role.
However, during the 1980-90s, Elinor Ostrom and others substantially challenged this 
‘ tragedy’ position through their analysis o f case studies o f successful self-managed
8 For an excellent overview of CPR theory see Marshall (2005) and Agrawal, (2001).
commons. Ostrom (1990, 1999) and Ostrom et al.( 1994) altered the focus of the CPR 
literature from the inevitable ‘tragedy’ outcome to one that analysed ‘the situation from 
one in which appropriators [resource users] act independently to one in which they 
adopt coordinated strategies to obtain higher joint benefits or reduce joint harm' 
(Ostrom, 1990, p.39). Extensive research by commons scholars working within this 
tradition demonstrate that there is no one ‘correct’ way of specifying these strategies 
(see for example Acheson, 2000), and thus resolving central commons problems of 
coordinating behaviour, and that the specific form of the governance institutions are 
shaped by biophysical, socio-economic and political contexts of the particular commons 
situation.
Nevertheless, scholars have observed, across numerous case studies, generalisable 
regularities in both the enabling conditions that promote successful commons 
management and in the structure of the kind of agreements reached. That is, regardless 
of the form of ownership and or specification of coordination strategies, all successful 
commons regimes share common characteristics (for example a relatively small number 
of heterogeneous number of agents) and have resolved key problems: how much 
resource to use, what rate to use it at, who should be allowed to use the resources, and 
what (if any) rules should be used to share the costs and benefits of resource use 
decisions and determining how compliance will be secured (Ostrom, 1990). Agrawal’s 
(2001) summary of the types of ‘enabling' conditions commonly identified in the 
literature are set out in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Critical enabling conditions for sustainability on the commons
R e so u r c e  S y s te m
C h a r a c te r is t ic s
i. s m a l l  s i z e
ii. w e l l - d e f i n e d  b o u n d a r i e s
iii . l o w  l e v e l s  o f  m o b i l i t y
iv .  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  s t o r a g e  o f  b e n e f i t s  f r o m  t h e  r e s o u r c e
v .  p r e d i c t a b i l i t y
G r o u p  C h a r a c te r is t ic s i. s m a l l  s i z e
ii. c l e a r l y  d e f i n e d  b o u n d a r i e s
iii . s h a r e d  n o r m s
iv .  p a s t  s u c c e s s f u l  e x p e r i e n c e s — s o c i a l  c a p i t a l
v .  a p p r o p r i a t e  l e a d e r s h i p — y o u n g ,  f a m i l i a r  w i t h  c h a n g i n g  e x t e r n a l  
e n v i r o n m e n t s ,  c o n n e c t e d  t o  lo c a l  t r a d i t i o n a l  e l i t e
v i .  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  a m o n g  g r o u p  m e m b e r s
v i i .  h e t e r o g e n e i t y  o f  e n d o w m e n t s ,  h o m o g e n e i t y  o f  i d e n t i f i e s  a n d  
i n t e r e s t s
v i i i .  l o w  l e v e l s  o f  p o v e r t y
In s t itu t io n a l a r r a n g e m e n ts i. r u l e s  a r e  s i m p l e  a n d  e a s y  t o  u n d e r s t a n d
ii. l o c a l l y  d e v i s e d  a c c e s s  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  r u l e s
iii.  e a s e  in  e n f o r c e m e n t  o f  r u l e s
iv . g r a d u a t e d  s a n c t i o n s
v .  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  l o w - c o s t  a d j u d i c a t i o n
v i .  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  o f  m o n i t o r s  a n d  o t h e r  o f f i c i a l s  t o  u s e r s
E x te r n a l e n v ir o n m e n t v i i .  t e c h n o l o g y :
a . l o w - c o s t  e x c l u s i o n  t e c h n o l o g y ;
b . t i m e  f o r  a d a p t a t i o n  t o  n e w  t e c h n o l o g i e s  r e l a t e d  t o  
t h e  c o m m o n s
v i i i .  l o w  l e v e l s  o f  a r t i c u l a t i o n  w i t h  e x t e r n a l  m a r k e t s
ix .  g r a d u a l  c h a n g e  in a r t i c u l a t i o n  w i t h  e x t e r n a l  m a r k e t s
x .  s t a te :
a . c e n t r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  s h o u l d  n o t  u n d e r m i n e  lo c a l  
a u t h o r i t y
b .  s u p p o r t i v e  e x t e r n a l  s a n c t i o n i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s
c. a p p r o p r i a t e  l e v e l s  o f  e x t e r n a l  a i d  t o  c o m p e n s a t e  
lo c a l  u s e r s  f o r  c o n s e r v a t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s
d .  n e s t e d  l e v e l s  o f  a p p r o p r i a t i o n ,  p r o v i s i o n ,  
e n f o r c e m e n t ,  g o v e r n a n c e .
Source: Agrawal, (2001)
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Scholars working in the institutional field emphasise different aspects of the 
"institutional' problem: they may describe an institutional setting and its operation using 
some or many of the above factors (see for example Anderson, 2004; Anderson, 2000; 
Anderson and Holland, 2006; Berkes and Shaw, 1986; Berkes, 1986; Yandle, 2008; 
Yandle and Dewees, 2008), analyse its performance (see for example Yandle and 
Dewees, 2008; Arnason, 2005; Barkin, 1999) or adopt a proscriptive stance as to how 
resources ‘could be better managed' through a focus on the ‘institutional’ arrangements 
as set out in Table 4.1—what may be referred to as the ‘policy mode’ of institutional 
economics (see for example Becker, 1995; Cash and Moser, 2000; Chand, 2003; 
Charles, 2001; Sanchirico, 2003). Indeed, it has been recognised that providing a 
‘complete’ assessment of all of these aspects of a commons situation is a difficult task, a 
situation that is not aided by a field that has been criticised for poor or incomplete 
analytical techniques (Imperial and Yandle, 2005; Agrawal, 2001).
Agrawal’s key criticism (reflected also in Imperial and Yandle) is that the usual 
analytical form of a commons analysis—that of the singular case study—does not assist 
in developing the inductive nature of commons research agenda. In particular he notes 
that ‘existing work has not yet fully developed a theory of what makes for sustainable 
common-pool resource management. Systematic tests of the relative importance of 
factors important to sustainability, equity or efficiency of commons are relatively 
uncommon’ (p.45). Thus Agrawal’s explicit interpretation of the literature is that of the 
commons analysis in theory building mode—that is, what case study approaches can 
reveal about what conditions and factors facilitate successful stakeholder-based 
commons management.
While recognising that this constitutes a key theme in the commons literature, this thesis 
adopts the opposite view and considers how an institutional commons analysis could be 
used in gaining insight into a specific policy problem. That is, it does not engage in the 
methodology research of the commons literature but rather seeks to use it in ‘policy 
building' mode, thus taking after Charles (2001). Explicitly seeking a non-normative 
analytical framework to this end, the iconic work of Elinor Ostrom, and others, in 
developing the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework has often been 
utilised and adapted by scholars seeking to explore one or more aspects of institutional 
analysis, formation and design. This framework, described below, is used in this thesis 
for two reasons. Firstly and primarily, it provides a flexible empirically driven 
framework that can be easily adapted to a variety of contexts and is recognised and 
utilised as being consistent with the fisheries economics and adaptive management 
literatures. Secondly, it focuses on analysis of self-organising common resource 
management situations—which was considered appropriate in the context of exploring 
an international fisheries management regime where external enforcement of 
agreements is considered largely unrealistic.
4.2.1 Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
2.1.1 The basic framework and institutions as ‘rules ’
Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework conceptualises 
‘institutions’ as a cluster of ‘rules-in-use’ organised in such a way that creates the 
incentive structure within which commons stakeholders make decisions about the 
quantum and manner in which resources are used.
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Described as a ‘meta-theoreticaf device to identify and organise the “broad working 
parts’ of a commons institution, their relationships to each other and to assist in the 
prioritisation amongst key analytical variables, the IAD framework has three constituent 
parts:
• A descriptive metaphor, called the ‘action arena’, used to provide a consistent 
language with which to describe the ‘structure' of generic commons situations,
• an extension to the basic ‘action arena' metaphor to incorporate concepts of 
scale; and
• a proscriptive linguistic device called ‘rule sets’ which comprises a set of 
statements designed to specify—that is “animate’—the variables operating 
within an “action arena'.
The relationships between the constituent parts are summarised in Figure 4.1
Core to Ostrom’s theory is the first component—the analytical unit called an “action 
area'—which is defined as the ‘social space where individuals interact, exchange goods 
and services, engage in appropriate and provision activities, solve problems or fight’ 
(Ostrom et ah, 1994 p.28). The action arena is constructed to parameterise institutional 
analyses, that is, identify the analytical units, and it is comprised of seven key elements 
(see Figure 4.1) which are: participants—actors who are the centre of the action arena, 
including the links between them; positions—place holders that associate a participant 
with a set of actions in a process; actions—the actual behaviour of participants; 
outcomes—the potential outcomes that participants can potentially create through their 
actions; transformative functions—that map participants and their actions into 
intermediate or final outcomes; information—the set of information available to a 
participant; and the rewards —the set of costs and benefits associated with each 
outcome. The IAD framework hypothesises that all collective action situations are 
constituted as having these same working parts—although the particular form and 
behaviour of each part is different between each situation—and thus is used primarily 
by scholars as an organising tool for shifting through which theories may be needed to 
explain specific observable behaviours in a particular situation, and what data is 
required to support the analysis.
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Each of the elements within the I AD framework are shaped and framed by specific 
contextualised factors, some of which are beyond human control (for example, 
biophysical characteristics of the WCPO tuna fisheries); or are generally considered 
outside the realm of institutional analysis (for example, cultural factors that influence 
preferences or mechanisms used by actors to make decisions)—while others, called rules, 
are specific attempts by participants within an action situation to shape the relationships 
between themselves to facilitate particular resource-sharing outcomes. The concept of 
rules are central to institutional analysis (Ostrom, 2005; Hodgson 2006) because they 
describe and ‘define what actions are required, prohibited or permitted’ (Ostrom et al. 
(Ostrom, 1994), p.38, emphasis in the original) and thus drive configuration, as far as the 
contextual or other factors allow, of the particular form of each element in the ‘action 
situation’. In the IAD Framework seven types of rules are identified, one each for each of 
the seven elements in the IAD Framework—boundary rules, position rules, authority 
rules, scope rules, aggregation rules, information rules, and payoff rules. Together, these 
rules act to ‘animate’ the analysis and are the key mechanism by which alternative 
theories regarding human behaviour are integrated into the analysis. Table 4.2 sets out the 
relationship between the IAD Element, the rule governing that element, the rule function 
and the rules active within the WCPFC Convention Area.
Rules are ‘contextual, prescriptive and follow able’ (Ostrom et al. 1994), p.38; Shimanoff, 
1980) and within a policy mode of institutional inquiry are the primary focus of analysis 
both as a method to understand the structure of the resource-sharing situation under 
examination, the incentives they create for participants, as well as the analytical device 
for exploring alternative policies via alternative ‘rule sets’. These rule functions arise 
from the empirical basis of the IAD framework and explicitly acknowledge that rules can 
derive from both ‘policy sources’ as well as ‘non-policy’ sources. For example, fishers’ 
decisions about how much to fish, where to fish, what to fish and with what gears, 
amongst other relevant decisions, is a response not only to the economic signals they 
receive from both the input and output markets (an ‘contextual’ factor in Figure 4.1) but 
also to policy signals—or rules or ‘institutions’—put in place by fisheries managers.
Regardless of their form, or origin, these ‘rules’ alter the costs and benefits of undertaking 
particular actions in the resource-sharing situation, ceteris paribus to contextual factors. 
Where rules can be changed through ‘policy sources’, such as the WCPFC, they can act 
as the primary tool for changing the economic and political incentives of users and thus 
potentially alter resource use patterns and outcomes. Individual behaviour within an 
established rule set are characterised by an explicit or implicit cost-benefit analysis of 
whether to follow the rules or not. Analysts’ predictions of whether CPR participants will 
follow the rules or not is determined by variables that govern (1) the preferences held by 
individuals for particular actions and outcomes, (2) the way individuals obtain and use 
information, (3) the selection criteria used by individuals for deciding on an action (in 
turn determined by preferences), (4) the resources available to the individual.
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2.1.2 Multiple levels o f analysis and the move towards a ‘complexity ’ approach
As presented in Figure 4.1, action arenas were originally conceived of as ‘single’ entity 
systems that focussed on the actual day-to-day use of the commons. IAD and other 
institutional scholars, referring to this as the ‘operational’ level of analysis assumed that 
the rules of the action situation, and the technological, biophysical and other contextual 
constraints did not change. Recognition that these rules and factors, in fact, do change, 
motivated the extension of the IAD Framework to adopt an explicit ‘hierarchy’ of rule 
sets that capture both the concepts of (geographical and political) scale and a model to 
explore how institutions themselves may evolve over time.
This extension is based on the observation that “[A] 11 rules are nested in another set of 
rules that define how the first set of rules can be changed” (Ostrom, 1990, p.51). In 
other words, all rules sets that govern an action arena are themselves influenced, crafted 
or determined by rule sets that operate at higher geographical and/or political scales. 
Ostrom (1990) describes this ‘scaling’ analogously as ‘similar to the nesting of 
computer languages at several levels. What can be done at a higher level will depend on 
the capabilities and limits of the software (rules) at that level, on the software (rules) at 
a deeper level and on the hardware (CPR)’ (pp.51-52). The operation or changes in rules 
at one level are assumed to occur within ‘fixed’ rules established at higher scales of rule 
making—although these ‘fixed’ rules at higher scales themselves may be changed over 
time subject to substantial effort and costs involved. The IAD Framework argues that 
each level of rules can and does have rule sets in each functional category described 
above, but distinguishes between three different levels of action arenas.
• Operational Rules—these are the rules that affect the day-to-day decision­
making and activity within the commons resource. These rules are used by 
resource users to determine when, where and how to withdraw resource units, 
what information must be exchanged or withheld, and what rewards or sanctions 
are associated with particular actions.
• Collective Choice Rules—used by resource users and their officials or external 
authorities to make the policies, that is, the operational rules, about how a 
commons resource should be managed.
• Constitutional choice rules—rule set that determines who is eligible and 
determining the specific rules to be used in crafting the set of collective choice 
rules.
This scaling of rules sets can be simultaneously interpreted as representing different 
scales of economic incentive-creating institutions, as well as being interpreted as scaled 
legal structures constructed for the orderly negotiation of international law. For 
example, from this perspective, the hierarchical framework of ‘nested’ international 
legal agreements starting with the 1982 LOSC, its subsidiary agreement UNFSA and 
the subsequent development of WCPFC as an RFMO could be interpreted as a gradual 
development of constitutional, collective choice and operational rules—although the 
international element draws in several complications that are discussed more fully in the 
‘synthesis’ section of this chapter and elsewhere in this thesis. A summary, connecting 
these ideas to the legal frameworks operating in the WCPO is set out in Figure 4.2.
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The explicit pairing of the basic 1AD framework with the notion of political or 
geographical scales has created the concept, in the commons literature, o f ‘multi-scaled’ 
institutional regimes which, in turn has spawned several related but separately 
identifiable streams of research.
One important stream of this literature is the idea of ‘cross scale’ linkages between 
‘small’ scale and ‘large’ scale commons management which explicitly identify nested 
scales of semi-autonomous CPR situations that are linked through physical, 
informational or financial flows. Research in this field looks at the way in which actors 
working at different scales interact with each other and address issues of coordination 
between scales, of participation in decision making across scales (Noble, 2000) or 
separability between ‘those making decisions’ and ‘those to whom those decisions are 
applied’. By contrast Berkes (2006) argues that commons management between scales 
is more fruitfully considered by examining the linkages between scales and their 
dynamics in context of observing the ‘overall’ system as a complex adaptive system. 
This can be achieved through the study of ‘co-management agencies’ or ‘boundary 
organisations’, amongst other analytical tactics which are viewed as the ‘institutions 
provide a means to bridge the divide between processes taking place at different levels. 
In effect, they provide ways to deal with linkages in complex adaptive systems’ (p.56).
While the analysis of cross-scale linkages within a large complex system is important to 
understanding human-environmental interactions, this particular thesis focuses solely on 
the large scale of the WCPFC itself (and supporting institutions) and therefore rejects 
the ‘cross scale’ perspective in favour of treating the overall commons problems as a 
‘complex adaptive systems’. In this way it is reflective of the implicit assumptions made 
in Ostrom et al.(1994) or Barrett (2003) that treats nation states as ‘unitary actors’ 
(Berkes, 2006) and was therefore considered an appropriate way of delineating the 
research task. Complex adaptive systems—derived from a ‘system’s perspectives of 
biophysical scholarly traditions—encourage institutional scholars to focus on the 
relational aspects of the IAD framework and place a commons sharing situation more 
firmly within its ecological context. This is discussed in detail in Section 4.4 of this 
chapter.
4.3. Fisheries economics
4.3.1 The contribution of fisheries economics to fisheries policy
Conventional fisheries management, as well as current practice within the Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, provides an almost exclusive role for the 
disciplines of biological science and, to a lesser extent, law, in problem identification 
and problem solving (see Hampton, 2008; SCP, 2008; Hanich, 2008) inherent with 
fisheries management. Within this paradigm the primary task of fisheries management 
is to determine, using the best available data, the theoretically maximum level of harvest 
capable of being extracted from a fishery, without undermining the ability to extract 
approximately the same amount in future years (‘maximum sustainable yield’).
Many economists have criticised the dominance of this science-based fisheries policy 
formation, at the exclusion of other perspectives, because, it is argued, a purely 
‘scientific’ approach directs no attention to the behaviour of fishers within the system 
and essentially ignores economic costs and benefits of fishing, without which it is 
difficult to determine the appropriate level of capital investment in the fishery (and 
thereby promote a profitable fishery) (Gordon, 1954). By ignoring these issues, it is
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thereby promote a profitable fishery) (Gordon, 1954). By ignoring these issues, it is 
further argued, fisheries managers do not sufficiently take into account the scientific 
uncertainty inherent in the analysis o f fish stocks (Larkin, 1977) and also ignore the 
implications o f so-called ‘ institutional’ risks (Francis and Shotton, (Francis, 1997)) in 
fisheries policy— that is, the ability o f fishers to adapt their behaviour in response to 
policies (or other factors within the fishery system) that can then undermine the 
objectives o f the management regime.
By integrating principles o f economic behaviour and the economic motives o f fishers 
into the management regimes of a fishery, fisheries economists (for example Bjorndal, 
1999; Munro, 1992; Gordon, 1954; Munro, 1985; Grafton, 1996; Grafton, 2005; 
Kompas, 2005; Clark, 1973; Moloney, 1979) have made two major contributions to the 
fisheries policy agenda, both o f which have been influential in domestic fisheries 
policy, and are starting to gain international attention in the context o f international 
fisheries— although success is more difficult in this context. .
The first o f these contributions is a reconceptualisation o f the traditional MSY target 
away from the strict biological definition towards the broader notion o f fishing targets 
based on the Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) framework. Incorporating both 
biological and economic aspects o f fishing, MEY is defined as ‘ the [biologically] 
sustainable catch or effort level for the fishery as a whole [that] maximises profits, or 
creates the largest difference between total revenues and the total costs o f fsh ing ’ 
(Kompas, 2005, p.152)9.
Conceptually, MEY is captured by the relatively simple bioeconomic Gordon-Shaefer 
Model (Gordon, 1954), that formed the basis o f fisheries economics during the 1950s- 
1970s. This model starts o ff with a simple yield curve that measures the relationship 
between biomass (stock) and yield that is driven by biological facts o f the fishery— 
recruitment, growth, natural mortality, fishing mortality and carrying capacity. That is:
F ( x )  = rx 1 -
Where: K = a constant, the natural equilibrium biomass
r = a constant, is the intrinsic percentage growth rate in the fishery 
Within this model, fisheries harvests are determined by:
h(t)  =  qEa x^
Where:
q = a constant, is the catchability coefficient and where a and ß are constants such that a
= ß = l
In this framework ‘ sustainable’ levels o f fishing are determined where h (t) = F (x) that 
is harvests = yield growth, which is graphically represented as:
9
1954).
This different between total revenues and total costs is called ‘rent’ (see Gordon,
Sustainable
yield
F(x)
X msy K Biomass (x)
Each point on the yield curve is sustainable in the sense that it relates particular levels 
of biomass to particular equilibrium or sustainable yields over time, with the theoretical 
maximum being the ‘MSY\ This biological approach frames policy making as the 
simultaneous task of estimating F(x) through biological studies and, from that, 
determining h (t) such that h(t) = F (x) at the point F (x) = Xmsy -  sometimes 
interpreted either as target reference point (that is, biomass must equal the level at X) or 
at best, a limit reference point (or biomass must be no lower than that equal to X, but 
should be higher).
Using the harvest equations (see for example Munro and Scott, 1985) and some 
assumption about costs of fishing, fisheries economists recast the sustainable 
yield/biomass model in terms of fishing effort.
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Sustainable
yield
F(x)
E msy F Fishing Effort
Using the simplistic assumption that revenue per unit of catch is constant, and that the 
costs of fishing rise uniformly over all units o f effort:
C(E) = aE
That is C(E) represents the total cost of fishing effort and where a denotes the unit cost 
of fishing effort. The economic problem for fisheries can be represented by the
following diagram:
Sustainable RevenueSustainable
Eopenaccess
The different between sustainable revenue and total cost o f effort is defined as 
sustainable resource rent and, it is argued that the ‘optimal size’ o f the fishery is one
which maximises rent or the difference between the two (i.e. at E = Emey). Conversely, 
if there are no controls in the fishery, fishers will competitively enter it until their 
marginal costs equal average revenue (average product of effort) at E openaccess and rents = 
0. These results are discussed extensively and in more detail in Hannesson (1993), 
Grafton et al. (Grafton, 2006), Bjorndal, (1999) while applications to real world 
fisheries can be found in Grafton et al., 2000; Dupont et al., 2005; Grafton, 2000 and 
1995.
From a policy perspective, the important point to note is that the MEY framework gives 
rise to the notion of 'economic over-fishing’ whereby a fishery may be over-fished if 
the level of effort and catch, in combination, do not produce the profit-maximising level 
return to the fishery, or indeed any profit—although the harvest rates may be below that 
capable of being sustained at MSY. That is, in theory, points A, B and C—which all lie 
on the sustainable revenue curve (and consequently the sustainable yield curve)—are 
sustainable levels of fishing. The MSY approach to policy making selects point B on 
that curve to obtain the greatest physical yield, whereas the MEY approach selects point 
C to obtain the greatest profit. It thus redirects policy makers’ attention not only towards 
determining the harvest rates, but also the amount of fishing effort used to achieve those 
harvest rates. It therefore implies a more complex policy task for fisheries managers 
who, under this approach, are required to estimate F(x), h (t) and C (E) and find their 
equilibrium, or policy target, point. In theory, the MEY level can be greater or lower 
than the MSY level (depending on the relative slopes of the F (x) and C (E) functions) 
but in practice it is usual that MEY levels of effort are lower than MSY levels of fishing 
effort. In many cases, this analysis has led to the apparent counter intuitive results 
whereby the fishery becomes more profitable with less fishing, and less harvest 
occurring in the fishery.
In practice, the mathematical tools actually used by fisheries economists move beyond 
the relatively simplistic comparative static approach in the above Gordon-Shaefer 
Model to incorporate more realistic dynamic elements of fisher behaviour into the 
analysis—in particular, time paths for adjustment and uncertainty and different 
specifications of the underlying fisheries biological model. For example, the analysis by 
Kompas (2006) incorporates both a ‘short run’ adjustment level for effort and a longer 
run equilibrium level of effort while Grafton et al. (2007) use a ‘Beverton-Holf age 
structured model to underpin their bio-economic model of the skipjack and yellowfin 
fisheries in the WCPO.
Although these more mathematically complex bioeconomic models seek to provide 
more accurate predictions of MEY levels of harvest for use within policy making, they 
do not substantially alter the key policy insights of the basic Gordon-Schaeffer model.
A second insight is a move away from fiat style resource-use policies, that proscribe 
specific actions for fishers, and their fishing fleets, towards a flexible property rights 
and price-based approach designed to re-invent and align the economic incentives 
facing individual stakeholders with collective management goals (Bjorndal, 1999; 
Grafton, 2006; Squires, 1995). In practice this is achieved through the provision of 
enforceable and enduring property rights (to access, fishing opportunities or tonnage of 
catch) to the fishers in the form of individual (and usually transferable) quotas within 
the global limits set by overall fisheries management target (that is, a MEY or MSY 
effort or harvest target) (for extensive detail of this approach see Grafton, 2006; 
Grafton, 2006; Squires et al., 1998; Bjorndal, 1999; Kompas, 2007; Kompas, 2005; 
Munro, 1985; Squires, 1995, and for its application to a multispecies fishery see Squires
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et al., 1998). The centrepiece of this approach is the allocation mechanism—the process 
of dividing up the global target into portions of permitable effort or catch that each party 
(implicitly assumed to be the fishers themselves) is allowed to expend in the fishery. In 
combination with the property right, this allocation process allows for fishing nations 
and fishers themselves to actively consider some of the central issues in the ‘incentive 
based' approach to sustainable fisheries management: the trade-off between current and 
future catches; trade-off between competing uses of the stock and incentives to invest 
appropriate levels of capital into the fishery. This occurs because allocation unit holders 
can no longer rely on proscriptive policies by central authorities to guide their behaviour 
in the fishery but must actively consider the best way in which they can use their fishing 
rights to maximise their own profits. This depends critically on fishers holding property 
rights or quasi-property rights (see Scott, 1989; Davis and Gartside, 2001) which, by 
providing security of access to resources, re-adjusts the focus of these fishers-as- 
decision makers from a high discount/short term perspective often found in open access 
or commons situations to a longer term focus of promoting the value of their right over 
an extended time period (Kompas, 2005; Grafton, 2006; Moloney, 1979).
The allocation process itself, which is central to the economic conceptualisation of 
fisheries management, is itself not an economic phenomenon, but a political one bound 
up in the notion of ‘equity' in the distribution of benefits. Regardless of how the 
allocation issue is solved, it must be determined in a way which provides sufficient 
economic rewards for stakeholders to participate, or at least not cheat on established 
fishery harvest or effort targets—that is participants must see the wealth distribution 
inherent in the allocation process as a ‘fair’ one.
4.4. Governance of commons as complex adaptive systems
4.4.1 Complex Adaptive Systems and the study of natural resources
Conventional economic inquiry into natural resource management, such as the theory of 
fisheries economics discussed in Section 3 of this chapter, derives its analytical 
philosophy and methodology from the neoclassical economic tradition, that often 
assumes that fixed rational agents operate in a linear, static and statistically predictable 
environment (Holland, 1988) and with good reason: it has significant explanatory power 
in many applications and is analytically tractable. However, the philosophical and 
theoretical shortcomings of this approach within the NRM context have also been 
extensively explored (see for example Ostrom, 2007; O'Sullivan, 2004; Lansing, 2003; 
Gross, 2003; Janssen, 2002) and critiquing the underlying neoclassical basis of this 
approach is now an established tradition within the theoretical environmental 
governance and economics literature. Scholarly work of this nature has coalesced 
around several broad schools of inquiry and include, for example, the Experimental 
Economic field, which seeks to question the dominance and utility of the ‘homo 
economicus’ model in questions about environmental regulation (see for example 
Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Gintis, 2000) or the Ecological Economics School, which has 
sought to develop a physical energy basis for the theory of value (for the seminal work 
see Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, with applications found in Janssen et al, 2000; Janssen, 
2002).
Common to many of these alternative schools is the concept of integration and the 
desire to provide an alternative discourse that works across disciplinary boundaries for 
the purposes of analysing complex problems, including:
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• Integration between ‘traditional' concepts in economies and a broader 
conceptualisation of human behaviour
• Integration between ‘market’ transactions and ‘externalities’, that is, 
mainstreaming all aspects of human activity.
• Adopts a ‘systems’ approach—the basis of CAS theory.
Emerging as one response in this field, the ‘complex adaptive systems’ or ‘CAS’ 
approaches to conceptualising and studying biophysical and socio-economic 
environmental issues present scholars with a philosophical and theoretical critique and 
alternative to the neoclassical school, and as well, an increasingly a set of robust 
analytical tools (for example see Saviotti, 2001).
There is no generally accepted ‘definition’ of CAS theory, rather many authors (for 
example Manson, 2001 and Saviotti, 2001) identify ‘complexity theory’ as an 
‘approach’, characterised as a generic systems model which can be adapted to describe 
and analyse the behaviour of a wide range of ‘complex’ systems from the physical, to 
the biological, to the socio-economic (Holland, 1988; Manson, 2001). Differentiating 
itself from earlier reductionist and static frameworks, CAS theory in economics looks to 
the scientific metaphors of evolutionary biology and non-linear thermodynamics as the 
source of its core concepts of: out of equilibrium dynamics/positive feedbacks, 
evolution, adaptation and irreversibility, self-organisation/emergent behaviour and 
sensitivity to initial conditions (Saviotti, 2001) as well as the language and the 
techniques of research.
A ‘complex adaptive system’ can be generically described in terms of first, the structure 
of a system—w hat it looks like, how it is defined and delimited—then second, how the 
system behaves over time and lastly, how' structure and behaviour combine to produce 
different states of the worlds, or ‘outcomes’. A summary of the generic CAS theory 
structure, behaviour and outcomes is set out in Table 4.3. The following description of 
CAS theory synthesises the work from a wide range of authors working within the 
broadly defined CAS literature. For seminal papers on CAS literature in economics and 
social systems, the reader is referred to Arthur (1999, 1994, 1990, 1988). For ‘textbook’ 
introductions to CAS applications to environmental management see Gunderson and 
Holling (Gunderson, 2002), Feber (1999), Ford (1999)) and see also (Anderies et al., 
2004; Walker et al., 2002; Janssen, 2002). Good overviews of CAS theory, as applied to 
geographical sciences is given by Manson (2001) and O’Sullivan (2004) and for a 
review of application to social sciences more generally see Lansing (2003).
From a structural perspective, a complex adaptive system is made up of independent, 
autonomous but interrelated entities. The nature of the relationships between entities 
forms the basic composition of the system. Entities are often, but not alw ays, organised 
into a ‘network’ arrangement—which forms the basic pattern of their relationships. 
Many complex adaptive systems (particularly in the sub-field associated with agent 
based modelling) have spatial and temporal elements and spatial and temporal 
heterogeneity within the system structure. For example, a network of entities is situated 
within a geographical space, and the location of where they are, and what they do at 
particular times, influences systems behaviour and outcomes. Networked entities can 
also be (and mostly are) organised within distinctive ‘scales’ of geographical space 
(defined on physical terms as the ‘spatial extent of a phenomenon’) and/or social 
space—which corresponds to the ‘level at which relevant processes operate’ (Marston, 
2000). Linkages between scales (“cross scale linkages’’) are ubiquitous within complex 
adaptive systems and are a key instrument in driving change throughout a system.
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The behaviour o f a CAS system is flexible and can be characterised as either economic 
in nature, or draws on alternative models o f human decision making. Key defining 
characteristics are a non-linear relationship between cause and effect (including causal 
loops), the tendency towards ‘positive’ feedback or ‘ reinforcing’ behaviours (meaning 
that small events become magnified and result in large systemic impacts), the tendency 
towards path-dependency (future changes are influenced by what has already occurred), 
and a capacity to learn, explore and adapt through time to particular situations. Many 
CAS systems display a tension between individual localised events (or behaviours by 
individuals) and the patterns that these localised events create at broader scales 
(sometimes called ‘emergence’)— that is, system wide behaviour ‘emerges’ from the 
collective action o f non-coordinated agents.
System outcomes, or system behaviour as a whole, emerge from the combination o f 
system structure and system behaviour. Individual components o f a complex adaptive 
system are constantly changing, as is their relationship with each other as they 
continually adapt to changes around them (Marshall 2005) and thus— patterns o f 
individual behaviour can create patterns o f global behaviour that is path-dependent, 
non-linear and has ‘positive feedbacks’ . In addition, it is often observed that systems 
themselves in situations that are not optimal when seen from the perspective o f the 
constituent elements, but that these situations are difficult to alter (sometimes called 
‘ lock-in’ ).
Table 4.3:Structure, Behaviour and Outcomes in a Complex Adaptive
System
S tructu re  o f system Behaviour o f ind iv idu a l entities and system as a whole
•  E ntities •  E n tity  behavioura l m odels w ide  in  scope
•  Relationsh ips •  E ntities behaviour exp la ined by path-dependencies,
•  N e tw o rks  o f  re la tionsh ips n o n -lin e a rity , feedbacks (po s itive  and negative) e tc ....
•  Spatial elements and spatial •  System w id e  behaviour ‘ em erges’ fro m  the co llec tive
heterogeneity. action o f  non-coord ina ted agents.
1r i f  ' f  ' f
System outcomes
•  System can becom e ‘ lo c k e d -in ’ to  an ‘ in e ff ic ie n t ’ outcom e.
• g loba l behav iou r that is path-dependent, no n -linea r and has ‘ po s itive  feedbacks’ .
Source: Authors’ own analysis
4.4.2 Complex Adaptive Systems Theory and Institutional Analysis
‘CAS’ thinking has it origins primarily in the physical and engineering sciences 
(Manson, 2001) and its influence in economics begun relatively recently in the work o f 
David, Arthur (Arthur, 1999, 1997, 1996, 1994, 1990, 1989, 1988, Arthur et al., 1987), 
Schelling (1978) whose explorations o f economic history, urban development and the 
economics o f standards introduced key complexity concepts to the social sciences.
The complexity literature— as a technical modelling exercise— has directed some 
attention towards fisheries problems, but these are primarily focussed on understanding 
fisher behaviour within well defined contexts and are thus placed firm ly within an 
‘experimental’ tradition o f research. For example, studies undertaken in the ‘agent- 
based modelling’ framework focus on how fisheries make decisions about where they
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may choose to fish within a spatially defined area using a variety of techniques 
including use of algorithms (Boschetti, 2005); neural networks (Dreyfus-Leon 
(Dreyfus-Leon and Kleiber, 2001, Dreyfus-Leon, 1999); bayesian networks for agent 
decision making (see Little, 2004) but a significant drawback is both their lack of 
validation to real world fishers.
By contrast, this thesis aligns itself with the ‘policy' oriented research into complex 
adaptive systems, which under the influence of 'systems’ thinking has, through 
theoretical and applied work, explicitly linked these ideas to that of a ‘commons’ (see 
for example Anderies et al., 2004, Wilson, 2002, Paavola and Adger, 2005, Adger et al., 
2003). The key contribution of this approach has been to move the traditional 
‘commons’ field of analysis beyond ‘small-scale’ resource sharing situations to the 
explicit consideration of large scale, nested ‘commons systems’, reconceptualised as 
‘complex adaptive systems’ (see for example Marshall, 2005; Anderies et al., 2004)). 
These scholars argue that the scaled structure, diversity, complexity and dynamic nature 
of these systems precludes human capacity to fully understand and comprehend system 
behaviour and consequently they question the ability and appropriateness of making 
reliable and precise predictions about the future. This view has strong policy 
implications: if predictions are difficult if not impossible to make, then the ability for 
policy makers to use them to craft sustainable resource use outcomes presents a 
relatively pessimistic view.
In responding to these analytical challenges complexity theorists, rather than shy away 
from its analytical challenges, have observed and embraced what may be considered as 
an adaptable perspective rooted in everyday experience. Arthur (1994, pp.406-407) 
described this as:
[humans faced with complex problems] look for patterns; and we simplify the 
problem using these patterns to construct temporary hypothesis to work with. 
We carry out localised deductions based on our current hypothesis and act on 
them. As feedback from the environment comes in, we may strengthen or 
weaken our beliefs in our current hypotheses, discarding some when they cease 
to perform and replacing them as needed with new ones....Such behaviour is 
inductive
This perspective places uncertainty and risks at the centre of the policy problem and 
shifts the policy perspective from 'optimisation’ to 'risk management’ .
The management implications of risk in policy development are rooted in the adaptive 
management literature, which takes two specific forms in the context of fisheries 
management. The first of these is the concept of 'adaptive management' as a scientific 
process based around the idea of stock assessment and management and policy as a 
‘fisheries experiment’. A typical characterisation of an ‘adaptive management’ cycle is 
given by Hilborn and Walters (1992) as a six-stage process: identification of alternative 
hypotheses; assessment of whether further steps are needed to estimate the expected 
value of additional information; development of models for future learning about the 
hypothesis; identification of policy options; development of performance criteria for 
comparing options and formal comparison of options (cited in Berkes, 2000).
An alternative conceptualisation of this ‘technical’ adaptive management approach is 
made by theorists writing from a policy and institutional perspective who interpret 
adaptive management as a process designed to promote sustainability through learning 
behaviours (see for example Charles, 1988, 1994, 2001, 2004, 2008; Berkes 2000). In
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this literature, policy is reinvented from being a ‘decision* to being a ‘ learning process' 
that allows policy makers to reflect on experiences and new information from many 
sources, and incorporate these into the policy process, gradually ‘updating" them over 
time. In this way, policy is described as an ‘adaptive process.’ Similar to the scientific 
work o f Hilborn and Walters (1992), a central focus o f this ‘adaptive process' is 
addressing the uncertainties and consequently risks inherent in fisheries management— 
although in this case, the concepts o f ‘uncertainty* and ‘ risk’ move beyond scientific 
ones to other types o f risks such as institutional and implementation risks (see the work 
o f Francis and Shotton, 1997 for discussion) as well as the uncertainty created by the 
broader relationships within a complex adaptive system (see for example Anderies et 
ah,2004).
Within this paradigm, the approach o f management ‘as technical exercise’ is explicitly 
rejected in favour o f a discourse that views management as a ‘ learning process’ of 
‘adapting’ ‘ institutions’ and human knowledge to the dynamic socio-ecological system. 
Here the aim is not to ‘optimise’ the system outcomes, but rather to strive towards a 
‘ robust’ system capable o f maintaining the qualities o f value to humans (and 
ecosystems, depending on the underlying philosophy), rather than maximum extraction 
o f resources. In application, these ideas suggest less rigid and more flexible 
management style than that suggested by the economic approach, but do not preclude 
the fundamental insights o f that literature. For example, given the significant gaps in 
scientific understanding about stock biology, future market conditions for tuna, and the 
structural diversity between 32 member countries and territories, a complexity view­
point would argue that the calculation o f an MEY is unrealistic as an outcome oriented 
fisheries target, but its construction provides a useful tool and guide to learn about the 
‘tuna system’ behaviour and its evolution over time. This information then provides 
critical feedback to considering alternative management strategies. This uncertainty/risk 
approach to natural resource management implies four things with respect to designing 
institutions:
• Goals are necessary management tools but they need to adapt to meet changing 
circumstances over time.
• ‘ Risk’ margins — in the form o f ‘ spare capacity’— are an important part of 
managing for external or internal shocks (unexpected or not) and consequently 
are critical to managing for robustness
• Management frameworks and policy processes need to be designed as ‘ learning 
processes’
• Mechanisms are required to allow policy makers to experiment with resource 
use and different configurations o f institutions— to discover over time 
improvements in system outcomes.
There is growing application o f complexity approaches to natural resource management 
and fisheries management both in a theoretical, technical and policy senses, with good 
examples found in Charles, 2004; Charles, 2001; O’Sullivan, 2004; Janssen, 2002; 
Marshall, 2005; Wilson, 2006; Paavola and Adger, 2005.
4.4.3 Institutional change, 'dynamic' transactions costs and path dependency
A parallel— but still related— area o f research to the ‘complex adaptive systems’ 
approach is found in the institutional literature relating to ‘path-dependency’ of 
institutional development and change over time. Starting with North (1990), this 
research places institutional design and change in specific historical time and places
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focus on institutional choice not on the quality of governance ‘outcomes' listed above, 
but on the costs of minimising institutional change.
The starting point of this literature is the assertion that ‘institutions' exist to reduce the 
costs of undertaking an economic transaction (‘static transactions costs) but, more 
relevant for this thesis, is the extension of the basic transaction costs insight into 
theoretical inquiries of how and why institutions may change over time and in which 
circumstances. Within this discourse, Challen (2000) argues that the ‘...supply of new 
institutions [that is, institutional or policy change] ...is [partially] constrained by 
dynamic transactions costs arising in the costs of transition from one institutional 
structure to another' (p. 147) and that ‘institutional history influences practical 
opportunities for institutional change in the present' (p.7). In turn these ‘dynamic’ 
transactions costs are defined as the costs associated with the choice of current 
institutional arrangements on the options for institutional change in the future. Two 
types o f ‘dynamic transactions costs' are identified. First, are the ‘institutional transition 
costs' which are those costs of implementing institutional change and arise as a result of 
activities such as research on institutional design, bargaining costs, political costs to 
decision makers, costs associated with institutional creation (for example, establishing 
the secretariat of the WCPFC), obsolescence in existing infrastructure created by 
institutional change (see Marshall, 2005, for an over view). The second type of 
‘dynamic transactions costs’ arise from the costs associated with the ability of current 
institutional arrangements to determine the range of possible future institutional options 
that may be considered viable. That is, current institutional arrangements are subjected 
to significant ‘path-dependency' tendencies that mean that some alternative institutional 
arrangements are considered to require transition costs that are higher than any potential 
benefit that may be enjoyed from new arrangements. Source of this ‘path-dependency’ 
vaiy but two major sources—which are likely to be present in the WCPO—are those 
associated with policy (political) irreversibility, network externalities and those created 
by ‘learning by doing’.
The core insight from this transactions costs view is that policy makers seeking 
institutional change need to identify and work towards reducing transaction costs across 
two dimensions: reducing transition costs as well as ensuring that the selection of new 
institutions does not unduly create institutional lock in. As Challen states “...there may 
be a value to adopting or retaining institutions that minimise ...inter-temporal 
opportunity costs through maintaining institutional flexibility to respond to altered 
parameters or new knowledge in resource systems’ (p 8). This is recognised as an 
analytically difficult task in its empirical application (for example, Marshall, (Marshall, 
2005) due to the difficulties in predicting the effects of institutional change on each 
category of costs identified. Marshall (2005) argues that this challenge can be best met 
through the use of the ‘adaptive’ inductive method of the sorts proposed by Arthur 
(1994, noted above) and that analysis ‘need to look beyond comparative statics’ when 
predicting these costs (Marshall, 2005, p.71). Marshall’s analysis, therefore, draws a 
direct connection between the transactions costs literature and the complex adaptive 
literature’s ‘learning’ criterion for institutional design. These concepts are drawn into 
the analysis of this thesis through an explicit recognition of the ‘path-dependent' nature 
of policy development that is used to underpin the analysis in Chapter 9.
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PART TWO
CONTEXT AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE WCPFC
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CHAPTER 5
SOVEREIGNTY AND COOPERATION IN REGIONAL PACIFIC TUNA 
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, CONSERVATION  
AND THE VESSEL DAY SCHEME
5.1. Introduction
The Pacific Islands region has developed a collaborative approach to fisheries 
management that has set global precedents in regional fisheries co-operation and 
significantly boosted their capacity to manage the region’s tuna fisheries and progress 
their national interests. Similarly, through cooperation, the Pacific Islands States have 
developed a collective influence in fisheries negotiations that is arguably far greater and 
more effective than what they could achieve individually.
Regional co-operation is vitally important in the Pacific Islands region due to the 
migratory nature o f the region’s tuna fisheries and the limited capacity o f most Pacific 
Island States to take advantage o f their rights and discharge their obligations under the 
United Nations Law o f the Sea Convention (LOSC) following the extension o f maritime 
zones o f jurisdiction.
During 2007-2008, the Pacific Islands region further developed its collective 
approaches and established new initiatives in regional fisheries co-operation that are o f 
global interest. These regional achievements are particularly impressive given the 
significantly limited capacity of the region, and the parlous state o f many o f the island 
economies and governments. This paper discusses the evolution and development of 
these recent management initiatives and provides a tentative evaluation o f these against 
the regions conservation and management commitments.
5.2. The Pacific Island States and Territories and their fishing resources
The Pacific Islands region encompasses a unique grouping o f small island states 
characterised by small land mass surrounded by large oceanic exclusive economic zones 
(EEZs). In total, these zones cover roughly 30,569,000 km2 o f the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean (WCPO)10 and include some o f its most productive fishing waters with 
roughly 57% o f all WCPO catches for the four key tuna species (skipjack, yellowfin, 
bigeye, albacore) taken from the Pacific Island EEZs.* 11.12
10For the purposes of this paper, the WCPO is defined as those waters within the Area defined 
by the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean. This stretches from Indonesia and the Philippines in the 
west to Hawaii, Kiribati and French Polynesia in the East.
11 For the purposes of this estimate, this includes the EEZs of: (FFA members) Cook Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu (and non-FFA members) 
American Samoa, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Pitcairn Island, and the French territory of 
Wallis and Futuna. The data for this estimate was sourced from Gillett, 2005.
12 The Island States and Territories in the region are at different stages of political and economic 
development. Ten are politically independent but with substantial dependence on foreign aid 
(Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu). Two are independent but affiliated with 
New Zealand (Cook Islands, Niue). One is part of New Zealand (Tokelau) and the rest are 
dependent territories of either the United States, France, or the United Kingdom (American 
Samoa; Guam; Northern Marianas; French Polynesia; New Caledonia; Wallis and Futuna; and 
Pitcairn Islands).
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These fisheries have long been viewed as the primary development opportunity for 
many of the region’s developing island states (for example, Asian Development Bank, 
1997; Gillett et al, 2001). Access fees from foreign fishing vessels deliver much-needed 
untied financial contributions to governments, while domestically-based fishing fleets 
and support industries pump hard currency into national economies. Fisheries resources 
have also, to a degree, motivated some distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) to build 
and maintain relationships throughout the region that include significant aid budgets. 
While coastal fisheries provide important sources of traditional food and income to 
artisanal communities (Gillett, 2006), the oceanic tuna fisheries are the cornerstone 
upon which many Pacific Island States—particularly those in the western part of the 
region—depend for revenue and economic activity.
The two main components of the Pacific Islands tuna fisheries are purse seine vessels or 
longline vessels originating either from distant water fishing nations or domestic 
industries. Distant water fishing vessels may either be based within a Pacific Island 
State (due to licensing requirements) or operate from a distant home port. The vast 
majority of these vessels are from distant water fishing nations (DWFN), notably China, 
Japan, Korea, the United States, Taiwan and increasingly, the European Union, who fish 
within Pacific Island EEZs or on the high seas. These vessels operate through access 
agreements or are directly licensed by the coastal states to fish within their EEZ. The 
annual value of tuna caught by DWFN vessels is approximately four times that caught 
by domestic fishing vessels (Forum Secretariat, 2005).
Domestic fishing vessels are generally smaller vessels that mostly fish for tuna within 
their own flag state's EEZ. These vessels may be nationally owned and operated, or 
may be foreign owned and operated through domestic charters and/or joint ventures 
with local interests. Charter and/or joint venture arrangements generally specify local 
participation requirements in the venture and require that the vessel be located within 
the country. Most domestic vessels are longliners, but recently there has been an 
increase in Pacific Island flagged or domestic-based purse seiners (ForSec, 2005a). A 
comparison of the key characteristics between the main fleets is summarised in Tables 
5.1 and 5.2.
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In recent years, the problems of overfishing and overcapacity (that is, too many fishing 
boats) have increased and now threaten the long-term sustainability of some of the 
region’s key fish stocks. The WCPFC Scientific Committee has repeatedly expressed 
concerns regarding current levels of fishing since its inaugural meeting in 2005 and 
each year recommends increasingly tougher reductions in fishing mortality (WCPFC, 
2006, 2007, 2008). Furthermore, economic studies have shown that fishing effort is 
significantly above optimal levels, thereby reducing the profitability of the fishery and 
undermining opportunities for Pacific island States to develop fishing and related 
industries (Bertignac et al, 2001; Kompas and Che, 2006; Reid et al, 2006).
5.3. R e g io n a l  A p p r o a c h e s  to  F ish e r ie s  C o o p e r a t io n  a n d  C a p a c it y  B u il d in g
From the granting of EEZ rights under Law o f the Sea Convention in the late 1970s 
adoption until the formation of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
in 2004, tuna management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) has been 
organised around the principle of coastal state ownership of marine resources (Munro, 
1990; United Nations, 2004) and regional cooperation over their management. Quickly 
recognising the potential of these EEZ rights to foster economic development, the 
independent Pacific Island Countries (PICs) formed the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), 
to assist them in the management of these valuable resources. The key objective for 
these states was, and continues to be, to ‘maximise the economic returns’ through a 
variety of strategies to ensure that tuna stocks are managed on a sustainable basis in 
order to underpin future economic opportunities associated with the resource (Barclay 
and Cartwright, 2007; Ram-Bidesi, 2003; Ram-Bidesi & Tsamenyi, 2004).
The Pacific Islands States depend upon regional cooperation and the effective operation 
of regional institutions to enable and support effective fisheries management and 
development. This is a biological necessity—since the tuna fisheries are a shared 
commons resources between the Pacific States and other coastal states in the region, the 
long term sustainable use of these resource therefore requires regional cooperation. 
Regional cooperation is also an economic imperative: any serious threat to the 
sustainability of the tuna resource can be viewed as a threat to the region’s economic 
viability and food security.
The FFA itself does not manage the tuna fisheries and has no such mandate, nor any 
authority to enforce decisions of its governing council (Aqorau, 2002). This is an 
important distinction as the establishment of the FFA caused some concern amongst 
DWFN that the FFA was a regional fisheries management organisation and therefore 
should be open to the participation of distant water fishing states with an interest in the 
tuna fisheries (Van Dyke and Heftel, 1981; Van Dyke, 1995). These concerns reflected 
the interests of some DWFNs, particularly the US, that did not necessarily recognise the 
sovereign rights of coastal states over migratory fisheries (Aqorau, 2002), or properly 
recognise the fundamental capacity-building purpose of the FFA.
The FFA supports the interests of the Pacific Island States through facilitating regional 
cooperation in their favour and providing technical and policy advice. Concerns over 
the role of the FFA were effectively laid to rest in the early 1990s13 and discussions 
began to develop momentum for the establishment of the WCPFC.
13 While som e DWFN (most notably the US) historically rejected interpretations of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) that granted coastal states sovereign rights
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The FFA works closely with the Oceanic Fisheries Programme (OFP) o f its partner 
agency, the Secretariat o f the Pacific Community (SPC). OFP is one o f a number o f 
SPC programmes that aim to build capacity within the Pacific islands region and 
support members with technical assistance. The mission o f the OFP is: ‘ to provide 
member countries with the scientific information and advice necessary to rationally 
manage fisheries exploiting the region's resources o f tuna, billfish and related species’ 
(SPC, 2005). The OFP provides fisheries science services to its members (primarily 
relating to tuna) and is also a contracted science provider for the Scientific Committee 
o f the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.
5.3.1 Cooperative Approaches to Fisheries Management and Domestication
The FFA has been most successful in its work to support sub-regional and regional 
cooperation relating to access by foreign fishing fleets into EEZs. In this area, the FFA 
has facilitated the development of a number o f key regional arrangements.
The first o f these arrangements, established in 1987, arose out o f growing conflict 
between FFA states and the US over the latter’s refusal to recognise EEZ rights in the 
context o f highly migratory tuna stocks. The USMLT was a true multilateral treaty 
negotiated with all FFA members and comprehensively covered issues such as licence 
numbers, access conditions, access fees and reporting obligations (see FFA, date 
unknown). Allocated 40 vessel places, the Treaty allowed the US fleet to roam freely 
between the EEZs o f FFA countries in exchange for access fees and a development 
assistance fund— which represents a major plank o f Pacific-US relations. In practice, 
the US fleet predominately concentrated its activities in the Western part o f the region 
due to the relatively larger concentration o f skipjack tuna found there: however the 
treaty has allowed the eastern states to benefit from the occasional fishing activity.15
Following on from the US treaty, and the key driving force behind most subsequent 
regional cooperation, was the establishment in 1982 o f the Nauru Agreement by a sub­
set o f the FFA membership comprising the relatively ‘tuna rich' states in the western 
and equatorial region o f the Pacific: Papua New Guinea, Federated States of
over migratory species within their EEZs, the reality at sea moved on. For over 20 years, the 
status quo has reflected the coastal state interpretation and there is no indication that fishing 
states are likely to fish for tuna within EEZs without the permission of coastal states. It is now 
widely accepted that the LOSC grants coastal states ‘practically exclusive powers over 
regulating access’ to the fisheries within their EEZ, including straddling and highly migratory fish 
stocks (Molenaar, 2003).
14SPC, formerly the South Pacific Community, was the first of the regional fora to be established 
and was founded in 1947 by the colonial powers of the time: Australia, New Zealand, 
Netherlands, France, United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (US). The 
membership evolved through the period of de-colonisation and now includes the independent 
Pacific island States (Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu) the Pacific island territories (American Samoa, French Polynesia, 
Guam, New Caledonia, Northern Mariana Islands, Pitcairn Islands, Tokelau, Wallis and Futuna) 
and Australia, New Zealand, France and the US. The organisation is headquartered in Noumea, 
with regional offices throughout the Pacific islands region. Its mission is to “... help Pacific island 
people make and implement informed decisions about their future’ (SPC, 2005).
15 The US Treaty has had various guises and forms -  for example with different numbers of 
boats permitted (up to 50 during the early 1990s, which dropped over time. For a 
comprehensive history of the Treaty and the US Fleet in this part of the Pacific, see Gillett et al 
(2002)
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Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands. Tuvalu 
subsequently became a party in 1991.
As the primary focus o f distant water fishing activities, the Pacific Island Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement (PNA) recognised that they were in a weak position when negotiating 
access arrangements individually with DWFNs, particularly when DWFNs played each 
state against each other in negotiations over access fees and conditions (Lodge, 1992, 
1998). In response, the PNA negotiated the Nauru Agreement in order to coordinate and 
harmonise their fisheries management and access conditions, thereby placing 
themselves in a stronger strategic position when negotiating with DWFNs. The Nauru 
Agreement promoted the follow ing objectives:
• coordinate and harmonise management o f common fish stocks between PNA, 
w ithout derogating any o f their sovereign rights (Article 1);
• priority consideration for licensing PNA vessels over foreign vessels (Article 
2a);
• establish minimum terms and conditions for foreign vessel access (Article 2b);
• cooperate and coordinate fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance (Articles 
6 and 7).
The Nauru Agreement became the cornerstone for regional cooperation and enabled 
subsequent cooperative agreements to develop increasingly harmonised approaches to 
common fisheries that would extend beyond the limited membership o f the PNA.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Pacific Island members o f the PNA became 
increasingly concerned at the rapid expansion o f the purse seine fishery and its potential 
impact on the long term sustainability o f the WCPO tuna fisheries. In light o f these 
concerns. PNA initiated discussions in 1990 to develop arrangements that might lim it 
purse seine numbers within the PNA sub-region. During this process, the PNA agreed to 
introduce interim limits on how many purse seine vessels they would license to fish in 
their collective EEZs while negotiating a more comprehensive arrangement to lim it 
purse seine fishing across all PNA EEZs. In 1990, PNA agreed to provisionally lim it the 
number o f purse seine vessel licenses to 164 purse seine vessels but by 1993, this lim it 
had increased to its final maximum o f 205 (Dunn, 2006). These increases arose from 
significant pressure from DWFN to license vessels and reflected problems verifying 
exactly how many purse seine vessels were actually licensed across all PNA EEZs.16
In 1993, the Pacific Island members o f the PNA concluded negotiations and signed the 
legally binding Palau Arrangement for the Management o f the Purse Seine Fishery in 
the Western and Central Pacific (Palau Arrangement, 1995) which subsequently entered 
into force in 1995. This agreement essentially built upon the earlier 1987 USMLT and 
brought within scope o f regional fora the management o f all DWFN fleets. Concurrent 
to these developments, FFA interest in developing their own fisheries grew throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s and many Pacific Island States aspired to replace DWFN fleets 
with locally based domestic fleets. In response to these aspirations, PNA members 
established the FSM Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access (FSM Arrangement, 
1995). The Arrangement further elaborated the Nauru Agreement’ s objectives o f 
supporting local development and promoting PNA vessels over DWFN vessels. In this
The development of the Palau Arrangement caused much concern amongst DWFN 
and raised significant opposition. For discussion, see: Aqorau and Bergin, 1997; Lodge, 1998; 
Dunn et al., 2006.
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regard, the FSM Arrangement provided for lower cost licenses and access to the waters 
of all PNA states for domestic and locally based vessels that met specific criteria.
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Table 5.3: Timetable of Major Regional Treaty Making in the Western and
Central Pacific
Date Event
1982 Conclusion o f LOSC
1987 US Multilateral Treaty
1992 Signature and ratification o f the Nauru Agreement
1993 Signature and ratification o f the Palau Arrangement
1994 First, MHLC Conference ( ‘ Majuro Declaration’
1992 Implementation o f the Nuie Treaty and MTCs Agreement
1995 Conclusion o f the UNFSA Agreement
1996 Negotiation and development o f the FSMA
2000 Study reviewing the Palau Arrangement— development o f the 
VDS proposal
2000 Signing o f the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention
2004 Coming into force o f the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Convention
2005 First meeting o f the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Convention
2007 - December Implementation o f the Vessel Day Scheme
2008 Development o f the ‘Third Implementing Agreement’ o f the PNA.
Source: authors' own analysis
The objectives o f these arrangements are, inter alia, to promote both the sustainability o f 
the tuna resources and to increase the level o f economic returns obtained by the PNA 
and FFA states from their tuna resources. This is reflected in the preamble o f the Palau 
Arrangement which states:
Recognising the responsibilities o f coastal states and fishing states to cooperate 
with each other in the conservation and management o f the living marine
resources.....  and M indful o f the dependence o f countries o f the South Pacific
upon the rational development and utilization o f the living marine resources and 
the continued abundance o f these resources (Palau Treaty, 1995).
Taken together, the essence o f these arrangements was a mutual agreement to 
coordinate national purse seine management policies through a global restriction on the 
number o f purse seine vessels able to access the fishing grounds. The objective o f this 
approach was to mutually restrict fishing activity, under each national fishing 
management regime, and thereby restrict harvests o f the key target species o f skipjack 
tuna and yellowfin tuna. Implementation critically remained, therefore, a national 
responsibility. It was anticipated that by doing so, harvest levels be maintained at 
‘ sustainable’ levels (particularly a concern for yellowfin tuna) (Clark, 2006) and the 
total supply o f canning tuna restricted on the world market— thus increasing the value 
o f the fishery to the Pacific states and the fishers. By basing access fees on a percentage 
o f the value o f catch , increasing the value o f the fishery overall, would, it was argued, 
would flow through to higher access fee revenues collected through licensing DWFN 
and other vessels to operate in EEZs. Given its exclusive coastal state membership, the 
scope o f the Arrangement was effectively limited to EEZs. Significantly, the preamble 
to the arrangement did emphasise the special interest o f coastal states in tuna in adjacent 
high seas areas.
17 In general access fees were expressed as a percentage of the value of the fish harvested 
within an EEZ, with access fee negotiations focused on determining expected levels of catch, 
expected prices and percentage rates (usually around 5-6%). Pers comm., Kumoru, 2006; Pers 
comm., Clark (2006a).
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The question o f allocating these vessel limits was resolved through honouring the terms 
of the US Treaty (which allowed for 40 vessels) and then allocating most o f the 
remaining vessels to existing DWFNs— who in essence received the vast majority o f the 
implicit property rights bound up in the permit to operate a vessel because they 
collectively owned the vast bulk o f active purse seine vessels in the region. Additional 
allocations, with favourable terms of access, were set aside for fishing for domestic 
vessels under the FSMA— partly as a way o f encouraging domestication o f purse seine 
vessels which met w ith some moderate success18. An overview o f the structure o f these 
arrangements is set out in Figure 5.1l9.
5.3.2 Cooperative Approaches to Fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
Immediately after concluding the Nauru Agreement, the PNA began negotiating the 
first o f three implementing arrangements that would operationalise the treaty's 
objectives.“0 The First Implementing Arrangement to the Nauru Agreement (11 A, 1983) 
was adopted in September 1983 and established agreed Harmonised Minimum Terms 
and Conditions for foreign fishing vessels (HMTCs). While these conditions were 
originally intended to only apply to PNA, the broader FFA endorsed a draft o f the 
conditions during their negotiations and began a parallel initiative that quickly extended 
the application o f the HMTCs to the entire FFA membership. The HMTCs harmonised 
licensing procedures and catch reporting, and established a regional register o f fishing 
vessels. Each Pacific Island is responsible for the implementation o f these conditions at 
the national level (Aqorau, 2002).
In April 1990, follow ing a significant increase in the number o f vessels fishing in PNA 
waters and a desire from some PNA to review the HMTCS, the PNA commissioned a 
legal drafting group to prepare a draft second implementing arrangement." The Second 
Implementing Arrangement to the Nauru Agreement (21 A, 1991) came into affect in 
January 1991 and expanded the HMTCs to also incorporate observer requirements, 
prohibit transhipments at sea, expand monitoring and surveillance, and introduce an 
annual registration for the regional vessel register. Once again the broader membership 
o f the FFA endorsed the PNA's expanded HMTCs and agreed that the conditions 
should be implemented throughout all FFA EEZs (Forum Communique, 1990).
Regardless o f these new agreements on harmonised licensing conditions, Pacific Island 
States still suffered from an obvious lack o f capacity to patrol and monitor their massive 
EEZs. In response, the Pacific island members o f the FFA adopted a treaty framework
First, it appears that the FSM arrangement has spurred some PNA to invest in the 
harvesting sector. Second, it has encouraged foreign direct investment into PNA to obtain 
fishing licenses for all PNA waters (Havice, 2007). However, for various reasons, the FSM 
Arrangements seems to have had limited success in domesticating vessels from DWFN into 
becoming truly locally based (or domestic) in the PNA. A review of the FSM Arrangement in 
2007 found that there was significant variation in the amount and quality of benefits gained from 
the FSM Arrangement to PNA and that other factors, not related to the FSM Arrangement, were 
probably just as important as the Arrangement in promoting domestication and onshore 
development (that is, proximity to fishing grounds, availability of land, infrastructure and services 
and domestic government policy). (Parris, Barclay and Cartwright, 2007).
19Additional aspects of the Treaties included implementing mechanisms to promote orderly 
behaviour of vessel on the fishing grounds, through monitoring vessel activity and common 
licensing conditions as well as mechanisms to record harvest levels for scientific research and 
as a basis for determining access fees.
90For details of negotiations for the First and Second Implementing Arrangement, see: Lodge, 
(1992) and Doulman, (1987).
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in 1993 that enabled FFA member states to cooperate in surveillance and enforcement 
and share surveillance assets.
The Niue Treaty on Co-operation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the 
South Pacific Region entered into force (Niue Treaty, 1993) is essentially an umbrella 
arrangement that supports the development o f subsidiary agreements to implement 
surveillance and enforcement cooperation at the bi-lateral or sub-regional level.
Despite some initial interest. FFA members were slow to finalise subsidiary agreements 
due to the high costs involved in running surveillance patrols (Aqorau, 2000). However, 
while negotiation of subsidiary agreements was slow, FFA members began to cooperate 
more actively in jo int surveillance operations through MOUs.21
Since 2000, FFA members have shown significantly more interest in surveillance and 
enforcement cooperation and have also expressed interest in inviting non-FFA states, 
particularly France and the US, to cooperate more actively with FFA members in 
surveillance and enforcement activities. There are now four subsidiary agreements in 
effect22, a further six awaiting government endorsement, and an increasing number of 
regular multi-lateral fisheries surveillance operations that include Niue Treaty members 
and non-members providing support (such as aerial surveillance).23 FFA members are 
now considering the development o f a multilateral subsidiary agreement and invoking 
Article X11(5) o f the Niue Treaty to enable the US and France to participate.
Similarly, during the late 1990s, the FFA discussed establishing the world's first 
centralised satellite based vessel monitoring system. In 1997, the entire FFA 
membership o f Pacific Island States agree to expand the HMTCs and require all their 
licensed foreign vessels to report continuously to a satellite-based vessel monitoring 
system (VMS) that would operated by the FFA secretariat and would forward vessel 
positions to national officers to monitor.
5.3.3Regional Approaches to Cooperation between Pacific island States and Distant 
Water Fishing Nations (DWFN): the development of the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission
The jurisdictional boundaries o f the FFA Treaties were limited both by the extent of 
their EEZ rights, as set out under LOSC, and by the spatial pattern o f fishing resources, 
which determined the influence they exerted over the fleets. The reason that these 
Treaties focused on purse seine rather than longlining gears was due to the relative 
dominance o f fishing activity o f the former gear type within EEZs. Since the majority o f 
longlining activity took place on the ‘ high seas’ areas o f the WCPO, the FFA states had 
less power to control this activity and. despite efforts, they were never able to replicate 
an equivalent set o f Treaties for this gear type24.
21 Most notably: Palau, Federated States of Micronesia and Marshall Islands (which 
subsequently formalised the MOU into a subsidiary agreement).
22 Federated States of Micronesia, Palau and Marshall Islands: Australia and Papua New 
Guinea: Tonga and Tuvalu: Samoa and Cook Islands.
23 Operations Bigeye and Island Chief in Micronesia: Operations Kurukuru and Tui Moana in 
Polynesia: and Operation Rai Balang between Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia. 
24That did not stop them trying and periodical efforts are made to develop a longline-based 
regional agreement.
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The limited coastal state membership o f the FFA and PNA inevitably lim it their 
effectiveness. Using Reid (2007) as the source data, these figures indicate that only 
approximately 50 per cent o f the total purse seine catch across the entire WCPO region 
is actually taken within the EEZs o f the FFA states— see Figure 5.2— and that the purse 
seine catch o f yellowfin tuna and bigeye tuna, as a percentage o f all gear types that take 
this species within these EEZs, is relatively small.
Figure 5.2: Percentage of total purse seine catch taken in difference zones
of the WCPFC-Convention Area
■ FFA Zone iCtferEEZs HcfiSaas
Source: Reid 2007; author's own analysis
Up until 2004. fishing effort targeting the same migratory stocks on the high seas was 
essentially unregulated and there was no mechanism to coordinate fisheries 
management between the EEZs o f the FFA states and other coastal states in the region, 
most notably Indonesia and the Philippines.
In the early 1990s, FFA members recognised that a regional forum was required that 
engaged their DWFN partners and Indonesia and Philippines and facilitated 
management o f migratory fisheries beyond their EEZs.
In 1994, the FFA hosted a multi-lateral high level conference o f Pacific Island States 
and DWFN on the future management and conservation o f straddling and highly 
migratory fisheries within the WCPO. This meeting agreed on the need to co­
operatively and sustainably manage WCPO tuna resources across their entire range (see 
Tarte, 2002). This was followed by six further conferences until negotiations concluded 
in 2000 with the successful adoption o f the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Convention (WCPF Convention, 2000) which subsequently entered into force in July 
2004. The objective o f the WCPF Convention, as described in Article 2, is to ensure the
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The Pacific Island States are a critical membership bloc of the WCPFC and were a key 
driver behind its development. Other WCPFC members include (amongst others) 
Indonesia, Philippines and the DWFNs: Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, US and the 
European Community. The WCPF Convention binds these members to implement its 
provisions and WCPFC conservation and management measures. Since its 
establishment in 2004, the WCPFC has agreed on a number of conservation measures 
that impose specific obligations on all members, the most important of which from a 
conservation perspective—the Vessel Day Scheme—was developed within the context 
of the PNA.
The WCPFC closely follows the framework established by the United Nations Fish 
Stocks Agreement (UNFSA, 1995) and emphasises a precautionary and ecosystem- 
based approach to fisheries management. The WCPF Convention applies to all waters 
of the WCPO, including both high seas and EEZs. However, the WCPF Convention 
clearly states in Article 4 that nothing in the Convention shall prejudice the rights, 
jurisdiction and duties of states under the LOSC and UNFSA, and that the WCPFC shall 
be interpreted and applied in the context of, and in a manner consistent with the LOSC 
and UNFSA. This is a critical point for Pacific Island States, given their heavy 
dependence upon the fishery and aspirations for development, and their sovereign rights 
over much of the fishery within their EEZs.
A critical focus for the WCPFC will be how it develops co-operative management 
across the high seas/EEZ nexus, and by operation or intent, allocates rights to the tuna 
resource. There are key disagreements between DWFN and Pacific island States over 
how the WCPF Convention should be interpreted regarding implementation of 
management measures in EEZs and on the issue of allocation ( Langley et al. 2009; 
Parris, 2010; Parris, and Lee A., 2009). Both interpretations cite relevant articles of the 
WCPF Convention and UNFSA (Aqorau, 2001).
Pacific Island States argue that the main purpose for the WCPFC is to regulate the high 
seas and ensure that stocks are not over-fished on these areas (Ram-Bidesi & Tsamenyi, 
2004). They note that management measures already exist within their EEZs. This 
argument is supported by provisions within both the WCPFC and the UNFSA which 
require measures be compatible across the high seas/EEZ nexus, taking into account 
existing measures already in practice.
DWFN argue that the WCPFC, as the primary management authority for tuna across the 
region, should establish management and conservation measures across the entire range 
of the stocks, both inside EEZs and on the high seas (Cordonnery, 2002). These states 
refer to Article 10 of the WCPFC which provides that the Commission can determine 
the quantity of catches, levels of effort, limitations on fishing capacity and other 
necessary management measures throughout the convention area.
Pacific Island States respond that the Commission can establish ‘global’ catch, effort 
and/or capacity limits across the entire Convention area, but that it is the sovereign right 
of coastal states to determine catches within their EEZs. This is supported by the 
‘without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States’ clause in Article 10 of the 
WCPF Convention regarding the Commission’s functions.
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Resolving these conflicts will be critical to the effective functioning of the WCPFC and 
its ability to agree upon, and implement effective conservation and management 
measures across the range of the stocks.
5.4 . R e s p o n se  a n d  O p p o r t u n it y : r e c e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t  in  r e g io n a l  f is h e r ie s
MANAGEMENT.
5.4.1 The case for change from a Pacific Island perspective
While much has been achieved by the Pacific islands region in its 30 years of 
cooperation, for the majority of that time conservation issues generally took a secondary 
priority after development objectives and this was reflected in both the structure and 
operation of the FFA purse seine treaties and the decisions taken by participating 
countries over time.
A key weakness of the Pacific island region’s fishing vessel cap was that it did not 
account for effort creep (where fishing vessels catch ever more fish as technology 
improves, engines get more powerful, nets get bigger and so on...). While the fishing 
vessel cap of 205 remained stable, it became increasingly seen as a blunt and ineffective 
tool at promoting both conservation and development interests. Key problems emerged 
on both the development and conservation aspects of the treaties. These included:
• Selection of too high a vessel limit and reluctance to adjust levels over time in light 
of new information and opportunities as the US fleet declined over time. In some 
years the number of active vessels operating in the region was below the notional 
205 limit, possibly indicating that this limit was higher than what the fishery could 
profitability support.
• Deliberate encouragement to increase number of vessels under the FSMA—see 
Figures 5.3, 5.4 and Table 5.4. Although it is noted that since this data was collected 
the US vessels have increased in number, although the exact extent is unknown.
• Reluctance to adopt further restrictions on the activities of fishing fleets in order to 
account for effort creep—for example, restrictions in FAD use or vessel size. 
Examination of data suggests that the FSMA vessels in particular were the source of 
most effort creep in terms of increasing vessel size and increase use of FADs.
• An implicit allocation of vessel access rights to distant water fishing nations 
(DWFNs) and consequential difficulties in accommodating new fleets who would 
pay access fees on terms more favourable to the PNA.
• Insistence that access fees be negotiated separately with DWFN, leading to a 
continuing downward pressure on access fee charges and a incentive to ensure that 
domestic management regimes continued to actively encourage vessels to enter their 
zones through generous in-kind assistance and/or by ensuring that domestic 
regulation did not extend significantly beyond the regional agreements.25
25 This downward pressure did not apply to monitoring, reporting or related activities where 
minimum uniform standards were adopted throughout the PNA group under the Nuie Treaty,
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VFigure 5.3: Average Vessel Capacity Per Treaty
-------Bilateral ---------- USMLT - - FSM Arrangement
Source: Gillett and Lewis(2003) and FFA (2006)
Table 5.4: Growth in Average Vessel Capacity 1988-2006
Period from 1988 
to 1995
Period from
1995 to 2003
Period 
from 2003 
to 2006
Period from 
1995 to
2006
TOTAL
BILATERAL 54% 29% 2% 32%
TOTAL USMLT 24% -50% -38% -69%
TOTAL FSM
Arrangement 215% 316% 6% 340%
Source: Gillett and _ewis(2003) and FFA(2006a)
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Figure 5.4: Growth in Vessel Numbers per Treaty 1988-2006
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Reinforcing the dissatisfaction was the uneven and unexpectedly slow realisation of 
domestic fleet development and domestic industry development, although some success 
was experienced in PNG, FSM and the Marshall Islands (see Parris et al., 2007).
The reasons for these decisions are complex and go beyond the scope of this paper but it 
is important to note that there were contextual factors that underpinned these decisions. 
Primary amongst these was :
• Significant political pressure to ensure that access fee revenue was maintained, 
particularly in fragile risk-adverse government decision-making bodies, and 
pressure by DWFN.
• It was largely consistent with the available scientific advice at the time and the 
measures were considered practical and achievable in the context. For example 
Table 5.4 indicates that while concerns were raised early for bigeye tuna, scientific 
questions over the sustainability of yellowfin tuna were raised only towards the 
middle of the 1990s.
This growing unease over the operation of the treaties was both driven by and reflected 
in the growing scientific and economic evidence that the region was increasingly 
overfished in bigeye and yellowfin stocks and that the skipjack fishery was overfished 
from an economic—that is profit maximising—point of view (Grafton, 2007; Kompas, 
2006). Clearly a more effective mechanism was required that would enable better 
implementation of conservation goals and support the short and long-term development 
interests of PNA members (Rodwell, 2004)
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5 .5 . The development of the Vessel Day Scheme
In 2000, the PNA states accepted a proposal to convert the structure of the Palau 
Arrangement from a vessel-based scheme to one where the total number of fishing days 
permitted in the fishery were capped within a Total Allowable Effort (TAE) designated 
in ‘fishing days’. Known as the ‘Vessel Day Scheme’ (VDS), the objective was to re­
allocate the quasi-property rights away from the ‘right to operate a vessel’, which 
primarily lay with the existing DWFNs, to the PNA coastal states themselves and 
thereby increase their bargaining power vis-a-vis bilateral access arrangements, as well 
as allowing other interested DWFN fleets to participate (and therefore expand the 
demand, and consequently value, for bilateral access). One of the primary objectives of 
the VDS was therefore to increase resource royalty payments to the PNA states. Within 
the VDS, the TAE would act as the tool for determining ‘limits consistent with resource 
sustainability” while allocation between PNA states was based on the unusual formula 
that combined estimates of shares in biomass within PNA EEZs with actual fishing 
history. As the VDS has been introduced, allowances have been made for vessels that 
fish under an agreement between the US and the Pacific island States (the USMLT)26 
and the FSM Arrangement, which was allocated a pooled effort target.
There remains many similarities between the original Palau Arrangement and the 
VDS—most notably that individual PNA countries retain bilateral access fee 
negotiations while the FSMA and the USMLT maintain their ‘multilateral character. 
But in addition, the VDS does introduce some innovations include allowing days to be 
‘traded’ between PNA states, and a measure to manage capacity growth by adjusting the 
value of a ‘fishing day’ according to the size of the vessel27. The VDS became 
operational on 1 December, 2007.
In 2008, the PNA adopted additional measures— referred to as the ‘Third Implementing 
Agreement’—which are designed to further curb purse seine effort for those vessels 
wishing to operate within their waters. These measures are:
• 100 per cent observer coverage on purse seine vessels operating in their EEZs,
• A three-month closure on FAD fishing in the 3rd quarter of the year, and
• closure of high seas pockets (see FFA, 2008 for more detail).
These measures only apply to foreign vessels operating in PNA waters, and not 
domestic or domestically based vessels. They are currently being implemented.
5.5.1. Evaluating the Vessel Day Scheme
Growing dissatisfaction over these conservation outcomes—and a sense that sufficient 
economic opportunities were not forthcoming from bilateral partners, or from vessels
In 1987, the FFA negotiated a multi-lateral fisheries treaty between its members and 
the US that recognised coastal state rights over migratory fisheries and significantly increased 
benefits to Pacific Islands States. The Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain 
Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of America (USMLT, 1988) 
commenced in 1988 and has since been renewed three times.
For those vessels with less than 50 meters, one ‘fishing day’ under the VDS is 
accounted for as 1/2 day, for vessels with length between 50-80 meters, one VDS ‘fishing day’ is 
counted as one full day and for vessels with length over 80 meters, one VDS ‘fishing day’ is 
counted as 1 V2 days. Previous rules relating to the negotiation and payment of access fees, 
reporting obligations and rules relating to operation of vessels within the fishery grounds remain 
as they were under the previous Palau Arrangement.
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under the FSM Arrangement—was a primary driver in the adoption of the Vessel Day 
Scheme. Like the original Palau Arrangement, the full implications of the VDS will 
only become apparent over time but the structure of the arrangement, and the manner in 
which it is currently being implemented, permits some preliminary comments on its 
merits in addressing the perceived shortcomings of its predecessor and more broadly 
against conservation and political objectives of the region.
5.5.1.1. Political and Economic Objectives o f the VDS
Politically and economically, the VDS seeks to advance the PNA position, and the FFA 
more broadly, in a number of areas. The key masterstroke of the VDS was the 
reallocation of the implicit property rights over the purse seine fishery away from 
existing DWFN’s (Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan and others) to an explicit allocation of 
purse seine effort to coastal states in line with their rights and responsibilities under the 
Law o f the Sea Convention (LOSC). In this way, PNA states can and anecdotally are 
increasing their economic and political bargaining power vis a vis obtaining higher 
access fees, or other benefits, from bilateral distant water fishing fleets. Allocating 
resources in this way provides the additional boost of allowing PNA countries— 
although not the rest of the FFA receiving access fees under the USMLT—to look 
beyond traditional DWFN and to broaden the potential market for access rights to 
individual EEZs and thereby increase competition (and hence payoffs) for access.
The income-boosting potential of the VDS is reinforced by provisions that allow PNA 
countries to purchase ‘Day’ from each other, which permits opening up of additional 
revenue streams to smaller Parties, who traditionally do not attract purse seine effort in 
their EEZ (such as Palau or Tuvalu).
At this early stage of implementation the evidence that this strategic move is not yet 
conclusive, but although the impacts are uneven across the PNA countries the strategy is 
bearing fruit for the region with progress being made along several lines:
• Business entities from DWFN (predominately Philippines, Taiwan, and to some 
extent Japan and China) are actively investing in 'on-shore’ developments in 
PNA countries—most notably in PNG and to some extent Solomon Islands and 
the Marshall Islands. Operating a canning-related facility is more expensive and 
difficult than operating from the home country, but the pace of investment 
appears to be growing, fuelled by a general view in the industry that without 
such business relationships, they will, in future, be ‘cut out’ of the Pacific.
• In 2006 and 2008, key arguments between coastal states and DWFN were partly 
resolved in practice (though not clearly in principle) through the incorporation of 
the PNA VDS and the PNA 3IA into WCPFC conservation and management 
measures. These decisions indirectly recognised the primacy of coastal states 
over management of fisheries within their EEZs and framed conservation and 
management for high seas fisheries in the context of existing management 
practised in EEZs. A key example of this was the endorsement of the PNA 3IA’s 
closure of the high seas pockets and its inclusion within the WCPFC bigeye and 
yellowfin conservation and management measure (CCM 2008-01).
On the other hand, it also appears that the internal trading mechanism of the VDS has 
not yet been operationalised due to a reluctance of the smaller PNA countries to sell to 
each other. This could be indicative of internal regional politics between the PNA 
countries but is more likely to reflect an inherent caution in national fisheries
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administrations about how to best implement a relatively new and sophisticated fishing 
regime.
5.5.J.2 Conservation objectives o f the VDS
From a conservation perspective, the VDS introduces two important innovations into 
the Palau Arrangement. First, unlike the original Palau Arrangement, the VDS is 
explicitly linked with a conservation and management objective—2004 effort levels— 
and that these effort levels are consistent with broader regional developments in 
conservation management, primarily through the conservation and management 
measures of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.28 This has recently 
been strengthened through the closure of the high seas pockets to DWFNs who seek to 
operate within PNA waters. These therefore address a weakness of the original Palau 
Arrangement, identified by Aqorau & Bergin (1997) and Lodge (1998), in setting 
arbitrary limits, calibrated to the then ‘status quo’, rather than explicitly determining 
‘optimal’ levels.
However, key challenges remain within the design and implementation aspects of the 
VDS with respect to conservation. In its provision to the WCPFC, the original advice 
provided by the Commission’s scientific advisors was that effort levels should not 
increase above 2004 levels (Hampton et al 2005a, 2005b; Langley et al 2005, 2005b; 
WCPFC, 2005). Rather than follow this exactly, the Commission adopted the politically 
expedient interpretation of allowing participating countries, including the PNA, to select 
either a baseline equivalent to effort levels expended in zone in 2004 or an average of 
2001-2004 in zone effort levels. At the time, this approach was largely unproblematic 
due to the uncertainty associated with the advice and the political necessity of reaching 
an agreement. The adoption of the 2004 baseline under the Commission therefore came, 
as default, the baseline for the VDS.
However, during the ‘implementation’ phase of the VDS, from its formal adoption by 
the WCPFC and its implementation on 1 December 2007, it has become increasingly 
apparent that effort creep has continued to undermine the conservation objectives of the 
scheme.
Table 5.5 provides the most recent estimates of effort levels since 2004 and compares 
these to agreed effort levels in the original WCPFC management measure (CMM 2005- 
01) and in the formal VDS allocations as reported to the WCPFC in December 2008 
(see ((PNA), 2008). In examining Table 5.5 it is clear that:
• In general, the effort levels, as defined by CMM 2005-01, have since that time 
continued to increase above the recommended effort levels proposed by the 
scientific advisors—with the final VDS allocation approximately 12% above 
2004 levels; and
• That the increase in fishing effort is unevenly spread, with PNG and Kiribati, 
and to some extent the USMLT accounting for the majority of the change.
The issue of the absolute TAE has been further complicated by the issue of ‘shifting’ 
baselines. For instance it is notable that the 2004 effort level was higher than the
28 The 2004 benchmark is somewhat arbitrary and was a policy choice that lay not with the 
PNA, but the WCPFC itself. The PNA’s original choice of baseline simply operated to match that 
of broader regional commitments. One possible reason for the selection of the 2004 baseline by 
the WCPFC was that it represented the highest historical of harvest in the Convention Area.
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original baseline agreed to by the PNA states who initially set the TAE at the average 
purse seine effort expended in 2000-2002 (Rodwell, 2004). Although this could be 
justified on (biological) sustainability grounds, as discussed above, it nevertheless 
increases the number of purse seine effort days by approximately 30 per cent29. 
Potentially more seriously for baselines was the move by Papua New Guinea to 
‘remove’ from VDS management effort expended in its archipelagic waters, even 
though this was an area with high purse seine and FAD activity. In essence, this move 
has meant that PNG unilaterally increased its allocation—and created another area of 
unrestrained capacity growth within regional management.
As yet, these shifting and expanding baselines are, as indicated in Table 5.4, notional 
rather than real, since it appears that many PNA countries, with the exception of PNG, 
are yet to utilise all of their allocation.
Rodwell (2004) reports that the original TAE for the first three years of operation (that 
is, ‘Management Period’) is set at 27,386 days, while the PNA recently announced that the 
actual days allocated was 35,738 days—an increase of 30.49%.
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Parris (2010) has pointed out that one of the key barriers to the adoption of tighter 
conservation targets is the existence of a negative asymmetric externality between the 
pursue seine interests and those of the long liners. This primarily takes the form of a 
disjunct between those who are deemed ‘responsible' for conservation measures in the 
WCPFC and those who may enjoy the conservation benefits in the future. This is 
particularly the case for addressing bigeye conservation needs where the PNA states— 
the primary beneficiaries of the purse seine fishery—are being required to limit the 
benefits they derive from the fishery for the preservation of benefits accruing to other, 
non-PNA, longline states (Parris, 2009, forthcoming). To further complicate matters, 
bigeye tuna, while not being a primary target for them, does nevertheless represent a 
valuable addition to their small domestic longline fisheries and is an important resource 
to other FFA states.
The PNA have correctly recognised that addressing this issue requires broader 
cooperation with the WCPFC and the Third Implementing Agreement can be 
interpreted as one response to this situation. Despite these efforts there remains the 
more difficult problem that, in essence, the VDS is poorly designed to address bigeye 
conservation because it is focused on limiting the effort of purse seine gear, which, in 
turn is an imprecise mode of control over the variable of concern: bigeye tuna harvests.
Its use in this manner is both inefficient in the sense that valuable skipjack tuna 
harvests, that are not under biological threat, are reduced unnecessarily. And for the 
PNA countries this situation is arguably unfair since they are bearing a disproportionate 
amount of costs compared with the benefits they gain from bigeye conservation—a 
view that underpins the PNA’s demand for compensation on this issue. Clearly 
resolution of this dilemma will require further adjustments to the operation of the VDS, 
with one option, as discussed by Parris (2009, forthcoming) to extend property rights, at 
least over bigeye tuna, as a mechanism for shifting the costs of bigeye conservation 
towards those who may benefit.
5.5.1.3 Capacity Management in the VDS
The potential for substitution effects within the purse seine fleets, leading to effort creep 
within participating fleets, is gaining increased attention within the VDS framework 
through measures such as adjustment of the number of available days according to 
vessel size and the Third Implementing Agreement, which further restricts vessel 
activities for distant water fishing fleets.
However, if the objective of VDS is to promote ‘optimal’ capacity for conservation 
purposes, it remains the case that several aspects of the VDS, in particular its integration 
with the USMLT and FSMA Treaties, potentially remain problematic.
The primary problem is that the VDS, largely for historical reasons, has created an 
actual or proxy ‘Olympic style’ fishery for vessels operating under the FSMA and the 
USMLT Treaties. This is achieved by the imposition of an actual global limit on days 
available to the FSMA vessels and a notional global limit applied to the USMLT 
vessels. These limits are applied specifically to the domestic Pacific and the US purse 
seine fleets operating within the WCPO, and in effect constitute a circumscribed sub-set 
of quasi-exemptions to the broader WCPFC management measures for purse seine 
vessels which are continually striving to restrict and reduce total effort (see for example 
Parris et al 2007).
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This policy environment provides a strong incentive for vessels who are eligible to 
operate under these treaties to increase their per vessel capacity and, w here possible, to 
increase vessel numbers as well. For example, the current USMLT restricts the number 
of US vessels that can be licensed under the USMLT to 45 vessels. However, 
throughout the late 1990s the number of vessels licensed under the treaty declined to a 
low of 11 in 2007 due to economic factors (see Gillett et al, 2002). Since then, vessel 
numbers have dramatically increased for two reasons. First, the US removed its 
restriction on vessel origin and now allows foreign built (and significantly cheaper) 
vessels to be licensed under the treaty. Second, the imminent implementation of fishing 
limits by the equatorial Pacific Island States created an incentive for vessels to come 
under the USMLT umbrella to avoid restrictions on fishing effort applied to other 
DWFN vessels (FFA, 2008).
There is also the potential for other sources of capacity slippage to become problematic 
over time. The first of these relates to the technical infrastructure underpinning the VDS 
and the interplay with the MCS systems. Critical to the success of the VDS is a 
functional and reliable vessel monitoring system that is underpinned by rigorous 
enforcement mechanisms. Without these two complimentary strategies, it is possible 
that the number of days actually fished by vessels runs over their allocated amount— 
and therefore the risk exists for gradual capacity creep over time. While the monitoring, 
compliance and surveillance frameworks described above represent an impressive 
regional infrastructure, their success depends on a strong enforcement capacity at the 
national level which unfortunately has been an area experiencing significant problems 
in most PNA countries (see (Hanich, 2008).
Another potential source of capacity slippage is the ability to bring days forward from 
future year allocation. In theory, "borrowing' days from the future should not be a 
significant problem provided that the total number borrowed is not relatively large. 
However, for this to occur without a capacity over-run in following years the 
maintenance of significant political and economic discipline within national fisheries 
administrations is necessary in the face of intense distant water fishing nation (and 
possibly domestic) pressure to increase fishing, particularly on the abundant skipjack 
tuna stocks.
5 .9. Discussion: Achievements of 30 years of regional cooperation
Taken together, a key achievement of the FFA Treaties was that it provided the FFA 
states, and the PNA countries in particular, with a politically strategic, as well as a 
practical platform from which to pursue their economic and political interests with 
respect to the tuna resources. The importance of these cooperative mechanisms within 
an international context of the tuna fishery cannot be underestimated. Hardin’s (1968) 
original conclusions of either a benevolent dictator or private ow ner of the resource, as 
the only solutions to over-exploitation of resources is simply not available in this 
context -  either politically or in within international legal frameworks. Cooperation is 
the only option.
This occurred simultaneously through several mechanisms. First, the concurrent 
development of a regional cooperative MCS regime with operations coordinated by the 
FFA Secretariat was a critical enabling tool for countries unable to afford their own 
comprehensive MCS regime. These MCS Treaties provided members with vital 
facilities such as observers, vessel monitoring services, agreement and enforcement on 
the ban of at-sea trans-shipment, register of vessels and critical data to support
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enforcement should countries wish to do so. These activities provided a dual service to 
the FFA members: they provided data for the purposes of stock management, but, more 
critically, provided the information sources needed to underpin negotiations for access 
agreements and consequently for determining licence fees payable to the FFA member 
governments. As a consequence, a major achievement of the Palau Arrangement, and 
the FFA more broadly, was to put in place the legal, institutional and technical 
infrastructure to enable countries to assert, defend and enjoy the benefits from the EEZ 
rights granted to them under UNCLOS.
The second strategic advantage afforded by the PNA treaties centred around the gradual 
development of the PNA countries around a unified regional process based on perceived 
common interests in the purse seine fishery. Based around the common modus operandi 
of collective management—regular meetings, building of interpersonal relationships, 
development of common positions on issues and joint decision making, the PNA group, 
in effect, carved itself a recognisable identity within regional tuna politics. The value of 
this was underscored with the advent of the WCPFC where strong cooperative 
mechanisms between the FFA states—particularly the PNA states—became a key 
strategic advantage in negotiations with other WCPFC parties over a wide range of 
issues pertaining to the development of the WCPFC and to matters of policy itself. This 
was exemplified in the adoption by the WCPFC of the VDS as an official management 
measure.
A less obvious, but equally powerful strategic advantage of the purse seine treaties was 
the subtle and gradual influence that they had in re-drawing the power relationship 
between PNA group, as coastal states, and the major DWFNs. The PNA treaties, in 
particular the FSMA, were in part an expression of what Schurman (1998) calls 
‘resource nationalism’ that arose during the 1990s. By encoding and enforcing these 
nationalistic ideals into international treaty, the DWFN were forced, over time to 
recognise the legitimacy of these views and shift their perspective of FFA states from 
being merely ‘sellers' of a low-value natural resource to being ‘partners’ in the future 
development of the industry.
5.9.1 The Vessel Day Scheme
Fisheries policy development in the Pacific has historically been an iterative process, 
with new developments arising from and building upon existing efforts. Growing in 
sophistication and addressing more complex needs over time, the latest round of 
transformation—the Vessel Day Scheme—reflects more closely the Pacific island 
aspirations to take a proactive approach to develop their own fisheries and progress their 
own aspirations. Importantly, the VDS has been developed and adapted to operate 
within the available governance capacities of the region, which is an important issue in 
the Pacific islands where governance resources are highly limited (Hanich, 2008).
The key success of the VDS is the strength of its framework design. Yet achieving its 
potential depends on the resolution of remaining design issues: Olympic fishery and 
bigeye tuna problem and overcoming challenges with implementation; baseline creep 
and MCS.
5.10. Conclusion
The recent achievements within the WCPFC, particularly the bigeye and yellowfin 
conservation measure, demonstrate the strength of the FFA and PNA sub-group when
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they negotiate collectively. Similarly, the achievements of the FFA and PNA 
management, control and development mechanisms demonstrate the potential of this 
sub-regional grouping to manage Fishing efforts throughout its area in the direct 
interests of its members, and to extend its influence beyond its immediate boundaries. 
While neither the current VDS nor WCPFC conservation and management measures yet 
meet conservation requirements as recommended by SPC and the WCPFC Scientific 
Committee, they provide the initial framework—due almost entirely to the drive of the 
FFA and PNA.
Given the high dependence of the region on fisheries resources for revenue and food 
security, it is vital that these fora achieve their conservation, management and 
development goals and enable the Pacific Island States to implement the institutional 
and governance programs necessary to conserve and develop the WCPO tuna fisheries.
As pressures grow, and global fishing fleets become more aggressive in their hunt for 
open fishing grounds, strong cooperative institutions will become increasingly critical to 
the effective management, development and control of regional fisheries.
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CHAPTER 6
TUNA DREAMS AND TUNA REALITIES: DEFINING THE TERM 
‘MAXIMISING ECONOMIC RETURNS FROM THE TUNA FISHERIES’ IN
SIX PACIFIC ISLAND STATES
6.1. Introduction
Previous work by Clark (2006) Barclay and Cartwright (2007), as well as earlier work 
by the Asian Development Bank (1997) has generated a significant amount of analysis 
and discussion devoted to identifying the opportunities, and barriers, for Pacific Island 
countries to improve the economic returns they may enjoy from their share of the vast 
tuna resources of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). All of these studies, 
as well as numerous ‘grey literature’ reports (see for example Evans et al, 2008) serve 
to highlight the potential of practical strategies for Pacific Islanders to move towards 
their often stated goal o f ‘maximising economic returns from the tuna fisheries’.
This previous work is important in that they identify potential path-ways for tuna-led 
development and provide Pacific Governments real options to consider when seeking to 
‘maximise economic returns from tuna fisheries’. They do, however, tend to be 
externally driven studies where opportunities are essentially driven by a ‘consultant’s 
perspective’ (albeit usually from those who have a high degree of knowledge about the 
region), the limited scope of consultants terms of reference and the demands of aid 
budgets.
Surprisingly, little work has been conducted on examining tuna development issues 
from the perspective of participants in the Pacific-based tuna industry(ies) themselves 
and how Pacific islanders themselves may articulate their own aspirations. Developing a 
deeper understanding of what Pacific countries want and need from the tuna fisheries in 
the WCPO is becoming increasingly important as the region begins the difficult process 
of implementing the terms of the Convention on the Conservation and Management o f  
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. Several observers 
(Parris et al, 2010; Langley et al., 2009; Tarte, 2008) have noted that the 
implementation of the terms of the Convention is being increasingly slowed over time 
as members become entangled in competing interpretations of its text, including the 
extent to which small island developing states, which includes (but is not confined to) 
the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) countries, will be given special considerations to 
pursue tuna-led development. The FFA interpretation of these texts, in turn, is driven by 
their aspirations and resource use strategies.
This study attempts to partially re-dress this gap by presenting an analysis on the self- 
identified aspirations of industry participants and government representatives from six 
Pacific Island Countries: Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, Fiji, Samoa, the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). 
Using interview-based data’0, media reports, and formal national statements (for 
example, tuna management plans or public statements by governments), this study seeks 
to identify these self-identified aspirations, the strategies used in pursuing them and to 
discuss them in the context of the broader policy development agenda within the 
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.
Almost all interview participants in this study requested that their comments be kept 
confidential. Hence this paper is written without reference to particular individuals.
99
This article is divided into the following sections. Section 2 briefly outlines background 
to the tuna-led development in the Pacific states, while Section 3 sets out the methods 
used in the analysis. Section 4 presents and discusses the results while Section 5 
considers the implications for the FFA negotiating positions within the WCPFC. 
Section 6 concludes this paper.
6.2. Tuna resources, tuna development and tuna aspirations
While artisanal and small-scale tuna fishing has historically played an important part in 
Pacific islander culture, economy and diet (Schurman, 1998; Gillett, 2006), the history 
of industrial tuna fishing in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean is dominated by the 
development of ‘distant water' large scale fleets (DWFNs) during the mid to late 20lh 
century. Operated primarily by non-Pacific islander countries (initially Japan and then 
the US), these fleet, onshore and processing investments included little indigenous 
Pacific involvement in the industry (Gillett, 2006), and the traditional legal 
infrastructure o ffreedom o f the seas ensured that the Pacific coastal states were not able 
to enjoy the economic benefits of this exploitation, nor were they able to exert 
conservation control over the stocks (Tsamenyi et al, 2004).
This situation was significantly altered in the late 1970s, as least in a legal sense, after 
the establishment of Exclusive Economic Zone’s (EEZs) under the Law o f the Sea 
Convention which provided a set of limited rights, and responsibilities, to coastal states 
with respect to the resources within their designated waters (United Nations, 2004; 
Munro, 1990). Many of the independent Pacific states used this international 
recognition of their coastal state status to pursue a two-pronged strategy of asserting 
their sovereign rights in order to gain economically from tuna, either through their own 
fishing efforts or by allowing harvesting by DWFN fleets in return for access fee 
payments (Schurman, 1998; van Santen and Muller, 2000), as well as coordinating 
management activity across the region through the formation of the Forum Fisheries 
Agency (Aqorau, 2001, 2002; Cordonnery, 2002; Tsamenyi, 1999; van Santen and 
Muller, 2000).
During the 1980s and 1990s, Schurman (1998) identifies two broad phases of resource 
exploitation strategies employed by the Pacific. The first of these was intense 
negotiating efforts to increase the level of access fees paid by DWFNs while the second 
phase, in response to frustrations over dealings with DWFNs, and due to increasing 
‘resource nationalisin’, was to actively invest in on-shore facilities and fleets either with 
outright ownership or in partnership with operators in DWFNs. As could be expected, 
different Pacific states adopted different strategies, with some domestic industries being 
largely developed by private sector initiatives (for example, Fiji) while others where 
primarily driven by public finance and management initiatives (for example, FSM) (see 
Barclay and Cartwright, 2007b). Over time these efforts have created a complex pattern 
of national fleets and domestic on-shore processing facilities. An overview is 
summarised in Table 6.1. However, it is generally accepted by analysts (Schurman, 
1998; Chand et al, 2003; van Santen and Muller, 2000; Petersen, 2002), and by the 
Pacific islanders themselves, that while the EEZ institution provided these countries 
with legal capacity to exploit the resources in a sustainable manner, converting these 
into an income stream has not been the ‘economic boon’ once hoped for and that—for 
many reasons—many countries experienced a ‘boom and bust cycles’ in their domestic 
industries.
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Rather than seek to evaluate the merit of these development efforts, the outcomes are 
simply noted here, along with the views of the Pacific islanders themselves as evidence 
of a profound sense that ‘more could be done’ to improve the economic returns from the 
region’s tuna resources. In this sense, there are outstanding aspirational goals held by 
Pacific islanders towards these fisheries, a view that was recently confirmed in the 
preamble statement to the Vava’u Declaration on Pacific Fisheries Resources (‘Our 
Fish, Our Future’)
.....recognising the aspirations of Pacific Islands countries to strengthen their
engagement in sustainable fisheries and to maximise the flow on benefits 
from both domestic fisheries and foreign fishing operations in the region; 
and
...cogniscant of the significant economic opportunities which the regional 
fisheries resource offers ... and of the comparatively low returns on the 
resource being achieved by countries in the region;
6.3 . M e t h o d s  a n d  d a t a
6.3.1 Research Questions
In identifying ‘what’ these ‘economic opportunities’ are—that is, the aspirations and 
strategies to implement—it is noted that the idea of ‘aspirations’ is a multi-dimensional 
concept that is inherently subjective on the part of the interviewee. For the purposes of 
this research it is defined as any conceptual idea about how to improve economic or 
social outcomes (for example, income or employment) arising from future industry 
development either at the macro scale (for example, the industry as a whole across the 
economy) or at the individual business level31. To ground the analysis, the following 
research questions were used
• What aspirations do Pacific Island Countries (PICs) hold for their tuna resources?
• How are they different or similar between countries?
• In what ways are countries expressing these aspirations? That is, what strategies are 
they using?
• Are they being successful? Why or why not?
It should be noted that aspirations are likely to be somewhat changing over time, and 
hence data here really only represent views, aspirations and development strategies 
currently operating in the countries visited.
6.3.2 Interviews and data
The analysis of Pacific Islander aspirations in this study drew on a mixed qualitative 
data set comprising field based interviews; field notes and observations; media reports; 
official documents from ‘regional organisations’ and formal literature, where 
appropriate. A full list of written material is set out in Appendix One to this chapter.
Field-based interview data was collected during a series of open-ended question-based 
interviews of 63 individuals conducted during two fieldwork trips throughout mid- to
This definition is derived largely from the Macquarie Dictionary (1985 edition) which 
defines aspirations as ‘ the act of aspiring; lofty or ambitious desire’. Macquarie University 
(1985)
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late 2006. These interviews had two primary aims. Firstly, they assisted in gathering 
information about how the industry was structured and identification of key 
stakeholders, which was used in the policy analysis components of this broader research 
project. Second, the interviews were used to gamer the perceptions and expressed views 
of stakeholders with respect to the future of their industry, that is, their aspirations, the 
strategies they have in place (or not) to achieve them and contextual (and historical) 
factors that may assist or hinder in their achievement. Interviewees were initially 
selected on the basis of inclusion in a regional industry contact book (SPC, 2005), with 
a list refined over time in response to feedback from interviewees. An ‘interviewee’ was 
defined as a stakeholder in the industry in the sense that they participated in policy 
making, management or operating a tuna related business and/or were identified as 
being active by other stakeholders within government or industry.
These interviews were then transcribed into note form, rather than being transcribed 
verbatim. This was considered appropriate given the timing available for this 
component of the project and because the interviews were designed to gather non­
personal and/or professional judgements—thus rendering unnecessary the recording of 
detailed linguistic expression often associated with sociological qualitative studies of 
personal experience. It was recognised that this involved some rephrasing and 
interpretation and to counter this, notes were sent back to the interviewees with 
invitations for corrections to be made—a practice that also allowed for follow-up 
questions to be posed. Table 6.2 sets out the broad categories of people classified either 
as government, industry representatives or ‘other’. The other category includes people 
from NGOs or regional organisations, such as the Forum Fisheries Agency, whose 
extensive regional-based work provided invaluable regional perspectives on this issue. 
As can be seen, a good balance was struck between the different categories. Due to 
confidentiality requirements interviewees are not identified individually in the analysis.
Table 6.2: Types of People Interviewed
Country Visited Total Government Industry Other
Papua New Guinea 14 4 8 2
Solomon Islands 14 2 4 8
Fiji 13 2 7 4
Marshall Islands 9 4 5 -
Federated States of 
Micronesia
11 5 5 1
Total 61 17 29 15
Source: Field notes
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The six selected countries were chosen because they provided a representative mix of 
experiences with the tuna industry in terms of size of fishing zone (that is, EEZ), size of 
fishery, number of operating vessels, nature of the fishery (for example, domestic 
dominated versus DWFN, purse seine dominated versus longline dominated) and 
cultural context (for example, a mixture of Melanesian, Polynesian and Micronesian 
countries).
To ensure that views were representational and not personality-driven, attempts were 
made to interview close to 100 per cent of the industry and appropriate government 
policy officers—a feat made possible by the small number of individuals operating in 
the tuna sector at this time.
6.3.3 Methods
This project followed the analytical techniques set out in Bazeley (2007) and employed 
NVIVO software for the purposes of data management and as an interrogative tool for 
drawing out patterns and key themes within the data using NVIVO’s core functions of 
coding, searching, grouping and relationship building.
Significant efforts were made to encourage the patterns and ideas to emerge from the 
data and thus this paper is influenced by the ‘grounded theorists’ approach. However, 
this approach was supplemented by drawing on previous experiences by the author, 
field notes and other forms of literature to construct, prior to the coding process, an 
overall theory to identify first, the key variables working upon actors in the field and 
second, the relationship between these variables using the model building functions of 
NVIVO. This theory was then used to guide the development of the initial coding 
structure within NVIVO, which was adapted over time (that is, added to and subtracted 
from) in response to novel concepts arising from data. NVIVO’s key strength as an 
analytical tool is to identify and record relationships between ideas and between 
research subjects (documents, people and so on....) which was exploited in this analysis 
through the tactic of ‘double coding’ broad sections of text (that is, coding a complex 
statement/set of ideas at more than one node). Coding nodes were therefore kept 
generally expansive in their descriptions—and the annotations and ‘active links’ 
functions of NVIVO were used within each node (and in the raw material) to provide 
reference to related documents or ideas. An example of the coding structure used in this 
study is set out in Appendix two of this chapter.
Searches using the ‘matrix’ function of NVIVO were carried out to identify key 
relationships underpinning the hypothesis of this paper. These matrices are:
• Matrix of general aspirational states by country
• Matrix of aspirational strategies by country
• Matrix of aspirational strategies by likelihood of success by country
• Matrix of aspirational strategies and (positive and negative) contributors to 
those by country
Summaries of the results of these matrices were then made using the ‘relationships’ 
function of NVIVO, as well as additional memos to aid in its interpretation. These 
summaries form the basis of the results discussed in the next section.
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6.4. Tuna dreams and realities: Identifying aspirations and strategies
6.4.1 Key Results
The qualitative data in this study was interrogated to identify views regarding 
aspirations for the use of tuna resources, what strategies were being put in place to 
achieve them and their likelihood of success. Further analysis also highlighted the role 
of past experiences and current contexts that either act to promote these strategies or 
present potential "blockers' in their achievement.
Table 6.3 summarises the key variables for each country and represents an overall 
picture of the aspirations and strategies held by stakeholders in the tuna industry in each 
country. These are summary views that capture, on balance, the majority of ideas 
expressed by individuals in a country. It was found that, in general, there was a 
reasonable level of consistency between the views of industry players and governments 
within most countries visited—perhaps reflective of the small scale of the domestic 
economies and the consequent close linkages between these two groups. The exception 
was Fiji and Samoa, although both industry and government groups tended to share 
rhetoric, differences did exist between groups in how to achieve these aspirations. These 
results were then compared to the more recent analysis by Gillett (2008) on aspirations, 
which described a similar set of aspirations and consequently suggests that the 
aspirations reported in this study are somewhat robust.
A striking feature of Table 6.3 is the similarity in the concepts used across each country 
case in describing their aspirations, which is typically expressed formally in ways 
similar to that set out in the Solomon Islands Tuna Management Plan (1999), whose 
‘tuna management objectives' are:
• to ensure that the tuna resources .... are not exploited beyond their optimal
sustainable yields; and
• within the limit set by this conservation objective, to harvest the resource in
such a way that maximises the economic and social benefits received by the 
people of the Solomon Islands.
That is, ‘maximising the economic and social benefits’ was identified by almost all 
interviewees as involving some form of on-shore processing, while most mentioned 
employment creation as being important and some retained importance on the continued 
collection of access fees. This similarity, in turn, is reflected in the language and 
concepts used by stakeholders across all countries in the actions they identified as key 
strategies to operationalise the stated aspiration.
Exploring the data in more detail, however, reveals that the practice of how these 
strategies are pursued presents a rich diversity across the six Pacific states in their 
experiences and responses to the opportunities and challenges with the tuna industry, for 
three reasons discussed below. Indeed, it is notable that there is significantly more 
diversity between them compared to similarities that each country may share.
Of the countries studied in this report, some have achieved what they want or are in the 
process of achieving it, while others still hold truly aspirational strategies for how they 
may envisage their future. Although this mixture of actual versus aspirational strategy is 
present in all countries it is interesting that the former effect dominates: in many 
instances Pacific countries are starting to see their visions of how they wish to operate 
in the tuna industry come to fruition. The challenge then is maintaining and building on
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these gains in the context o f fragile economies (for example, Solomon Islands) or 
fragile industry conditions (for example. Federated States o f Micronesia).
Another interesting feature o f the results is the experiences in using the tuna 
management plans (TMPs) as a basis for development. Flere there was a 50/50 split 
between the countries with some making active use o f their TMPs as developed through 
external assistance, while others did not. For the latter group, it was found that most 
interviewees thought that the TMPs were excellent documents for guiding future 
development, but that for drivers lying outside the tuna industry, these plans were not 
formally adopted or used either by the industry or by government. The reasons differed 
slightly between countries, but the main reasons were that the context in which the Plan 
was developed no longer applied in the country— and therefore the plans and ideas set 
out in them were no longer relevant.
It is also notable that some aspirations have changed since the conclusion o f the field 
work. For example, when visiting the Solomon Islands the key aspiration was to focus 
on 'getting the management working’ in the context o f the domestic political tensions 
that have disrupted the industry. Since then, the Solomon Islands Government has 
reported plans to establish two new loin processing facilities and reports a trial 'pump 
boat’ programme to encourage further domestication o f the fleet (Solomon Islands 
Government, 2008). Similarly, the loining plant, now established in the Marshall 
Islands, was still in development stage during the course o f field work undertaken there.
6.4.2 Explaining differences (1): The influence of past experiences and current context 
on current actions
The diversity between PICs may be considered to have developed along two 
dimensions: first, in the way in which the strategy may be implemented— that is, two 
countries may identify7 the same type o f strategy, for example, developing onshore 
processing facilities— but the way they were implemented was different. The second 
dimension is whether the strategies discussed were currently in action, in the planning 
stage (that is, w ill be/have been put in place but are still in planning), or were 
conceptual ideas that may be suitable for future strategic development— with all 
counties having a different balance o f each.
The differences in the way in which strategies are implemented are due, largely, to the 
obvious point o f context— different countries have different opportunities to implement 
diverse approaches o f the same idea. For example the relative abundance o f albacore 
tuna in Samoa, compared to skipjack tuna, which is found in much higher 
concentrations in PNG, leads to the specialisations into two different types o f fleet 
operations in each country’s waters, that is, longline vessels in Samoa and purse seine 
vessels in PNG waters.
A more interesting pattern emerging from the data is the role in which past experiences 
in industry development, and the current context o f the domestic industry— including 
factors that extend beyond the industry itself—can hold significant sway over whether 
the nominated strategies are likely to be implemented, are in the planning stage or 
simply remain at the conceptual level. Table 6.4 summarises the range of'positive ’ and 
‘negative’ historical and current contextual factors most commonly identified as 
influencing current views on aspirations and, like those aspirations themselves, several 
commonalities emerge across countries.
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In positive terms islanders most commonly identified 'proximity' to the resources as a 
significant factor underpinning the nature of their aspirations. Alongside this, some 
cited institutional factors such as EU preference tariffs and exemptions under the 
WCPFC—or at least favourable treatment—as being contextual factors that facilitate 
their longer term development plans (a view on the WCPFC that has since been 
confirmed by work in Gillett, 2008). Some ‘positive' contextual factors were considered 
more specific to the country, such as access to a relatively cheap and well educated 
labour force (for example, Samoa) or good air-links (for example, Fiji) while the PNA 
countries (PNG, Solomon Islands, RMI and FSM) saw the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) 
as a strategic opportunity for furthering their aspirations regarding onshore development 
(PNG) or facilitating changes in the access fee arrangements (Marshall Islands).
Many more respondents, however, discussed ‘current’ or ‘historical’ factors that 
negatively impacted on aspirations. Some of those factors were issues that may be 
considered ‘barriers’ to implementation and consisted of several 'generic’ issues were 
raised in many countries including: geographic isolation (high fuel/transport costs); 
poor government policies/government crowding out private sector investment; skills 
shortage, poor or mismanaged infrastructure; the fairly limited (and highly competitive) 
markets for sashimi and longline-caught product; and lack of provision of long term 
access to resources (issues highlighted by industry participants in Fiji). These ‘barriers’ 
are consistent with those identified by previous work (Asian Development Bank, 1997; 
Gillett, 2003; Clark, 2006; Barclay and Cartwright, 2007b) and in turn were often 
considered in the context of determining 'what should be done’.
A surprising aspect of this dialogue was the way in which past (usually negative) 
experiences acted to influence the formation of aspirations and expectations in current 
periods. In essence, many interviewees noted that their views on what were considered 
realistic prospects are tempered in light of observing past failures and the resultant 
knowledge of the risks involved in re-investing in the industry. The case of FSM and 
RMI were typical here. Both countries experienced rapid growth in their longline Beets 
during the 1990s, and for RMI, it experienced rapid growth of purse seine fleets, 
through government-led investment (often financed through development assistance 
funds). The aim was to encourage locals to participate in the industry as vessel owners 
and operators, and governments actively encouraged this through various schemes, such 
as the establishment of 'business incubators’, allowing joint ventures, and government 
back loans, as well as allowing foreign companies to become established within the 
domestic industries. At the time, local investors, as well as government, had 
considerable expectations that this was the expected 'boon’ from fishing.
Various factors were highlighted by interviewees as leading to the failure of these 
ventures, including poor management by the private sector companies involved, 
corruption between industry and government, and inexperienced management by 
government-owned enterprises who ‘thought they could take over’ (pers. comm, various 
interviewees) These negative experiences have acted, in some countries, to alter the 
expectations held by stakeholders in the desirability and functioning of the industry. 
That is, in response to these experiences, many of the stakeholders interviewed rejected 
the ‘optimistic’ notion of fisheries rights being a ‘boon’ to their countries and held a 
cautious view of their future industry prospects. In this context, aspirations were framed 
within a dialogue that consciously acknowledged, and discussed the consequences of, 
the actual and perceived limitations posed by the current operating business 
environments. One consequence of this view was the increasing use and development of
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‘ partnership strategies' as a way o f addressing these lim itations— an issue that is 
discussed in Section 6.4.4.
6.4.3 Explaining the differences (2): Split in interests
A second interesting feature o f the data is that it clearly highlights the key differences 
between the different countries in terms o f interests in particular stocks and particular 
gear types— and consequently what is considered ‘ important’ in development terms. 
The clearest, and best acknowledged split between the groups is between the so-called 
PNA states and the rest o f  the FFA Group, w ith  the former often being associated w ith 
the purse seine skipjack tuna fisheries and the later associated w ith the longline fleets 
dominated by albacore.
W ith in this study, however, a more nuanced d ivision o f  interests was observed. F irstly, 
there are those states that align themselves w ith longlin ing interests only— for example 
Samoa and F iji, whose domestic fleets and onshore processing facilities are singularly 
geared towards this sector o f  the fishery
The second ‘ interest’ group o f countries are FSM and RM I who have interests in both 
longlin ing and purse seine sectors o f  the fishery, although the experience o f  each was 
somewhat different. The Marshall Islands had development strategies in both types o f 
fishing, but purse seine activ ity appeared to dominate government priorities. By 
contrast, the focus o f  future potential expansion in FSM was clearly linked to locally 
based longline fleets— although the purse seine sector remained important for 
generating on-shore benefits.
The third type o f ‘ interest’ group that could be identified was that o f the purse seine- 
only countries— PNG and the Solomon Islands. Here domestic onshore and fee t 
industries were strongly focused on the purse seine sector w ith  the processing 
component almost over-rid ing the importance o f  domestic fleets for PNG.
Another type o f  ‘ split interest’ has been noted by Tarte (2002; 2008) as existing 
between those FFA (particularly PNA) states that consider themselves as ‘ coastal states’ 
(that is, those who govern the fishing grounds w ith in  their national jurisd ictions) and 
those states that consider themselves as ‘ flag states’— usually in addition to their 
‘ coastal state' status. A lm ost all countries examined in this study exp lic itly  or im p lic itly  
incorporated both types o f  identities w ith in  their TMPs, or their aspirations, while PNG, 
F iji and RM I added a th ird type o f  identity: that o f  an onshore production country.
Aspirations regarding domestic fleets, coastal state status and those centred on shore 
processing are largely mutually supportive or consistent but in some instances have led 
to subtle shifts in emphasis in domestic aspirations and led to a much broader range o f 
strategies that are being pursued. This is most clearly seen in Marshall Islands, which 
for a small country has actively used the m ultip le perspectives offered by the coastal 
state/flag state dichotomy to pursue a broad range o f  strategies ranging from domestic 
fleet development, onshore processing fo r longline, onshore processing for canneries, 
vessel servicing and using the YDS to pursue alternatives for access fees.
For these two countries, their ‘interests’ in the purse seine fishery are limited to the 
extent that they are signatories to the US Multilateral Treaty and receive some development 
assistance funds under the Arrangement. In general, industry participants either did not mention 
purse seine fishery as an issue or discussed it in negative terms—that is, stock externalities 
were occurring between the purse seine fleets and ‘their’ longline fleets.
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These differences in what was considered the fishing ‘ interests’ o f the nation was also 
seen in stakeholders’ views o f what constituted ‘ sustainability’ in the fishery. Almost 
universally, ‘sustainability* o f the fishery was considered to be a critical part o f future 
management but stakeholder views about what this meant in practice clearly diverged 
along three separate streams, in that some stakeholders:
• Were not concerned about sustainability and thought it was someone else’s 
problem.
• With clear interests in longlining fishing blamed purse seiners for problems 
regarding sustainability; or
• With clear interests in purse seine fishing blamed longliners for problems.
It is also interesting to note while FSM, RMI and Solomon Islands aligned themselves 
with the purse seine interests o f PNG, and the rest o f the PNA Group, many o f the 
domestic opportunities for locally based development were seen by interviewees as 
being tied up in the longlining industry in the sense that it was this part o f the industry 
that was thought to be most accessible for locals to become involved, albeit with more 
modest ambitions and a strong sense o f ‘ learning from the past’ .
6.4.4 Explaining the differences (3): The role of partnerships
Partnerships, as a key concept in tuna-led development strategies, featured almost 
universally in each o f the countries studied, although consistent with the discussion in 
Section 6.4.1, the practical expression o f the idea differed between countries. Several 
different models o f partnerships were observed within the domestic industries:
• Direct foreign investment with foreign company owning and operating the 
venture, employing locals ('skills transfer’ ) (for example, PNG, RMI and FSM)
• Joint venture arrangements with foreign capital, but retaining some form o f local 
control in management (Solomon Islands, Fiji, RMI)
• Partnerships between companies within a country (Samoa)
• Partnerships between governments and the foreign company, often in the form 
of enticements for local development (RMI, PNG).
These broad models o f operation were discussed in the context o f all different types o f 
strategies that were active, in the planning stages or even those that remained at the 
conceptual level. The industry development initiatives in PNG— government/industry 
jo int venture in loining plants (for example, Wewak) or the ‘Marine Park’ initiatives— 
represent perhaps the best known, and most developed, examples o f these kinds o f 
actual and planned partnerships operating in the Pacific. Interestingly, PNG is also 
actively experimenting with the concept o f foreign partnerships to promote small-scale 
community employment initiatives through the ‘pump boat’ program, whereby local 
fishers are encouraged to take up fishing through the provision o f guaranteed sale for 
their product to a foreign cannery as part o f its broader sourcing strategies within PNG. 
Such guarantees were built into licensing requirements for the company by the PNG 
government. Elsewhere in the Pacific, partnerships between foreign companies and 
local ones have taken a more ‘hands o f f  approach— for example in the Solomon Islands 
partnerships in the domestic industry take the form o f foreign equity into businesses 
while local industry participants retain control and benefit from the global marketing 
networks offered by their foreign business partners. In Marshall Islands this model o f 
partnership is extended through the conscious approach taken by Government and
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industry participants in actively seeking to ‘learn' the business of fleet operations from 
their foreign vessel partners.
Partnerships were considered appropriate mechanisms for bringing together the 
strengths of both groups operating within the industry—the resource owners (that is, the 
Pacific Island governments) and those parties with expertise and finance (foreign 
companies). This ‘partnership' approach has evolved over time in response to the 
negative experiences that many Pacific countries had with industry during various 
efforts to ‘nationalise' or start a national tuna industry in the past. While many 
stakeholders still acknowledged the ‘ideal* for nationals to ‘own vessels, fish and 
process locally’, they conceded that this was unrealistic in the foreseeable future and 
that they needed to engage with foreign companies to meet their finance and skill gaps.
In encouraging partnership approaches, the Pacific island strategies appear to be 
explicitly embracing two generic themes in tuna development. The first of these is the 
idea of Teaming by doing' and evolving the appropriate knowledge and skills over 
time, with key sources of knowledge sourced outside the Pacific islands themselves. 
The second is the explicit prioritisation of employment creation over revenue generation 
created through access fee arrangements from DWFN fleets. For the later strategy, there 
was some recognition by those interviewed that this may not be ‘optimal’ in a 
theoretical sense o f ‘maximising returns’ but it was considered a preferable option given 
the social context of their domestic economies and the need for employment generation. 
This view was a key theme in PNG domestic development where the emphasis on ‘on­
shore’ processing, rather than domestic fleet development, consciously emphasised the 
‘employment generation’ aspects of this strategy. While in Samoa, the universal desire 
to continue the closure of the EEZ to foreign fleets was done in part to ensure that the 
benefits from the fishery flowed through to local employment opportunities.
6.5. Implications for the FFA states in regional fisheries management
During the course of field work for this study, many commentators and participants in 
the policy-making positions openly talked about the differences between the various 
FFA states, yet in the development of negotiating positions, and in assessments of FFA 
role in the WCPFC, these differences have been frequently summarised into a single, 
region-wide position with the FFA group of countries adopting, on principle, a 
consensus position on issues within the Commission. The rich diversity in experiences 
between the Pacific countries studied however suggests a more nuanced approach in 
understanding Pacific islander interests—and the differences between them—may be 
required in future discussions about their role in the WCPFC and in regional fisheries 
management more broadly.
The ‘split in interests’ within the FFA Group, and even within individual countries 
obviously significantly complicates the task of developing a truly representational FFA 
negotiating position within WCPFC processes. Several examples of policy initiatives 
within the WCPFC—for example the management of purse seine effort or FAD use— 
indicate that FFA positions are clearly beneficial to some FFA members (that is, those 
with purse seine and onshore production interests), while others with dominant longline 
interests are less advantaged (see Gillett, 2008 for further discussion). Similarly, 
strategies pursued by some countries may emphasise one aspect of their industry, at the 
expense of another, thus reflecting an implicit or explicit domestic prioritisation of how 
to pursue tuna-led development. The potential tensions that these splits in interests 
could raise were highlighted during the 2007 meeting of the WCPFC over the
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consideration o f "new entrants’ . Concerned that ‘ new entrants’ may exacerbate capacity 
growth within the region, some FFA countries stridently opposed new entrants to the 
Commission on the grounds that new fishing nations could undermine their aspirations 
to grow their own fleets in the future (see for example Flanich, 2008; Government o f the 
Republic o f the Marshall Islands, 2008), including their ability to secure sizeable 
allocations. In contrast, other FFA states, whose interests were more firmly aligned as 
coastal states, welcomed the opportunity for new entrants, interpreting them as 
potentially new opportunities to increase competition for access licences (and therefore 
fees) for their EEZs (see Hanich. 2008 for full discussion).
Given these differences, it is remarkable that the FFA has persisted with a single 
negotiating position over time. On the other hand, some compromises are being 
pursued— for example, one interpretation o f the decision by the PNA states to ‘close 
high seas' areas to fishing and to partially regulate FAD use, could be that this in some 
measure addresses the conservation needs o f yellowfin and bigeye species for the
O ')
longline interests o f other FFA states.
The division o f interests within the FFA group underscores the importance o f 
supporting the smaller, less vocal. Pacific countries, to develop their own ‘national 
interest’ positions on critical WCPFC matters as a counter balance to more dominant 
countries who may push relatively narrow agendas in the context o f developing a 
unified FFA bargaining position. In recognition o f this, the FFA Secretariat is actively 
pursuing several complementary regional strategies to encourage strategic policy 
development at the national level.
The significant level o f partnerships occurring at the individual industry level across 
FFA is another important factor in the FFA negotiating positions because it challenges 
the traditional divisions between FFA states (as coastal states) and the non-FFA states 
(as powerful distant water fishing nations) within the WCPFC (see for example Tarte, 
2008). The industry experiences studied for this article clearly suggest a more active, 
positive and development-oriented relationship exists between the two groups. This, in 
turn, implies that the concept o f ‘competing’ interests between the FFA and DWFN 
within the fishery, and the WCPFC, becomes, at a minimum blurred i f  private sector 
investments from both countries are bound up within the same business enterprise. The 
best example o f this is in PNG but, as suggested by the case studies here, strong DWFN 
company/local company partnerships are operating in many other FFA countries as 
well.
This could be a potential positive in the WCPFC because these jo int arrangements 
signal common interest between these two groups and therefore the basis for working 
towards common goals. However, it also raises complex challenges as the WCPFC 
management regime matures over time. Currently, the FFAs enjoy some ‘exemptions’ 
to the fishing restrictions imposed in the WCPFC management measures on the grounds 
that they had a ‘ right to develop’ and that the DWFN should take the lead on 
conservation measures (see for example Va’Vavu Declaration -  ‘Our Fish, Our Future’ 
and Government o f Republic o f the Marshall Islands, 2006). However, if  this ‘ tuna-led’ 
development occurs, on the ground, in the context o f a ‘ partnership’ company, whose 
beneficial owner is a company from a DWFN, then questions arise as to whether these 
‘exemptions’ then become a ‘ loophole’ for non-FFA companies to participate in the
33 Another is that the closure of the high seas will force vessels to fish in the EEZs of PNA 
countries and thereby increase their collection of access fees -  both interpretations are 
probably correct.
I l l
fishery in unrestricted ways not possible within their own domestic industry. Parris 
(2008) has criticised these exemptions as potential tools to 'undermine' the 
sustainability goals of the WCPFC by allowing ‘exemptions-led' expansion in fishing 
mortality—which has been recognised by the FFA as being against their longer term 
interest. Given these tensions, it is (politically) unlikely that the exemptions argument 
can be sustained over the long term while simultaneously pursuing, and benefiting from, 
strong partnerships with DWFN companies and this will require a reconsideration of 
this key element to the FFA negotiating position.
6.6. Conclusion
Although Pacific islanders share a common aspiration about their tuna resources, the 
strategies they use to pursue them varies significantly between countries, some of which 
can be explained by the influence of context and of past experiences in industry 
development. Reflecting a willingness to 'learn from the past’, many Pacific countries 
are now actively engaged in a broader range of tuna-related activities and are engaging 
in partnerships with foreign sources of finance and expertise. This diversity and the 
engagement with partners has implications for the FFA as it continues to negotiate a 
unified position with the WCPFC—the two main challenges being the need to find 
common ground between ‘split interests’ and the growing challenge of defending their 
'exemptions’ in the context of supporting domestic industries with significant foreign 
involvement.
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PART THREE
THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL PACIFIC FISHERIES COMMISSION AS A 
RESOURCE SHARING INSTITUTION
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CHAPTER 7
IS THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL PACIFIC FISHERIES COMMISSION  
MEETING ITS CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES?
7.1. Introduction
The Convention on the Conservation and Management o f Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (‘ the Convention') (WCPFC, 2000) came 
into force as international law in mid-2004 as a new regional fisheries management 
treaty for the purposes o f promoting cooperative region-wide governance o f highly 
migratory fish stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Developed in response 
to UN Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement’4, the Convention, and its implementing body, 
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), provides all fishing 
and coastal states within the region the first opportunity to implement a comprehensive 
management regime incorporating all tuna stocks across their full geographical range. It 
thus draws together the hitherto institutionally separated management regimes operating 
within the EEZs o f coastal states and the high seas and is also the first Pacific regional 
fisheries regime to explicitly adopt the principles o f ecologically sustainable 
development. The stakes are high: i f  the Convention is successful then the biological 
and ecological sustainability o f the tuna stocks and the economic viability o f the fishery 
can be improved. I f  not, the fishery risks becoming over-exploited.
The WCPFC has now been active for five years and has implemented a number of 
conservation and management measures (CMMs) with the explicit purpose o f managing 
fishing capacity and reducing fishing threats to key vulnerable stocks, in particular 
bigeye tuna and yellowfin tuna. However, growing dissatisfaction with the performance 
o f these CMMs suggests that it may be pertinent to consider whether they are sufficient 
for addressing the twin problems of over-fishing and over-capacity. In particular, this 
article poses the question: are the CMMs put in place by the WCPFC consistent with 
available scientific and economic management advice? Arguing that while significant 
steps in developing management strategies have been made, the current set o f CMMs 
are, at best, insufficient and that further progress under the WCPFC w ill be difficult to 
achieve unless it addresses the underlying economic incentives facing the stakeholders, 
in relation to their use o f stocks under management and that active risk management 
within the fishery is incorporated into the CMMs. To achieve this, it is argued that, at a 
minimum, the Commission needs to ensure that the benefits o f change fishing regimes 
accrue to those that are bearing economic costs o f such change, and that some basic 
adaptive management approaches are adopted.
This paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 o f the paper provides a brief 
background to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission and the key 
policy issues it faces, while Section 3 sets out the main analysis o f the WCPFC 
measures using an ‘ institutional’ conceptualisation o f the WCPFC. Section 4 discusses 
possible explanations for observed outcomes, while Section 5 concludes this paper.
The full title of this agreement is Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.
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7.2. T he creation of the W estern and C entral Pacific  F isheries 
Commission
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) forms one o f the world's largest 
fishing grounds for four commercially important species o f tuna— yellowfin tuna 
(Thunnus albacares), skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis), albacore tuna (Thunnus 
alalunga) and bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus) as well as other valuable pelagic fish 
stocks^ and is a complex fishery in physical, political, economic and institutional terms. 
Physically and economically, a significant proportion o f the purse seine fishery (the 
region's dominant gear type servicing the canning industry) lies within the national 
waters o f coastal states, chiefly the Pacific Island Countries, while the longline fishery 
(servicing the sashimi markets) is more evenly spread between the national waters and 
high seas areas o f the WCPFC-Convention Areaj6. Tuna resources are primarily 
harvested by distant water fishing nations, DWFNs (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, US), some 
of whom are also coastal states, but in recent years the domestic harvesting by Pacific 
Island coastal states has become more significant and several PICs have made strong 
indications that they are actively promoting this trend . Foreign fleets access fishing 
grounds through the purchasing o f licensing arrangements with regional governments 
and it is through this process, as well as through their own fishing efforts, Pacific States 
seek to gain economically from this valuable resource (Clark, 2006a), which recently 
valued at just over USD$3 billion (Reid, 2007). In addition, many WCPFC coastal 
states, (FFA members and others) have domestic based fishing industries and shore- 
based fisheries-related investment, which are important contributors to the local 
economies (Gillett and Lightfoot, 2001; Gillett et al, 2001). The tuna species are both 
highly migratory and transboundary in character and the biological range of the tunas 
extend across a broad sweep o f the Western and central Pacific, crossing both the 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) o f 27 countries and areas o f high seas fished by 
coastal and distant water fishing nations (see Figure 7.1), essentially making the tuna 
resources an international 'common-pool' resource.
35Formally, the WCPFC covers all fish listed in Annex 1 of the 1982 UNFSA Convention. Aside 
from the four commercial tuna species, scientific and management work is currently being 
undertaken on striped and black marlins, swordfish and shark.
36According to data reported by Reid (2007) on average for the period 1997-2005, purse seine 
catch for all species was dominated by catches taken in zones of all WCPO countries (-77%), 
whereas catches for frozen longline was dominated by harvests on the high seas (-74%). Fresh 
longline catches were predominately taken ‘in-zones’ (-82%).
37See for example statements made by Marshall Islands (WCPFC, 2007)
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Figure 7.1: Map of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
§^r
o
COs
H O E  130E 15 0 E i 7QE 1 70W  I50VV 130W  110W  SOW 70W
Commission
1CQE 120E 140E I6GE 130 1S0W  140W  120 W  1C0W SOW
Source: Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
available at www.wcpfc.int
Overlaying these physical and economic dynamics is a nested set o f management 
institutions that operate to govern the fishery at different geographical and political 
scales. Summarised in Figure 7.2, these institutions, in particular the development o f the 
Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) group o f countries , have evolved primarily out o f the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) provisions o f the Law o f the Sea Convention (LOSC) 
and the development o f the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA). While the 
highly migratory nature o f the tuna species made the fishery essentially a ‘common- 
pool’ resource, these international management structures essentially created, for almost 
20 years, two parallel institutional structures for fisheries governance. The primary 
structure was that o f a common-property institution encompassing the shared tuna 
resources that flowed between, and was controlled by the coastal states (via their control 
o f their EEZs, which was essentially ‘owned by them). On the high seas, by contrast, 
the lack o f defined jurisdiction created an open access property right regime available 
for use by any fishing nation. The newest o f the region’s institutional layers— the 
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission— was developed as an explicit 
attempt to bridge these dual structures by providing a political and physical space for 
‘cooperative governance’ o f shared resources between all relevant national sovereign
38The Pacific Island Countries comprise the countries who are members of the ‘Forum Fisheries 
Agency’ (Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, , Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and 
Vanuatu. The Forum Fisheries Agency was formed in 1979 to assist its members to assert and 
exploit the potential economic benefits of the newly acquired EEZ institution, primarily through 
cooperative regional initiatives such as monitoring compliance and surveillance activities, as 
well as the development and administration of regional fisheries management regimes for the 
purse seine fishery.
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States as envisaged under UNFSA. The objective of the Commission is ‘to ensure, 
through effective management, the long-term conservation and sustainable use of highly 
migratory fish stocks’ (Article 2 of WCPFC convention text) and the governing 
Convention Text carries with it explicit instructions to, inter alia, ‘take measures to 
prevent or eliminate over-fishing and excess fishing capacity and to ensure that levels of 
fishing effort do not exceed those commensurate with the sustainable use of fishery 
resources’, as well providing a range of tools that could be used for this purpose. In 
essence, the WCPFC broadens the scope of collective decision making, compared to the 
existing regional arrangements, in three different dimensions: first, it covers all highly 
migratory species in the Convention Area (except saury), second, it incorporates all 
fishing gear types and third, decisions apply to stocks across their entire biological 
range, although the modus operandi of how the latter is achieved is subject to ongoing 
debate.
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Analysis by SPC (Hoyle, 2008, Langley, 2008b, Langley, 2008a, Langley, 2007), 
Kompas and Che(Kompas, 2006), Kompas and Grafton(Grafton, 2007) and Reid(Reid, 
2006b, Reid, 2006a) amongst others are beginning to clarify the nature of the biological, 
economic and political questions that the WCPFC management regime will need to 
address. Summarised recently by Langley(Langley et al.) the current scientific advice 
provided to the commission, set out in Table 7.1, suggests a growing and urgent need to 
reduce fishing mortality on bigeye and yellowfin, although skipjack and albacore is 
considered relatively healthy, and able to sustain increases in fishing mortality. This 
forms one of the key dilemmas for policy makers. While the skipjack tuna fishery, 
dominated by purse seine gears, can sustain an increase in harvests, to do so would 
simultaneously increase the catch of vulnerable yellowfin and bigeye tuna which is also 
caught as a target and/or by-catch species. Increasing yellowfin and bigeye tuna catches 
also presents an asymmetric negative negative gear externality between longline vessels 
who target these species at later life stages for the more valuable sashimi markets. By 
contrast, the availability of scientific advice about other pelagic species, such as marlins 
and swordfish, is still rapidly developing, although the signals regarding their biomass 
status are not promising and caution is urged by commission scientists (see for example 
WCPFC (Kolody, 2008, Davies, 2008b).
Economic analysis of the fishery has received substantially less attention although 
independent academic analysis (see Table 7.2) strongly indicates that economic over­
fishing is occurring at least on skipjack, bigeye and yellowfin tuna as a direct result of 
over-capacity operating in the fishery. Economic modelling is an inherently uncertain 
exercise and, depending on the assumptions used, it is unlikely that studies will 
necessarily produce the same results. However, consistency across studies on the 
conclusions—that fishing capacity operating in the WCPO is significantly higher than 
the bioeconomic estimate of profit maximising levels—strongly imply a broad 
consensus on the economic performance and the general direction for policy attention. 
There are, however, serious gaps in this analysis, most notably in the absence of 
bioeconomic assessment of the economically important albacore longline fishery.
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7.3 . E v a l u a t in g  c u r r e n t  r u l e s  u n d e r  t h e  W e st e r n  a n d  C e n t r a l  Pa c if ic  
F is h e r ie s  C o m m is sio n
Fishers’ decisions about how much to fish, where to fish, what to fish and with what 
gears, amongst other relevant decisions, is a response to the economic signals they 
receive from both the input markets—in particular fuel and labour costs—and the 
primary output markets for Western and Central Pacific-caught tuna in Thailand, Japan, 
the EU and the United States. Policy makers have the capacity to influence these 
economic signals by implementing their own policy signals, or rules or ‘institutions’ 
that can alter the way in which fishers make those decisions and the activities that they 
allow fishers to act out in the fishery grounds. Institutions perform a number of roles in 
the fishery but at a minimum, provide a set of rules that determine the following: who 
has access to the fishing grounds (access/authority rules); what actions are permitted, 
required or forbidden with respect to the fishing resources (activity rules), what is the 
scope of those behaviours (that is, who and what do the rules apply to) and what kinds 
of payoffs may be enjoyed by stakeholders associated with the common-pool resource 
(that is, payoff rules) (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al, 1994). In essence, these kinds of 
rules constitute the core range of issues that determine how much fish is harvested and 
by whom and what the economic costs and rewards may be for these actions—that is, 
whether the fishery is harvested at a sustainable rate and whether there are appropriate 
economic incentives for stakeholders to support the management regime.
The institutions or ‘rules’ put in place by the WCPFC, as it begins to implement the 
terms of its Convention, (known as conservation and management measures, or CMMs) 
constitute the governance framework to coordinate national management regimes and 
facilitate cooperation amongst sovereign states. As ‘meta-rules’, that guide national 
policy making, the resolutions and CMMs developed by the WCPFC have, in the main, 
pursued a pragmatic and cautious response to the mounting scientific evidence of over­
fishing on the vulnerable bigeye tuna and yellowfin tuna stocks (and other species, such 
as swordfish). In general, WCPFC measures attempt to control entry into the fishery 
through setting effort limit targets to equal levels expended approximately in the periods 
2000-2004 or 2004, although there is variation between measures39, and/or have flagged 
moderate entry or activity reductions for some fleets. Adopting the basic boundary- 
activity-scope rule typology in the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework, key issues with the rules are discussed in more detail below.
The WCPFC is yet to adopt operational management objectives and, in its absence, 
reflecting the terms of the Convention Text, maximum sustainable yield (MSY) biomass 
and fishing mortality benchmarks have been used as default reference points to evaluate 
policy options. Upon this basis, in its 2008 advice to the Commission, the WCPFC 
Scientific Committee (WCPFC Secretariat, 2008a) argued for a ‘minimum 30% 
reduction in fishing mortality [for bigeye tuna] from the average levels for 2003-2006’ 
(p.xi) and noted that even with such reductions, this stock may become over-fished in 
the future. For yellowfin tuna, advice from the 2007 Scientific Committee (WCPFC 
Secretariat, 2007a) recommended an unspecified level of fishing mortality reduction to 
ensure that average biomass levels are above MSY and to reduce the risk of the stock 
moving into an ‘over fished state’. Table 7.2 sets out the full range of conservation
S ee  Table 7.3 for variations in base years for limiting capacity on stock under 
management. It is not clear why these different base years were chosen other than for political 
expediency.
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measures40 for tuna stocks and provides a comparison to the scientific and economic 
recommendations regarding optimal’ effort across species,41 while Table7.3 sets out the 
details o f each o f the management measures from a institutional ‘ functional 
perspective’ .
The WCPFC defines ‘resolutions’ as ‘non-binding statements and 
recommendations addressed to members of the Commission and Cooperating non-members’ 
while ‘Conservation and Management Measures’ are ‘binding decisions’. See advice at
http://www.wcpfc.int/
Other entry rules are in essence supporting rather than facilitating 
conservation measures and are unlikely to have direct conservation outcomes. The Record of 
Fishing Vessel is an important rule in that it requires members to take responsibility for the 
conduct of its fleet and the conditions under which vessels are allowed to enter. But, in the 
main, it provides only a set of technical conditions which need to be met—members are allowed 
to authorise any vessel that meets these conditions. Although useful for monitoring, surveillance 
and compliance (MCS) purposes, like other MCS rules currently being considered by the 
WCPFC it provides only a supporting rather than central role in effort and harvest management. 
These ‘other MCS’ measures include rules to govern and organise data sharing, regional 
observer programme, a vessel monitoring scheme, data documentation schemes and so on. 
See www.wcpfc.mt for examples.
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7. 3.1 Boundary rules: limiting entry into the fishery
3.1.1 Boundary limits and risk management
The most obvious problem with the WCPFC ‘entry’ (boundary) rules42 is that the use of 
a 2004, or an average of 2001-04 levels, fishing effort benchmark allows member states 
to maintain their purse seine fleet effort levels above recommendations for bigeye tuna 
and is notionally consistent with the available scientific advice for yellowfin tuna only 
under some fairly restrictive assumptions regarding uncertainty in the scientific 
assessments as well as uncertainty in the human dimensions of the fishery. Furthermore, 
as fishing activity grew through the early 2000s, the resulting management benchmarks 
set at 2004 levels are consistent with one of the highest levels of fishing mortality 
assessed by the Commission’s scientific provider (the SPC) as being consistent with 
MSY.
Francis and Shotton (1997) classify six types of uncertainty associated with fisheries 
stock assessment and management advice and this is summarised, along with evidence 
regarding its existence within the WCPFC, in Table 7.4. Clearly, uncertainty pervades 
all stages of the scientific assessment and management process, and significant 
scientific resources are committed to quantifying at least the scientific dimension of it, 
as well as analysing its management implications (see for example Hampton, 2008). 
Yet, beyond a commitment to ‘review progress’, actively managing for this 
uncertainty—such as choosing a more conservative fishing effort benchmark, or 
adopting adaptive management principles—risk and uncertainty do not appear to be 
well integrated into the management measures. This risk is reinforced by relatively few 
resources directed towards addressing uncertainty associated with (poor) 
implementation or the potential consequences of adaptive behaviour by fishers, or the 
lack of management objectives within the CMM (that is, institutional uncertainty). 
Issues related to both are discussed below43. While this could indicate that risk is 
effectively being ignored by the Commission members, it also suggests that these 
measures are consciously trading off the risks associated with the measures for the 
pragmatic utility of relatively simple measures that can be negotiated across 33 
Commission members.
42 Entry rules are boundary rules in the sense that ‘boundary rules’ are defined by Ostrom et al 
(1994) as rules that govern who is permitted to enter and use the commons. In the parlance of 
the WCPFC, this is best represented by the CMMs pertaining to rules that limit vessel entry.
43 Although this is the case on the ‘policy’ side of the CMMs, the current focus on developing the 
Commission’s monitoring, compliance and surveillance systems could be considered as one 
element in addressing implementation uncertainty over the longer term.
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These boundary rules44 almost certainly result in effort levels above that consistent with 
the estimated optimum economic level of fishing—which generally argues for levels of 
fishing effort under a 2004 reference point (although direct comparisons are difficult to 
make). Economic studies (Kompas and Che, 2006, Bertignac et al, 2001) further find 
that increasing the profitability of the fishery requires not just a reduction in effort in the 
purse seine and longline fleets but also a redistribution of target species, with bigeye 
tuna and yellowfin tuna being targeted less by purse seiners and more by longliners in 
direct recognition of the stock externalities that exist between the two fleets. The CMM 
2008-01 clearly does not do this, but it is perhaps unrealistic to expect that the initial 
efforts of the WCPFC could accomplish both reductions in effort and the substantially 
more difficult task of redistributing the species targeted by each fleet. Instead, the 
measure seeks a technical solution through the implementation of Fish Aggregating 
Devices (FAD) restrictions that are largely responsible for the stock externality 
associated with bigeye tuna (Langley and Hampton, 2008; Itano, 2004) and other 
‘activity rules’, which are discussed below.
For the southern albacore tuna stocks the necessary economic analysis has not been 
undertaken although SPC advice cautions against increases in effort upon this basis 
(Langley and Hampton, 2005, Hoyle et al, 2008). Similarly, for the northern albacore 
tuna, marlin and swordfish stocks SPC, and other scientific analysis, is still sufficiently 
uncertain to be unable to draw significant conclusions but the evidence seems to suggest 
that further reductions in effort and/or harvest will be necessary as understanding of 
these stocks develops. At a minimum, this analysis suggests that the WCPFC is lacking 
in the provision of economic and/or definitive scientific advice on some key pelagic 
species.
3.1.2 Institutional uncertainty: addressing loopholes in the purse seine fishery
Management by ‘limiting effort’ carries the implication that vessels ‘target’ stock in a 
singular manner and consequently, by limiting effort, the fishing effort target 
sufficiently and reliably reduces catch of target species. The multi-species nature of the 
WCPO fishery therefore adds further complications to the risks associated with the 
boundary rules for both purse seine and long line fleets because of the possibility for 
fishers to adapt by re-directing fishing effort to other species, some of who may also be 
subjected to management measures.
Previous measures for bigeye and yellowfin tuna (for example, CMM 2005-01 and 
CMM 2006-01) were written in relatively simple terms and raised this possibility of 
substitution into other forms of fishing in order to maintain catch rates. Moreover, lack 
of consistent terminology between purse seine management within Parties to the Nauru 
Arrangement (PNA) states45 (accounting for just over 50 per cent of purse seine effort), 
which was managed by ‘fishing days’, high seas areas (managed by ‘effort’) and other 
coastal states (management unit undefined) created an inconsistent mosaic of regulation 
that could be exploited by vessels seeking to change fishing locations.
44 In this analysis these WCPFC management measures are defined as ‘boundary rules’ 
because they represent operational limits as to how much effort is allowed into the fishery -  
rather than proscribing technical limits of effort, as discussed below.
45The PNA States are: Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Nauru, Kiribati, Republic of the 
Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau and Tuvalu.
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In recognition o f this, reforms set out in CM M  2008-01 have the potential to actively 
address the transfer issue, and simultaneously address over-fishing on vulnerable stocks 
(discussed below). These measures are:
• Closure o f high seas pockets
• Three month closure on FAD use
• Catch retention measures, that is, ban on discards
• Ban on moving effort around the WCPFC-Convention Area
• Development o f a high seas Vessel Day Scheme to be compatible with the PNA 
VDS.
Initia lly proposed by the PNA states (with the exception o f the last two measures), these 
'technical' measures offer the significant advantage o f being relatively easy to 
implement within available resources o f the region and are consistent with the generally 
techno/scientific approach to management commonly used in the fishery. However 
experience in other fisheries suggests that this technical approach also raises further 
risks o f encouraging additional adaptive behaviour as fishers, seeking to maintain or 
increase their catch, seek ways around technical limits such as increasing vessel sizes 
(Sutinen, 1999). One consequence o f this 'capacity creep’ is a gradual undermining o f 
the ability for the management regime to achieve conservation outcomes (Sutinen, 
1999), and the continual need to 'update’ measures to take account o f new technical 
developments in the fishery. Another impact is the tendency for this process to raise 
harvesting costs by fishers and therefore move the fishery away from a 'profit- 
maximising’ orientation.
3.1.3 Institutional uncertainty: addressing loopholes in the longline fishery
To some extent the transferability issue has also been addressed in the longline fisheries 
where, taken in their entirety, the measures seek to discourage re-targeting o f effort 
between species by the imposition o f constraints on fishing activity across the entire 
range o f species generally targeted by this gear type.
Other multispecies issues remain, however, in the measures relating to longline 
primarily as a result o f the applicability to ‘ by-catch’ issues and the potential confusion 
over the use o f different terms and different baselines. In general, many boats target a 
particular species or several species, but take as 'bycatch’ various assemblages o f 
bigeye tuna, yellowfin tuna, albacore tuna and other pelagic species depending on the 
location and season. As boat operators often remark, they w ill catch and sell ‘ what ever 
comes up in the net (or on the line)’ , although it is possible to discern established 
patterns o f ratios between the species. By focussing effort lim its on one target species at 
a time, the measures only indirectly manage the catch o f species taken as 'bycatch’ even 
i f  they are subject to another management measure. This raises difficulties with 
measuring both the effectiveness o f the regulation and for practical implementation by 
members as well. For example, members may have longline vessels that target albacore 
tuna, but these vessels also harvest yellowfin tuna and bigeye tuna, swordfish and 
marlin as by catch46— it is unclear how the bycatch w ill be counted in any reduction 
required for particular species. In this case, the extent to which these by-catch species 
w ill be subjected to a conservation measure depends on the extent o f the percentage o f
46For example longliner operators in Fiji, Samoa, RMI and FSM all report that they regularly 
target either bigeye tuna or yellowfin tuna or albacore tuna but that ‘other pelagic fish’ are 
always caught as bycatch. In some instances, for example, Fiji, this bycatch is considered as a 
valuable resource which is marketed on the same basis as tuna species. For others, the 
bycatch is considered less valuable.
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catch they represent in the ‘albacore tuna fleet’ and the extent to which this said fleet is 
limited.
3.1.4 Development o f zonal-based longline measure for FFA countries and implicit 
allocation in the management measures.
Many of the boundary rules carry with it an implicit allocation for members as it seeks 
to limit entry using defined base years. By restricting effort to a particular year, these 
measures are, in effect, allocating implicit shares to individual Commission members 
equal to the share of fishing they enjoyed in the selected base year. The most obvious 
example is the Vessel Day Scheme—a central component of CMM 2008-01—which is 
based on an implicit zonal-based allocation, incorporates other ‘economic’ instruments 
such as trading, and has been of particular benefit to the PNA Group. The relative 
shares implied by CMM 2008-01 for the purse seine vessels are set out in Figure 7.3, 
while the implicit allocation for the bigeye measure is set out in Figure 7.4. A 
comparison of bigeye allocation based on the current management measures relative to 
a ‘zonal’ based approach as used under the YDS, is set out in Figure 7.5
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The significant purse seine effort allocation provided to the PNA states through the 
VDS has allowed the PNA states to exercise considerable influence within the 
Commission—influence that remains relatively unavailable to the remaining FFA 
countries, primarily because, for the rest of the FFA, their gear of interest, longline, 
carries implicit bigeye allocations (and other species as well) based on vessel flag, 
rather than on a zonal basis. This is reflected in the implicit shares of bigeye tuna for 
longline fleets in CMM 2008-01—with the majority accruing to DWFNs who dominate 
this gear type across all regions.
Unsurprisingly, the ‘Non-PNA’ FFA group are beginning to address this issue within 
CMM 2008-01 by securing an agreement to develop a zonal-based allocation 
mechanism for long line vessels—and consequently this can be interpreted as an 
explicit attempt to increase its potential allocation within the Commission. The key 
question is whether this will place them in a relatively better position with respect to 
current implied allocation, and initial calculations—set out in Figure 3-5—confirms that 
this is indeed the case for many (but not all) PNA countries. This preliminary data 
suggests that while other PNA countries may increase their implicit allocation for fresh 
longline fleets, compared to the implicit bigeye allocation in CMM 2008-01, a zonal- 
based approach will give them relatively less shares in frozen longline effort. For PNA 
states and DWFN the opposite case is true, where a switch to zonal-based allocation 
will increase shares of frozen longline effort, reflecting the relatively high level of 
frozen longline fishing activity on the high seas for these countries.
7. 3.2 Activity rules and the potential for adaptation through intensification of fishing 
effort
‘Fishing effort’ is a multi-dimensional concept that theoretically incorporates all inputs 
employed in the harvesting process (Ward, 2004; Kirkley et al., 2002; Wilen, 1979; 
Kompas, 2007), and the supposition that the control of one aspect of fishing effort (that 
is, fishing days or boats) can control fishing mortality depends on the assumption that 
all other aspects of fishing effort, such as technology, fisher skill, days, numbers of 
hooks, FAD use and so on, remains constant. In practice, however, this is generally not 
the case, and substitution between inputs or capacity creep, a common form of adaptive 
behaviour by fishers in response to any gear limitation, is already likely to have 
occurred within the purse seine fishery particularly through increases in vessel size 
(Reid et al, 2006) and increased use of various types of fish aggregating devices 
(FADS) (Itano, 2004). This has two implications. Firstly, at a theoretical level, recent 
analysis by Yamazaki et al (2008) shows that under conditions of uncertainty, at least 
for the skipjack fishery, the TAE approach adopted by the Commission is likely to lead 
to lower profitability in the fishery as well.
Second, by ignoring the ‘multi-dimensional aspect’ of fishing capacity, measures 
relating albacore tuna, marlin, swordfish, and the initial measures for bigeye tuna and 
yellowfin tuna incorporated the potential risk of encouraging capacity creep by allowing 
for fishers to substitute into unregulated inputs out of regulated ones (days, vessels, 
hooks). Such possibilities remain in the longline fishery where the terms of the CMMs, 
such as ‘fishing effort’ (for northern albacore), or ‘vessels’ (for southern albacore tuna 
and swordfish) remain undefined (Wright et al, 2007) and therefore vessel operators 
retain the capacity to undertake gear intensification through, for example, using 
increased numbers of hooks.
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In the case o f bigeye tuna and yellowfin tuna, recognition o f this problem led the 2008 
Commission to adopt several activity rules for both longline and purse seine fleets. 
Summarised in Table 7.5, these measures— FAD closures, high seas closure, catch 
retention and observer coverage and reduction in bigeye tuna harvests— are primarily 
oriented towards reducing bigeye mortality by 30 per cent over three years and w ill take 
effect in two stages beginning in 2009, and then in 2010-11. Comparing these to 
scientific recommendations regarding excess effort on bigeye tuna (Table 7.5), it is 
suggested that while these measures represent significant progress in addressing a large 
source o f expanding capacity in early measures,47 if  implemented correctly, they w ill 
result only in a reduction o f effort directed towards bigeye tuna o f 13.38 per cent in 
2009 rising to 15.48 per cent in 2010-11— or just over half the recommended level o f 
effort reductions. The focus o f this measure was primarily on bigeye tuna as measures 
designed to reduce mortality for this stock were considered to be sufficient to address 
the conservation needs o f yellowfin tuna (Hampton and Harley, 2008).
Although representing a significant advance, like the original measures, this- CMM 
carries with it a range of risks that could potentially reduce its intended outcomes. The 
primary risks— consistently highlighted by SPC— is that its recommended 30 per cent 
reduction in bigeye tuna mortality is still likely to result in a decline in MSY fishing 
mortality for bigeye tuna (Hampton and Harley, 2008).
In formulating its advice on this matter, SPC scientists carefully highlighted that their 
analysis is a best-case scenario reliant on a range o f assumptions that presume, amongst 
other things, that effort reduced through FAD closures or high seas closures are not 
transferred elsewhere, that FAD use is not increased throughout the rest o f the year or 
that catchability on FADs are not increased in the period after the closure- that is, there 
is no further adaptive behaviour either by fishing vessels or by CMMs in their national 
implementation regimes. It is hard to see how this could work in practice since the 
incentives to switch fishing strategies is strong -  there are, for example, no 
countervailing measures to ensure that vessels do not increase their fishing power 
elsewhere in the region. Consequently, it is possible that these measures w ill not result 
in achieving even its modest reductions .
CMM 2008-01 also strengthened the previous conservation measures for bigeye tuna 
harvests taken by long line gears by requiring these fleets to undertake a phased 30 per 
cent reduction in bigeye tuna catch over 3 years to 2011, using a baseline o f harvests 
taken, on average, between 2000-2004. This is a significant step forward for the 
WCPFC but, like the boundary rules discussed above, appears to have adopted a risky 
target through the incorporation o f an explicit set o f exemptions for the many WCPFC 
members with relatively small bigeye tuna harvests. These exemptions— the numerics 
o f which are set out in Table 7.6— have the potential to undermine the CMMs 
conservation objectives because, taken to its logical conclusion, it is possible that this 
measure could actually increase bigeye tuna catch approximately 31 per cent above 
2004 levels and 57 per cent above recommended MSY harvest targets. This occurs 
because those members that caught less that 2000 tonnes in 2004 are allowed, under this 
measure, to catch up to this amount. The potential implications for overall catch levels 
are presented in Table 7.6 which, although it represents a ‘worst case scenario’ does 
highlight the potential risk from building in ‘exemption clauses’ .
47Previous measures for bigeye tuna and yellowfin tuna generally limited purse seine effort to 
2004 levels and longline catch to 2004. Details may be found in WCPFC 2006, 2007c, 2008b.
149
A particular challenge of this measure is to determine where future cuts in bigeye tuna 
harvest may be sought. One option may be to continue cutting bigeye tuna harvests 
from the DWFN long line fisheries, although in light of the significant cuts already 
agreed to in this measure this may be politically contentious. The two other obvious 
options, to cut from SIDS allocation or from Indonesia and the Philippines fisheries, are 
problematic. From the Indonesian perspective, lack of capacity in effective 
implementation means that expectations of a significant contribution to conservation is 
unrealistic in the short to medium term. This has been recognised by the Commission 
which is actively engaging in capacity building projects with Indonesia and the 
Philippines (Leroy, 2008. WCPFC, 2008c), but does mean that should further cuts be 
made, it is unrealistic that this can be expected from the Indonesian fishery. The 
alternative option—reducing the opportunity for harvesting by SIDS—may be 
technically straightforward to deliver since the increase in catch derived from their 
exemptions is currently hypothetical rather than real. Nevertheless, it does cut across 
Pacific Islanders’ strongly held political ambitions to develop domestic fisheries and 
therefore may be politically difficult to achieve.
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Table 7.6: Potential Increase in Bigeye Tuna Harvests From
CMM 2008-01
FFA members Average amounts (tons) 2001-2004
Permissible average catch (tons) 
set out in CMM 2008-01
Australia 1,057 2,000
Cook Islands 164 2,000
Fiji 915 2,000
FSM 652 2,000
Kiribati - 2,000
Marshall Islands 0 2,000
Nauru 5 2,000
New Zealand 266 2,000
Niue - 2,000
PNG 335 2,000
Palau 8 2,000
Samoa 134 2,000
Solomon Islands 476 2,000
Tokelau - 2,000
Tonga 135 2,000
Tuvalu _ 2,000
Vanuatu 779 2,000
Other WCPFC Members
American Samoa 185 2,000
Canada _ 2,000
China 9,323 6,526
French Polynesia 582 2,000
Japan 28,100 19,670
Korea 21,449 15,014
New Caledonia 137 2,000
Philippines 343 2,000
EU (Spain) 11 2,000
Taiwan 15,854 11,098
US 4,185 2,930
Total 85,095 101,238
TABLE 7.6 (CONTINUED)
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TABLE 7.6 (CONTINUED)
Baseline for calculating CM1V1 2008-01 Longline 
measure 85,095
Total Amount o f permissible catch allowed in CMM 
2008-01 (with exemptions) 101,238
Estimated MSY catch 64,600
percentage increase in catch over estimated MSY — 
CMM 2008-01 baseline 32%
percentage increase in catch over estimated MSY — 
CMM 2008-01 total permitted catch 57%
Source: Langley (2008b), WCPFC (2008b), WCPFC (2008d); author's own
calculations
7.3.3 Scope of Rules—Applicability In The Face O f 'Exemption' Clauses
4.3.1 Catch Coverage and exemption-based management
The bigeye tuna measure for longline may be interpreted as one form o f ‘exemption' 
clause for small island developing states, but this is not the only one. Several CMMs 
contain clauses that have the potential to alter the scope o f their applicability to 
members o f ‘small island developing' country status. For example, CMM 2005-02 
(South Pacific Albacore) states that the requirement to lim it number o f fishing vessels 
actively fishing for southern albacore tuna ‘ ...shall not prejudice the legitimate rights 
and obligations under international law of small island developing State and Territory 
[member states]...’ while Paragraph 6 in CMM 2005-01 (bigeye tuna and yellowfin 
tuna) states that ‘nothing in this decision shall prejudice the legitimate rights ...o f those 
small island state Members....seeking to develop their own domestic fisheries’ .
Recent interpretations by the WCPFC of these kinds o f statements is consistent with the 
FFA view that these represent ‘exemptions’ clauses that allows small island developing 
state members significant scope to develop their own domestic fishing fleets without 
being subjected to the same restrictions on fishing effort faced by DWFN . This is 
largely argued on equity grounds: the Pacific states are poor under-developed states 
with tuna being a substantial resource available for them to drive development and 
consequently they should not be restricted in their development efforts. The corollary o f 
this view is that the DWFN should be responsible for reducing effort as required for 
sustainability purposes. The general exemptions argued for by Pacific states reflect a 
long-standing political/legal debate within the WCPFC regarding development rights o f 
Pacific states and who retains control over national waters (Tarte, 2002). It is beyond 
the scope o f this article to comment on the specifics o f this debate, but it is argued here 
that the exemptions clauses are problematic from a sustainability perspective because 
they could mean that a substantial portion o f the tuna industry may remain unregulated 
under the WCPFC and therefore undermine the effectiveness o f the CMMs. I f  the FFA 
interpretation holds, it is unlikely that it could be conferred that ‘ small island 
developing state’”  refers solely to the FFA states, but would also need to cover other 
Pacific islands as well: Noumea, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna and arguably the
48For example, statements made by Tuvalu and Republic of the Marshall Islands at the Third 
Annual Meeting of the WCPFC who explicitly argued that small Pacific states should be exempt 
from measures to restrict capacity in the WCPFC-CA (WCPFC, 2007). See statements made to 
the plenary session of the third WCPFC meeting, Samoa 2006, by the delegations from Tuvalu 
and the Republic of the Marshall Islands.
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Philippines, Indonesia and the US Territories of American Samoa and Commonwealth 
of Northern Marianas Islands. Table 7.7 shows the possible quantum of catch that 
would not be included in total WCPFC catch levels (i.e.'leakage’) under any 
exemptions clause for small island developing country members to the WCPFC and 
potentially shows that, if exploited fully, it could lead to up to 47 per cent overall 
exemption for all fish caught by Pacific Island Domestic Fleets.
It may be counter argued that although the Pacific-based fleets are not regulated under 
the WCPFC they are subject to other forms of regulation at the national and sub­
regional level (for example, the FFA regional treaties) and that these can be made 
consistent with sustainability (see for example statements made by Government of 
Papua New Guinea, 2008). For example, the Vessel Day Scheme proposed under the 
CMM 2005-01 found genesis outside the WCPFC amongst the FFA states (Dunn et al, 
2006). The primary problem of this 'exemptions’- based management approach is that, 
so far, it hasn't worked. Under the 'exemptions’ argument, the PNA sub-group of the 
FFA bloc have rapidly increased their fishing mortality above their 2004 levels for the 
years 2005-2007 (see Figure 7.6) and attempts to rein in harvesting activity is placing 
the policy under considerable strain. One example is the recent report to the WCPFC of 
the implementation of the VDS and over-run by PNG of its allocated budget days 
(Parties to the Nauru Agreement, 2008). Another is the increasing use of the United 
States Multilateral Treaty (USMLT), which has been provided a notional global 
allocation under the VDS, has seen a rapid resurgence in the US fleet (Government of 
the United States of America, 2008) as vessel owners transfer to US flags as a method 
to gain relatively easier access into the fishery. Already this resurgence has lead to an 
over-run of its notional allocation under the VDS first management period (Parties to 
the Nauru Agreement, 2008).
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Table 7.7: Total Catch from Small Island Developing Country Members,
2005
A lbacore Bigeye S k ip jack Y e llow fln T O T A L
C ook Islands 2,309 208 32 414 2,963
F iji 8,892 423 577 2,072 11,964
FSM 0 974 23,184 3,643 27.801
K ir ib a ti 0 396 5,930 2,843 9,169
M arsha ll Islands 0 2,468 47,613 6,139 56,220
N auru 0 0 0 0 0
N iue 55 10 4 34 103
PNG 2,086 9,837 166,507 44,894 223,324
Palau 0 0 0 0 0
Samoa 1,264 64 15 199 1,542
S olom on Islands 267 2,124 13,449 8,315 24,154
Toke lau 0 0 0 0 0
Tonga 283 125 2 219 629
Tuva lu 0 0 0 0 0
Vanuatu 9,320 2,552 62,272 11,095 85,240
French Polynesia 2,510 606 773 1,136 5,026
Indonesia 0 27,265 182,476 52,042 261,783
N e w  C aledonia 1,590 76 0 448 2,114
P h ilipp ines 0 22,868 170,352 119,410 312,630
T o ta l S ID S  catch (including  
Philippines and Indonesia) 28,577 69,996 673,186 252,904 1,024,663
T o ta l C atch  in W C P F C -C A 126,152 161,905 1,446,583 424,305 2,158,945
Percentage 2 3 % 4 3 % 4 7 % 6 0 % 4 7 %
Source: Reid (2007) for raw catch data and author’s calculations.
Note: Separate data was not available for the catches taken by domestic fleets o f the 
Northern Marianas Islands but Annual Report (Pelagics) from the Western Pacific 
Regional Fisheries Management Council suggests around 144 metric tons was caught in 
2006 (WPRFMC, 2007; author's own calculations).
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Figure 7.6: Total Purse Seine Effort Days in PNA Exclusive Economic 
Zones
Source: WCPFC Secretariat (2008)
Note: This effort data does not include effort expended in archipelagic waters as these 
areas do not come under management control o f the WCPFC.
This is unsurprising since for the PNA (and other small island developing states) to take 
on a ‘ unilateral' management, and still achieve conservation outcomes, particularly for 
bigeye, requires significant conservation measures to be put in place by coastal states, 
and their associated costs, while the economic and conservation benefits accrue 
primarily to other members who target bigeye tuna using longline gears for the sashimi 
market (see Reid, 2006a for further discussion o f this issue). The fact that the PNA
49countries have agreed to adopt their own measures to address bigeye and yellowfin 
shows considerable leadership on their part, but this reliance on the PNA to ‘do the right 
thing’ also raises questions as to its long-run sustainability unless the longline bigeye 
tuna measures in CMM 2008-01 impose broadly 'equitable' costs (that is, responsibility 
for conservation) on those DWFNs who are likely to benefit from the actions. It is 
notable that the PNA measures do not apply to their own rapidly growing fleets (FFC, 
2008).
4.3.2 Transfer offishing capacity from DWFN to Pacific based fleets
There is also a risk that the exemptions clauses could be used as a mechanism to 
increase capacity operating in the WCPFC-Convention Area through a transfer o f 
fishing effort between DWFN, who face capacity/effort restrictions, to Pacific states, or 
other developing coastal state members, who do not— thereby raising fishing mortality 
further.
49These measures are: use of observers, FAD closures and use of access arrangements to 
effectively close ‘high seas pockets’ (FFA, 2008).
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This is a controversial issue in the WCPFC with many DWFN seeing this as a 
‘loophole’ in the effectiveness of the CMMs, while the Pacific states see it as a 
necessary position, without which they would be unacceptably limited in pursuing their 
own domestic development agendas. It is argued here that the risk certainly exists for 
this to occur—there is nothing within the WCPFC rules to prevent these transfers, and 
recent transfers between Chinese Taipei and Marshall Islands and Tuvalu have been 
explicitly debated and allowed for in the WCPFC (2007a). The proposed Charter 
Arrangements Scheme currently under consideration by the WCPFC (rightly) focuses 
on ensuring that chartered vessels do not encourage a transfer of illegal and unregulated 
vessels, but it is silent on methods to ensure that the transfer of vessels does not increase 
capacity or harvest rates in either the flag state or the chartering state. In fact such an 
arrangement could actually increase capacity. For example, both Charter Arrangement 
Schemes under consideration explicitly state that the effort and catch of the chartered 
vessels (again correctly) counts against the chartering member allocation—but if a 
management measure provides an ‘exemption' for this member (and therefore doesn’t 
‘count’ the transferred vessel under its fisheries management regime) then the vessel 
adds to effort levels rather than transferring them between members. This occurs 
because the transfer vessel does not ‘count' as part of the overall effort in the WCPFC, 
but the DWFN, who previously ‘flagged' the vessel can now replace it with a new one. 
Moreover, by ‘freeing’ up a vessel from a DWFN, then it is possible that transferring an 
existing active vessel from a DWFN to a Pacific state could actually increase effort as 
the DWFN vessel is replaced in its fleet with a new vessel of greater fishing power.
However, whether this transfer of vessels will actually increase capacity is uncertain. 
The potential quantum of effort transfer depends on the extent to which the cost of 
operating in the Pacific states, universally recognised as being more difficult and costly 
(Barclay and Cartwright, 2007a), is outweighed by the economic incentives to enter into 
the fishery'. This depends on a range of factors including the opportunities available to 
fish as a DWFN vessel in the WCPFC-CA, or elsewhere around the world, the expected 
profitability from the fishery, and the extent to which basing a fishing vessel in a Pacific 
state increases the cost of operation compared to its original location. Policies adopted 
by Pacific states to encourage relocation, and linkages to domestic economies, such as 
the operation of the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement, are also pivotal and 
the experience in the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement (FSMA) signatory 
states has not been as large as desired or expected. Whether a stronger barrier to entry 
by DWFN will facilitate more transfers remains an open question. For longline vessels, 
many Pacific states have experienced influxes of charter vessels or vessels based in their 
countries in response to domestic policies encouraging this transfer (Barclay and 
Cartwright, 2007).
7.4. Discussion: A preliminary assessment of the Conservation and 
Management Measures
Taken together, the CMMs provide a framework of rules determining permissible, 
forbidden or required actions that members may initiate as they seek to control their 
domestic fisheries or fishing fleets within the Convention Area. It is an on-going 
research task to closely monitor their effectiveness however recent analysis (Langley et 
al., 2009; WCPFC, 2008a) indicates that fishing capacity and fishing mortality 
continues to increase beyond 2004 levels. This could indicate that members are not 
honouring their commitments, or the start of such a trend, and/or vessel operators are 
taking advantage of the relatively weak policy signals and expanding their fishing
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mortality by increasing fishing intensity. Against this, and the analysis set out in this 
article, what conclusions can be drawn about the performance of the WCPFC overall?
The WCPFC clearly represents significant progress in the collaborative management of 
tuna stocks in the WCPO. Key achievements centre around the establishment of a 
region-wide framework for consistent and collaborative fisheries management across all 
jurisdictions, all stakeholders and for fishing gears other than purse seine fishing in 
EEZs of Pacific countries. It has also been successful in broadening the scope of 
regional fisheries management beyond stock management of tuna to include other 
pelagic species and ecosystem management issues (for example, by catch of marine sea 
birds or turtles). Although initiated pre-Commission by the FFA Group, the adoption of 
the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) by the WCPFC also represents another significant 
advance in regional management. The structure of the VDS, based around a Total 
Allowable Effort target and mechanisms for allocation and trading of defined ‘property 
rights’, represents essentially the adoption of an ‘incentive based' economics approach 
to fisheries management in the WCPFC purse seine fishery operating in the PNA 
countries’ EEZs. Although limited in scope, it provides a clear framework for evolving 
more robust CMMs for other gear types, provided that gear externalities can be 
appropriately addressed.
Observation of the WCPFC meetings also suggest other less tangible, but important, 
achievements of the Commission. Primary amongst these is the success of the FFA 
states in demanding and obtaining a voice equal in power to DWFNs at the negotiating 
table. In addition, the WCPFC has established a meeting culture that remains focused on 
issues of substance, rather than procedure, thus avoiding the unproductive stalemates 
characteristic of some other regional fisheries management organizations.
But capitalizing on these achievements and implementing more robust management 
regimes will require a WCPFC that is willing and able to address the significant 
shortcomings of its early efforts as discussed in this paper. First, the levels of effort 
limits and harvest limits (bigeye tuna only) agreed to, are only notionally consistent 
with scientific advice and fail to effectively acknowledge or integrate the various 
dimensions of uncertainty inherent in fisheries management. Second, the definition of 
how ‘fishing effort' is defined is confusing and/or narrowly defined, leading to an 
expansion of effective capacity through substitution into unregulated inputs (that is, 
effort creep). The multispecies dimension of the longline fishery is also poorly 
addressed. Third, the range of exemptions for Pacific and developing coastal states are 
unclear and untested, but could result in a substantial portion of the fleet and catch 
unregulated by the WCPFC—thus encouraging a move of capacity' into these countries.
One plausible assessment of the CMMs is that, with the exception of the VDS, they are 
temporary in nature and have been put in place while more robust measures can be 
considered and implemented and this has been explicitly recognised by the WCPFC 
membership50. A sense of ‘temporariness’ in management measures however can, and 
appears to already be, encouraging additional capacity growth above 2004 levels— 
particularly in the domestic fleets case of small island developing states domestic
50Several clauses in the CMM’s support this view. For example, CMM 2005-01 tasks the 
Scientific Committee to ‘identify levels of fishing effort to ensure bigeye and yellowfin stocks 
remain at an agreed level above Bmsy’, while under CMM 2005-03 The Commission shall 
consider future actions with respect to North Pacific albacore tuna based on recommendations 
of the Northern Committee’. These clauses suggest that the WCPFC wishes to continue to 
debate further options, if the CMMs within which they are contained are not effective.
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vessels who operate on the assumption that WCPFC measures ‘do not apply to 
them"(Gillett 2008). This is unsurprising: in the face of policy uncertainty, industry 
(encouraged by their national governments) has every incentive to increase its fishing 
presence lest future policies restrict access to ‘existing players’ or allocate valuable 
resources to those with a catch history and further risk moving bigeye and yellowfin 
into the 'rebuilding' phase of fisheries management.
Several authors have discussed why progress within the Commission has been slow. For 
example, see (Langley et al. 2008: Parris et al, 2009), who note that current debates are 
embroiled in deep divisions over textual interpretation, efforts to protect domestic 
industries and problems regarding 'day to day’ governance. While agreeing with these 
views, it is argued here that these divisions are indicative not just of a 'lack of political 
will' but an inability for members to reach meaningful agreement, and implement their 
commitments, is in turn driven by a fundamental failure to address the incentives 
created by the common property/open access structure of the fishery. Further progress is 
therefore unlikely to be successful unless more attention is paid not just to altering the 
rules regarding who does what, where and why, but also on altering the economic 
incentives or ‘payoffs’ to members.
Current economic payoffs available to each member, consistent with any typical 
common-pool fishery, depends on how much they catch in each time period and the 
value of any ‘spin-off benefits’ such as processing, prior to the fish being caught by 
someone else. This is the case whether the fish is caught by a domestic fleet, or revenue 
is collected from allowing access by distant water fleets (because this revenue is a 
function of tonnage harvested) (Clark, 2006b). Combined with relatively high discount 
rates (that is, preferences for returns in the short run rather than the longer run), the 
economic pressure is on members to ‘catch as much fish as possible’, as soon as 
possible. The current WCPFC CMMs merely seek to limit the extent to which 
individual members can enjoy the available economic benefits today to an approximate 
equivalent of the amount of fish harvested in 2004 (or 2005), thus maintaining the 
common-pool payoff structure (see Table 7.3 which summarizes the key features of the 
measures). The measures therefore act as a limit to the potential growth in the value of 
the fishery to individual members51 without any assurances that those bearing the costs 
of current loss in this value, due to the CMMs, will actually be the ones who benefit 
from improved stock sustainability in the future.
Equally important, is the need for the Commission to actively manage the kinds of risks 
highlighted in this paper. Focusing initially on the scientific ones as required under the 
‘precautionary’ responsibilities set out in the Convention Text, other risks, such as those 
associated with implementation risk and institutional risk, need to move beyond the 
current focus on MCS measures towards active anticipation of these risks within the text 
of the CMMs themselves. Current expansion of fishing effort beyond 2004—that is, 
non-compliance by members and adaptive responses by fishers— provides insight into 
the implications of not addressing implementation and institutional risks.
These twin issues suggest that the WCPFC may benefit from a stronger focus on policy 
processes that are viewed both as ‘adaptive’ or ‘learning’ experiences as well as policies 
that change the incentives faced by members. Key to these approaches will be drawing
51 In some cases where fishing fleets are declining, for example Japan, whose numbers of Ion 
line vessels are declining over time, these CMMs represent a consolidation of the value of the 
fishery because it provides for a level of access (that is, access to the value of the fishery) 
above current fishing effort.
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into the governance framework the key insights from the ‘incentive-based' fisheries 
economic literature and the adaptive management literature, the most important 
elements of which can be considered as introducing two policy tools. The first of these 
will be mechanisms—such as property rights and tradable rights—that allow for 
assessments to be made between the trade off between current and future use of the 
fisheries stock (current costs/future benefits) and the trade off between competing uses 
of it (for example, harvest by different gear types). The second of these is a risk 
management approach to fisheries that suggests the development of an 'adaptive 
management’ cycle that allows members to measure progress against targets and to 
evaluate and ‘adapt' policy as new information becomes available and/or political, 
economic or biophysical changes occur within the fishery.
There is, of course, an extended and richly populated academic and 'grey’ literature 
documenting a wealth of experience from other fisheries and other common-sharing 
situations and some of this also includes consideration of these issues within the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean. But in considering these issues, the WCPFC is 
fortunate, and possibly unique amongst the tuna RFMOs, in that the genesis of both 
incentive-based and adaptive management approaches can already be found within the 
current policy debates and/or within the Convention Text itself. Three key existing 
elements within the WCPFC that support this approach are:
• The structure of the Vessel Day Scheme (see (Dunn et al, 2006) as adopted by the 
WCPFC in 2005.
• Active discussions around the use of Management Strategy Evaluation tools in 
scientific assessment and debates about the appropriate selection of reference points, 
(see Davies, 2008a)
• Risk assessments routinely undertaken by the WCPFC scientific advisor to address 
scientific aspects of risk in fisheries management.
• Governing Convention Text that provides the WCPFC with a mandate to pursue a 
'precautionary' approach to fisheries management.
This suggests that a policy development using incentive-based and adaptive 
management principles in the WCPFC is not a radical change to policy development, 
but a transformative one. Extending the VDS, and its property right structure will 
require the successful resolution of the ‘allocation problem’—although the existing 
scheme sets strong precedence for directing allocation towards coastal states—as well 
as ensuring that property rights are defined in such a manner that discourages capacity 
growth and ensures sufficient security, exclusivity and durability of the rights to allow 
members to shift their focus to longer term management. The adaptive management 
approach is broadly consistent with the Convention Text and current practice, but 
formal adoption of key elements, such as the use of reference points, raises other 
controversial issues about setting appropriate fishing targets over time and how they 
should change over time as fishery conditions change. Slow progress on the discussion 
of reference points within the WCPFC reflects not only the crowded meeting schedule, 
but also a recognition of the complexity in finding common management objectives 
between 34 stakeholders. The maintenance of this issue on the agenda, however, is 
encouraging.
7.5. Conclusion
The formation of the WCPFC has been a substantial achievement in bringing together 
all stakeholders to manage highly migratory tuna stocks in a comprehensive 
management framework for the first time. In particular, it represents the first
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comprehensive region-wide regime to govern fishing activity on the high seas and 
fishing gears other than purse seine fleets. However, progress in using this regime to 
agree to and implement management measures consistent with economic and scientific 
advice has achieved some success but fundamental issues regarding risk management 
and incentive structures remain unchanged. Progress has been, at times, frustratingly 
slow if the interpretation of measures is that they are temporary political 
compromises—they are likely to result in further increases in fishing capacity and 
consequent reductions in stock biomass for the tuna species.
While the time available to decision makers to focus on rule creation and on the 
awkward political dynamics of the WCPFC partly explain the lack of progress, this 
analysis suggests that the real reason for the lack of appropriate measures is the failure 
to address the pay-off structures faced by members and a lack of sufficient policy 
attention to the risks associated with fisheries management. Until these issues are 
addressed it is unlikely that members will agree to implement further reductions in 
fishing capacity and harvest levels, and that the scientific and human behavioural risks 
associated with the targets will continue to undermine achievement of sustainable 
harvest levels. The key to addressing these issues is already part of the WCPFC policy 
dialogue. Building on these existing elements towards more robust strategies should be 
a key priority of the future work of the WCPFC.
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CHAPTER 8
THE CHALLENGE OF FISHERIES GOVERNANCE POST UNSFSA: THE 
CASE OF THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL PACIFIC FISHERIES
COMMISSION
The charm o f fishing is that it is the pursuit o f that which is elusive but attainable, a 
perpetual series o f occasions for hope
John Buchan
8.1. Introduction
The Convention on the Conservation and Management o f Highly Migratory Fish Stock 
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean came into force as international law in mid- 
2004, amid much optimism that this would herald a new regime for oceanic fisheries 
governance and tuna fisheries management in the western and central Pacific Ocean 
(WCPO).
In the four years that has since elapsed, a more sobering reality has emerged within the 
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the intergovernmental 
body established as the decision-making and implementation forum for the convention. 
Despite a broad consensus that such international cooperation was overdue to conserve 
vulnerable fish stocks, the success o f the commission so far has been mixed. While 
progress is being made, there are troubling signs that the commission's members, 
cooperating non-members, and participating territories (hereafter referred to as member 
states) " have failed to capitalize on the new structure, and a possible stalemate looms, 
particularly with respect to agreement on measures to meet the responsibilities for 
conservation and management measures (CMMs).
Failure to further progress CMMs is not the result o f disputed science. Indeed, the 
WCPFC is a notable exception among the regional fisheries management organizations 
(RFMO) in that, to date, the science has received broad acceptance from all 
stakeholders. Nor is the failure a result o f a poor decision-making framework— the 
WCPFC convention is widely considered to provide an excellent basis for decision­
making within an RFMO context.
This chapter reviews the status o f implementation o f the convention and proposes three 
possible explanations for what many consider is a lack o f progress. The first factor, 
common to the experience o f other cooperative management arrangements, revolves 
around the interplay among divergent national economic and political interests that 
influence the scope and quality o f debate within the WCPFC negotiation room. The 
second factor is the process o f interpreting the convention itself beyond its framework
32The current membership of the WCPFC comprises the Forum Fisheries Agency Group of 
Countries (Australia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, 
Samoa, Cook Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Tokelau, Kiribati, Nauru, Nuie, Marshall Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Palau) and Japan, Korea, China, Chinese Taipei, United 
States, European Union, France, Canada, and the Philippines. The Pacific Territories of 
American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, 
New Caledonia, Wallis, and Futuna also participate in their own right. Belize and Indonesia 
have cooperating nonmember status.
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language and into practical mechanisms for management. The third factor is the 
challenge of day-to-day governance that arises in a region with limited human and 
financial capacity for implementing complex governance arrangements. We contend 
that all three factors influence the relative costs and benefits facing member states as 
they determine their level of compliance to existing conservation measures as well as 
their political willingness to craft new measures.
This chapter concludes by reflecting on what governance scholars could learn from the 
experiences of the WCPFC and considers some options for addressing overfishing and 
other threats to the sustainability of the stocks.
8.2. The Tuna Fisheries and Tuna Management in the WCPO
The WCPO is the world's largest and most productive fishing ground for four 
commercially important species of tuna: yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares), skipjack 
tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis), albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga), and bigeye tuna 
(Thunnus obesus) (Gillett et ah, 2001; Williams and Reid, 2005). Responding to 
changing oceanographic conditions, these highly migratory species travel large 
distances across the WCPO, moving frequently in and out of the exclusive economic 
zones (EEZs) of coastal states and high-seas areas (Hampton et ah, 2006; Langley and 
Hampton, 2005; Langley et ah, 2005, 2007).
Unique among the world's major tuna fisheries, Pacific tuna fisheries are characterized 
by a large proportion of the total catch being taken within the EEZs of coastal states, the 
vast majority of whom are Pacific Island countries (PICs). Tuna resources are primarily 
harvested by distant-water fishing nations (DWFNs; Japan, Korea, Taiwan, United 
States) although domestic harvesting by PICs, supported by substantial foreign 
investment, is also significant (for a more complete description, see Aqorau, 2001; 
Barclay and Cartwright, 2007; Hamilton, 2006). While generally in better biological 
condition than other fisheries, tuna stocks in the WCPO are now increasingly heavily 
fished, with overfishing occurring on bigeye and yellowfin tuna (WCPFC, 2006, 
2007a). Evidence suggests that significant threats to future stock sustainability now 
exist, and there is a general acceptance that overcapacity in the fishing fleets exists 
within the region (see Bertignac et al., 2000: Kompas and Che, 2006; Reid et al., 2003).
Evolution of international law over the last 25 years has seen the development of two 
themes in tuna management in the Pacific: (1) conditional ownership rights provided to 
coastal states, through the establishment of the EEZ regime under U.N. Convention of 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and (2) acceptance that tuna stocks, as highly migratory 
species, are shared resources requiring cooperative management over their biological 
range (for an overview, see Aqorau, 2002).
PICs responded to these two issues with a two-pronged strategy of asserting their in­
zone sovereign rights, in order to gain economically from tuna through fishing access 
agreements (Schurman, 1998: van Santen and Muller, 2000), as well as coordinating the 
administration of fishing fleets across the region through the formation of the Forum 
Fisheries Agency (FFA) (Aqorau, 2001, 2002; Cordonnery, 2002; Tsamenyi and 
Aqorau, 1999; van Santen and Mulle, 2000; Wright et al., 2006). The development of 
EEZ rights in the late 1970s changed the nature of the involvement of DWFNs in the 
region, with all countries gradually recognizing sovereign rights of coastal states and
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paying license fees to access their waters to fish (Aqorau, 2007). More recently, under 
the domestication policies of the FFA states, many DWFNs have also been obliged to 
engage in strategic investments in Pacific-based tuna industries and supporting fleets.
Since the implementation of the UNCLOS regime, the need for a region-wide 
cooperative regime for the collaborative management of highly migratory and shared 
fish stocks throughout the WCPO was recognized by all major stakeholders. However, 
progress was delayed by the FFA states that resisted pressure from DWFNs to broaden 
FFA membership and activities to reflect the kind of management regime envisaged 
under Article 64 of UNCLOS (Tarte, 2002). The primary reason for this was their 
concern that the negative experiences of small developing states in other RFMOs would 
be replicated in the Pacific and their interests subsumed by the more powerful fishing 
nations. During the 1990s, this position began to change in response to the conclusion 
of the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) which the PICs felt was progressing on 
terms favorable to them. Interpreting the UNFSA as placing them in a stronger legal 
position to negotiate a WCPFC that reflected their interests (Tarte, 2002), the FFA 
countries overcame their reluctance and agreed to participate in a broader regional 
negotiation for a WCPO fisheries management organization. Starting in 1994 this 
process culminated in 2000 with the agreement to the text for the Convention on the 
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean.
8.3. Governance in Natural Resource Management and the Framework of 
the ‘Tuna Convention’
The idea of governance in natural resource management is a multidimensional concept 
that captures both the processes associated with policy development and the actual 
policies themselves—that is, the rules put in place that seek to alter the pattern of 
human interaction with the environment (see Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). Conceived 
more broadly than simply the range of activities within the domain of government, the 
idea of governance incorporates the concept of collaborative decision making, 
cooperative actions, and mutual responsibility among stakeholders—however defined— 
ranging across the public (that is, government, community) and private (that is, 
enterprise, individual) spheres (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; 
Ostrom, 1990).
Scholarship and practical experience with governance arrangements for natural resource 
management have grown exponentially in the last 30 years, and a clearer vision of what 
constitutes good governance—at least in terms of approaches and principles—is 
beginning to emerge. This is particularly the case for ocean’s governance conducted at 
the international level (see, for example, Tsamenyi et ah, 2004; for an alternative view, 
see Hanna, 1999).
On the theoretical side, several streams of intellectual thought have influenced both the 
conceptualizations of governance of large-scale oceans commons resources—such as 
WCPO tuna resources—and the actual content of how a governance regime may work. 
Key ideas from this scholarship include the idea of hierarchical and mutually supportive 
governance regimes, designed to link global management with appropriately scaled 
institutions to address regional issues; the recognition of the complexity and variability 
of large-scale commons and the related problems of managing with limited control and
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under uncertainty; the recognition of the importance of incentives in shaping 
stakeholder behavior; and the idea that policy must be adaptive and learn from 
experiences within the commons situation (see, for example, Berkes, 2006).
Although they have a different genesis, many of these ideas have been incorporated—in 
practical terms—into the architecture of international maritime law and related 
agreements. For example, the idea of an ecosystem-based management approach, 
precautionary approaches, and cooperative decisions are ideas written into many 
influential international legal fisheries-related instruments including Agenda 21 (1992), 
United Nations Fish Stock Agreement, and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Kaye, 2001; Tsamenyi et al., 2004; van 
Houtte, 2002).
The most striking example is the hierarchical framework of ‘nested’ international legal 
agreements starting with the 1982 LOSC, its subsidiary agreement UNFSA, and the 
international process it generated in gradually moving to more finer scales of 
international collaborative management that match the governance institution with the 
geographical range of the fish stocks under management. From this perspective, an 
RFMO is a mid-scale institution that forms a bridge between the higher aspirational 
goals of fisheries management (for example, under UNFSA) and the decision-making 
space found at the point where cooperation among states intersects with the principle of 
national sovereignty exercised by states within their national waters. RFMOs in this 
context can be interpreted as the first meaningful stage of encouraging cooperation and 
the agreement of measures among states and incorporating its consequences into 
national management of fleets that operate throughout the range of the stocks.
One outcome of delaying the negotiation of the WCPFC convention until after UNFSA 
was concluded was that the timing of the negotiations process both compelled and 
encouraged participating delegations to incorporate progressive concepts regarding 
cooperative international fisheries governance that was promoted by UNFSA and 
through broader environmental governance debates at the time (for example, those 
expressed in the Agenda 21 document). The existence of the UNFSA text and several 
features of the WCPFC negotiation process (including being guided by the same 
chairperson) meant that, in many ways, the WCPFC convention mirrored the 
philosophy and language of the UNFSA text. This was a deliberate strategy by the FFA 
states to ensure that the potential benefits of the UNFSA would be preserved in any 
future regime to apply to the WCPO (Tarte, 2002). FFA states were also conscious of, 
and incorporated into the negotiation process, their own perspectives on regional 
management. Primary among these was that the WCPFC convention should build upon 
the 20 years of FFA experience in harmonizing national approaches to administering 
foreign fishing activity and that the convention favourably recognizes and protects the 
position and aspirations of the participating FFA states.
Drawing together the broad range of developments in ocean’s governance, the concept 
of a model RFMO was explored in detail under a recent report by the Independent Panel 
to Develop a Model for Improved Governance by Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations (Lodge et al., 2007). The key recommended characteristics are set out in 
Table 8.1, alongside the key features of the convention text and the extent to which the 
regulations have implemented them. As suggested there, the structure of the convention 
compares favourably to the concept of an ideal RFMO, making the convention text, at 
least in theory, an excellent framework for securing agreement for the sustainable 
management of tuna fisheries in the Pacific.
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4. Fisheries Governance Outcomes under the WCPFC
Four years’ experience in international cooperative mechanisms is a short time frame 
within which to observe substantial changes in fisheries management, so evaluation of 
the full implications of the WCPFC convention on fisheries management is premature. 
Nevertheless, the pace of development of management measures in the commission to 
date, and their subsequent implementation, provides grounds for some concern.
On the positive side, the commission is consolidating earlier work of the Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement (PNA) in developing a policy framework for managing the purse 
seine fleet through a Vessel Day Scheme,53 and some progress has been made on 
implementing interim measures for other gears and stocks (see WCPFC, 2007b)54.
Better progress has been made in addressing the monitoring, compliance, and 
surveillance needs of the commission and a nascent framework has begun to be 
implemented. Key features include systems for vessels records, fishing authorizations 
by flag states, a regional observer program, a satellite based vessel monitoring system, 
and a process for facilitating boarding and inspection of vessels operating on the high 
seas (see www.wcpfc.int). In addition, active discussion is ongoing regarding harvest- 
related documentation schemes and for port State measures to coopt the power of major 
off-loading ports to monitor vessels for illegal activity (WCPFC, 2007c).
From the CMM perspective, however, the experience of the commission has been less 
positive and several stakeholders have expressed concerns that the convention has not 
lived up to expectations (see WWF and TRAFFIC, 2007; see also comments from J. 
Anderton and G. Joseph in Johnson, 2007).
Recent analysis by Parris (2010) has suggested that the CMMs—the primary tool for 
implementing the principles of sustainable governance—are lacking in several ways. 
First, the conservation measures adopted so far are inconsistent with the range of 
available scientific and economic advice regarding ‘sustainable levels of harvests and 
effort’ that have been forwarded to the commission by the commission’s own scientific 
committee. A summary comparing the CMMs with this available advice is provided in 
Table 8.2 and indicates gaps between recommended actions and scientific advice where 
the appropriate analysis has been developed. Second, that the current set of exemption 
clauses extended to small island developing states (SIDS), as a way of recognizing their 
aspirations to promote their domestic industry development, are untested, unclear, and, 
unless effectively monitored and administered, expose the WCPFC to a significant 
expansion in fishing effort—that is, moving away from sustainable fishing levels. For 
example, analysis by Parris (2010) suggests that management measures for bigeye tuna 
could lead to overfishing on this stock of up to 68 per cent over maximum sustainable 
yield (MSY) levels if all developing state members exploited the clause that allows 
them to increase their catch as a means of supporting local industry development. This
53The Vessel Day Scheme is a management regime put in place by the PNA subgroup of the 
FFA to cap total purse seine effort allowed to operate across the EEZs of Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Tuvalu, Marshall Islands, and the Solomon 
Islands (Dunn et al. 2006; FFA 2007).
54Putting in place a set of interim measures to cap capacity expansion in the WCPO was 
considered one of the most urgent tasks of the new commission because, by comparison with 
other major tuna fisheries, the region was relatively under regulated, and there were concerns 
that vessels who were no longer able to operate elsewhere would migrate to the WCPO. For a 
full set of CMMs, see www.wcpfc.int/
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issue is further confounded by the language of the CMMs, which is ambiguous and 
opens up scope for endless debate on textual interpretation. Third, the CMMs, by 
focusing on single-species conservation, and selecting simple measures of fishing effort, 
do not adequately address the multispecies nature of the fishery, nor the 
multidimensional nature of fishing capacity. For example, there are several CMMs that 
deal with bigeye tuna and yellowfin tuna and separate CMMs to address conservation 
needs of swordfish and albacore tuna—but all four species may be targeted by longline 
gears or taken as by catch during a trip. The CMMs do not address how to manage the 
interactions among species when vessels may switch targeted species or how or when to 
count the species taken as bycatch but which itself is subject to conservation measures. 
In addition, by selecting the concept of 'days' or ‘vessel numbers’ or ‘fishing effort' in 
the CMMs, the WCPFC has essentially not recognized the problem of ‘ effort creep' in 
the fleets.
It appears that the WCPFC member states have also been willing to accept exemptions 
to key capacity measures on an ad hoc basis in order to accommodate the needs 
(development aspirations) of the individual members. Hanich (2008) highlighted the 
recent case of Kiribati that was granted a 12-month waiver to license nine Latin 
American vessels in its EEZs, contrary to the CMM requiring WCPFC members not to 
license non-WCPFC member vessels. While Kiribati licensed the vessels and sought an 
exemption post facto, the fishing arrangements for vessels were facilitated by E.U. 
nationals with strong commercial ties to the Latin American processors and producers 
that manage the vessels concerned in the Pacific Ocean.
In addition, some important early management strategies to address overcapacity in 
major fleets and the ecological consequences of fishing were agreed in the weaker form 
of resolutions (see WCPFC, 2005) that do not impose binding actions on commission 
members. A positive development has been the agreement that, from 2006, all decisions 
agreed by the commission will be binding. Although this provides a stronger basis for 
promoting compliance, it does not guarantee that member states will implement them.
Recent analysis by the WCPFC secretariat has also highlighted issues of non- 
compliance by Commission members with current CMMs. These relate primarily to 
reporting obligations and a recent report to the WCPFC 2007 annual meeting (WCPFC, 
2008a) indicates that several parties have not met commitments (in part or total), and/or 
it is not possible to verify the quality of the reported information (WCPFC, 2008a). This 
raises questions regarding accuracy and comprehensiveness of collected data and 
adversely affects the scope and quality of information available to monitor the dynamics 
of the fishery and status of stocks.
Lack of compliance to current management measures suggests unwillingness to comply 
and/or the lack of capacity to comply (through poor human and financial resources at 
the national level), a factor likely to exist in both developed and developing state 
member states and, as a result, suggest that some countries are free-riding on the 
conservation efforts of others. Whatever the reason, poor compliance with existing 
management measures will impede the future progress of the WCPFC: if member states 
cannot meet these basic requirements, it raises doubt about the degree to which they w ill 
meet the reporting/action requirements of more sophisticated management measures.
To a certain extent, the limited range of current CMMs may be interpreted as interim 
measures that responded to the immediate need to cap capacity migration into the region 
while more robust, longer term measures are put into place. This was a reasonable
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response by the commission, but the current struggle for member states to move beyond 
this interim framework points to more fundamental divisions that could impede the 
convention’s conservation objectives in the longer term.
8.4. The Gap between Expectations and Practice
The overall situation in implementing the WCPFC convention text suggests that, while 
progress has been made, this progress is mixed, and there are signs of increasing 
challenges in building more comprehensive CMMs.
Some stakeholders have characterized the current situation within the WCPFC as the 
result of insufficient political commitment by commission parties to implement the 
provisions of the convention text and the misgivings of environmental nongovernmental 
organizations in this regard are clear:
The two most valuable tuna species in the Pacific are no closer to recovery than 
they were before . . . yet again short sighted economics continues to rule the day 
putting the environment, fish stocks. Pacific Island economies and the fishing 
industry itself at risk. This fisheries commission is now failing miserably just 
like all the others. (Greenpeace, 2007)
While these views may have merit, they fail to acknowledge the full range of factors 
that is blocking meaningful progress in the negotiation room. Four years of operation of 
the commission demonstrate there are at least three such factors that work 
interdependently to constrain the scope and quality of debate, each of which is 
discussed below.
8.4.1. The 'Strategic' Influence of Domestic Development Agendas
The most obvious factor adversely affecting progress can be found in divergent and, at 
times, opposing, domestic and regional development agendas that act to influence, 
shape, and ultimately constrain national negotiating positions. Working from insistent 
domestic economic pressures to underpin fleet viability, processor profitability, and 
employment opportunities and maintain regional power relationships—as well as 
promoting favorable balances of power within the commission itself—these agendas are 
multidimensional, complex, and fluid. Several broad drivers emerge as the principle 
factors influencing decision making:
• Heavy investment in canneries and related processing throughout the region 
(for example, Japan, Philippines) and expressed desire to increase capacity' in 
developing country CMMs, particularly in Papua New Guinea
• Aspirations by developing country CMMs—particularly the FFA group—for 
the expansion and development of their domestic tuna industries
• Recognition by DWFNs and others of the strategic importance of the tuna 
fisheries and strategic positioning to secure access
• Heavy investments in particular fishing technologies that favor one form of 
conservation method over another
• Strong political and economic links among PICs and bilateral donors that are 
also DWFNs, and the influence of short-run domestic political cycles that favor 
short-run outcomes from fisheries management
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As the WCPFC seeks to develop measures for the CMMs for vulnerable bigeye and 
yellowfin tuna stocks, this diversity o f interests, combined with the geographical 
distribution o f the stocks creates an uneven pattern o f ‘winners' and ‘ losers' in 
alternative policy options. For example, reductions in purse seine effort to conserve 
bigeye tuna and yellowfin tuna— as originally recommended by the commission's 
scientific committee— places a heavy cost burden o f compliance on the rich skipjack 
tuna fisheries that are o f principle interest to many Pacific Island Members o f the 
Commission (formally: Contracting and Cooperating Members, CCMs). By contrast, 
the benefits from an improved bigeye resource accrue predominately to DWFNs fishing 
on the high seas and those members heavily invested in longline fishing techniques 
(Reid, 2006)— often not the same countries as those with purse seine interests.
Whilst negotiations at the Commission w ill inevitably be heavily influenced by 
individual member states aiming at securing a maximum share o f resources, these 
pressures are reshaping the work o f the Commission in a way that is preventing the 
development o f effective management measures. In this way, national support for 
conservation measures are being driven by, and conditional on, the economic advantage 
that such measures would give to the proponent. A commission-endorsed allocation 
mechanism would address many o f the threats posed by the ongoing effort by member 
states to secure their presence in the fishery based on historical levels o f participation 
while accommodating efforts to increase shares as fishery development aspirations are 
pursued. However, recent efforts to progress discussions o f allocation issues stalled and 
is likely to do so for some time as member states have recently rejected opportunities to 
openly discuss allocation in commission sponsored forums (for example Government o f 
Japan, 2007).
8.4.2. Practical Implementation of the Convention Text
Through close alignment with the UNFSA text, the convention contains many features 
that would be considered integral parts o f an ideal RFMO negotiated as a general 
collective arrangement. This was positive at one level, but failure to develop some of 
the principles o f UNFSA into more concrete outcomes in the context o f the Pacific has 
meant that the final WCPFC convention text retains a series o f broad generalized 
statements designed to seek common ground among the divergent interests.
While this secured the political support required for the ratification, the resulting text is 
now presenting the commission with serious difficulties as it attempts to implement the 
provisions o f the convention. Rather than clarifying the nature o f the management task, 
many aspects o f the convention text act, instead, as ambiguous guidelines that set out 
the parameters for further negotiations about how to collectively manage the fishery. It 
is becoming increasingly clear that this ambiguity can be found in many central aspects 
o f the convention and that, in essence, the political and economic conflicts played out at 
the strategic level (as discussed above) are embedded within the text itself.
Two issues are central to this dilemma. Firstly, is the scope o f the WCPFC's jurisdiction 
and the related issue o f the relative power o f coastal states in dominating commission 
activities regarding CMMs. The second issue arises over the interpretation o f the special 
needs provisions o f the convention designed to address the particular circumstances of 
small island developing member states and its related debate over which member states 
should bear the significant costs for conservation o f vulnerable stocks.
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Articles 7 and 8 o f the convention relate to the issues o f compatibility— that is, while 
recognizing the sovereignty o f coastal states, the highly migratory status o f the stocks 
means that, in order to be effective, conservation measures need to be consistent among 
waters under national jurisdiction and the high seas and apply throughout the range o f 
the stocks. Potentially, issues arise when no such measures are in place or the 
jurisdictions have incompatible measures in place in the context o f meeting overall 
sustainability objectives.Vl However, in practice since coastal states participate in 
decision making on the high seas, it is unlikely that measures for high seas areas would 
be more stringent than those put in place by these states for their ow n waters.
The experience o f the WCPFC so far has seen an increasing tendency for some coastal 
states— primarily the FFA group— to resolve the compatibility issue through the 
adoption o f measures for their coastal state waters which is then either retrospectively 
adopted by the commission (as happened with the Vessel Day Scheme) or without 
reference to the WCPFC at all. For example, in response to slow progress on 
conservation measures for bigeye and yellowfin tuna in the WCPFC, the PNA subgroup 
o f the FFA recently announced its ow n suite o f three measures, designed to curb purse 
seine capacity (through use o f observers, bans on the use o f fishing with fish 
aggregating devices closures and use o f access arrangements to effectively close ‘ high 
seas pockets’ ) and w ill apply to purse seine vessels operating in its own waters/7 This 
decision by the PNA significantly progresses the conservation agenda o f the WCPFC by 
putting in place measures that the broader member states were unwilling to do and also 
clarifies some o f the ambiguity found in Articles 7 and 8 (that is, coastal states establish 
their own mechanisms that are retrospectively adopted by the WCPFC).
Unilateral coastal state measures can, however, create some uncertainties because they 
do not necessarily account for the fu ll range o f fishing activities (for example, measures 
to cover longline effort that is absent from the PNA decision)' that place pressures on 
vulnerable stocks, nor do they take account o f the legitimate interests o f other member 
statess. It is also not clear how (potentially disparate) coastal state driven measures can
56The issue has recently been complicated by the Papua New Guinea position that their 
archipelagic waters in the Bismarck Sea lie beyond commission jurisdiction (although it is 
biologically part of the tuna fishery) and therefore not subject to commission management 
measures. In essence this amounts to an increase in it allocation of purse seine effort under the 
Vessel Day Scheme. In acknowledging the potential impacts of this move on bigeye tuna and 
yellowfin tuna mortality—and hence stock sustainability—Papua New Guinea is actively 
exploring more stringent management regimes for the use of fish aggregating devices . This 
position can and may be adopted by other WCPFC member states that claim archipelagic 
status (Fiji, Indonesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and 
Vanuatu) (United Nations 2008).
57ln full, these measures are as follows:
• Total (100 per cent) observer coverage on purse seine vessels operating in their EEZs
• Three-month closure on the use of fish aggregating devices in the third quarter of the 
year
• Development of access arrangements that effectively close pockets of high seas fishing 
to many purse seine vessels
See FFA (2008) for more details.
58The physical overlay of the EEZs of the PNA group and the physical distribution of the stock 
has enabled the PNA to implement these measures and, as a consequence, exert considerable 
influence over all purse seine fleets operating in the WCPFC Convention Area.. Such leverage, 
however, was absent over the longline fleets, whose pattern of operation generally lies outside 
the waters of the PNA. Consequently, the PNA decision could not include the longline fleets, 
and thus the PNA could not be expected to lead policy development in this area.
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be combined at a 'regionwide' level to ensure that, over all, the total level o f fishing 
pressure is contained within levels advised by commission scientists/4
The second issue regarding the rights o f small island developing states concerns the 
fundamental challenge o f balancing the right to develop, within sustainable bounds, and 
the interests o f fishing states in securing access. The FFA parties argue that since both 
the UNFSA text and Article 30 in the convention recognize and protect their rights to 
development, they are (and should be) exempt from certain management measures 
relating to capacity and harvesting constrains. Moreover, to give practical expression to 
these aspirations, the WCPFC must recognize their sovereign right to enter into joint- 
venture and chartering partnerships with developed countries in the procurement and 
operation o f vessels and related onshore facilities (see, for example, statement by the 
Republic o f the Marshall Islands in WCPFC, 2007a). This position is influential within 
the Commission because o f the heavy reliance o f the purse seine and, to some extent, 
longline fleets on securing access to the EEZs o f the FFA states in order to secure 
fishing opportunities. In response, other WCPFC parties argue that small island 
developing state exemption opens up the fishery to effort creep and loopholes for 
fishing effort to escalate when attempts are being made to ensure that fishing is 
managed within sustainable limits. Analysis by Parris (2010) suggests that this issue is 
real: should small island developing states take full advantage o f the exemptions 
extended to them under the management measure for bigeye tuna, the total amount o f 
harvest for this species could increase from 31 per cent above MSY levels (the basis of 
the measure) to 68 per cent above MSY levels.
Pacific island states have long sought to address effort creep through securing a 
corresponding reduction in effort from DWFNs and the current Vessel Day Scheme 
could be used for this purpose. However recent capacity increases in some member 
states fleets and increased WCPO activity by Latin American fleets suggest that such 
compromise w ill be difficult to achieve in the current political environment.
8.4.3. The Challenge of Day-to-Day Governance
It is generally recognized that the Pacific states face significant human and financial 
resource constraints that lim it their capacity for managing and monitoring the tuna 
resources within their EEZ (Hanich et al., 2008). This 'lack o f capacity”  is also a factor 
within the WCPFC itself—extends across both developed and developing country 
member states— and is actively limiting progress in negotiating both the outstanding 
issues discussed above and in developing alternative management measures. The 
capacity deficit is both broad and deep and manifests in multiple ways, for example, 
through the lack o f sufficient suitably skilled people to undertake critical analytical and 
managerial tasks for individual national governments, particularly in the case o f the 
SIDS member states, or the lack o f available funds to grow commission secretariat 
staffing to appropriate levels. Small budgets and competing opportunities elsewhere 
also impede the recruitment and retention o f suitability skilled staff in the fisheries 
administrations o f SIDS members, suggesting that this problem is likely to continue in 
the future (see Hanich et al., 2008).
59 The PNA Vessel Day scheme cap, provided it is set at an appropriate level and reinforced by 
other measures (e.g., restrictions on the use of fish aggregating devices), will be helpful in this 
regard.
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The disparity in governance resources is particularly evident in the size and professional 
composition o f delegations that attend WCPFC meetings and in the ability o f the 
smaller sized delegations to appropriately negotiate across a relatively large number of 
complex issues that are usually under simultaneous consideration within the time- 
constrained annual meetings o f the Commission. The pace and complexity o f the annual 
meeting process also present some non-English speaking delegations (for example, the 
delegations from Japan and Korea) with the challenge of negotiating technical matters 
in their secondary language of English, thus adding further obstacles in seeking mutual 
understanding and agreement among members. This issue has been recognized by FFA, 
and for its members, at least, considerable efforts are being expended each year in 
undertaking regional workshops to build capacity and promote understanding o f key 
issues to be addressed at the commission. However, this kind o f support is not available 
to other members o f the commission.
The experience o f the WCPFC suggests that issues regarding time availability, logistics, 
management overload, technical understanding o f issues, and the ability to cope with 
the sheer level o f paperwork produced in support o f commission deliberations represent 
real limits for the ability o f the WCPFC to meets its management tasks. Rather than 
being a secondary issue to the "strategic issues’ discussed above, this ‘day-to-day’ 
tactical governance issue is a key constraint for achieving governance reform because it 
undermines the ability for PICs to meet, debate, and understand the implications of 
collectively agreed management arrangements.
8.5. D iscussion
The experiences o f the WCPFC raise some critical challenges for the study o f complex 
large-scale resource commons and for the crafting o f policy solutions to meet their 
CMM demands. Primary among these is the observation that even in situations where 
real world, theoretically consistent and mutually agreed upon governance frameworks 
exist, this does not necessarily lead to sustainable outcomes in resource management. 
As the WCPFC shows, the reasons for these blockages operate at many different levels, 
ranging from protection o f national interests, to the detriment o f overall returns from 
(the sustainable management of) the fishery, differences in interpretation o f the 
convention text, and what is termed here day-to-day governance— or the limits to the 
human and financial capabilities available to member states. Addressing these 
challenges requires looking beyond the generalized blueprints o f fisheries governance, 
for example, as set out in the Independent Panel to develop a model for improved 
governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (Lodge et al., 2007)60 
and toward a tailored approach that can address the specific problems and conflicts 
facing the members as situations unfold. In the case o f the WCPFC, these specific 
problems are finding ways through the differences in interpretation o f the text and 
addressing the real challenges posed by the day-to-day governance constraint. Unlike 
the radical redesign approach proposed by Chand et al. (2003) or Grafton et al. (2006), 
this approach recognizes that policy progress toward more sustainable forms of 
governance in the WCPFC w ill be a slow and transformative process driven by 
developments in the fishery, changes in capacity and time. Proposals about governance 
reform, therefore, should focus on supporting this process rather than seeking the 
ultimate ‘ fix .’ To this end the following strategies could be pursued by the Commission 
in progressing its responsibilities to implement the terms o f the convention.
o0 This panel was commissioned by the Task Force on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing on the High Seas and was undertaken under the auspices of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (Chatham House).
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First, effort could be directed toward developing a stronger constituency within WCPFC 
member states for better governance through robust analysis that seeks to highlight both 
the benefits of greater cooperation, within the context of the commission, and the 
potential costs associated with non-cooperation. Central to this will be the independent 
technical analysis to examine the trade-offs in costs and benefits among different 
member states, and opportunity costs forgone with particular policy options against the 
diverse range of interests highlighted in this chapter. These types of analyses need to be 
evaluated using a range of expert and national view points, but in particular, special care 
needs to ensure that a distant water fishing nation (DWFN, i.e. a non-Pacific Islander 
member of the Commission) perspective is incorporated into the analysis. Many 
analysts place particular attention on policy options that meet the aspirations of small 
island developing state members of the WCPFC, in particular, those of the FFA—and 
this is supported by an active and vocal FFA secretariat. By contrast, relatively less 
attention is given to explore policy options that meet the needs of the non-FFA group— 
many of whom are also coastal states with significant domestic fisheries. Such an 
initiative will help draw into the policy debate the broader range of interests highlighted 
in this chapter and provide a robust process for exploring alternative interpretations (and 
their implications) of the convention text.
A second strategy that could be pursued would be to build the capacity of the secretariat 
and the Commission itself in order to strengthen its regional identity among member 
states and reinforce the monitoring, compliance, and surveillance functions. This would 
encourage both a stronger political culture of compliance by member states—and thus 
help address some of the commitment issues raised in this chapter—and could also 
provide a robust information database to support trade-related, port-state, and other 
market-based measures to track down and identify noncompliant vessels. A better 
resourced secretariat would also have the capacity to assist member states in the 
practical problems of engaging with the number of issues contained in the voluminous 
amounts of papers, analysis, and data that are generated and circulated every year by the 
commission and its various technical, scientific, and policy processes. Such work could 
focus on relatively pedestrian, but nevertheless valuable, work of developing 
mechanisms for standardizing and summarizing papers considered by the commission 
and simplified processes for recording Commission decisions and proceedings and 
processes for communicating these among member states.
A third strategy would be to develop a more robust policy development process within 
the context of the commission itself. Many member states argue that policy making is 
the domain of sovereign states in the commission and not the role of the secretariat. 
While generally this is the case, there is, nevertheless, room for the Commission to have 
more structured, but relatively informal, forums for member states to actively consider, 
in greater depth, the merits of alternative policy options and their implications for the 
diverse interests of all member states in the WCPFC. To minimize the burden on 
already stretched delegations, such a mechanism should take the form of a semiformal 
panel of independent experts that is convened to look at specific policy proposals and 
provide advice as appropriate. Such a panel could incorporate representatives of 
member states, as well as independent ‘experts,' and be empowered to consult widely 
with member states through in-country visits and by receiving submissions. This type 
of panel would have no powers of decision making or recommendation, but act as a 
think-tank of the commission—and thus provide an additional source of advice without 
increasing the day-to-day governance burden on member states. If developed, the first
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item for consideration by such a panel should be the form and content o f appropriate 
management reference (lim it and target) points for the commission, incorporating in 
turn the different perspectives offered by the diverse members in this multi-species and 
multi-gear fishery.
8.6. Conclusion
In many ways, the experience o f the WCPFC is unique: it was one o f the first RFMOs 
developed post-UNFSA and the biophysical and geographical characteristics o f the 
fisheries under its jurisdiction incorporate both the largest and richest countries in the 
world (Japan, United States) and some of the smallest (for example, Nuie, Nauru, and 
Tuvalu) in its membership.
The convention meets the obligations o f UNFSA signatories to work collaboratively for 
the purposes o f pursuing CMM of shared fish stocks and may be considered a ‘good’ 
example o f cooperative fisheries management as envisaged under the UNFSA. But the 
experience of the commission, so far, demonstrates that issues pertaining to different 
interests, textual interpretation, and capacity to manage day-to-day governance tasks at 
national and commission levels are presenting real blockages to an effective 
implementation process. The chapter thus highlights that, despite the apparently good 
framework provided by the convention text, implementation is proving challenging for 
reasons beyond expected issues associated with ‘ differences in interests' among 
stakeholders.
In developing potential policy responses, we argue here that initiatives should recognize 
that institutional change over time is gradual and slow. Three such initiatives are 
suggested that may assist in this process and focus on building a broader constituency 
for and understanding o f reforms in fisheries management. While these w ill be useful, 
they ultimately only support the development of, and do not replace, the political 
commitment and leadership required over the longer term for the commission's success.
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PART FOUR
‘RULES IN USE’: ALLOCATION AND GOVERNANCE REFORM IN THE 
WESTERN AND CENTRAL PACIFIC FISHERIES COMMISSION
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CHAPTER 9
FISHERIES GOVERNANCE
That is alright in theory, but it doesn’t work out in practice. 
George J. Stigler, Nobel Laureate for Economics. 1977
9.1 . In t r o d u c t io n
Coming into force in 2004, the Convention on the Conservation and Management o f 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (‘the 
Convention’) represents a new approach in regional cooperative management of 
common-pool tuna stocks. Developed under the UN Straddling Fish Stocks 
Agreement60, the Convention provides all stakeholders an opportunity to construct and 
implement a comprehensive management regime that incorporates all tuna stocks and 
all fishing activity using ecologically sustainable development principles and best 
practice fisheries management.
The central problem facing the signatories to the Convention, as Parties to the Western 
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) is typical of those facing common- 
pool resource (CPR) users everywhere: how are the tuna resources to be shared amongst 
stakeholders, how much tuna should be harvested, where should it be harvested and 
who should be allowed to harvest it? Arguably, the international dimension of the 
Convention complicates the problem because, unlike national based common-pool 
dilemmas, the constraints represented by national sovereignty issues, such as those in 
Barrett (2003), shift the emphasis of achieving outcomes from the use of co-ertion (in 
many of its forms, as originally implied by Hardin’s 1968, rhetoric) to the more difficult 
task of reaching cooperative agreement. Furthermore, there is significantly greater 
diversity amongst stakeholders in terms of size, power and resources available for 
negotiation (for example, both the micro-state of Tuvalu and the United States of 
America are parties), and in the interests and aspirations each hold for the stocks to 
drive domestic development agendas (for example, there are three main gear types, and 
four tuna species unevenly spread across the region). This task is further confounded by 
the limited financial and human capacity currently available to many WCPFC Parties 
(and the Commission Secretariat itself) to implement sophisticated and expensive 
management regimes.
Theoretical insights provided by fisheries economists (see for example Gordon, 1954) 
and natural resource scholars working in the adaptive management tradition have 
provided fisheries managers with profound insights into important issues facing 
sustainable management of fisheries. Key amongst these is the important relationships 
that exist between levels of fish stocks, (biological and economic) sustainable yields of 
harvest and the dynamics of managing a commons resource (for example, Gunderson 
and Holling, 2002; Holling, 2001; Holling et al, 1998).
60The full title of this agreement is Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.
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Yet achieving these theoretical outcomes is not a simple matter of policy fiat. Rather, 
resource use dynamics are largely determined by the governance regime—or 
institutions—used to inform and create the economic and social incentives within which 
resource users make their decisions. As Ostrom (1990) remarked: ‘It is a gigantic leap 
of faith to deduce that simply because a mathematical solution exists to an infinitely 
repeated CPR dilemma, [resource users] will automatically find such a solution and 
follow it’. In this view, it is the institutions—the nature of governance arrangements— 
rather than the existence of ‘optimal solutions’ which are the critical success factors in 
determining the success or failure of a CPR.
While agreeing with international fisheries scholars, observers and policy makers that 
‘something more’ needs to be done to progress the WCPFC agenda, this chapter uses as 
its starting point the argument put forward by Parris (2010) that successful future policy 
development relies on it being transformative, rather than a radical, policy programme 
that builds on the existing strengths of the region and the Convention Text itself.
At the same time, it is argued that the developments in commons theory and fisheries 
economics present potentially new policy options that may address the key management 
challenges facing the commission as set out in Chapter 8 of this thesis. Particular focus 
is placed on managing these challenges within the context of a complex and uncertain 
socio-cultural and biophysical environment. In doing so, this chapter is an attempt to 
answer within a specific context the question raised by Charles: ‘in a world of
uncertainty and complexity .......what management and governance mechanisms can
best move fisheries toward sustainability and resilience?’ (Charles, 2008).
The purpose of this chapter is to explore how the theoretical insights of this literature 
may be applied in the current practice of the WCPFC. By first observing that the terms 
of the Convention Text are broadly supportive of an adaptive/incentive based approach, 
this paper sets out four potential reforms that could introduce the key principles of this 
approach through targeted extensions of current management strategies.
This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 reviews the challenges facing 
the WCPFC as discussed elsewhere in this thesis. Section 3 reviews and discusses the 
current approaches to management within the commission and introduces and interprets 
key concepts in the incentive and adaptive literature. These are then applied to the 
specific context of the WCPFC in Section 4 through the introduction of four policy 
proposals, while Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes this paper.
9 .2 . The challenges facing the W estern and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission
The Convention on the Conservation and Management o f Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPFC, 2000, hereafter the ‘Convention’) 
came into force as international law in mid-2004, amid much optimism that this would 
herald a new regime for oceanic tuna fisheries governance and management in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Despite broad support from stakeholders, and 
general recognition of the innovativeness of the Convention Text, the success of the 
commission so far has been mixed. Analysis by policy makers (see WCPFC Secretariat, 
2007, 2008a, 2008b) as well as others (see for example Langley et al 2009; Parris, 2010 
forthcoming; Parris et al, 2009), are beginning to evaluate the implementation of the
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WCPFC and have identified significant areas of concern as well as some of the positive 
progress being made.
On the positive side, key achievements of the WCPFC are said to be the establishment 
of the institutional infrastructure for regional collaborative fisheries management, 
including the mechanisms needed for region-wide monitoring, surveillance and 
compliance activities (WCPFC, 2009), progressing the implementation of the Vessel 
Day Scheme61 for purse seine fleet management (PNA, 2008) and exploring 
opportunities for the use of an ‘ecosystems’ approach to fisheries management; and a 
Management Strategy Evaluation approach for scientific analysis and development of 
biological reference points (Davies, 2008).
However, from a conservation perspective, there is a growing consensus that the 
commission has not lived up to expectations (see TRAFFIC, 2007; comments from 
Anderton J. and Joseph G., in Johnson, 2007). The primary issue of concern is that, 
despite the existence of several measures seeking to implement fishing mortality targets, 
harvesting and fishing effort within the Convention area have further increased since 
their adoption (see Langley et al., 2008).
Several authors have identified reasons for slow progress beyond the current suite of 
management measures including:
• Tensions between competing national interests—in particular conflicts between 
longline and purse seine fleets over yellowfin and bigeye stocks.
• Continual need to interpret and define the Convention from its framework status 
to an implementable regime.
• Tension between coastal states who seek to maintain autonomy in setting 
management regimes in their own waters and DWFN who wish to see the 
WCPFC retain jurisdictions across the entire biological range of the stocks. This 
is exemplified in the current debates over the relative importance of Article 8 
versus Article 7.
• Capacity issues—in what is termed by Parris et al (2009) as ‘day-to-day’ 
governance.
Parris (2010) points out that a more fundamental problem with the management 
measures is that they do not fully incorporate the scientific, managerial and institutional 
risks associated with fisheries policy—which is enhanced through the use of fishing 
efforts targets equal to the highest level of historical fishing effort consistent with 
available MSY estimates. This situation is made worse by the apparent ad hoc 
acceptance of further exemptions to cover the circumstances of particular members (see 
Parris et al, 2009; Hanich, 2008).
9.3. Reconceptualising the WCPFC management problem
Current policy debates within the WCPFC are driven primarily by a scientific and 
industrial framing of the fisheries management responsibilities set out in the Convention 
Text. In general, this conceptualisation of the WCPO focuses on stock, health of stocks
61The Vessel Day Scheme is a management regime put in place by the ‘PNA Group’ of the 
Forum Fisheries Agency to cap total purse seine effort allowed to operate across the EEZs of 
Palau, PNG, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Tuvalu, Marshall Islands and the Solomon 
Islands (Dunn et al., 2006; FFA, 2007).
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and their limited relationship with ecosystems. The industrial paradigm—driven by 
industry interests in maintaining access to the fishery—focuses on the economic 
products obtainable from the fishery and how the benefits associated with these 
products may be shared between competing interests.
These visions of the fishery represent a fairly narrow conceptualisation of the WCPO as 
a simplified system but are reflective of the many common assumptions and approaches 
in fisheries management (Charles, 2001). These assumptions can be summarised as:
• Single simple policies can exert control over the fisheries to align the 
management with the scientific advice regarding sustainability.
• Uncertainty and risk associated with management is associated with scientific 
risk and uncertainty—and this can be adjusted for.
• Management draws substantially from scientific advice and legal commitments 
made under international law.
Within this world-view, fisher behaviour ‘on the water’ is controlled by national policy­
making bodies, whose approaches to management are, in turn, derived from 
internationally agreed management strategies developed through a legal-political 
process of negotiation within the WCPFC. This view can be summarised in Figure 9.1.
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In progressing its agenda beyond the current perceived stalemate, policy makers 
working with the WCPFC often identify the need to ‘move beyond’ the current 
approaches to management towards a more solid basis for sustainable fisheries 
management and express a sense of despair over how to progress this. In considering 
this issue, it is notable that many natural resource management scholars have explored 
the linkages between the particular mental models used by policy makers to understand 
‘states of the world’ and the range of viable policy options that are comprehensible 
within the assumptions and values of the chosen model (Jager et ah, 2000; Faucheux 
and Froger, 1995). In essence, policy ‘ideas’ are identified and are consequently 
legitimised, or rejected, by the policy discourse used within a particular policy debate. 
This carries the implications that changes in the type of discourse allowed for in a 
policy debate may alter the ‘world view’ used by policy makers and, consequently, shift 
the range of policy options that may be considered. This is also true within the WCPFC, 
where the dominance of science and law in the policy debate, has, unsurprisingly, 
produced policies that reflect science and legal interpretations of issues such as ‘control’ 
within the fishery and ‘uncertainty’ about future events. If WCPFC members are 
dissatisfied with current outcomes, then proceeding with policies that represent ‘more of 
the same’ is unlikely to yield satisfactory results. A shift in the way in the fishery is 
conceptualised, as an alternative way of developing new policy options, may therefore, 
represent a more fruitful path forward for the commission.
It is argued here that contemporary literature in complex adaptive systems research, as 
applied to natural resource management, combined with a careful application of the key 
insights from fisheries economics literature, may open up new possibilities for policy 
development by providing the commission an alternative conceptualisation of the 
fishery, and factors that drive fisher behaviour. Grounded in the idea of a ‘systems’ 
conceptualisation of natural resource problems, and a framing of resource use problems 
as one of the ‘incentives’, this ‘mental model’ advocates a view of a fishery as:
• Primarily comprised of relationships between stakeholders and between 
stakeholders and their biophysical and socio-political environment (often formed 
into ‘networks’).
• Being constantly subjected to dynamical behaviour which can occur at different 
spatial scales (for example, individual scale of a country or the scale of an 
individual vessel) and different time scales (that is, different processes of change 
can be slow or fast). Constant change places the notion of uncertainty—and 
therefore risk—as a key organising principle in understanding behaviour.
• These changes being shaped by what has gone on previously (‘path-dependent’).
• Stakeholders (and the state of the resource) are spatially and temporally 
heterogeneous.
• Stakeholders respond primarily to the (economic) incentives generated from the 
institutional context within which they operate—primarily that of a common- 
pool/common property fishery. Consequently individual short-run incentives for 
resource use do not align with longer-run societal objectives of resource 
conservation.
Thus the WCPFC is, as described by Garcia and Charles (2008) as ‘a plexus of sub­
systems. It is the architecture of biophysical, ecological and socio-economic 
components, along with interconnecting processes, fluxes of matter, energy and 
information’ (p.505). To visualize this, Figure 9.2 sets out a representation of the 
relationship between the main entities in the WCPO which are considered to be drawn
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across the biophysical and socio-economic spheres (Garcia and Charles, 2008) and, by 
drawing on evidence gathered from the existing academic and ‘grey’ literature, traces 
the number and quality of connections between them. In contrast to Figure 9.1, this 
view of the fishery identifies at least four multidimensional factors that influence fisher 
behaviour in addition to that suggested by the scientific/legal perspective—the adaptive 
behaviour of fishers themselves, the incentives created by product markets, the 
incentives created by input markets and environmental conditions, each of which have 
their own complex characteristics and their own dynamical behaviour through time. 
Further details are set out in Table 9.1.
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TABLE 9.1: IS THE WCPFC A COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM?
Feature in the W C PO
U n certa in ty  and risk Fisheries: SPC  a d v ice
Industry: related  to ch a n g es in fuel prices, output p rices, 
ch an ges in dem and
C h an ge (large and sm all sca le ) C hange: fish in g  industry ch a n g es o v er  tim e  
N atural variab ility  in the fish  sto ck s  
C hanges due to dem and for tuna products
Institu tional p ath -d ep en d en cy Prior institutional d ev elo p m en t in F F A  
International law
In flu en ce o f  other R FM O  and other fish er ies  m an agem en t 
exp erien ces
M u lti-sca le  d ec is io n  m aking arenas S ee  diagram
C ross sca le  L in k ages L inked g lo b a lly  into an in ternational m arket that d r ives the 
relative co sts  and p rices and therefore the o u tco m es o f  the 
resource sharing situation
H etero g en e ity — spatial D istribution  o f  fish  stock s across the reg ion  and b etw een  
different tuna sp ec ies . M irroring th ese  b io lo g ica l d ifferen ces , 
eco n o m ic  a ctiv ity  is a lso  sp atia lly  h eterogen eou s
A d a p tiv e  b eh av iou r b y  fishers F ishers have in p lace variou s intricate and sp ec ia lised  
m ech an ism s for ‘learn in g’ about w here fish  sc h o o ls  are 
located  and h o w  th ese  m o v e o v er  tim e, and adapt their fish in g  
strategies acco rd in g ly  (referen ce fie ld  w ork)
Source: Author's own analysis
What is most noticeable about Figure 9.2 is that the policy-making activity within the 
WCPFC itself represents just one aspect of the full range of factors affecting fishers’ 
decisions at the ‘in-water’ level. Taken together, these factors suggest that, overall, 
WCPFC as an entity itself has fairly limited capacity to influence fishery behaviour and 
that many factors that do influence behaviour are beyond the control—or even the 
detailed knowledge—of the WCPFC. This represents a significant risk to Commission 
members because any one of the ‘other’ factors could undermine the efficacy of 
management measures and do so in unexpected ways. For example, increases in the 
price of raw tuna to the canning markets (as is currently occurring) can create an 
incentive to ‘fish’ harder in high seas areas using more intensive inputs (such as larger 
vessels) despite the existence of measures that seek to constrain vessel capacity to 2004 
levels62. This insight switches the management task from one of ‘control’ of the fishery 
to a management task of the fishery which is described by Charles (2001) as ‘ones that 
are reasonably successful in meeting societal objectives even if a) our current
understanding of the fishery.....turns out to be incorrect and/or b) the actual capability
to control fishing activity is highly imperfect’.
An extensive literature review in Chapter 4 of this thesis considered both the adaptive 
management techniques in fisheries as well as fisheries economics and, as noted, there 
is considerable complementarity between the two approaches. However, while the main 
focus of the adaptive literature is on process, this study adopts the view of Nelson 
(2007), who defines the approach as ‘... the decision-making process and the set of
actions undertaken to maintain the capacity to deal with future change .....to a ...
system without undergoing significant changes in function, .... while maintaining the 
option to develop’ (p.397, emphasis added). Thus adaptive management is understood
62 See CMM 2008-01, WCPFC (2008c, 2008e).
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to give agency to the management actions themselves as well as the process for arriving 
at the relevant management decisions.
The incentive-based fisheries literature speaks directly to the content of the actions so 
implemented. In effect, the core aim of an incentive-based approach in a CPR such as 
fishery is to ‘restrict., .access and create., .incentives for users to invest in the resource 
instead of over exploiting it' (Ostrom et ah, 1999) through a standard policy repertoire 
of limiting total harvest (or access), allocation and property rights.
The evidence for promoting such approaches within a fisher)' are compelling and 
growing over time (see for example Grafton et al, 2006; Costello and Kaffine, 2008; 
Sutinen, 1999). For both approaches, there remains, however, a pressing need to explore 
these ideas in a practical context— such as the WCPFC—which presents the analytical 
challenge that while much of the analysis aims to be pragmatic, many concepts are only 
discussed abstractly, making it difficult for policy makers to see how these ideas can 
relate to on-ground policy issues. The approach adopted in the remainder of this chapter 
is to consider the policy implications of this literature by considering four questions that 
may be considered to distil the key insights from the adaptive management and 
incentive based literature. These four questions posed are:
• How could the WCPFC design a decision-making process that facilitates 
‘learning’ about the fishery ‘system’ and incorporates non-scientific 
information?
• What policies could be implemented that would encourage commission 
members to adopt a ‘longer term’ view of sustainability in the fishery?
• What policies can be put in place to encourage members to undertake policy 
‘experiments’ with their fishing opportunities—for example, by exploring the 
implications of different uses of fishing opportunities.
• Can strategic links with other stakeholders in the WCPFC help promote 
sustainable behaviour? If so, how?
The potential answers to these questions are considered in the remainder of this paper.
9.4. Adaptive governance and allocation models in the Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission
In finding practical ways to address the WCPFC management challenges it is 
acknowledged that such a process will not start from a 'clean slate’ but must be pursued 
in ways that are consistent with the Convention Text, the current policy environment 
and political and economic context of the commission.
It is proposed that the implementation of four modestly reformist policies, that build on 
existing initiatives, could allow the WCPFC to incorporate some aspects of the 
incentive/adaptive approaches. These proposals are:
• Adoption of longer-term strategic biomass targets and shorter term harvesting or 
effort goals -  that draw on both scientific and other types of information relevant 
to the objectives of member states. This is consistent with current processes 
within the WCPFC itself, and draws upon the basic process within the 'adaptive’ 
literature of continuous learning and adaptation to new information.
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• Implement a Convention Area-wide allocation regime based on the Vessel Day 
Scheme for all purse seine, longline and pole and line fleets. The outcome o f this 
allocation process— an individual country quota— should be considered as a 
“permanent’ share o f any future TAC or TAE adopted by the commission. This 
approach is broadly consistent with the current approach being considered by the 
WCPFC.64
• Adopt a set o f “rules’ that support commission members in seeking the best 
value for the allocated units they hold. Three rules are proposed:
i. A unit o f TAC or TAE is tradeable between members and non-members 
on a “temporary' basis.
ii. A unit o f TAC or TAE can be used by any members or fleet in any part 
o f the WCPFC Convention Area.
iii. Members need to provide (sell, gift, rent) their allocations to vessel 
operators and not retain them at government level.
These rules are heavily influenced by the “incentives’ approach to fishery management 
and aim to provide the widest possible market -  i.e. potential for value creation -  for 
fishing rights held by member states,
• The WCPFC, as an organization, works with key stakeholders in other parts o f 
the fishery system to develop “market based’ incentives to encourage 
compliance with Commission rules at the vessel level. Most simply this can take 
the form o f an agreement that “buyers’ within the tuna industry will:
i. only purchase from vessels that can demonstrate compliance with 
relevant national laws put in place to implement WCPFC decisions
ii. Not purchase from vessels operating under fag states whose rules o f 
operation are inconsistent with WCPFC rules
This approach is drawn from the “network’ analysis developed above and explicitly uses 
the insight that many factors, other than Commission rules, can influence fisher 
behaviour. The approach seeks to recognise these other influences and actively use them 
in WCPFC management regimes.
Table 9.2 summarises these policy initiatives and draws a direct link between them and 
the theories o f adaptive/incentive management. Each strategy is discussed briefly 
below.
64 It is recognised that there are risks with using a ‘permanent allocation’, particularly to meeting 
the aspirations of SIDS members states of the Commission. To address this, this chapter 
adopts to views. Firstly, a recognition that DWFN, some of whom are coastal states themselves, 
have a legitimate share of allocation in the WCPFC. Secondly, allocation methods are sought to 
favour the aspirations of SIDs member states, although it is recognised that this s a difficult 
challenge -  see chanpter 10 for further discussion.
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TABLE 9.2: POLICY REFORM, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT AND THE 
MANAGEMENT NEEDS OF THE WCPFC
Element L in k  to Adaptive/Ineentive 
Management Approach
Meets management need o f the 
WCPFC.....
Longer term biomass 
targets and shorter term 
TAC/TAE fisheries
management goals
• Establishes process for gathering
appropriate infonnation and
‘ learning' about the fishery system.
• Explicitly examines tradeoffs
between current fishing and future 
impacts on biomass at the global 
level.
• Addressing the ‘ non-scientific’ 
risks in fisheries management.
• Incorporates other types o f values 
and information into decision 
making.
A WCPFC wide
allocation regime based 
on the VDS and made 
•permanent'
• Provide incentive to individual
commission members that
conservation action now w ill provide 
them with reward in the future.
• Encourages ‘ experimentation’ with 
allocated units as policy ‘ failures’ 
now can be adjusted for in the future.
• Securing compliance to WCPFC 
conservation and management 
decisions at the level o f 
commission member.
• (Potentially) addresses the
development objectives o f SIDs 
members-i.e. can deal with equity 
issues.
• Provides security for SIDs
industry development.
•Rules o f Use’ for an 
allocated unit: tradeable, 
transferable to vessels, 
for use in any part o f the 
WCPFC-CA
• Vessel transfer: provides a self­
regulating mechanism for industry to 
manage fishing capacity at
‘profitable’ levels.
• Tradeable and Use throughout the 
WCPFC-CA: encourages Members 
to utilise the physical and socio­
economic ‘ networked’ structure o f 
the WCPFC to maximise the value o f 
their aUocated unit.
•  Manage vessel capacity as a 
conservation issue and an 
economic issue.
• (Potentially) meets demands o f 
SIDs to increase their economic 
benefit from the fishery.
Develop market based 
incentives to encourage 
compliance at the vessel 
level
• Links WCPFC created incentives 
(management measures) for vessel 
compliance with other incentive 
creating networks within the 
WCPFC ‘system'.
• Secure compliance to WCPFC 
conservation and management 
measures at the vessel level— as a 
‘ backup’ to poor compliance 
follow  through by members.
Source: Author’s own analysis.
9.4.1 Longer term biomass targets and short term TAC/TAE fisheries management 
goals.
The selection o f a fishing mortality (or equivalent fishing effort) target could used by 
the WCPFC as the primary tool for determining overall fishing mortality and 
consequently for achieving its overall aim o f ‘ long term sustainable use and 
management ‘ o f key stocks.
Current approaches focus on single fishing effort targets for relatively short (but 
undefined) periods o f time65 and provide an ‘operational’ or ‘day-to-day’ management 
tool for members to implement within their national fisheries management regimes. 
While retaining this usual function, the concept o f a fishing target (TAC/TAE) could 
draw on the notion o f 'reference' points, as set out in the Convention itself, and 
currently under active consideration (see (Davies and Basson, 2008; Davies and
65Current management measures are subject to annual review—implying that fishing mortality 
targets could change from year to year. However, this has only occurred once in the five-year 
history of the commission.
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Polacheck, 2007 and Clark, 2008) to develop management tools for evaluating the two 
key trade-offs implicit in fisheries management: the trade-off between total ‘current* 
catches and ‘future catches* and the trade-offs involved in determining which gears 
should be allowed to catch which fish. This could be achieved through two tools:
• the adoption of a long run benchmark goal for stock biomass chosen to ensure the 
long run sustainability of tuna stocks (as required by Article 4 of the Convention).
• the use of a short run Total Allowable Catch (TAC) or Effort (TAE) fishing target 
for use in the day-to-day management of the fishery and be selected by considering 
the questions: given the current mix of gear, technologies, prices, political 
aspirations and other relevant variables, what is the appropriate level of harvests 
and/or effort that could be permitted in the fishery to maintain the biomass at the 
benchmark level?
The selection of a long run target for biomass will provide a strategic goal for the 
fishery against which the policy targets can be measured—that is, it will allow the 
WCPFC to consider whether the specific choice of TAC or TAE will allow the fishery 
to maintain overall biomass objectives. The selection of a variable shorter run 
TAC/TAE target translates the biomass goal into a management policy and allows for 
the WCPFC to tailor that short run policy to meet the current needs and aspirations of 
current members. Should these needs or aspirations change over time, then the WCPFC 
can change the TAC or TAE to reflect this.
In considering the levels at which to set these targets, the WCPFC has a choice of 
adopting an MSY or an MEY framework—with the latter being central to the 
‘incentive* approach due to its ability to account for the economic profitability in the 
fishery (Kompas, 2005). However, in practice calculating MEY is technically difficult, 
is politically contentious and, as yet, insufficient analysis has been undertaken to 
ascertain MEY harvest and stock levels for all pertinent stocks (for example, albacore) 
and areas (for example, Indonesia). It is also the case that WCPFC Members will 
always wish to draw into the policy debate other types of values—such as development 
values (see Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, 2008) and that the 
dynamic nature of environmental, economic (fleet and industry) and political changes 
over time will require adjustments to the amount of tuna harvested to maintain stock 
sustainability. Given the incomplete knowledge about the tuna ecosystem, and its 
unpredictability, it may also be prudent to ensure that the fishery has ‘spare capacity’ in 
its tuna stocks to ensure that ‘shocks’ to the system do not undermine stock viability66.
One way to capture the desirable aspects of the MEY approach could be to set the 
biomass goal at estimated MEY levels but that the TAC or TAE becomes a negotiated 
amount drawing on economic, biological and political factors that reflect the gear mix 
and political and economic goals of current stakeholders. The relevant questions then 
refocus from selecting the ‘correct’ MEY harvest level to considering the ‘optimal’ 
level of fishing based on the collection of different types of information from scientific, 
industry and other sources from around the WCPFC ‘system’—thus drawing into the 
management equation all ‘systemic’ factors, such as market prices, input prices, 
ecosystem impacts, national level development strategies, that may effect achievement
66For example, the impacts of climate change on the tuna stocks are unknown and may be 
negative (see Miller, 2007)
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of the desired fishing mortality. In this way. the management focus moves from trying 
to shoot towards an MSY outcome towards an approach more accurately defined as an 
'optimising' approach (i.e. Optimum Yield Approach).
This adaptive approach is already utilised in fisheries management in considered 
scientific analysis (see Hilborn, 1992) and broadly consistent with the current practice 
of the WCPFC Scientific Committee which regularly highlights the link between 
current fishing mortality and predicted long-term impacts on available biomass 
(assuming an MSY benchmark) and likely outcomes for fishing mortality (see for 
example WCPFC, 2008b; WCPFC, 2007). Similar ideas are central to the current 
discussions on the merits of a Management Strategy Evaluation Approach (MSE) to 
guide scientific analysis and reference points (see Davies and Basson. 2008). This 
proposal seeks to extend the MSE approach through an incorporation of a broader range 
of information (and therefore values) into the decision-making processes and could be 
implemented through the current proposed MSE framework—summarised in Figure 
9.3—with alternative interpretations of the MSE components 'specification of 
management strategies' and the 'method of evaluating strategy (information signal)’. In 
particular ‘management strategy’ would need to be interpreted as a point at which TAC 
or a TAE is set, and the point at which information required to assess its impact on 
biomass is determined. This is a different interpretation from the MSE literature, where 
a 'management strategy’ is linked to data collection specifications only (see for example 
Davies and Polacheck, 2007).
Secondly, the stage of 'evaluating the strategy’ would need to be broadened beyond a 
scientific assessment and actively seek an assessment model that incorporates economic 
considerations as well as, for example, qualitative assessments of broader industry 
dynamics. This would generate the necessary information to allow the commission to 
consider issues such as the effect on fleet profitability within alternative effort targets, 
or long term demand for tuna products on demand for WCPO-caught tuna.
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Higher
management
goals
Method of Evaluating 
Strategy (information 
signal)
Operational
objectives Specification of 
management 
strategy
Performance
Measures
Figure 9.3: Summary of Management Strategy Evaluation process as discussed 
within the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission
(see Davies and Polacheck, 2007)
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9.4.2 Allocation and property rights
Allocation, and the designation of the allocated unit as a ‘property right’, is a critical 
component of the incentive based approach to fisheries management because, carefully 
designed, it allows for the over all ‘fishing target’ to be converted into an operational 
management tool. For an overview of the issues see Moloney (1979) as well as a 
critique of the risks involved in Yandle (2007). Property rights also serve the critical 
role of providing a political incentive to participate: if members have a guaranteed share 
of the fishery, and that share is considered ‘fair’, then they have an incentive to manage 
the fishery sustainably to ensure they continue to enjoy its benefits.
Although many different allocation options are potentially available to the WCPFC (see 
(Parris and Lee, 2009), in practice the form and content is guided by the requirements of 
the Convention Text, the precedents set out in current management measures and the 
politically driven position of key members of the WCPFC—primarily those in the PNA 
sub-group of the FFA. Taken together these factors strongly suggest that the precedence 
set by the Vessel Day Scheme will determine the basis for any future commission-wide 
allocation regime (Langley et al., 2008; Parris and Lee, 2009 for further discussion).
Detailed consideration of the VDS allocation mechanism may be found in FFA (2007) 
and Dunn et al (2006) but is described in the Palau Treaty as follows:
The PAE for each Party shall be expressed as a percentage. The formula for 
calculating the PAE o f  each Party shall be that 50 percent o f the PAE is based 
on the distribution o f the assessed relative biomass o f skipjack and yellowfin 
within the waters o f the Parties - for this purpose the average shall be taken 
over a ten (10) year period using the most recent available data; and 50 percent 
on the average o f the annual distribution o f the number o f vessel days fished in 
the waters o f the Parties - for this purpose the average shall be taken over a 
seven (7) year period using the most recent available data. (Paragraph 12.5).
Extending this concept of ‘coastal state’ allocation to all gear types operating across the 
WCPFC is conceptually straightforward but raises some technical issues which are 
considered in Appendix One of this chapter. Using the principles of the VDS, Figure 9.4 
sets out the basic steps that could be used to calculate a similar WCPFC-wide allocation 
mechanism for each major gear type: purse seine, frozen longline, fresh longline and 
pole and line. Under this model, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 10, members 
may derive their allocation share in one of three ways. For coastal states, with no high 
seas fleet, their allocation is based on the amount of fishing in their zones as expended 
by all fleets o f all nationalities operating in that zone plus the share of biomass found in 
that zone. For coastal states with high seas fleets, their allocation similar depends on 
effort in zone, in addition to the proportion of effort/catch expended or taken by their 
flagged vessels on the high seas plus proportionate shares of biomass found in each 
area. For member states who are not coastal states, their allocation depends on the ratio 
of effort their flagged vessels take on the high seas plus their share of biomass found on 
the high seas.
The construction of the original VDS implies a ‘rolling’ allocation formula whose 
shares are, in theory, subject to change over time in response to changes in biomass and 
fishing effort within zones. Although there are some benefits to this approach—for 
example, it avoids the potentially negative impacts of ‘fossilising’ patterns of industry
- 193 -
development—providing time-limited allocations also limits the security of access 
members have to a defined amount of resources. In turn this could undermine the 
incentives to adopt a ‘long term’ planning horizon in fisheries management—a key 
objective in the incentive-based approach. Instead, this paper proposes three innovations 
to a WCPFC-wide VDS scheme:
1. That allocations are conducted as a ‘once off process and are considered as 
permanent shares of any future TAC or TAE set by the WCPFC. This turns the 
allocation from a ‘temporary’ level of access to a store of the value associated with 
these future access rights.
2. That high seas allocations of biomass are allocated equally between all members of 
the commission on the basis of catch history in the high seas portion of the fishery.
3. That the ‘rules in use’ for the VDS be expanded to incorporate those set out in the 
next section.
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A key difference between this approach and the original VDS, is the inclusion and 
explicit allocation of bigeye tuna to purse seine gears. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 7, 
a key problem with the VDS with respect to bigeye tuna conservation is that its 
allocation mechanism provides no direct link between the ‘right to fish’ and the on­
going existence of the bigeye stock. In essence, purse seine operators (and their national 
management bodies) are given no incentive for bigeye conservation—and Commission 
measures to reduce purse seine mortality on this stock represent an unambiguous cost to 
them. Providing explicit allocations to purse seine vessels allows the commission to 
incorporate bigeye mortality from purse seine into overall management objectives for 
this stock and provides a positive incentive (that is, a monetary reward) for purse seine 
vessels to conserve bigeye tuna.
The potential allocation shares under a WCPFC-wide VDS approach to allocation are 
set out in Figure 9.5 and are explored more fully in Chapter 11. The original VDS 
focussed on one gear type and two species (skipjack and yellowfin) and the biomass 
components of the allocation formula are calculated as a weighted average of the two 
species. This proved to be technically problematic in initial attempts to determine an 
expanded allocation scheme across four species and three gear types and a different 
approach to combining biomass with effort data was required. This was resolved by 
retaining the original effort shares calculated on a ‘coastal state’ principle and 
employing an averaging process across the biomass data, to provide an estimate of the 
biomass in each zone and on the high seas that could be reasonably attributable to each 
gear type. A discussion of the allocation procedure is set out in Chapter 10.
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9.4.3 Rules of use: promoting efficiency; value and dealing with externalities
The terms of the Convention Treaty explicitly recognise the continuing national 
sovereignty of member states with respect to implementing their responsibilities under 
the WCPFC and this issue remains central to many different policy debates within the 
Commission. This is particularly the case with allocation and it is generally accepted 
that choices about how to use an allocated unit remains the responsibility of individual 
members. However, it is also true that the means in which some members may exercise 
this sovereign right may negatively affect the fishing and development opportunities 
available to other members, and this is implicitly recognised in policies that seek to 
restrict the use of FAD fishing by purse seine vessels for the purposes of bigeye 
conservation—a species targeted by longline vessels. In fact, the WCPFC has put in 
place several conservation and management measures that deal explicitly with 
‘externalities’ (that is, unintended but negative impacts of fishing activity on third 
parties), primarily those dealing with ‘ecosystem’-based issues such as measures to 
prevent seabird or sea turtle mortality in the longline fisheries.
The Vessel Day Scheme has also developed some ‘rules of use’ for participating 
members to guide how and when allocated units in that scheme could be used. These 
rules are:
• Different definition of ‘days’ depending on size of vessels
• An ability to ‘trade’ days between participating members
• An ability to borrow ‘days’ from (limited) future year allocations
The first rule was designed to address the risk of ‘capacity creep’ in vessels, and 
differential levels of capacity across fleets, seeking access under the scheme (Dunn et 
al., 2006) an issue discussed in more detail in Parris (2008, this volume). The second 
two rules, however, were explicitly designed to allow members a flexible approach in 
seeking the best ways to use their allocation. Although Dunn et al. (2008) ascribes this 
as necessary ‘to take account of the migratory nature of tuna stocks’ which will affect 
the level of fishing demand in each member’s EEZ’s in any particular year, these 
mechanisms essentially increase the value to members because it allows them—through 
the ability to trade—to create value from the allocation (that is, the proceeds from sale) 
even if no fishing occurs in their waters in a year66.
This chapter proposes two additional rules to increase the potential range of economic 
opportunities able to be exploited by members holding allocated units in a commission­
wide allocation scheme:
• A unit of TAC or TAE can be used by any Members or fleet in any part of the 
WCPFC Convention Area.
• Members need to provide (sell, gift, rent) their allocations to vessel operators 
and not retain them at government level.
Under the current VDS, members can only benefit from an allocation if the fishing 
occurs within their zone, or they sell a ‘day’ to another party—that is, allocations are 
implicitly spatially defined. The purpose of the first rule is to remove the spatial link 
and allow members to use their allocated unit, and gain benefit from it, regardless of 
where the fishing is physically located in the Convention Area. For example, Solomon
66 Although by doing so, it is conceded that some trade off will occur in sustainability if inter 
species or inter-gear type trades are allowed.
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Islands, under the VDS, may sell 'days’ to the Japanese fleet, which must be used to 
cover fishing e ffort w ith in  the Solomon Islands EEZ. Under this proposed rule, the 
Japanese fleets could use the ‘ day’ purchased from  the Solomon Islands anywhere 
w ith in  the Convention Area— thus increasing its value and, potentially, the amount o f 
fees it is w illin g  to pay Solomon Islands for that ‘ day’ .
The second rule is an exp lic it recognition that the allocation process w ith in  the 
Convention occurs at a reg ional level to members, and not the vessels themselves. 
Therefore, there remains the possibility that parties could choose to hold their allocated 
units in ‘ trust’ fo r vessels operating w ith in  their zones and consequently create the 
conditions fo r an 'O lym p ic  Fishery' where vessels race to fish before the entire fleet 
uses up the days/tonnage allocated to the coastal state— and this creates the risk o f  over 
capacity and low levels o f  economic pro fitab ility . By 'handing over’ the allocated unit 
to the actual vessels operating on the fishery this re-creates the im p lic it incentive for 
vessel operators to control and minim ise their capital investment in the fishery.
9.4.4 Work with industry to develop market-based incentives for compliance
The WCPFC is currently considering processes to encourage members to reach 
compliance w ith binding decisions However, as an international agreement, vessel 
compliance is considered w ith in  the realm o f  national enforcement mechanisms, albeit 
one supported by the commission's m onitoring compliance and surveillance (M CS) 
fram ework68. In parallel, some members are also considering the development o f  ‘ port 
state measures’ to d irectly encourage vessel compliance by reducing the ab ility  to 
market the fish product that may have been caught illegally. This approach, promoted 
internationally by FAO, is recognised as a valuable tool in promoting vessel compliance 
and does so in ways that are h ighly complementary to the current MCS structure while 
also encouraging other elements o f  a fisheries system to promote enforcement.
In considering the merits o f  this approach, it may be observed that the WCPFC 
Convention Area is part o f  a global tuna industry and usual industry practice can often 
mean that fish caught in the region are sent around the world to a large number o f 
national ports— although semi-predictable patterns suggest key offloading w ith in  the 
region (Barclay et al, 2009). A  drawback o f  Port State approaches, therefore, is the 
relatively large numbers o f  potential ports that could provide offloading facilities for 
fish taken in the W CPFC-CA, and consequently, the relatively large number o f 
countries (including non-WCPFC parties) who would need to actively participate and 
enforce a port state agreement.
A re-examination o f  the WCPFC networked system in Figure 9.2, as well as evidence 
collected by Barclay et al. (2009) suggests that some commercial linkages w ith in  the 
‘ fishery system' are more narrowly focused and intense than others. One such 
relationship is that between the vessel operators and the so-called three ‘ trading 
companies’69 who act as ‘ super-agents’ w ith in  the industry to facilitate critica l transfers 
o f  finances and materials (fo r example, by organising transhipment activities). This
68This ‘MCS’ framework comprises of a vessel monitoring scheme, a regional observer scheme, 
a high seas boarding and inspection protocol. Ongoing discussions are focused on the 
developed of a ‘catch documentation scheme’; port state measures and transhipment 
verification.
69These trading companies are FCF (Taiwan based), Trimarine (Singapore based) and Itochu 
(Japan based).
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constitutes a natural ‘focal point’ in the supply chain in the industry which could be 
utilised to develop a similar type of port state incentives for vessel compliance through 
a relatively smaller number of agents (and at lower cost). This could take the form of 
these critical industry ‘buyers' committing to an agreement to:
• Only purchase from vessels that can demonstrate compliance with 
relevant national laws put in place to implement WCPFC decisions
• Not purchase from vessels operating under flag states whose rules of 
operation are inconsistent with WCPFC rules.
This approach is complementary to the current MCS framework under development by 
the WCPFC and could actually strengthen it by actively engaging in the governance 
regime other ‘non-policy’ factors that influence fishery behaviour. The current MCS 
framework, as well as industry-led traceability schemes (to support food or market 
standards (see Barclay et al., 2009, forthcoming) could be used to support this 
arrangement.
9.5. Discussion
Dietz et al. (2003) argue that the adaptive governance of a complex system—like the 
WCPFC—requires actions that provide the correct type of information, that deal with 
conflicts, induce compliance with rules, provide physical technical and institutional 
infrastructure and also encourage adaptation and change achieve sustainability. 
Alternatively Charles (2001, 2008, 2004) argues for a ‘robust management’ approach, 
designed to ‘to achieve “reasonable” success in meeting societal objectives, even if (a) 
our current understanding of the fishery (for example, the status of the resources), its 
environment and its processes of change, turns out to be incorrect, and/or (b) the actual 
capability to control fishing activity is highly imperfect.’ Charles (2008, p.4).
Both these strategic goals are desirable and worthwhile but for practitioners faced with 
the daily task of implementing the Convention Text, in a region with fairly limited 
governance resources, this can present an ‘overwhelming’ task. Yet, reflection on how 
the WCPFC could incorporate an ‘adaptive/incentive’ approach into its management 
practices suggests that many aspects are already part of the commission policy program. 
In particular:
• Extensive technical, physical and institutional infrastructure, designed to 
promote cooperative governance in ways sensitive to the cultural and political 
context of the region are already embodied in the Convention, the commission's 
meeting structures, the committee structure, as well as its fledging monitoring, 
compliance and surveillance (MCS) regime.
• The developing MCS framework is one aspect of ‘encouraging compliance’ 
with rules.
• The WCPFC has put in place measures to begin to address non-use conflicts (for 
example, ecosystem issues) and gear conflicts (active management of FADs).
In considering how to progress this agenda, this paper has sought to demonstrate the 
utility of some key aspects of the adaptive/incentive approach through a brief 
demonstration of how they could evolve from current WCPFC policy practices. In 
considering the merits of this approach, this discussion highlights two issues: the limited
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contribution o f new frameworks and the potential consistency o f the proposals with the 
Convention text.
9.5.1 The limited contribution of new frameworks
A key insight o f the complexity governance literature is the need to re-scope the 
management task as a learning process while the essence o f the ‘ incentive’-based 
approach involves ‘ restricting access and creating incentives ...for users to invest in 
the resource instead o f over-exploiting it' (Ostrom et ah, 1999). The framework 
presented in this paper proposes a limited number o f reforms that could introduce these 
ideas within the Commission.
However, as a framework for decision making, the approach set out here cannot replace 
the need for political debate within the WCPFC. Decisions regarding resource use and 
allocation are always political, and expectations that rational, theoretically sound 
analysis and recommendations for policy options can replace or resolve politically 
contentious issues are somewhat naive. Rather, the proposed framework set out in this 
paper, can, at best, be considered a process for directing the attention o f that political 
debate towards important issues in the adaptive/incentive approach. For example, by 
defining the allocated units as both a tradeable commodity and as a property right— 
received by parties in perpetuity— this approach draws into the governance framework 
the key ‘efficiency’ insights from the economic literature: the trade-off between current 
and future use o f the fisheries stock (in terms o f profitability, rather than biological 
sustainability) and the trade-off between competing uses o f it (for example, harvest by 
different gear types). Rather than being proscriptive about these relative trade-offs, say 
for example by presenting them within the context o f a ‘profit-maximising’ approach 
(see Kompas et al, 2006 or Reid et al, 2006), this framework encompasses a broader 
conceptualisation o f the ‘u tility ’ from a fishery and re-frames these traditional 
efficiency issues around the question ‘ subject to achieving sustainability, what are the 
(subjective) relative costs and benefits o f catching more tuna now i f  it means less fish in 
the future?’ and ‘should their holdings o f bigeye tuna allocation be caught by their purse 
seine fleet or a long line fleet?’ . Given the relatively unfamiliarity o f policy makers in 
use o f technical economic analysis, and the potential divisive nature o f its use, it is 
contended that this approach is a more realistic one for the WCPFC that explicitly 
acknowledges the broader range o f aspirations held by commission members beyond a 
theoretical profit maximising criterion.
Through shifting the policy debate in this way, this proposed framework encourages 
members to consider a broader range o f non-scientific information (for example, 
relating to economic or market conditions or changes in fleet structure) that can 
influence fisheries performance. It thereby explicitly draws into the debate the 
underlying political and economic issues that frequently serve to block decision making, 
but which are often disguised through reference to scientific uncertainty or legal 
interpretations. For example, during observations o f commission meetings, it was 
observed by the author that political arguments against particular management measures 
were often presented in the guise o f questioning the scientific advice.
A second key advantage o f this approach is that the framing o f key decisions by the 
commission compels management decision-making processes to respond to improved 
knowledge over time. In particular, a periodic re-assessment o f the relationship between 
the short run TAC/TAE and the long run biomass requires the WCPFC to reconsider
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changes in gear mix or fishing technologies, which are largely industry-driven in 
response to market changes and by the trading o f quota, and which may affect meeting a 
particular biomass target. Because the impact on biomass outcomes is determined, in 
part, by how the species is harvested (i.e. different gears target different portions o f the 
biomass and depending on gear use, the TAC associated with an MEY or MSY target 
w ill change.), this mechanism thus has the added advantage o f incorporating the multi­
gear and multi-species nature o f the fishery.
9.5.2 Consistency with WCPFC Convention
One underlying assumption in this paper has been that the Convention is a collaborative 
framework designed to actively consider the economic aspects o f common-pool tuna 
fisheries management. A more customary reading o f the Convention (see Aqorau, 2001; 
Cordonnery, 2002) is not as an economic agreement but as a legal framework with 
international legal standing as a treaty between sovereign states. Adaptive approaches to 
management, therefore, need not only meet the managerial requirements discussed 
throughout this chapter, but also require consistency with the governing legal 
framework— in this case the Convention itself.
A primary consideration, therefore, is to consider consistency o f these proposals with 
the Convention Text and a comparison between these rules and powers to implement 
them under the Convention are set out in Table 9.3. While a full legal analysis o f the 
legal interpretations o f the Convention goes beyond this paper. Table 9.3 does suggest 
that such an approach is broadly consistent with it and clearly shows that there are some 
direct links between the "adaptive' approach and the Text. As noted in Table 9.3, three 
key Articles in the Convention support its ability to adopt an 'adaptive/incentive’ 
approach:
• Article 5— which requires the commission to manage fishing resources 
sustainably using the best information available, including economic 
information.
• Article 10— which empowers the commission to establish fishing targets and 
determine allocation as well as the power to collect any relevant information
• Article 6 (and 13)— which allows the commission to determine stock reference 
points; take into account uncertainties when establishing these reference points 
and ensure that they are not exceeded.
In several important instances, however, consistency with the Convention may rest upon 
particular interpretations o f the Text. This is particularly the case with the allocation 
powers in the Convention which, i f  implemented in the many proposals in this paper, 
require an explicit interpretation o f Article 10 (3) that favours the FFA states at the 
expense o f other "readings’ which may favour the interests o f more wealthy fishing 
nations. This issue is discussed in full in Parris and Fee (2008) which is included as 
Chapter 10 in this thesis.
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More, broadly, however, it is likely that three key ideas in the adaptive/incentive 
approach requires further active discussion of textural interpretation prior to 
determining conclusively whether the text supports, in detail, the approach set out in 
this paper.
Firstly, the Convention provides no specific power to adopt long-term permanent 
biomass goals and the process for calibrating short term TAC/TAE to this longer term 
goal—although this could be one interpretation of Article 6 (1) (a) which states:
.....determine, on the basis of the best scientific information available, stock-
specific reference points and the action to be taken if they are exceeded...;
Read in context, Article 6 (1) frames the construction of reference points solely as a 
scientific endeavour. By considering the reference points in the form proposed in this 
paper, the adaptive management approach incorporates a scientific element but also 
actively encourages other perspectives such as careful consideration of economic issues 
in formulating short-term targets or explicitly acknowledging the aspirations of 
developing country members. The latter approach could be supported by a grouping 
together of Article 10—that allows for the commission to ‘obtain and evaluate’ other 
fisheries related data—but whether this is acceptable to commission members is open to 
interpretation.
Second, there is no express power within the Convention to determine whether 
allocation processes occur on a ‘once* off basis or, like the VDS, have an implied 
‘rolling’ allocation. On the other hand, there is nothing within the Convention that 
expressly forbids it either—suggesting that the matter is a policy, rather than a legal 
issue.
Third, there is no power in the Convention that requires members to ‘hand-over’ 
allocations to individual vessels—although this is a key mechanism within the fisheries 
incentive-based approach for encouraging efficient levels of fishing capacity within the 
region. Encouraging or requiring commission members to ‘hand-over" allocations raise 
sensitive issues regarding the relationship between ‘national sovereignty’ and the ability 
of the WCPFC to set management rules across the biological range of stocks—an issue 
that is regularly highlighted by the FFA states within any policy discussion. 
Nevertheless, like the allocation issue, there is nothing expressly in the Convention to 
forbid this action should members agree to adopt it as a binding conservation and 
management measure.
9.6. CONCLUSION
One persistent problem in using alternative theories to re-envisage natural resource 
management problems is to develop the appropriate balance between maintaining the 
right kinds of theoretical insights into the problems at hand while also developing the 
appropriate heuristics from this theory, that are capable of being used ‘on-ground". 
While this is an acceptable challenge in an academic context, within the often time- 
constrained world of policy making difficulty in comprehending a theoretical 
framework would lead to not further analysis or attempts at understanding, but rather, 
the casting aside of said theory. Use of adaptive management and economy theory by
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policy makers will inevitably lead to tensions between ‘pure’ theoretical frameworks 
and something that is ‘useable’ by on ground analysts.
Although an infinite number of management options could be considered for the 
WCPFC, this paper sets forth the argument for an incentive-based approach and an 
adaptive management approach and highlights four possible changes to existing 
management frameworks that could be used to implement it in ways that are consistent 
with the WCPFC Convention Text and the needs and aspirations of WCPFC Parties. 
The management models discussed in this paper do not absolve the WCPFC of the 
inevitable and difficult political decisions, particularly around the issue of allocation, 
but use of these models provides a clear framework for decision processes.
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CHAPTER 10
ALLOCATION MODELS IN THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL PACIFIC 
FISHERIES COMMISSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PACIFIC ISLAND
STATES
10.1. I ntroduction
The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) is empowered under 
its Convention70 to determine the allocation o f fisheries resources for stocks under 
management and considerable interest in potential allocation mechanisms has been 
discussed by commission members on both a formal and informal basis (WCPFC, 
2007a; MRAG, 2006). Nevertheless, progress on the discussion o f allocation issues in 
the WCPFC remains stalled and is likely to do so for some time as members have 
recently rejected opportunities to openly discuss allocation in commission-sponsored 
forums (Government o f Japan, 2007; Government o f Australia, 2007) One reason for 
this reluctance is political: consideration o f allocation explicitly raises difficult issues 
regarding equity between members and requires active debate on the contentious topic 
o f who should bear the burdens o f any reduction in fishing effort or harvests. Another 
reason is lack o f structured concepts about what an allocation regime may look like and 
what may be the implications for WCPFC members (MRAG, 2006)71. This is 
particularly the case for members o f the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), some of whom 
have already received a significant effort-based allocation for the purse seine fleet 
through the adoption o f the Vessel Day Scheme (FFA, 2007; WCPFC, 2005) and, 
naturally, are reluctant to open discussions on allocations lest they lose political ground.
Although recognizing this reluctance, this paper argues that the explicit and transparent 
allocation o f tuna resources under the rules o f the Convention remains a potentially 
valuable and effective way for the WCPFC to meet its management responsibilities, in 
particular the sustainable management o f stocks, whilst also addressing the aspirations 
o f stakeholders. This paper aims to address the second issue facing WCPFC 
stakeholders— lack o f appropriate structured models— through the presentation o f 
several alternative allocation models that could form the basis o f an allocation debate 
within the WCPFC. Adopting an explicit ‘ FFA' point o f view, these models aim to 
explore the practical implications o f key principles that underpin the FFA positions on 
allocation by estimating potential shares for FFA states (and other commission 
members) that could be generated i f  these principles were used as part o f a commission 
allocation calculation. Although the WCPFC has allocation powers o f all highly 
migratory species in its Convention Area the focus here is on the principle tuna 
species o f interest to the FFA (skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye and southern albacore tuna) 
and on the three main gear types o f purse seine, (frozen and fresh) longline and pole and 
line fleets. The relative performance o f each model is then discussed including some 
potential implications for the existing FFA purse seine treaties.
0 Full title of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean done at Hawaii, 2000 hereafter referred to as 
the Convention.
71 For example MRAG (2006) prepared an allocation paper for the third WCPFC annual meeting, 
but this was considered by FFA countries to insufficiently cover the range of issues associated 
with allocation (WCPFC,2007a).
72The exception here is sauries, Convention -  Article 3 (3).
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This chapter is organized in the following way. Section 2 defines allocation and briefly 
discusses the role o f the WCPFC Convention Text as a framework for the allocation 
debate within the commission. Using an interpretation o f the FFA position on 
allocation, Section 3 sets out the allocation principles used in this paper and outlines the 
alternative allocation models. Section 4 presents the results o f these models, while 
Section 5 discusses issues relating to their interpretation. Section 6 concludes this 
chapter.
10.2. Basis for allocation in the W C P FC  
10.2.1. What is allocation?
Allocation here is defined as the process o f determining shares, for each resource user, 
o f an explicitly defined level of fishing (for example a TAC or TAE). This level o f 
fishing, or fishing target, is chosen, in turn, for the purposes o f achieving an explicit 
management goal for the fishery (for example achieving biological sustainability or 
achieving maximum economic yield). In essence, allocation is a negotiation about 
‘who' is allowed to catch ‘what' fish and to 'what amount’ .
Although a lot o f emphasis in policy discussions is placed on the allocation process, 
determining ‘who’ is allocated 'what fish' and 'how much’ , by itself, w ill not deliver a 
sustainable outcome for the WCPFC. Rather, sustainability outcomes (and economic 
profitability) can only come from setting appropriate global levels o f effort or harvest 
across the fishery and enforcing them appropriately (Kompas, 2005; Grafton, 1996; 
Gordon. 1954; Davis and Gartside, 2001; Bjorndal and Munro, 1999). Allocation plays 
the secondary role o f translating this global harvest or effort level into a day-to-day 
management regime for the fishery and, i f  done well, can do so in a way that promotes 
fair access to resources and provide significant economic incentives, and resources, for 
members to comply with the conservation objectives o f these targets (for an overview 
see Grafton et al., 2006; Moloney and Pearse, 1979, Davis and Gartside, 2001; Grafton 
et al., 2006a, for a general discussion o f allocation for the IATTC context see Joseph, 
2003). For example, i f  allocation units are defined as permanent property rights, 
members who hold a unit o f allocation have an interest in ensuring that the fishery is 
sustainable in the long run so they can continue to enjoy the economic benefits o f their 
rights to fish.
Another relevant issue in the allocation is determining what can be done with allocated 
shares o f TAC or TAE. Choices about how to use an allocated unit is clearly the 
decision o f individual members o f the Commission, but the means in which some 
members may exercise this sovereign right may negatively affect the fishing and 
development opportunities available to other members. Where this occurs, members 
may consider developing some ‘ground rules’ to minimize these negative effects. 
Conversely, ground rules about how allocated units can be used can improve the ability 
o f members to fully exploit the opportunities o f an allocated unit .
In effect, then, for allocation to improve sustainability outcomes in the WCPFC, 
members need to consider three interrelated questions:
73For example, rules under the Vessel Day Scheme that allow for the PNA countries to ‘trade’ 
days can allow individual PNA members to earn revenue from their allocations even if there is 
no purse seine fishing in their EEZs.
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• How much fish should be harvested OR how much fishing effort should be 
allowed in the fishery (that is, what is the TARGET?)
• If the amount of fish harvested or effort allowed in the fishery is limited (due to 
the TARGET) who should be allowed to fish and how much should each be 
allowed to harvest? (that is, what is the ALLOCATION process?)
• Once member statess receive their ALLOCATED UNIT, what other rules may 
the WCPFC need to implement to allow member statess to pursue their own 
tuna development strategies? (that is, what are the ‘GROUND RULES'?)
Members have a wide range of choices when determining policies for each component 
of this framework—for example, there are a wide range of options regarding the actual 
allocation process (that is ‘who’ gets 'how much') and this will be considered in some 
detail in Section 3. But there are equally a large number of policy choices for 
determining targets or the 'ground rules’. For example, should allocations be made on a 
permanent basis or re-calculated periodically? Should there be a target for biomass as 
well as for the level of fishing? Should members be permitted to trade their allocated 
units? A full discussion of these options would extend beyond the scope of this chapter 
but a range of relevant issues that are worthy of consideration are set out in Table 10.1 
(for more details see Chapter 9).
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Table 10.1: POLICY OPTIONS IN AN ALLOCATION BASED MANAGEMENT
FRAMEWORK
POLICY ISSUE TO
CONSIDER
POTENTIAL POLICY OPTIONS
T  argets
W hat ta rget shou ld  he a d op ted  
b y  the W CPFC? What shou ld  it 
look  like?
•  use o f  a M ax im um  Sustainable Y ie ld  target (focuses on 
b io lo g ica l susta inab ility  issues o n ly )
•  use o f  M ax im um  Econom ic Y ie ld  target (addresses b io log ica l 
susta inab ility  and econom ic p ro fita b ility  issues)?
•  targets to  be made fo r biomass levels? (e.g. B msy o r B mey)
•  targets to  be made fo r ha rvest/e ffo rt levels on ly? (e.g. T A C  =  Fmsy
Of Fmey)
•  adjust ha rvest/e ffo rt levels to  m ain ta in  target biomass? (e.g. T A C  
=  Fmsy or Fmey subject to  m eeting B mey)
N a tu re  o f  a llocated un it •  permanent share o f  any fu ture  level o f  fish ing/harvest?
•  a llocated units tradeable between parties?
A ddressing (b io lo g ica l,
econom ic and p o lit ic a l)  change 
in  fishe ry  over tim e
• should targets change over tim e? W hat tim e period?
•  should units be tradeable between gear types?
• a llo w in g  the use o f  an allocated un it in any area o f  the W C PFC - 
C A ? (i.e  not ju s t in the EEZ o f  the coastal state w ho holds the 
allocated un it)
D e a ling  w ith  vessel capacity 
issues
•  should W C P FC  members be required to pass on (sell o r g ift )  the ir 
a llocated units to  in d iv idu a l vessels? (i.e . in order to  avo id  
establish ing an ‘ O lyp m ic  F ishery*?
• vessels rece iv ing  a lloca tion subject to be ing on W C PFC  register 
and com p le ting  a ll reporting requirem ents?
‘ G round Rules’ • rules to  address eco logica l im pacts o f  fish ing?  (e.g. res tric ting  
access to spaw ning ground areas?)
Source: Grafton et al. (2006), Kompas (2005); author's own analysis
10.2.2. Commission powers and allocation precedents in management measures
Any allocation debate within the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
w ill not be an ‘open discussion* between members but w ill be guided both by the legal 
framework o f the governing Convention Text as well as the set o f precedents embodied 
in the current management measures o f the commission.
The commission holds specific powers for allocation and these are set out in Article 10 
o f the Convention Text which allows for the establishment o f TAC and TAE goals and 
processes for allocating these fisheries limits between commission members. Unusually 
for a regional fisheries management organization, the Convention Text o f the WCPFC 
significantly acts to guide the scope within which the commission may exercise these 
powers and these could work potentially in favour o f the FFA states. Three articles are 
particularly important. The first o f these is Article 10 (3), which contains a list o f factors 
that must be Taken into 30001101’ when determining any allocation formula under the 
commission— many o f which reflect the specific interests o f FFA members and which 
are summarized in Column One o f Table 10.2. However the benefit to the FFA 
members o f Article 10 (3) is unclear because the text is ambiguous and does not provide 
clear guidance in terms o f ‘quantifying’ shares. For example it is unclear how to 
quantify the clause 10 (3) (i) which states (i) The geographical situation o f a small 
island developing State which is made up o f non-contiguous groups o f islands having a
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distinct economic and cultural identity o f their own but which are separated by areas of 
high seas;’ .
The second one is Article 8, which deals with ‘compatibility' issues between the high 
seas and areas under national jurisdiction and states and requires that conservation 
measures established within EEZs and high seas must be compatible, that commission 
members must cooperate to ensure this occurs but that, in doing so, the commission 
must ‘take into account’ any management regimes for the tuna stocks put in place prior 
to the commission. That is, commission must recognize the prior work o f the FFA when 
determining management measures, including that o f allocation.
The third is Article 30, which gives explicit recognition to the special needs of 
developing state members o f the commission. Here, the Convention states that in 
carry ing out its duties, the commission needs ‘ ...to ensure that such measures do not 
result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate burden o f conservation 
action onto developing States Parties'. That is, the commission needs to ensure that any 
allocation regime takes into account the economic circumstance and aspirations o f FFA 
members
While these three aspects o f the Convention Text (Article 10 (3), Article 8 and Article 
30) can be used to promote FFA interests, there is a risk associated with them because 
ensuring that they are used in this way relies on interpretation o f the Convention Text. 
This in turn, depends on ensuring that all non-FFA members o f the commission share 
the same interpretation o f the Convention. At the time o f writing, Text interpretation is 
actively being negotiated between commission members (Parris et ah, 2008. 
forthcoming). More specifically, two factors that may ‘dilute' the benefits o f these 
clauses for the FFA members are:
• Article 10(3) also includes elements that could be used by DWFN to support 
their perspectives on allocation (including, for example ‘past and present fishing 
patterns’) 74.
• Article 30 recognizes the special needs o f small island developing state members 
o f the commission— but there are many countries beyond the FFA group that 
could be considered in this way. In particular it is likely that the Philippines and 
Indonesia— both o f which have large domestic fisheries, could also argue for 
‘ special consideration’ under this clause in any allocation debate.
74 For example Article 10 (3) and the ‘contribution to scientific study’ clauses and Article 30 
mentioning SIDS only, which extends way beyond the FFA states.
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Table 10.2: Article 10 (3) of the WCPFC: Factors that ‘need to be taken into
account’
A rt ic le  10 (3 ) C r i te r ia  fo r  a llocation H a rv e s t M o d e l E ffo r t
M o d e l
Biomass M o del Space
M o d e l
(a) the status o f  the stocks and the existing level o f fishing 
effort in the fishery';
Depends on 
target chosen
V
(b) the respective interests, past and present fishing 
patterns and fishing practices o f participants in the fishery 
and the extent o f the catch being utilized for domestic 
consumption;
J
Depends on ac
V
option o f c
V
oastal state prii iciple
(c) the historic catch in an area; V
Depends on
V
idoption o f
V
coastal state pi
V
'inciple
(d) the needs o f  small island developing States, and 
territories and possessions, in the Convention Area whose 
economies, food supplies and livelihoods are 
overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation o f  marine 
liv ing resources;
V V? V? 9
(e) the respective contributions o f  participants to 
conservation and management o f the stocks, including the 
provision by them o f accurate data and their contribution 
to the conduct o f scientific research in the Convention 
Area;
X X X X
(0  the record o f compliance by the participants with 
conservation and management measures;
X ? X ? X X
(g) the needs o f  coastal communities which are dependent 
mainly on fishing for the stocks;
9 9 V V
(h) the special circumstances o f  a State which is 
surrounded by the exclusive economic zones o f  other 
States and has a lim ited exclusive economic zone o f its 
own;
X X X X
(i) the geographical situation o f a small island developing 
State which is made up o f non-contiguous groups o f 
islands having a distinct economic and cultural identity o f 
their ow n but w hich are separated by areas o f  high seas;
X? X? V V
(j) the fishing interests and aspirations o f  coastal States, 
particularly small island developing States, and territories 
and possessions, in whose areas o f national jurisdiction the 
stocks also occur.
V
Depends on in
V
terpretatior
_
V
o f Conventior
V
l Text
1 _ |
Source: WCPFC (2000 -  Article 10(3)); author's own analysis
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10.2.3. Implicit allocation in the WCPFC conservation and management measures
Although explicit allocation has not been pursued in the WCPFC, the implementation of 
several conservation and management measures (CMMs), focusing primarily on 
yellowfin, bigeye and albacore tuna, and on fleet capacity, carry with them some 
implicit, and precedent-setting, patterns of allocation. These precedents have potentially 
both positive and negative implications for the FFA states in the allocation debate.
The CMMs are, in the main, structured as imposing limits on fishing effort, capacity or 
harvest equal to an historical baseline, which is predominately 2004 or 2005 depending 
on the measure. From an allocation perspective, these CMMs imply that whatever 
percentage share of effort or harvest that each commission member had operating in the 
fishery during the base period then that is the share of allocation accruing to that 
commission member. Table 10.3 sets out the relevant management measures pertaining 
to tuna stocks and fishing capacity in active fleets and notes the relative implicit 
allocation contained in them. One interpretation of these management measures, is that 
they work against the FFA states, is that each of these management measures makes an 
implicit allocation that tends to favour fleets—predominately the DWFN fishing on the 
high seas and larger countries with longline fleets—that are already active within the 
WCPFC Convention Area74. This, in turn, potentially undermines the political and 
economic aspirations of the small island developing (SID) states (which includes the 
FFA Group) who may wish to expand their domestic fishing industries.
This interpretation is not shared by the FFA Group who have argued consistently that 
these measures do not limit their fishing related activities to the baseline years but, 
rather provides them, as SID members of the commission, with exemptions to expand 
fishing activity under domestic development strategies in accordance with ‘responsible 
levels of exploitation’ (see for example, statement of RMI in WCPFC, 2007). For 
example, with respect to bigeye tuna and yellowfin tuna, the commission’s management 
measures state:
Nothing in this decision shall prejudice the legitimate rights and obligations of
those small island state Members and participating territories in the Convention
Area seeking to develop their own domestic fisheries (WCPFC CMM 2005-01).
While this position carries legal and political weight, it raises the difficult issue that 
these exemptions could actually expand current levels of fishing and harvesting and 
thus critically undermine the sustainability objectives of the CMMs to protect 
vulnerable stocks. For example, analysis by CMM 2005-01 for longline catch of bigeye 
tuna suggests that exemptions given to SIDs members to catch up to 2000 tons of this 
stock could possibly raise the level of harvests to 61 per cent above recommended MS Y 
levels (Parris, 2010). Obviously, in the longer run, the continuation of ‘exemptions’ for 
SIDS members is not viable if the sustainability objectives of the commission are to be 
met.
(continued on p.215)
74This is particularly the case for longline fleets but less so for purse seine fleets for whom a 
significant percentage (-50%) of effort is expended in the PNA waters and are therefore 
covered under the allocation mechanisms of the VDS.
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An alternative interpretation is that these exemptions provide a “bargaining chip' that 
can be used by FFA states in future negotiations to leverage more favorable allocations 
within the context o f tighter fishing restrictions76.
The obvious exception to this implicit allocation approach in the current conservation 
and management measures is the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) which has been the most 
significant measure adopted by the commission (see WCPFC CMM 2005-01 and FFA, 
2007). The VDS allocation mechanism is unusual in that the organizing principle 
underlying the formula places sole focus on the issue o f where the harvest occurs, or 
where in space the distribution o f resources are, rather than on who is harvesting the 
fish. In this way it gives practical expression to the principle o f coastal state sovereignty 
and ‘ownership' o f resources, found in Articles 61 and 62 o f the LOSC. The 
commission’s adoption o f the VDS as a formal conservation management measure in 
2005 was important both in the formal recognition o f the importance o f the FFA 
grouping within the WCPFC, and the previous work by the FFA on regional 
management, as well as explicit recognition o f the validity o f the ‘coastal state' 
principle that underpinned the scheme’s allocation mechanism.
10.3. A l l o c a t io n  m o d e ls  in  t h e  W estern  a n d  C e n t r a l  Pa c if ic  F is h e r ie s  
C o m m is s io n
10.3.1 Allocation principles
Article 10 gives the commission the power to determine criteria for allocation between 
members and this inevitably w ill be a political and subjective process. The central 
question is how to combine the various competing arguments over allocation into a set 
o f allocation principles and subsequently into a set o f concrete concepts capable o f 
being quantified in a formula. The critical issue o f the FFA states is to determine what 
principles best represent their interests within this process.
The previous section has highlighted that various factors may be consider relevant in 
determining allocation principles capable o f being quantified. Article 10 (3) o f the 
Convention provides some guidance to negotiators, but the clauses in this text are 
difficult to use in deriving an allocation formula primarily because o f their ambiguous 
meaning and the difficultly in quantifying them. As noted above, for Articles 10(3), 8 
and 30 to work in favour o f the FFA states w ill require further negotiation with other 
members. The current set o f conservation and management measures do contain 
potentially negative implications for allocation outcomes for the FFA states but contain 
a very big positive in the form of the Vessel Day Scheme which sets a clear precedence 
for ‘coastal state’ sovereign rights within a broader allocation scheme in the WCPFC.
Into this mix, the FFA states have expressed clearly their views on how allocation is to 
proceed. For example, responding to the MRAG (2006) paper, on behalf o f the FFA 
group, the commission representative from the Federated States o f Micronesia noted:
The FFA Members see the role o f the Commission as being to determine stock­
wide total allowable catch or total allowable effort and developing criteria for 
allocations o f the TAC or TAE exactly as provided for in Article 10 o f the 
Convention. We also see the Commission making allocations for the high
76This view was expressed privately to the author by various Pacific-based commentators 
during the research conducted for this paper.
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seas.....we do not see the Commission as having a major role in allocations
relating to fishing in waters under national jurisdiction.....  [which is] subject
under Article 10 to the sovereign right of coastal states... (WCPFC, 2007a, pi 7).
Driven by political imperative to assert their power within the commission, this position 
by the FFA is understandable. However, set within the context of managing highly 
migratory shared tuna stocks it is difficult to see how the artificial separation of 
decision-making processes between ‘coastal states’ and ‘high seas’ areas could be 
achieved in practice in the context of achieving an overall TAC or TAE target for the 
fishery—at some level both coastal states and states operating on the high seas will need 
to reach agreement on the level of fishing each member is permitted to have if an 
overall sustainability objective for the tuna stocks is to be met. This view carries with it 
the risk that unless coastal states provide a reasonable level of fishing opportunities on 
the high seas then those that operate in that part of the commission area face strong 
incentives to undertake illegal fishing—which could have negative consequences for the 
conservation efforts of FFA states. In evaluating this view it is also worth noting that 
almost all of the WCPFC members are, in themselves, coastal states (in fact only five 
could be considered purely as DWFNs) and that there are many other ‘developing 
states’ beyond the FFA group. To talk about allocation solely as the responsibility of 
‘coastal’ states means in practice to consider most members of the commission.
In finding a pragmatic way forward, a reasonable interpretation of the FFA position, 
supported by the text of Article 10 (3), may be that the Convention Text gives coastal 
state powers (FFA countries as well as others) a priority in determining allocation 
shares in their favour and. that developing country coastal states are particularly 
generously accounted for in any allocation formula. This does not necessarily mean that 
small island developing country members are excluded from the disciplines of catch 
limits that are put in place for sustainability reasons, but that the allocation regime 
directly addresses their political and economic aspirations, through generous 
allocations.
Drawing these various drivers together (the internal political dynamics of the WCPFC, 
the FFA and historical approaches to fisheries management), the following set of 
principles were developed to guide the construction of allocation models discussed in 
Section 3.2:
• Allocation shares for coastal states should be based on the amount of harvesting 
and/or biomass that occurs within their EEZs, regardless of the flag of the 
vessels carrying out the fishing activity. This is referred to as the ‘coastal state 
principle' in the rest of the paper. This concept essentially reflects the allocation 
precedence set in WCPFC CMM 2005-01 which endorsed the Vessel Day 
Scheme and extends it to cover all fleets, all species and all countries within the 
commission
• Allocation on the high seas should preferably be shared equally between all 
commission members or. if a compromise is needed, in accordance with Article 
10 (3) (c) be based on historical catch of fishing fleets operating based on 
harvest taken from the high seas only.
• Some recognition should be given to precedents set in the current CMMs of the 
WCPFC.
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• The physical concentration of the tuna resources within the tropical zones of the 
WCPFC-Convention Area, and therefore the concentration around the Pacific 
Island states, should be recognized and incorporated into the allocation formula.
These ideas are summarized in Figure 10.1 that indicates that commission members 
may derive their allocation share in one of three ways. For coastal states, with no high 
seas fleet, their allocation is based on the amount of fishing/catch in their zones as 
expended by all fleets o f all nationalities operating in that zone, and/or based on the 
relative size of their EEZs in the Convention Area and/or (possibly) equal shares of any 
allocation made on the high seas. For coastal states with high seas fleets, their allocation 
similarly depends on catch/effort in zone, and/or the relative size of their EEZs, and 
either equal shares high seas allocation or the proportion of effort/catch expended or 
taken by their flagged vessels on the high seas. For members who are not coastal states, 
their allocation depends on either receiving equal share on the high seas or the ratio of 
effort/catch their flagged vessels take on the high seas only.
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10.3.2 Allocation models
Using the allocation principles set out in Section 3.1. the following four allocation 
models were developed.
10.3.2.1 Allocation using effort data and current WCPFC measures (the ‘Effort ’
Model).
This model calculates allocated shares using historical effort data for the principal 
industrial sized fishing gears: purse seine, frozen longline, fresh longline and pole and 
line gears. The years 2001-2004 were chosen as the base years for calculation to reflect 
the base years currently used by the majority o f the WCPFC measures. The two key 
principles used in this model are the ‘coastal state' principle and, the compromise 
principle for the high seas: allocation o f a high seas ‘pool o f shares’ based on the 
historical effort o f fishing fleets operating in this part o f the Convention Area.
To calculate these shares it was necessary to adopt an interpretation o f several key 
issues currently under consideration by the WCPFC. These are as follows:
• It was assumed that the management measures CMM 2005-01 and CMM 2006- 
01 applied to all major commercial purse seine, longline and pole and line fleets 
and all areas o f the WCPFC-CA, including those flagged to, or based in (that is 
domestically based) Pacific Island Countries.
• Indonesia is yet to ratify the Convention, and consequently is not eligible for 
allocated units. Its share o f the fishery is calculated and represented separately.77
• Although intended to be complementary. CMM 2005-01 and CMM 2006-01 use 
different language when referring to fishing effort. In this model, all references 
to ‘capacity’ , ‘effort' and ‘ vessels' is interpreted as meaning ‘ fishing days’ for 
the purse seine and pole and line fleets and ‘ number o f hooks’ for the longline 
fleet.
Primary data sets used in this analysis, can be found in Reid (2007), Hampton et al. 
(2006a), Hampton et al. (2006b), Langley et al. (2005), Langley and Hampton (2005), 
WCPFC (2008) and supplementary national reports submitted by members to the 
WCPFC Scientific Committee (Hooper, pers.com. 2008; Matsunaga et al, 2006; 
Fisheries Agency o f Japan, 2007)78.
As this model reflects the current set o f WCPFC management measures, an additional 
form o f allocation to cover bigeye tuna harvest is also incorporated into this model. 
CMM 2005-01 provides an implicit harvest-based allocation for longline fleets catching 
bigeye tuna to an amount equal to an average catch taken in the years 2001-2004 or 
2004 (for China and US only) or 2000 tonnes, whichever is larger7^ . This was converted
77ldeally, effort related to Indonesian fishing fleets would be explicitly incorporated into the 
allocation model either through Indonesia joining the WCPFC or by ‘holding in trust’ and
therefore explicitly accounting for its effects on the fishery.
/8During the analysis it was not possible to obtain spatially disaggregated data for effort levels 
for all fleets and all gear types -  such data was only available for the purse seine fleet. Instead 
the analysis uses spatially disaggregated catch data from Reid (2007) ibid as a proxy for effort 
data for the frozen and fresh longline fleets and the pole and line fleets.
79CMM 2005-01 states: ‘Paragraph 17. The catch of bigeye for each CCM for the next 3 years 
shall not exceed the average annual bigeye catch for the years 2001-2004 or the year 2004 
[china, US only]... and 8. Paragraph 17 does not apply to CCMs that caught less than 2,000
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into shares o f bigeye tuna catch based on the proportion o f catch taken by each party, as
allowed for in CM M  2005-01, on the assumption that the total amount o f allowable
80bigeye tuna was harvested.
10.3.2.2. Allocation using kämest data and variable based (the 'Harvest' Model)
This allocation model uses historical harvest data to calculate relative allocations using 
‘coastal state' principle and high seas historical ‘ flag’ catch record as in the ‘ Effort 
Model'. Two base years were chosen for the analysis. First, the years 1997-2005 were 
used for determining the relative shares o f allocation as this reflected both a period o f 
several ENSO cycles in the Pacific, which alter the geographical spread o f skipjack tuna 
harvests (Lehody, 2001) and the scope o f the time series used in the analysis. A shorter 
base period o f 2000-2005 was also calculated to explore the effects o f using different 
baselines in calculations o f allocation and to reflect an historical period whereby FFA 
domestic fleets were growing in relative size in the fishery. This model was calculated 
using the same basic procedures o f the ‘effort model' (see Figure 10.1) with the 
principle data sources being derived from Reid (2007).
In addition to allocations made to individual parties o f the WCPFC, this model 
explicitly incorporates an allocation to two global ‘ pools' o f harvest rights that are held 
by the commission as a whole. The first allocation ‘pool’ is made to cover harvests 
taken by fishers (such as subsistence fishers) whose target stocks are biologically part o f 
the WCPO tuna stocks but for some reason are not institutionally incorporated within 
the WCPFC allocation-based management regime (for example, artisanal catches or 
catches taken in Indonesian waters). This ensures that catches taken from non-covered 
sources do not become a source o f ‘ leakage' for the system, and thus undermine broader 
efforts to achieve stock sustainability. This allocation also directly addresses the criteria 
in Article 10 (3) (d) and (g) which requires the needs o f coastal communities, and their 
reliance on fishing activities, be incorporated into the allocation regime.
Following on Chand et al (2003), the second pool is to allocate directly to the WCPFC 
Secretariat, who can then auction the TAC for fundraising to finance its own activities 
and/or to finance a ‘development/capacity fund' for developing country’ members o f the 
commission. I f  necessary, a portion o f the funds raised through the open auction could 
be used to fund a ‘ buy back’ scheme to enable vessels to leave the fishery, and reduce 
capacity down to more appropriate levels.
10.3.2.3. Allocation using estimated biomass shares in EEZs (the 'Biomass ’ Model)
The allocation pattern in this model follows the basic pattern o f coastal state/high seas 
allocation as discussed above but, in contrast to the previous two models, the baseline 
data uses patterns o f estimated biomass distribution throughout the WCPFC-Convention 
Area to determine relative shares for each Member. Thus, the expected share o f biomass 
to be found in the EEZs o f coastal state members and shares o f high seas biomass 
allocated on a flag state basis, forms the basis o f calculating shares. This method 
extends the biomass component o f the allocation mechanism used in the YDS to cover
tons in 2004. Each CCM that caught less than 2,000 tons of bigeye in 2004 shall ensure that 
their catch does not exceed 2,000 tons in each of the next 3 years.
80That is, assuming that all parties caught, in the future, the equivalent of their average 2001- 
2004 catch or 2000 tonnes. Since not all parties actually catch this amount, this allocation 
mechanism is essentially allowing for an expansion in the bigeye tuna harvests.
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all coastal states and all tuna species harvested in the WCPFC-Convention Area80. The 
years 1995-2005 were chosen as the base years for determining relative shares as this 
reflects the impacts of several ENSO cycles in the Pacific, as well as recent levels of 
biomass available in the fishery.
Following the precedent of the VDS allocation mechanism, this model is calculated 
using the relative size of EEZs of each coastal state within the WCPFC and the 
estimated relative ‘biomass’ density of each coastal state area, a summary of which is 
set out in Diagram 10.3. Basic data is drawn from tuna stock assessment reports of SPC 
and from a GIS spatial model of the WCPFC Convention Area constructed for the 
purposes of this analysis. Further details of methods used in this model are set out 
below81.
As discussed above, the northern albacore tuna stocks are excluded from this analysis.
For the calculations of biomass estimates, the GIS model required the use of defined 
boundaries of both the EEZs of coastal states and the WCPFC Convention Area itself. The later 
was problematic due to the lack of a formal Western boundary of the Convention Area. This was 
resolved by adopting the spatial boundaries used by MFCL model when conducting stock 
assessments for the Commission -  although it is recognized that there may be some under­
representation of the actual distribution of biomass as a result. For example, it is likely that 
skipjack tuna biomass may be found in the Australian and New Zealand EEZs but estimates 
pertaining to these areas are not incorporated into the skipjack tuna biomass model because 
the MFCL model for skipjack tuna does not incorporate the EEZs of these two countries. In 
addition, it is recognized that some minor portions of the WCPFC-CA are subject to maritime 
claims or joint management regimes. These areas are grouped together in the results to 
highlight the uncertainty surrounding these areas and to avoid making pre-emptive decisions 
regarding maritime or other international boundaries.
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10.3.2.4 Allocation using relative size o f  EEZs (the ‘Spatial ’ Model).
This model is a simplified version of the Biomass Model and uses spatial parameters 
only to determine relative shares between coastal states and high seas areas. Preliminary 
calculations of this model produced results for the FFA Countries that were less than the 
shares calculated in the Harvest Model, because the relative size of coastal state EEZs 
was diluted by the broad expanse of high seas areas in the northern and southern regions 
of the Convention Area. Although the high seas areas are legitimately a part of the 
Convention Area, it is recognized that the majority of the tuna biomass spend the 
majority of their lives in and around the tropical and sub-tropical zones (see stock 
assessment reports prepared by SPC, listed in footnote 26) where most coastal states 
EEZs are found. To incorporate this into the analysis, estimates of EEZ biomass was 
weighted against the SPC biomass estimates in each sub-region of the SPC stock 
assessment model (that is MFCL) to provide an overall estimate of the size of the EEZ 
and its relative ‘importance’ in terms of tuna resources. In order to test the influence of 
the ‘equal high seas shares’ approach, this model allocates shares associated with high 
seas spatial areas equally between all WCPFC members, of which there are currently 33 
(WCPFC, 2007c).
Although much focus is placed on the ‘tropical’ part of the WCPFC Convention Area, 
the EEZs of other coastal states—such as Japan, New Zealand or the US—are also 
fished and also legitimate parts of the fishing grounds and are included in SPC stock 
assessments. Where the appropriate data was available, these areas were therefore 
included in the allocation calculations.
10.4. Methods and data
10.4.1 Method
A broad interpretation of the allocation principles set out in Section 3 suggest that 
several data-driven alternatives may be consistent with the FFA position, with the key 
differences being the type of data that is used as the ‘baseline’ for determining the 
calculations of individual shares and the ways in which these ‘baselines’ are weighted. 
To explore possible options, four types of baselines, constructed as ‘sub-models’, were 
calculated for this analysis:
• Harvest data—using the ‘coastal state’ principle. That is, all harvest of all 
species taken within the EEZs of coastal states are counted towards the 
allocation baseline of coastal states. For high seas harvests, allocation is made on 
historical catch by flag.
• Biomass data—allocation based on the expected biomass found in each coastal 
state for each species. For high seas harvests, allocation is made on historical 
catch by flag.
• Spatial data—relative of the size (Km2) of the coastal state EEZ as a proportion 
of the entire WCPFC Convention Area. Shares associated with high seas areas 
are allocated equally between members.
• Effort history—using the ‘coastal state’ principle. That is, all effort of all gear 
types expended within the EEZs of coastal states are counted towards the
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allocation baseline of coastal states. For high seas effort, allocation is made on 
historical catch by flag..
Each tuna species is calculated separately, although for albacore tuna only the southern 
stocks are included in recognition of their importance to the FFA states and the state of 
scientific advice regarding northern albacore tuna stocks. The same core analytical 
procedures are followed for all baselines and are a variation on the simple calculations 
of relative proportions of shares (harvest, biomass, space, flag history) of individual 
countries as a percentage of the entire fishery. Formal methods for each model are 
discussed below.
10.4.1.1. Biomass Sub-model
The analytical procedure used in this allocation model follows the general process used 
by the Forum Fisheries Agency when determining the biomass component of the 
allocation regime in the Vessel Day Scheme (Dunn et al., 2006; Rodwell, 2004). This 
model extends the basic methodology to all countries in the WCPFC and to bigeye tuna 
and southern albacore tuna species. All calculations cover all countries in the WCPFC 
and Cooperating Non-Member of Indonesia—and thus are extended beyond the core 
Pacific states.
Drawing on biomass estimates of the key tuna stocks from the Multifan-CL stock 
assessment reports (see Hampton et al., 2006a, 2006b; Langley et al., 2005, Langley and 
Hampton, 2005) and spatial estimates of the EEZs of coastal states and of the WCPFC 
Convention Area itself (see Section 10.4.2), the biomass calculations are constructed 
using three key variables:
• The relative size of each coastal state EEZ and of the ‘high seas’ areas in the MFCL 
model for each tuna species.
• The expected biomass of each tuna species that could be reasonably found in each 
coastal state EEZ and on the high seas, and the relative share of each as a proportion 
of the entire estimated biomass.
• The relative share of historical harvest taken by each flag on the high seas as a 
proportion of the total harvest for each species82.
More formally the estimated total share of biomass that can be expected in the EEZ of 
country J can be expressed as:
Where there are j countries and i regions in each Multifan-CL model. For the albacore 
tuna model i =1 and for skipjack tuna, bigeye tuna, and yellowfin tuna, i = 6 and where 
bj is defined as:
£ EEZß x b , ~ A
percentageshareEEZj =
82 See Section 5.3 for further details regarding high seas catch estimates.
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biomassdensity{bl) = B:
X  EEZß + HS, 
V i
And Bi is the biomass parameter for each Multifan-CL region as obtained from stock 
assessment reports.
Similarly, the expected share of high seas biomass can be expressed as:
percentageshareHSj =
^ H S ,x b ,
= B
Where HSj is the size of the high seas area in region i. The share of country j in the high 
seas biomass is expressed as a proportion of the historical share in catch taken on the 
high seas or:
shareoßüg/iseaspool
HSC j 
I  j H S C j = C
Here HSCj is the high seas catch of all fishing nations operating on the high seas of the 
WCPFC-CA for each species.
If these equations are defined as A, B and C respectively, then the total percentage share 
in any future allocation regime accruing to individual members, based on the expected 
share of biomass within zones (for coastal states) and on the high seas (for fishing 
nations) can be expressed as:
percentageshareJf bhmas)
Y j EEZj; xb j
i +
L H S i xb i ___
I « ,
i >-
---
-- to
V _
__
Total allocation share = A + BC
Or
For simplicity, it is assumed in this model that tuna biomass is evenly distributed 
throughout each MFCL regions and consequently every area of ocean is considered 
equally as important as any other in terms of its value to the fishery—something 
unlikely in practice as the known habit of tuna is to aggregate more intensively around 
islands.
When calculating the spatial parameters for this model (see Section 10.4.2 below), the 
data sets used for EEZ spatial layers identified several areas within the WCPFC- 
Convention Area that are under international dispute and/or joint management between
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Commission members. Rather than re-empting decisions over these areas, and 
consequently determining who receives the allocation associated with them, these areas 
are grouped together in the results as ‘Conflict/Joint Management Zones’. It may be that 
these issues will be in favour of particular countries and allocation shares adjusted 
accordingly. But this is likely to only result in a minor change—overall this group tends 
to represent less than 1.5 per cent of allocation for each species in each model.
10.4.1.2. Harvest and Effort Sub-model
The Vessel Day Scheme allocation process gives equal weighting to the estimated share 
of purse seine effort expended in the zones of the participating PNA countries. As this 
model in this paper extends beyond the purse seine fleet and incorporates bigeye tuna 
and albacore tuna, it was considered that calculations of effort, on a gear basis, was 
somewhat inconsistent with the calculations of biomass shares as the latter is based on 
species. Moreover, as in Parris (2008, this volume) it was not possible to identify an 
appropriate spatially disaggregated data set for longline and pole and line effort. 
Consequently, following on from Parris (2008, this volume), it was assumed that spatial 
patterns of harvest for each species was a reasonable proxy for spatial distribution of 
effort and a sub-model was formally constructed using the following calculation:
More formally, the total catch taken in the EEZ of country i(i,...n) by country ja ....<n) is
expressed as:
TotalcatcEEZs= ^  's^ fLE7i j
The total catch taken by the flagged vessels of country yV/, n) on the high seas is 
expressed as:
HSj -  ^  HSj an(j totalcatch HS = ^  HS
For determining the shares accruing to each coastal state from EEZ fishing activity and 
to each flag state from high seas harvests, ratio the following calculations were made:
IEEZU
shareofEEZJ = 7
and
HS
shareofhighseasJ =
To ensure that the ratios sum to unity, the identities A and B were weighted by the 
shares of all EEZ based harvests and all high seas based harvests as a proportion of the 
total. That is:
II E E Z .J
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shareofEEZpool =
11 ,^,
J i
I l E E Z . j  + ^ H S j
j  i j
and
1 h s j
shareofhighseaspool =
j  i j
Finally, the total shares for each country is calculated as the weighted sum of the ratios 
calculated in previous steps. That is S = (AxC) + (BxD) or
I EEZ.J+HS,
totalsharecountryJ =
j  ’ j
The same process was followed using effort data. During the course of research, only 
effort data pertaining to purse seine gears (measured in days fished) was available at the 
correct spatial scale. Therefore, as a proxy, catch data for longline and pole and line 
gears were used in the Effort model.
For the harvest model, a flat two per cent of allocation was taken from the total at the 
beginning of the process to allocate to the two ‘pools’—one for artisanal fishers and the 
other for the WCPFC Secretariat. These are discussed in more detail in Section 3.
I i l EEZIJ+'£ H S J
L L E E Z U + L H S J
10.4.1.3. Spatial Sub-Model
This model is a simplified version of the biomass model and uses spatial parameters 
only to determine relative shares between coastal states and high seas areas. Similar to 
the previous models, individual shares of country J was determined as:
percentageshareJ (eez) I I  ,&Zß7 ^
I Y .E E Z j. + HS,
'■ V  j
Where EEZjj is the size in square kilometres of the EEZs of each coastal state j  in each 
region i as determined by the GIS modeling undertaken for this analysis (see Section 5.2 
below).
Preliminary calculations of this model produced results for the FFA Countries that were 
less than the shares calculated in the Harvest (Zonal) Sub-Model, because the relative 
size of coastal state EEZs was diluted by the broad expanse of high seas areas in the 
northern and southern regions of the Convention Area. Although the high seas areas are 
legitimately a part of the Convention Area, it is recognized that the majority of the tuna 
biomass spend the majority of their lives in and around the tropical and sub-tropical 
zones where most coastal states’ EEZs are found. To incorporate this into the analysis,
227
estimates of EEZ biomass were weighted against the SPC biomass estimates in each 
sub-region of the stock assessment model (see Section 10.4.2) to provide an overall 
estimate of the size of the EEZ and its relative ‘importance’ in terms of tuna resources. 
That is:
spatialshareJ—
/ 'S
EEZ)
f  )
b,
Y EEZ
V J  J
l bi= \,...n  J
In this model, shares associated with high seas spatial areas was allocated equally 
between all WCPFC members, of which there are currently 33.
10.4.1.4. Bigeye tuna calculations
As discussed in Section 10.3, the effort models and the harvest models were amended to 
incorporate the allocative impacts of CMM 2005-01 for bigeye tuna. This was 
calculated using which ever gave the highest proportion:
, » j ^  [catch2000-04] 2 0 0 0percentage share betJ =C j  —-----------------------------------------------------  or ------------------------------------------------------------------
totalbetcatch totalbetcatch
10.4.2. CIS Model for Area Calculations
ArcView GIS software was used to calculate the spatial dimensions of the EEZ for each 
coastal state, and the regions within each MFCL model, and consequently the high seas 
areas for each region. Three GIS models were created to reflect the spatial structures of 
the MFCL models: on each for skipjack tuna and albacore tuna, and a common model 
for bigeye tuna and yellowfm tuna (as they share the same spatial structure in MFCL). 
The fishing zones for the different species were generated from interpretation of maps 
and graphics from the SPC stock assessment reports83 (see Hampton et al., 2006a, 
2006b; Langley et al., 2005a, 2005b). Spatial layers of Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZ) were sourced from the Flanders Marine Institute maritime boundaries 
geodatabase (VLIZ, 2005). Both spatial layers were in geographic projection (that is 
coordinates in latitude and longitude), and, whilst this provided an effective 
cartographic representation, the projection was not suitable for area-based calculations 
and analyses. Therefore both layers were reprojected into the Mollweide projection, 
which preserved area estimates accurately (at the scale of interpretation), but distorted 
the shapes in order to better match the actual representation of the earth on an ellipse.
The comer coordinates for each fish species zone were extracted from the SPC stock 
assessment, and used to define the boundaries for each species as a spatial layer within 
the ESRI ArcGIS geographic information system (GIS). If a zone crossed the 180- 
degree longitude, the zone was split into two, and separate eastern and western portions
The SPC is the formal provider of scientific advice to the WCPFC.
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created. Once species zones were generated and attributed with the required 
information, they were combined with the EEZ spatial layer. The resultant merged layer 
could then be interrogated to extract the EEZ area of each country within a particular 
species zone. The area information was then exported into an Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet for further analysis.
The estimated accuracy of the coordinates extracted from the reports was ± 1 degree of 
latitude/longitude. When re-projected and the actual area calculated for the respective 
zones, generated a difference of approximately 100,000kmA2 on average, compared to 
the estimated area published in the report. This represented approximately ~1 % of the 
area of the different zones on average, and was considered acceptable for the purposes 
of the modeling.
For the calculations of biomass estimates, the GIS model required the use of defined 
boundaries of both the EEZs of coastal states and the WCPFC Convention Area itself. 
The later was problematic due to the lack of a formal western boundary of the 
Convention Area. This was resolved by adopting the spatial boundaries used by MFCL 
model when conducting stock assessments for the commission—although it is 
recognized that there may be some under-representation of the actual distribution of 
biomass as a result. For example, it is likely that skipjack tuna biomass may be found in 
the Australian and New Zealand EEZs but estimates pertaining to these areas are not 
incorporated into the skipjack tuna biomass model because the MFCL model for 
skipjack tuna does not incorporate the EEZs of these two countries. In addition, it is 
recognized that some minor portions of the WCPFC-CA are subject to maritime claims 
or joint management regimes. These areas are grouped together in the results to 
highlight the uncertainty surrounding these areas and to avoid making pre-emptive 
decisions regarding maritime or other international boundaries.
10.4.3. Data
All catch data used in this analysis was sourced from Reid (2007) a public data set 
released in 2007 by the Forum Fisheries Agency (available www.ffa.inO and the 
biomass data from stock assessment reports prepared for each tuna species by the SPC 
as part of its routine scientific advice for the WCPFC. Reid (2007) derives its data set 
from the SPC CES Database, but was used in preference to the original (SPC) format 
because the spatially disaggregated structure of the data allowed for reasonably accurate 
calculations to be carried out in each sub-model. However, low levels of observer 
coverage and log book coverage in fleets that have contributed to this data set suggest 
that there is likely to be inaccuracies in the database and consequently this flows into 
the results. Although confidential data held by individual members of the WCPFC may 
be more accurate, for the purposes of this paper, public information was preferred in 
order to ensure transparency in the results.
The high seas data sourced from Reid (2007) was available only in aggregated form— 
that is, without being broken down into harvest taken by each national fleet. As catch by 
national fleet on the high seas is important to the analysis, an estimation was made of 
catch per national flag using the data in Reid (2007) and the following identity:
High seas catch = catch(national waters, all parties) -  catch(FFA waters) -  catch(non- 
FFA waters)
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Estimated total high seas catches were then compared to the original estimates reported 
by Reid (2007) and shown only to differ from the latter by between 0 % and 5 % with 
most being around 2-3 %. While this does introduce some inaccuracies, and 
consequently uncertainty, into the analysis, it represents reasonable high seas estimates, 
by flag, in a situation where no such data was publicly available.
10.5 . Allocation shares: Results and comparison to current fishing
ACTIVITIES
10.5.1 Results
The results for the four basic allocation models are set out in Diagrams 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 
10.6 and 10.7. For conciseness, the results for individual countries are grouped together 
with other WCPFC parties of similar interests although it is acknowledged that this does 
mask some differences within groups as actual shares for individual countries may 
differ significantly from what is suggested by group totals. These groups are:
• PNA Countries: Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Nauru.
• Other FFA Countries: Vanuatu, Fiji, Cook Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Nuie, 
Australia, New Zealand, Tokelau.
• Distant water fishing nations (DWFN): USA, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, 
European Union.
• Other WCPFC members: Philippines, French Polynesia, American Samoa, New 
Caledonia, Guam and CNMI, Wallis and Futuna and Canada.
• Indonesia.
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For the Harvest Model, the differences between using the 1997-2005 baseline versus the 
2000-2005 baseline are set out in Table 10.4. As shown, this change in baseline 
generates some positive benefits for PNA states for skipjack tuna stocks but only 
marginal benefits being accrued to other FFA states and for other species.
Table 10.4: Estimates Of Change In Allocation Share From Change In
Baseline Of Harvest Model
sk ip jack  tuna yellow  fin tuna b igeye tuna alb acore  tuna
P N A  C oun tries 2.22% -0.63% 0.00% 0.67%
O th er FFA
C oun tries 0.01% 0.18% 0.08% 2.41%
D W F N -1.72% -2.26% -2.04% -3.90%
O th er W C P FC  
M em b ers -0.02% 2.52% 0.60% 0.82%
In donesia -0.49% 0.18% 1.37% 0.00%
Source: Author's own calculations
Clearly, each model results in different outcomes for FFA countries and evaluation of 
whether this is a ‘good’ or a ‘poor’ outcome depends on individual countries’ actual and 
relative allocations and on the current and aspirational resource industry development 
plans for each country. Here, discussions are limited to comments on the relative 
proportions allocated towards a particular group—with high proportions of allocated 
unit being considered more favourable, although it is noted that this does not necessarily 
translate into relative shares of any wealth associated with the tuna resources85.
Comparing across models for the PNA Countries, the Effort Model for the purse seine 
(primarily skipjack) and frozen longline fleets (i.e. yellowfin tuna) provides the best 
relative share of the fishery, although this model performs relatively poorly for this 
group for shares of fresh longline and pole and line gears (i.e. poor results for bigeye 
and albacore) . The relatively good results of the frozen longline, rather than the fresh 
longline, are driven primarily by Kiribati’s significant share of frozen longline activity 
(by DWFNs) in its EEZ. This is potentially good news for the PNA countries because, 
in using their negotiation position of ‘coastal state allocation’ it could provide good 
outcomes for the primary gear of interest for the PNA states (that is, the purse seine 
fleets) while providing some scope for the PNA countries to provide for some domestic 
longline fleet development.
The Space Model provides the second best option for the PNA, in terms of accessing 
relative shares of skipjack tuna, yellowfin tuna and bigeye tuna, albacore tuna and 
actually provides shares for each species in excess of the gear shares set out in the Effort 
Model. However, the Effort Model was considered a more favourable outcome for the 
PNA because it provided a stronger share in purse seine gears (assumed to be the 
highest priority) and was considered an ‘easier’ form of allocation to implement because 
it is based on the existing approach under the VDS. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
Biomass Based Allocation model provides the least favorable overall outcome for the
84For a discussion of these in the context of the WCPFC management measures see Gillett
is because the ability for a country to generate income from its shares may be 
disproportionately more valuable than percentage share of its physical allocation. This issue is 
considered in more depth in the discussion section.
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PNA countries. Although these countries have the highest level of biomass in their EEZ 
for skipjack tuna, yellowfin tuna and bigeye tuna and thus are allocated accordingly— 
this relative advantage (particularly compared to the DWFN) is more than offset by the 
allocation shares derived from biomass found of the high seas—the majority of which is 
allocated to the DWFNs on the basis of their dominant historical catch in this area.
The results for the ‘Other FFA Group’ are significantly different from the ‘PNA 
Countries’ Group both in terms of having an absolutely smaller allocation in all models, 
with the exception of albacore tuna in some models, and the pattern of favourable 
allocations being, in general, different from the PNA. For this group, the Space Based 
Model provides the possibility for these countries to obtain the largest share in the 
fishery in terms of species—although estimated fresh longline shares in the Effort 
Model or the albacore shares in the Biomass or Flarvest Model may also provide a 
reasonably acceptable share. It is likely that, for many countries in the ‘Other FFA 
Group’, the relatively good results from the Spatial Model come from the equal sharing 
of allocations on the high seas, and on the weighting procedure adopted—rather than the 
actual relative size shares of the EEZ of this group.
The underlying coastal state/high seas allocation principle in each of these models 
assumes that this approach will produce an outcome that directs the largest share of tuna 
resources towards the FFA states, with the PNA states being particularly advantaged. 
These results are, therefore, somewhat surprising in the sizeable allocations that each 
scenario provide to both the DWFNs, to other WCPFC countries and to Indonesia, in 
some cases on more favorable terms than the FFA countries. The results for the 
Biomass Model are particularly challenging because they indicate that the use of the 
physical characteristics of the fishery, an idea that has broad support throughout the 
FFA, may not necessarily work in the FFA’s favour if it is extended across the WCPFC 
Convention Area.* 6
One explanation for observed allocation patterns in the Harvest and Effort Based 
Models arises from the choice of using recent historical catch and effort data as the 
basis for allocation. As this data reflects actual recent activity, then the allocation 
patterns using the data will also mirror this history—it is therefore unsurprising that the 
DWFN, and the Philippines, which dominate recent fishery activity, are also dominant 
in the allocation formula. More generally, however, three factors contribute to the 
observed allocation patterns:
• Japan, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), the US are coastal states as well as being 
DWFNs—they therefore receive allocations from both the EEZ pool and the high 
seas pool.
• Indonesia and the Philippines are significant coastal states.
• Japan and Taiwan, and to some extent Korea, dominate high seas catches and effort 
for most gear types and for albacore tuna.
86 Care needs to be taken when interpreting these results because some of the technical 
assumptions used in this analysis skew the results in favour of the high seas. The primary 
problem with the biomass calculations is the assumption that the high seas part of the 
Convention Area is as ‘biologically’ dense as the EEZ areas—something unlikely to actually be 
the case, although it was used in order to simplify the calculations. The effect is to overstate the 
level of biomass found in the high seas and therefore inflate the allocation accruing to the 
(DWFNs) fleets that operate there.
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The final effect may be somewhat ameliorated by the use of the principle of ‘equal 
share’ of high seas is adopted—and the results in the spatial model indicate the potential 
benefits this approach. An alternative way of addressing the dominance of the DWFN 
on the high seas could be if results incorporated the into the high seas portion of the 
quota calculations the fishing history taken by vessels fishing under their own (DWFN) 
flag, but are operated as part of a chartering arrangement with a FFA state. Counting 
fishing activity of this type towards the allocation of a chartering state is a position 
adopted by the FFA states as part of its draft Charter Arrangement Scheme developed 
for, but never adopted by, the WCPFC (FFA, 2006). FFA states argue, in turn, that this 
position is supported by the text of the Conservation and Management Measure 2005-01 
of the WCPFC, which relates to the conservation and management of bigeye tuna and 
yellowfin tuna. This text states:
For the purposes of these measures, vessels operated under charter, lease or 
other similar mechanisms by developing islands States and participating 
territories, as an integral part of their domestic fleet, shall be considered to be 
vessels of the host island state or territory (WCPFC 2005-01).
For the FFA interpretation of this clause to have substantial impact on allocation to the 
FFA countries (PNA and ‘Other FFA’) then it must be read by the WCPFC membership 
as a whole as applying beyond monitoring, compliance and surveillance to incorporate 
allocation and to allocation of all species (rather than just bigeye tuna and yellowfin 
tuna which is the subject of this measure). At this point in time, it is unclear whether 
this interpretation will be adopted by the commission but, if so, this could alter the 
balance of tuna in the FFA’s favour with particular benefits accruing in the albacore 
tuna allocation as the majority of this species is taken on the high seas.
Finally, the Effort Model (based on the current management measures of the WCPFC) 
also includes a harvest component for bigeye tuna based on the allocation implied by 
member states 2005-01. The results set out in Diagram 10.8 clearly show a dominance 
in allocation of this species to DWFN, primarily driven by the dominance of DWFN 
longline fleets targeting this species on the high seas—although, as noted above, this 
could potentially be offset through an FFA charter arrangement. The pattern of 
allocation in this bigeye tuna measure draws attention to one of potential risks to the 
FFA of using the current CMMs as the basis for an allocation negotiation strategy. 
While the use of a TAE can benefit the PNA countries, extension of a TAE and TAC for 
big-eye could mean that some other FFA states miss out on receiving an allocation that 
could accommodate their aspirations for future development.
10.5.1 Combinations of Models
As part of the negotiating process, it is possible that some combination of allocation 
approaches may be used—and indeed the experience of the VDS negotiations highlights 
this as a real possibility. Numerous combinations are possible, and ultimately depend on 
what is negotiated between parties. To explore some possibilities, this chapter examines 
four combinations:
• Combination 1: 33.3 per cent equal sharing of the ‘spatial’, ‘biomass’ and 
‘effort’ models
• Combination 2: 50 per cent equal sharing of the ‘effort’ and ‘biomass’ models 
(as an attempt to replicate the Vessel Day Scheme)
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• Combination 3: 60 per cent share of ‘spatial’ model and 40 per cent ‘effort’ 
model
• Combination 4: 25 per cent equal sharing of all four models.
Combination 1 was chosen to incorporate the results of the two best options for the FFA 
states (the spatial and effort models) with the best option for the DWFN countries (the 
biomass model)—as may be necessary in a negotiated outcome. Combination 2 was 
chosen to reflect the allocation mechanism used in the VDS. Combination 3 was chosen 
to reflect a combination of the two best models for the FFA and Combination 4 reflects 
the effects of all four models. The results of these calculations are set out in Diagrams 
10.8, 10.9, 10.10, and 10.11.
A key disadvantage of using the ‘single’ models discussed above is that the model that 
best suits the PNA States is not the one that best suits the ‘Other FFA Group’—and the 
choice of one over the other will involve a significant trade off for one of those groups. 
This effect is muted with the use of the ‘combined models’, where both FFA groups 
experience the best outcomes in a ‘combined approach’ (unsurprisingly) in Combination 
3—which uses the two best individuals models for both groups (space and effort), with 
some additional emphasis placed on a key resource (space has 60 per cent weighting) 
that is available to all FFA members. This suggests that an allocation approach does 
exist which promotes the interests of all FFA states, relative to other WCPFC members.
However, combining the models in this way does require trade-off in shares compared 
to the situation if individual ‘Effort’ or ‘Spatial’ Models were used, and it is not 
apparently clear that using this approach of combining models is in the absolute 
advantage of either group. For example, while Combination 3 model (space and effort) 
is the best blend of the individual models, it may be better for the PNA or the Other 
FFA Group to adopt their ‘second best’ option, in the base case models, rather than use 
a combination of approaches. That is:
• For the PNA Group, the effort model (its best result) provides a 48.19 per cent 
share of the purse seine gear, while the second best option (space model) 
provides a 44.67 per cent share of the skipjack tuna species. In contrast, 
Combination 3 provides a 43.41 per cent share of skipjack tuna allocation.
• For the Other FFA Group, the space model (its best result) gives them a 35.06 
per cent share of albacore tuna allocation while the effort model (its second best 
option) gives this group a 24.63 per cent share of the fresh longline gear 
allocation. Combination 3, in contrast, provides this group with a 25.03 per cent 
share of the albacore tuna allocation.
Although comparisons between TAC (species shares) and TAE (gear shares) based 
allocation regimes is difficult, these results suggest that there is no one clear best option 
for developing a unified FFA allocation position and some compromise between the 
different FFA interests will be required. However, evaluation between these options will 
also need to take into account factors such as the relative difficulty in implementing and 
enforcing a TAE versus a TAC based allocation and the relative merits of each approach 
in achieving target fishing mortality or biomass levels. While an effort-based approach 
may be easier to implement, a species-based approach, if implemented well, will 
provide a more reliable tool for achieving overall sustainability outcomes.
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10.5.2 Comparisons to 2005
In considering issues regarding allocation, debate often centers around the relative 
performance of the new management regime compared to the existing situation. To this 
end, the following comparisons were made:
• Biomass, Spatial and Harvest Based Models compared to proportional share of 
harvest in 2005 harvests—allocated to each country using same allocation rules used 
in the allocation models discussed above; and
• Effort based Models, compared to the level of effort in the purse seine fleet in the 
fishery in 2005.
These results are set out in Figures 10.12, 10.13, 10.14, 10.15, and 10.16.
For skipjack tuna and yellowfin tuna, the Space Based model produces an allocation 
outcome that is most similar to the distribution of skipjack tuna patterns experience in 
2005 by the PNA Group (although it is a reduction). By contrast, the Biomass Based 
Model represents a substantial shift away from 2005 patterns—with the significant 
reallocation away from PNA countries towards the other groups. For the Other FFA 
Group, the Harvest Model represents a slight decrease (skipjack tuna) or increase 
(yellowfin tuna) compared to 2005, while the remaining models represent significant 
increases in catch shares.
For bigeye tuna (incorporating the TAC component of the Effort model) the Harvest 
Based model represents a slight increase for the PNA Group, while the Biomass Based 
Model and the Effort Based Model represents a moderate and significant decrease 
respectively. The Space Model and the Combined Model 3 represent substantial 
increases for the PNA. For the ‘Other FFA Countries’ all models represent a slight to 
significant increase in harvest shares compared to 2005. These models represent a shift 
away from the PNA countries, ‘other WCPFC Countries’ and ‘Indonesia’ towards the 
DWFNs.
For albacore tuna none of the models produce an allocation pattern that is close to the 
harvest share experienced in 2005. For all FFA Countries, the Harvest model represents 
a decrease compared to the 2005 fishery, while all other models provide an increase in 
harvest shares compared to 2005 with the Space Based Model providing the largest 
increase.
For purse seine effort, comparisons with 2005 levels of effort suggest that the Effort 
Model represents a decrease in shares accruing to the PNA—with a shift towards the 
DWFN Group and other WCPFC Country Group (mainly the Philippines)—and a slight 
increase to the Other FFA Group.
10.6. Discussion
10.6.1 Is an allocation regime worthwhile for the FFA states?
The models discussed above provide an analysis of a limited number of alternative 
allocation scenarios that could be considered in the context of the WCPFC. A key 
question is whether these models are consistent with Article 10 (3) of the Convention. 
This is a difficult question to answer because the language used in Article 10 (3) is
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10.6.1 Is an allocation regime worthwhile for the FFA states?
The models discussed above provide an analysis o f a limited number o f alternative 
allocation scenarios that could be considered in the context o f the WCPFC. A key 
question is whether these models are consistent with Article 10 (3) o f the Convention. 
This is a difficult question to answer because the language used in Article 10 (3) is 
ambiguous and depends on developing a consistent interpretation agreed to by all
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Commission members. A preliminary analysis of whether these models meet the range 
of issues that ‘need to be taken into account’ are set out in Table 10.2 and suggest that it 
may be consistent, but it depends on the interpretation of the Convention.
While each model attempts to draw upon the FFA approach to allocation it is 
acknowledged that many other alternatives are also possible—including a purely 
negotiated allocation formula without reference to harvest, effort or biomass data. 
However, if the FFA countries wish to use a data driven formula as the basis for an 
allocation debate, the results in this paper raise some challenging issues including:
• General application of the allocation principles often promoted by the FFA 
states will not result in an unambiguously positive outcome. Furthermore, there 
is no one single allocation regime that will provide the ‘largest share' of the 
fishery to all FFA states. In particular, emulating the VDS allocation formula 
across the entire WCPFC may not work in the favour of the broader FFA 
membership.
• The coastal state principle legitimately allocates a substantial portion of shares 
to non-FFA coastal states—predominately Japan, Indonesia, and Philippines.
• Use of harvest or effort-based models rewards those countries that have actively 
encouraged an expansion in the fishing effort.
• Although the Effort Model represents a potentially good outcome for the PNA 
states—and, as it draws upon the VDS, and therefore may be the easiest to 
implement—it does represent a decrease in purse seine shares from 2005. 
WCPFC data currently indicates that purse seine effort in PNA waters has 
increased since 2005—which suggests that the use of the Effort model may 
require an even further the reduction from ‘status quo’ as set out in this analysis.
It is recognized, however, that there will remain a strong political driver to find a 
unified negotiating position amongst the FFA Group in order to push forward an 
allocation debate that does not undermine the potential benefits of the approach or 
undermine the gains already made by FFA states. In finding a path forward, it may be 
observed that different models produce different kinds of outcomes for individual 
species or gears and that there are significant variations in interests in the fishery 
amongst FFA members. A potential option to accommodate these different interests 
may be to explore the implications of using different allocation formulas for each 
species or gears. For example, using the Spatial Model for allocation of albacore tuna 
stocks, the Effort Model for the skipjack tuna stocks and a combination of both for 
allocating the bigeye tuna and yellowfin tuna stocks.
In weighing up the potential costs or benefits of an allocation approach several other 
factors should be considered. First, it is important to remember that the shares 
calculated in this paper represent physical shares in the fishery and do not necessarily 
represent the share in the value of the fishery—which may be quite different. It is likely 
that the economic value of a share of an allocated unit of ‘TAC’ or ‘TAE' in the 
WCPFC will be calculated differently from the current way of determining access fees 
in a bilateral access arrangement. This is because a unit of allocated ‘TAC/TAE’ 
represents a different, and possibly more secure, form of access to the fishery and, the 
greater the security, the more likely vessels are to offer higher payments for it. This 
benefit is more likely to occur if the ‘ground rules' used by the WCPFC mean that 
allocations are made as permanent rights (increase in security) and that those rights are
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able to be exercised anywhere within the Convention Area (increases the area o f which 
these rights are exercised).
Second, the benefit o f an allocation approach is that it does provide some allocation to 
the non-PNA members o f the FFA group— and therefore allows them to generate an 
income stream (by selling the allocation) somewhat equivalent to the access fees 
enjoyed by the PNA states. Under the current situation, the ‘Other FFA' Group does not 
receive any DWFN access fee revenue beyond the USMLT and faces the possible risk 
under the WCPFC CMMs of having limited access to the fishery should CCMs be 
enforced on SIDS.
10.6.2 Implications for the FFA Treaties
For the PNA countries and for the FFA more broadly, an important consideration is the 
impact o f allocation-based management models on the current purse seine treaties: the 
Vessel Day Scheme, the Federated States o f Micronesia Arrangement and the US 
Multilateral Treaty . The potential benefits to the purse seine treaties lie predominately 
in the choices that WCPFC make regarding the nature o f the allocated unit— that is 
issues relating to targets and sustainability, property rights and the way in which these 
rights are exercised throughout the region (see Table 10.1). These allocation-based 
management regimes have the capacity to strengthen the FFA Purse Seine Treaties 
through the provision o f more secure access to resources through the provision o f in- 
perpetuity TAC or TAE, and by placing fisheries management goals on a sustainable 
basis by selecting a TAC that achieves a sustainable harvest over time. To achieve these 
benefits, however, the allocation results here suggest that PNA states may have to 
accept a slightly lower share o f the allocation pool than the share o f total fishing activity 
they experienced in 2005 for skipjack tuna and yellowfin tuna.
The overall impact of this trade-off on the FFA Treaties from these models depends on 
the particular model selected and the PNA’s own response to allocation-based 
management under the WCPFC. A number o f different scenarios are possible, with 
three such outcomes being:
• Under an effort-based allocation regime: continue as is under the current 
framework— albeit with different amounts o f purse seine days available for 
distribution to DWFN, US vessels and domestic vessels under the FSMA.
• Under a harvest or biomass-based regime: implement a dual licensing system 
whereby PNA states sell or use their available allocation under a TAC, which can be 
fished anywhere in the WCPFC-CA. In addition, the PNA states continue to charge 
access fees for the purposes o f granting permission to physically access the fishing 
grounds within their EEZs (and pool this access much in the same way as under the 
current FSMA).
• Under any allocation regime: Abandon the VDS and continue with the USMLT and 
the FSMA as mechanisms to leverage development assistance and domestic industry 
development. In this scenario, PNA states could make sale o f allocated units 
conditional on domestication in much the same way as the current FSMA.
oSThe full names of these Treaties are: Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain 
Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of America, which entered into 
force in 1987, and Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access, 
which entered into force in 1995.
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10.7. C onclusion
Although an infinite number o f allocation options could be considered for the WCPFC, 
this paper sets out several potential models that investigate the implications o f a coastal 
state/high seas approach. Placed in the context o f the broader benefits o f an allocation- 
based regime these approaches could improve the access and resource security o f FFA 
states, but it is likely to require some compromises on the sharing o f resources across all 
members.
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APPENDIX 1: FULL RESULTS
HARVEST S HARES (COASTAL STATE PRINCIPLE) (BASE LINE 2000-2005)
sk ip ja c k  tu n a y e llo w  Fin tu n a b ig e y e  tu n a a lb a c o re  tu n a
A llo c a tio n  to
a r te s ia n l  F ish e r 16% 0 % 0 % 2 %
A llo c a tin  to
S e c re ta r ia t 1% 1% 1% 1%
A v a ila b le  T A C 8 3 % 9 9 % 9 9 % 9 7 %
sk ip ja c k  tu n a y e llo w  fin  tu n a b ig e y e  tu n a a lb a c o r e  tu n a
P N A  C o u n tr ie s
K irib a ti 9 .7 7 % 8 .4 6 % 1 0 .0 1 % 0 .6 3 %
M a rsh a ll  Is la n d s 2 .2 1 % 0 .8 7 % 2 .9 8 % 0 .0 2 %
F S M 7 .8 3 % 5 .0 0 % 4 .3 4 % 0 .1 2 %
N a u ru 3 .2 5 % 2 .1 5 % 0 .6 2 % 0 .0 0 %
P alau 0 .0 8 % 0 .3 6 % 0 .8 0 % 0 .0 1 %
P N G 1 4 .6 1 % 1 3 .7 8 % 5 .5 4 % 0 .6 5 %
S o lo m o n  Is la n d s 2 .5 9 % 2 .8 9 % 2 .1 0 % 1 .8 1 %
T u v a lu 1 .1 0 % 0 .7 9 % 1 .0 4 % 0 .1 9 %
T o ta l 4 1 .4 4 % 3 4 .3 1 % 2 7 .4 3 % 3 .4 4 %
O th e r  F F A
C o u n tr ie s
A u s tra l ia 0 .0 6 % 0 .6 2 % 0 .7 3 % 0 .4 8 %
C o o k  Is la n d s 0 .0 6 % 0 .0 7 % 0 .1 4 % 0 .9 4 %
Fiji 0 .0 4 % 0 .5 0 % 0 .5 1 % 4 .8 4 %
N e w  Z e a la n d 0 .6 5 % 0 .1 6 % 0 .2 9 % 3 .8 2 %
N iu e 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 2 %
S a m o a 0 .0 0 % 0 .1 1 % 0 .1 0 % 2 .1 3 %
T o k e la u 0 .1 6 % 0 .1 0 % 0 .1 1 % 0 .0 6 %
T o n g a 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 6 % 0 .1 0 % 0 .6 1 %
V a n u a tu 0 .6 4 % 0 .7 1 % 0 .8 0 % 7 .4 0 %
T o ta l 1 .6 2 % 2 .3 2 % 2 .7 8 % 2 0 .3 0 %
DVVFN
C h in a 0 .2 3 % 0 .2 2 % 0 .8 0 % 2 .2 8 %
E U 0 .0 9 % 0 .1 2 % 0 .5 7 % 0 .1 3 %
Ja p a n 1 4 .9 3 % 8 .5 0 % 2 2 .6 2 % 5 3 .6 0 %
K o re a 1 .6 6 % 3 .8 1 % 1 2 .4 7 % 1 .5 5 %
T a iw a n 2 .7 5 % 4 .9 0 % 6 .3 9 % 7 .9 4 %
U S  +  te r r i to r ie s  (ex  
A m  S a m ) 1 .1 2 % 1 .6 6 % 4 .1 5 % 1 .6 0 %
T o ta l 2 0 .7 7 % 19 .2 3 % 4 7 .0 0 % 6 7 .1 0 %
O th e r  W C P F C
M e m b e r s
A m e ric a n  S a m o a 0 .0 1 % 0 .1 4 % 0 .1 1 % 2 .3 1 %
C a n a d a 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .3 2 %
F re n c h  P o ly n e s ia 0 .0 7 % 0 .3 0 % 0 .5 3 % 2 .5 3 %
N e w  C a le d o n ia
( in c h  M a tth e w  an d  
H u n te r  Is la n d ) 0 .0 0 % 0 .1 3 % 0 .1 4 % 0 .9 0 %
N o rth e rn  M a r ia n a s  
Is la n d s  an d  G u a m
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P h i l i p p i n e s 8 . 1 4 % 2 3 . 8 3 % 9 . 0 2 % 0 . 0 0 %
W a l l i s  a n d  F u t u n a
T o ta l 8 .2 3 % 2 4 .3 9 % 9 .8 0 % 6 .0 6 %
In d o n e s ia
In d o n e s ia 1 1 .2 5 % 1 8 .6 1 % 1 1 .7 7 % 0 .0 0 %
H ig h  S ea s
H i g h  S e a s
C o n flic t  Z o n e s  an d  
J o in t  M a n a g e m e n t
T o ta l  d i s p u t e d  z o n e s  
a n d  J o i n t  J a p a n -  
K o r e a  M a n a g e m e n t  
R e g i m e
T o ta l 1 00% 100% 10 0 % 10 0 %
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HARVEST SHARES (COASTAL STATE PRINCIPLE) (BASE LINE 1997-2005)
s k i p j a c k  tu n a y e l l o w  f in  t u n a b ig e y e  tu n a a l b a c o r e  t u n a
A l lo c a t io n  to
a r t e s i a n l  F i s h e r 1 6 % 0 % 0 % 2 %
A l lo c a t in  to
S e c r e t a r i a t 1% 1 % 1 % 1 %
Available TAC 8 3 % 9 9 % 9 9 % 9 7 %
skipjack tuna yellow fin tuna bigeye tuna albacore tuna
PNA Countries
K ir ib a t i 9 .3 5 % 9 .1 2 % 9 .8 7 % 0 .5 5 %
M a r s h a l l  I s l a n d s 2 .2 2 % 1 .3 5 % 2 .6 1 % 0 .0 5 %
F S M 7 .4 7 % 5 .4 8 % 4 .9 2 % 0 .1 0 %
N a u r u 2 .7 6 % 2 .5 3 % 0 .7 7 % 0 .0 0 %
P a la u 0 .0 6 % 0 .3 0 % 0 .8 0 % 0 .0 1 %
P N G 1 2 .7 9 % 1 1 .5 0 % 5 .1 0 % 0 .4 6 %
S o lo m o n  I s l a n d s 3 .2 6 % 3 .7 8 % 2 .3 2 % 1 .4 5 %
T u v a lu 1 .3 1 % 0 .8 7 % 1 .0 6 % 0 .1 5 %
Total 39.21% 34.94% 27.44% 2.78%
Other FFA
Countries
A u s t r a l i a 0 .1 2 % 0 .5 9 % 0 .8 1 % 0 .5 4 %
C o o k  I s la n d s 0 .0 5 % 0 .0 5 % 0 .1 1 % 0 .6 7 %
F iji 0 .0 5 % 0 .4 1 % 0 .4 9 % 4 .0 7 %
N e w  Z e a la n d 0 .6 1 % 0.1  1 % 0 .2 8 % 3 .7 0 %
N iu e 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 5 %
S a m o a 0 .0 1 % 0 .1 4 % 0 .1 2 % 2 .3 3 %
T o k e la u 0 .1 4 % 0 .0 8 % 0 .0 9 % 0 .0 4 %
T o n g a 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 5 % 0 .1 0 % 0 .6 9 %
V a n u a tu 0 .6 3 % 0 .7 0 % 0 .7 0 % 5 .8 2 %
Total 1.61% 2.14% 2.70% 17.90%
DWFN
C h in a 0 .1 6 % 0 .1 5 % 0 .5 7 % 1 .7 9 %
E U 0 .1 0 % 0 .1 2 % 0 .5 2 % 0 .1 2 %
J a p a n 1 5 .6 9 % 8 .8 5 % 2 3 .3 5 % 5 7 .9 3 %
K o r e a 1 .8 6 % 4 .1 3 % 1 3 .3 1 % 1 .5 2 %
T a iw a n 3 .0 0 % 5 .5 0 % 6 .4 6 % 7 .8 5 %
U S  +  t e r r i t o r i e s  ( e x  
A m  S a m ) 1 .6 7 % 2 .7 3 % 4 .8 4 % 1 .7 9 %
Total 22.49% 21.49% 49.05% 70.99%
Other WCPFC
Members
A m e r i c a n  S a m o a 0 .0 1 % 0 .1 0 % 0 .0 9 % 1 .7 1 %
C a n a d a 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .4 1 %
F r e n c h  P o ly n e s i a 0 .0 7 % 0 .2 9 % 0 .6 2 % 2 .3 8 %
N e w  C a l e d o n i a  ( in c l  
M a t th e w  a n d  b lu n te r  
I s la n d ) 0 .0 0 % 0 .1 1 % 0 .2 1 % 0 .7 5 %
N o r th e r n  M a r ia n a s
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I s l a n d s  a n d  G u a m
P h i l i p p i n e s 8 . 1 6 % 2 1 . 3 7 % 8 . 3 0 % 0 . 0 0 %
W a l l i s  a n d  F u t u n a
T o t a l 8 . 2 5 % 2 1 . 8 7 % 9 . 2 1 % 5 . 2 4 %
I n d o n e s i a
I n d o n e s i a 1 1 . 7 4 % 1 8 . 4 3 % 1 0 . 4 0 % 0 . 0 0 %
H i g h  S e a s
H i g h  S e a s
C o n f l i c t  Z o n e s  a n d
J o i n t  M a n a g e m e n t
T o t a l  d i s p u t e d  z o n e s  
a n d  J o i n t  J a p a n -  
K o r e a  M a n a g e m e n t  
R e g i m e
T o t a l 1 0 0 % 1 0 0 % 1 0 0 % 1 0 0 %
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SPACE BASED SHARES
sk ip ja c k  tu n a y e llo w f in  tu n a b ig e y e  tu n a A lb a c o re  tu n a
PNA Countries
K irib a ti 1 2 .9 6 % 7 .1 9 % 1 2 .5 3 % 5 .9 1 %
M a rsh a ll  Is la n d s 6 .8 6 % 6 .0 6 % 7 .1 8 % 1 .7 6 %
F e d e ra te d  S ta te s  o f
M ic ro n e s ia 7 .8 2 % 9 .7 6 % 9 .6 9 % 1 .8 6 %
N a u ru 1 .2 1 % 1 .4 5 % 1 .4 6 % 2 .0 8 %
P a lau 1 .6 5 % 2 .3 7 % 2 .3 7 % 1 .7 6 %
P a p u a  N e w  G u in e a 6 .2 5 % 7 .5 0 % 6 .3 8 % 3 .9 4 %
S o lo m o n  Is la n d s 5 .0 1 % 4 .5 2 % 3 .2 3 % 4 .4 9 %
T u v a lu 2 .9 0 % 1.8 5 % 2 .9 6 % 3 .0 0 %
T o ta l 4 4 .6 7 % 4 0 .7 0 % 4 5 .8 1 % 2 4 .8 1 %
Other FFA Countries
A u s tra l ia 3 .1 3 % 7 .7 3 % 1.65% 6 .2 4 %
C o o k  Is la n d s 6 .2 7 % 2 .2 6 % 2 .6 0 % 5 .1 0 %
Fiji 3 .3 8 % 1 .2 1 % 0 .8 1 % 3 .9 3 %
N e w  Z e a la n d 0 .1 0 % 1 .5 0 % 0 .8 5 % 7 .4 6 %
N iu e 0 .8 7 % 0 .6 7 % 0 .5 9 % 2 .3 0 %
S a m o a 0 .6 2 % 0 .5 7 % 0 .5 5 % 1 .9 8 %
T o k e la u 1 .37% 1.12% 1 .6 5 % 2 .3 0 %
T o n g a 1 .3 4 % 0 .8 6 % 0 .6 6 % 2 .8 9 %
V a n u a tu 2 .3 6 % 1.67% 0 .7 0 % 2 .8 5 %
T o ta l 1 9 .4 3 % 1 7 .5 9 % 1 0 .0 6 % 3 5 .0 6 %
DWFN Countries
C h in a 0 .5 3 % 1 .1 3 % 1.0 9 % 1.7 6 %
E U 0 .1 0 % 0 .5 0 % 0 .5 2 % 3 .1 8 %
Ja p a n 2 .5 7 % 2 .9 7 % 2 .7 1 % 1.7 6 %
K o re a 0 .1 0 % 0 .5 0 % 0 .5 2 % 1 .7 6 %
T a iw a n 0 .5 7 % 0 .9 1 % 0 .9 1 % 1 .7 6 %
U S A 8 .2 3 % 6 .0 5 % 1 1 .7 4 % 2 .3 9 %
T o ta l 1 2 .1 1 % 1 2 .0 5 % 1 7 .4 8 % 1 2 .6 2 %
Other WCPFC Countries
A m e ric a n  S a m o a 1 .7 1 % 0 .7 2 % 0 .6 1 % 2 .4 5 %
C a n a d a 0 .1 0 % 0 .5 0 % 0 .5 2 % 1 .7 6 %
F re n c h  P o ly n e s ia 2 .2 2 % 1 .0 2 % 0 .7 3 % 9 .8 9 %
N e w  C a le d o n ia 1 .2 8 % . 3 .5 3 % 0 .9 4 % 4 .1 7 %
N o rth e rn  M a ria n a s  Is la n d s  
an d  G u a m 1 .9 0 % 2 .9 1 % 2 .9 0 % 1.76%
P h ilip p in e s 4 .2 1 % 5 .9 0 % 5 .8 6 % 1.76%
W a llis  an d  F u tu n a 1 .1 1 % 0 .6 4 % 0 .5 8 % 2 .2 0 %
T o ta l 1 2 .5 3 % 1 5 .2 2 % 1 2 .1 2 % 2 3 .9 9 %
Indonesia
In d o n e s ia 9 .4 6 % 1 1 .7 8 % 1 1 .7 0 % 1.7 6 %
High Seas
H ig h  S e a s 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 %
Conflict Zones and Joint
M a n a g e m e n t
T o ta l d isp u te d  z o n e s  an d  
J o in t  J a p a n -K o re a
M a n a g e m e n t R e g im e 1 .7 9 % 2 .8 8 % 2 .8 3 % 1.7 6 %
TOTAL SHARE OF
WEIGHTED SPACE 1 0 0 .0 0 % 1 0 0 .2 2 % 1 0 0 .0 0 % 1 0 0 .0 0 %
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B IO M A S S  S H A R E S
sk ip  ja
ck
tun a
y ello w  fin  
tun a
b igeye
tuna
a lb a co re
tun a
P N A  C o u n tr ies
K iribati 8 .22% 5 .15% 8 .78% 4 .1 5 %
M arshall Islands 5 .01% 3 .43% 4 .0 3 % 0 .00%
FSM 5 .11% 5 .26% 4 .7 3 % 0 .10%
N auru 0 .7 0 % 0 .50% 0 .4 7 % 0 .32%
Palau 0 .9 5 % 0 .97% 0 .9 3 % 0 .00%
PN G 5 .23% 5 .36% 3 .2 7 % 2 .18%
S o lom on  Islands 3 .09% 3 .43% 1.59% 2 .73%
T uvalu 1.77% 1.04% 1.80% 1.24%
T otal
30 .08
% 25 .1 4 % 2 5 .6 2 % 10.72%
O th er  F F A  C o u n tr ie s
A u stra lia 1.85% 9 .4 7 % 1.33% 4 .51%
C ook  Islands 3 .8 9 % 0 .59% 1.56% 2 .17%
Fiji 2 .0 7 % 1.49% 0 .3 2 % 3.87%
N ew  Z ea lan d 0 .2 1 % 1.15% 0 .3 4 % 5.71%
N iu e 0 .4 8 % 0 .14% 0 .0 6 % 0 .54%
S am oa 0 .3 3 % 0 .52% 0 .0 5 % 0 .59%
T okelau 0 .8 0 % 0 .0 6 % 0 .8 4 % 0 .54%
T onga 0 .7 8 % 0 .31% 0 .1 2 % 1.21%
V anuatu 2 .5 9 % 2 .40% 0 .7 0 % 3 .25%
T otal
13.02
% 16.14% 5 .31% 2 2 .39%
D W F N  C o u n tr ie s
C h in a 0 .9 2 % 0 .81% 1.07% 1.84%
EU 0 .1 9 % 0 .25% 0 .59% 1.42%
Japan
22 .4 2
% 14.88% 2 1 .3 0 % 39 .77%
K orea 3 .4 9 % 9 .12% 15.40% 1.56%
T aiw an 5 .76% 9 .95% 6 .6 1 % 8.03%
US + te rrito rie s  (ex  A m  S am )
10.35
% 9 .02% 12.53% 2 .15%
T otal
43 .13
% 4 4 .0 2 % 5 7 .5 0 % 54 .77%
O th er  W C P F C  C o u n tr ie s
A m erican  S am o a 1.01% 0 .19% 0 .0 8 % 0 .69%
C an ad a 0 .0 0 % 0 .00% 0 .0 0 % 0 .42%
F rench  P o ly n esia 1.34% 0 .44% 0 .1 7 % 8.14%
N ew  C a led o n ia  (inc l. M a tth ew  and  H un ter Island) 0 .7 3 % 3 .97% 0 .5 2 % 2 .43%
N o rth e rn  M arian as  and  G u am 0 .0 0 % 0 .00% 1.23% 0 .00%
P h ilipp ines 2 .9 8 % 2 .83% 2 .7 0 % 0 .00%
W allis  and F u tu n a 0 .6 4 % 0 .12% 0 .0 5 % 0 .44%
T otal 6 .7 0 % 7 .55% 4 .7 5 % 12.12%
In d on esia 0 .0 0 % 0 .00% 0 .0 0 % 0 .00%
Indonesia 5 .73% 5 .86% 5 .6 0 % 0 .00%
H igh  S eas
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H igh Seas 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
C o n f l ic t  Z o n e s  a n d  J o in t
M a n a g e m e n t
T otal d ispu ted  zones and Joint 
Japan-K orea M anagem ent
R egim e 1.33% 1.28% 1.21% 0.00%
T o ta l 100% 100% 100% 100%
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EFFORT BASED SHARES
PNA Countries Purse Seine
Frozen
Longline
Fresh
Longline Pole and Line
K iribati 9 .91% 14.35% 0 .86% 0.10%
M arshall Islands 4 .97% 1.85% 2 .6 5 % 2.93%
FSM 10.55% 2.68% 2 .5 5 % 0.29%
N auru 2.31% 0.00% 0 .0 1 % 0.00%
P alau 0 .95% 0.07% 1.22% 0.00%
PN G 14.17% 0.00% 2 .24% 0.00%
Solom on  Islands 3 .78% 2.10% 2 .3 4 % 4 .30%
T uvalu 1.56% 0.54% 0 .16% 0.03%
T otal 48 .19% 21.59% 12.01% 7.66%
Other FFA Countries
A ustralia 0 .04% 0.04% 3 .53% 0.01%
C ook  Islands 0 .12% 0.03% 1.33% 0.00%
Fiji 0 .04% 0.17% 7 .27% 0 .22%
N ew  Z ea land 2 .48% 0.13% 2 .02% 0.00%
N iue 0 .00% 0.03% 0 .02% 0 .00%
Sam oa 0.01% 0.00% 2 .6 2 % 0 .00%
T okelau 0 .24% 0.00% 0 .1 1 % 0 .00%
T onga 0 .00% 0.00% 0 .98% 0 .00%
V anuatu 0.94% 2.96% 6 .75% 0 .00%
T otal 3.87% 3.36% 2 4 .63% 0 .23%
DWFN
C hina 0 .69% 0.00% 3 .82% 0 .00%
EU 0.03% 0.01% 0 .0 7 % 0 .00%
Japan 12.92% 31.96% 18.78% 6 6 .75%
K orea 1.96% 26.31% 0 .00% 0 .00%
T aiw an 3.04% 16.64% 15.98% 0 .00%
U S + te rrito ries  (ex A m  Sam ) 2 .28% 0.08% 3 .64% 0 .20%
T otal 20 .92% 75.01% 4 2 .2 9 % 66 .95%
Other WCPFC Members
A m erican  S am oa 0.00% 0.00% 3 .23% 0 .00%
C anada 0 .00% 0.00% 0 .0 0 % 0 .00%
French  P o lynesia 0 .00% 0.02% 3 .70% 0 .31%
N ew  C aledon ia 0 .00% 0.02% 1.46% 0 .00%
N orthern  M arianas and G uam 0.00% 0.00% 0 .0 0 % 0 .00%
Philipp ines 16.11% 0.00% 4 .7 2 % 0 .00%
W allis  and F u tuna 0 .00% 0.00% 0 .00% 0 .0 0 %
T otal 16.11% 0.04% 13.13% 0 .31%
Indonesia
Indonesia 10.91% 0.00% 7 .95% 2 4 .85%
High Seas
H igh  Seas 0 .00% 0.00% 0 .00% 0 .0 0 %
Conflict Zones and Joint Management
T ota l d ispu ted  zones and Jo in t Japan -K orea  
M anagem en t R eg im e 0.00% 0.00% 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 %
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Allocation of Bigeye tuna to longline fleets
C M M  2005-01 P ercen tage  S hares
PNA Countries
FSM 2000 1.60%
K iribati 2000 1.60%
M arshall Islands 2000 1.60%
N auru 2000 1.60%
PN G 2000 1.60%
P alau 2000 1.60%
S o lom on  Islands 2000 1.60%
T uvalu 2000 1.60%
Total 16000 12.79%
Other FFA Countries
A ustralia 2000 1.60%
C o o k  Islands 2000 1.60%
Fiji 2000 1.60%
N ew  Z ea land 2000 1.60%
N iue 2000 1.60%
Sam oa 2000 1.60%
T okelau 2000 1.60%
T onga 2000 1.60%
V anuatu 2000 1.60%
T otal 18000 14.39%
DWFNs
C hina 9314 7.44°/
Japan 28103 22.46°/
K orea 21449 17.14°/
T aiw an 15854 12.67°/
U S + te rrito ries (ex A m  Sam ) 4408 3.52°/
EU 2000 1.60°/
T ota l 81128 64.84°/
Other WCPFC Members
A m erican  Sam oa 2000 1.60°
C anada 2000 1.60°
F rench  P o lynesia 2000 1.60°
N ew  C aledon ia  (inch M atthew  and  H unter Island) 2000 1.601
P h ilipp ines 2000 1.601
T ota l 10000 7.991
Indonesia 0 0.001
T ota l
T o ta l 125128 100.001
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Combination One: 30% equal share to "space", "biomass” and "effort” Models
skipjack tuna yellow  fin tuna bigeye tuna a lbaco re  tuna
PNA Countries
K iribati 9 .83% 6.99% 10.20% 4 .94%
M arshall Islands 5.50% 4.58% 4.71% 1.51%
FSM 7.27% 7.73% 6.37% 1.58%
N auru 1.28% 1.20% 0.85% 0 .88%
Palau 1.13% 1.40% 1.30% 0 .78%
PN G 7.77% 7.77% 4 .68% 2.81%
Solom on  Islands 3.99% 3.79% 2.50% 3.40%
T uvalu 1.99% 1.36% 1.82% 1.53%
T otal 38.76% 34.82% 32.44% 17.43%
Other FFA Countries 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 .00%
A ustralia 1.68% 5.91% 1.30% 4 .03%
C ook  Islands 3.42% 1.04% 1.51% 2.60%
Fiji 1.85% 1.26% 1.01% 3.53%
N ew  Z ea land 0 .80% 1.57% 0.81% 4 .74%
N iue 0 .45% 0.27% 0.22% 0 .95%
Sam oa 0.32% 0.49% 0.42% 1.18%
T okelau 0 .79% 0.45% 0.86% 0 .97%
T onga 0.71% 0.44% 0.34% 1.49%
V anuatu 1.92% 2.00% 1.55% 3.13%
T otal 11.94% 13.44% 8.03% 22 .62%
DWFN 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 .00%
C hina 0 .68% 0.99% 1.10% 1.70%
EU 0.10% 0.26% 0.38% 1.55%
Japan 15.53% 11.96% 16.26% 25 .56%
K orea 1.74% 4.55% 9.39% 3 .25%
T aiw an 2.98% 5.65% 6.58% 6.65%
U S + te rrito ries (ex A m  Sam ) 6 .84% 5.74% 8.61% 2 .07%
T otal 27 .89% 29 .15% 42 .31% 40 .7 7 %
Other WCPFC Members 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 .00%
A m erican  Sam oa 0.91% 0.45% 0.50% 1.45%
C anada 0 .03% 0.17% 0.17% 0 .73%
F rench  Po lynesia 1.21% 0.67% 0.61% 6 .50%
N ew  C aledon ia  (inch M atthew  
and H un ter Island) 0.67% 2.57% 0.61% 2 .38%
N orthern  M arianas Islands and 
G uam 0.63% 0.97% 1.38% 0 .59%
Philipp ines 6 .89% 6.97% 4.70% 1.73%
W allis  and Fu tuna 0 .59% 0.25% 0.21% 0 .88%
T otal 10.93% 12.05% 8.18% 14.25%
Indonesia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 .00%
Indonesia 9 .44% 9.22% 7.70% 4 .34%
High Seas 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 .00%
H igh  Seas 0 .00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 .00%
Conflict Zones and Joint 
Management 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 .00%
T otal d ispu ted  zones and Joint 
Japan -K orea  M anagem ent
R egim e 1.04% 1.39% 1.35% 0 .59%
T otal 100.00% 100.07% 100.00% 100.00%
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Combination Two: 50% shares ’’biomass" and "effort mode" (V PS simulation)
P u rse  S e in e
L o n g lin e
F ro z e n L o n g lin e -F re s h P o le  a n d  L in e
PNA Countries
K irib a ti 8 .7 6 % 9 .7 0 % 2 .9 6 % 3 .8 3 %
M a rsh a ll  Is la n d s 4 .8 1 % 1 .9 8 % 2 .3 8 % 3 .8 0 %
F S M 7 .8 4 % 2 .9 3 % 2 .8 6 % 2 .7 2 %
N a u ru 1 .4 8 % 0 .2 1 % 0 .2 1 % 0 .3 3 %
P a lau 0 .9 5 % 0 .3 3 % 0 .9 0 % 0 .4 8 %
P N G 9 .6 8 % 1 .9 7 % 3 .0 8 % 2 .6 3 %
S o lo m o n  Is la n d s 3 .4 4 % 2 .5 5 % 2 .6 7 % 3 .7 3 %
T u v a lu 1 .5 9 % 0 .8 6 % 0 .6 7 % 0 .8 2 %
T o ta l 3 8 .5 5 % 2 0 .5 2 % 1 5 .7 3 % 1 8 .3 4 %
Other FFA Countries
A u s tra l ia 1 .7 2 % 3 .4 3 % 5 .1 8 % 1 .7 4 %
C o o k  Is la n d s 1 .6 3 % 0 .6 7 % 1.31% 1 .6 0 %
Fiji 0 .9 7 % 1 .2 5 % 4 .8 1 % 1 .0 9 %
N e w  Z e a la n d 1 .4 4 % 1 .5 1 % 2 .4 6 % 0 .2 1 %
N iu e 0 .2 0 % 0 .1 6 % 0 .1 5 % 0 .2 1 %
S a m o a 0 .1 8 % 0 .2 6 % 1.56% 0 .1 9 %
T o k e la u 0 .4 4 % 0 .1 6 % 0 .2 1 % 0 .3 2 %
T o n g a 0 .3 3 % 0 .3 3 % 0 .8 2 % 0 .3 4 %
V a n u a tu 1 .7 2 % 2 .7 8 % 4 .6 7 % 1 .2 8 %
T o ta l 8 .6 4 % 1 0 .5 5 % 2 1 .1 8 % 6 .9 6 %
DWFN
C h in a 0 .8 0 % 0 .6 2 % 2 .5 3 % 0 .4 5 %
E U 0 .1 2 % 0 .3 8 % 0 .4 1 % 0 .1 0 %
Ja p a n 1 6 .8 8 % 2 8 .6 3 % 2 2 .0 4 % 4 3 .7 9 %
K o re a 3 .5 0 % 1 6 .4 8 % 3 .3 2 % 2 .3 4 %
T a iw a n 4 .8 4 % 1 2 .7 7 % 1 2 .4 4 % 3 .3 2 %
U S  +  te r r i to r ie s  (ex  A m  S am ) 6 .2 2 % 3 .3 3 % 5 .1 1 % 5 .1 3 %
T o ta l 3 2 .3 5 % 6 2 .2 1 % 4 5 .8 5 % 5 5 .1 4 %
Other WCPFC Members
A m e ric a n  S a m o a 0 .4 1 % 0 .1 9 % 1 .8 1 % 0 .4 2 %
C a n a d a 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 8 % 0 .0 8 % 0 .0 0 %
F re n c h  P o ly n e s ia 0 .5 6 % 1 .7 5 % 3 .5 9 % 0 .7 3 %
N e w  C a le d o n ia  ( in c h  M a tth e w  a n d  
H u n te r  Is la n d ) 0 .6 9 % 1 .5 4 % 2 .2 7 % 0 .7 1 %
N o r th e rn  M a r ia n a s  Is la n d s  an d  G u a m 0 .0 2 % 0 .0 5 % 0 .0 5 % 0 .0 0 %
P h ilip p in e s 9 .5 3 % 0 .8 5 % 3 .2 1 % 1 .4 7 %
W a llis  an d  F u tu n a 0 .2 6 % 0 .1 2 % 0 .1 2 % 0 .2 7 %
T o ta l 1 1 .4 6 % 4 .5 9 % 11 .1 3 % 3 .6 0 %
Indonesia
In d o n e s ia 8 .3 3 % 1 .7 5 % 5 .7 3 % 1 5 .3 0 %
High Seas 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 %
H ig h  S e a s 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 %
Conflict Zones and Joint Management 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 %
T o ta l d isp u te d  z o n e s  a n d  Jo in t  Ja p a n -  
K o re a  M a n a g e m e n t R e g im e 0 .6 6 % 0 .3 8 % 0 .3 8 % 0 .6 6 %
T o ta l 1 0 0 .0 0 % 1 0 0 .0 0 % 1 0 0 .0 0 % 1 0 0 .0 0 %
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Combination Three: 60% "Space" Model, 40% "effort" Model
sk ip ja c k  tu n a y e llo w  fin  tu n a b ig e y e  tu n a a lb a c o re  tu n a
PNA Countries
K irib a ti 11 .1 0 % 7 .7 7 % 11 .2 3 % 5 .4 5 %
M a rsh a ll Is la n d s 5 .9 7 % 5 .3 3 % 5 .4 8 % 2 .1 7 %
FS M 8 .2 4 % 9 .1 2 % 7 .6 9 % 2 .2 2 %
N a u ru 1 .5 0 % 1 .5 3 % 1.13% 1 .3 4 %
P alau 1 .31% 1 .7 6 % 1.66% 1.28%
P N G 8 .4 8 % 8 .6 8 % 5 .5 8 % 3 .2 9 %
S o lo m o n  Is la n d s 4 .5 5 % 4 .0 9 % 3 .0 1 % 3 .8 9 %
T u v a lu 2 .2 6 % 1 .5 9 % 2 .0 6 % 1 .9 4 %
T o ta l 4 3 .4 1 % 3 9 .8 7 % 3 7 .8 4 % 2 1 .5 9 %
Other FFA Countries
A u s tra lia 1 .9 0 % 4 .8 5 % 1.36% 4 .2 7 %
C o o k  Is la n d s 3 .8 0 % 1 .4 7 % 1 .7 1 % 3 .2 7 %
Fiji 2 .0 7 % 1 .1 6 % 1.25% 3 .4 8 %
N e w  Z e a la n d 0 .8 9 % 1 .7 3 % 1.00% 4 .8 9 %
N iu e 0 .5 2 % 0 .4 0 % 0 .3 6 % 1.3 8 %
S a m o a 0 .3 8 % 0 .4 9 % 0 .5 9 % 1.5 8 %
T o k e la u 0 .9 0 % 0 .7 5 % 1.03% 1.4 1 %
T o n g a 0 .8 1 % 0 .5 7 % 0 .5 0 % 1 .8 8 %
V a n u a tu 1 .7 4 % 1.7 7 % 1.72% 3 .0 3 %
T o ta l 13 .0 1 % 1 3 .1 9 % 9 .5 2 % 2 5 .2 0 %
DWFN
C h in a 0 .5 6 % 1 .0 9 % 1.1 1 % 1 .6 5 %
EU 0 .0 7 % 0 .3 1 % 0 .3 2 % 1 .9 2 %
Ja p a n 1 0 .19% 9 .0 0 % 11 .5 3 % 1 5 .1 2 %
K o re a 0 .7 2 % 1 .9 1 % 5 .2 1 % 3 .6 2 %
T a iw a n 1 .39% 2 .9 8 % 5 .4 3 % 5 .1 3 %
U S  + te rr i to r ie s  (e x  A m  S a m ) 5 .7 2 % 4 .4 9 % 7 .6 7 % 2 .1 0 %
T o ta l 1 8 .64% 1 9 .7 8 % 3 1 .2 7 % 2 9 .5 5 %
Other WCPFC Members
A m e ric a n  S a m o a 1 .03% 0 .6 1 % 0 .6 9 % 1 .9 5 %
C a n a d a 0 .0 6 % 0 .3 0 % 0 .3 1 % 1.06%
F re n c h  P o ly n e s ia 1 .36% 0 .8 3 % 0 .8 1 % 6 .5 2 %
N e w  C a le d o n ia  ( in c h  M a tth e w  an d  
b lu n te r  Is la n d ) 0 .7 7 % 2 .2 0 % 0 .7 1 % 2 .7 2 %
N o rth e rn  M a ria n a s  Is la n d s  an d  G u a m 1 .1 4 % 1 .7 5 % 1.74% 1.06%
P h ilip p in e s 7 .9 1 % 8 .4 1 % 5 .7 3 % 2 .4 3 %
W a llis  a n d  F u tu n a 0 .6 7 % 0 .3 9 % 0 .3 5 % 1 .3 2 %
T o ta l 1 2 .9 4 % 1 4 .4 8 % 1 0 .34% 1 7 .0 5 %
Indonesia
In d o n e s ia 10 .9 3 % 1 1 .0 8 % 9 .3 4 % 5 .5 6 %
High Seas
H ig h  S eas 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 %
Conflict Zones and Joint
Management
T o ta l d isp u te d  z o n e s  an d  Jo in t  Ja p a n -  
K o re a  M a n a g e m e n t R e g im e 1 .07% 1 .7 3 % 1.70% 1.0 6 %
T o ta l 1 0 0 .0 0 % 1 0 0 .0 0 % 1 0 0 .0 0 % 1 0 0 .0 0 %
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Combination Four: Equal Share of All Models
s k i p j a c k  t u n a
y e l l o w  f in
t u n a b i g e y e  t u n a a l b a c o r e  t u n a
PNA Countries
K i r i b a t i 10.30% 7.38% 10.18% 3.87%
M a r s h a l l  I s l a n d s 4.79% 3.65% 4.29% 1.14%
F S M 7.80% 7.06% 5.88% 1.21%
N a u r u 1.94% 1.44% 0.80% 0.66%
P a l a u 0.87% 1.14% 1.17% 0.59%
P N G 10.21% 9.31% 4.91% 2.27%
S o l o m o n  I s l a n d s 3.77% 3.58% 2.41% 3.02%
T u v a l u 1.83% 1.22% 1.63% 1.20%
T o ta l 41.50% 34.79% 31.27% 13.96%
Other FFA Countries
A u s t r a l i a 1.27% 4.59% 1.16% 3.14%
C o o k  I s l a n d s 2.58% 0.80% 1.17% 2.19%
Fij i 1.40% 1.07% 0.89% 3.90%
N e w  Z e a l a n d 0.79% 1.22% 0.68% 4.54%
N i u e 0.34% 0.21% 0.17% 0.72%
S a m o a 0.24% 0.40% 0.34% 1.44%
T o k e l a u 0.64% 0.37% 0.67% 0.74%
T o n g a 0.53% 0.34% 0.28% 1.27%
V a n u a t u 1.63% 1.68% 1.37% 4.26%
T o ta l 9.44% 10.67% 6.72% 22.20%
DWFN
C h i n a 0.58% 0.80% 1.03% 1.86%
E U 0.10% 0.23% 0.43% 1.19%
J a p a n 16.13% 11.12% 17.92% 33.00%
K o r e a 1.81% 4.37% 10.20% 2.84%
T a i w a n 3.06% 5.48% 6.55% 7.04%
U S  +  t e r r i t o r i e s  ( e x  A m  S a m ) 5.47% 4.73% 7.51% 1.96%
T o ta l 27.15% 26.73% 43.63% 47.89%
Other VVCPFC Members
A m e r i c a n  S a m o a 0.69% 0.38% 0.40% 1.68%
C a n a d a 0.03% 0.12% 0.13% 0.63%
F r e n c h  P o l y n e s i a 0.93% 0.58% 0.60% 5.53%
N e w  C a l e d o n i a  ( i n c h  M a t t h e w  a n d  b l u n t e r  
I s l a n d ) 0.50% 1.96% 0.49% 2.02%
N o r t h e r n  M a r i a n a s  I s l a n d s  a n d  G u a m 0.47% 0.73% 1.03% 0.44%
P h i l i p p i n e s 7.61% 11.25% 5.80% 1.30%
W a l l i s  a n d  F u t u n a 0.44% 0.19% 0.16% 0.66%
T o ta l 10.67% 15.21% 8.61% 12.25%
Indonesia
I n d o n e s i a 10.46% 11.62% 8.75% 3.26%
High Seas
H i g h  S e a s 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Conflict Zones and Joint Management
T o t a l  d i s p u t e d  z o n e s  a n d  J o i n t  J a p a n - K o r e a  
M a n a g e m e n t  R e g i m 0.78% 1.04% 1.01% 0.44%
T o ta l 100.00% 100.06% 100.00% 100.00%
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Skipjack tuna
2005 Harvest Harvest Model Space Mode Biomass Model
Combined Mode
3
Allocation to
artesianl Fisher 0 15.69% 0 0 (
Allocatin to
Secretariat 0 1.00% 0 0 (
PNA Countries 51.06% 41.44% 44.67% 30.08% 43.41°/
Other FFA
Countries 1.78% 1.62% 19.43% 13.02% 13.01°/
DWFN 24.29% 20.77% 12.11% 43.13% 18.64°/
Other WCPFC
Members 10.22% 8.23% 12.53% 6.70% 12.94°/
Indonesia 12.65% 11.25% 9.46% 5.73% 10.93°/
Conflict Zones
and Joint
Management 0.00% 0.00% 1.79% 1.33% 1.07°/
Yellow fin tuna
2005 Harvest Harvest Model Space Mode Biomass Model
Combined Mode
3
Allocation to
artesianl Fisher 0 0.14% 0 0 i
Allocatin to
Secretariat 0 1.00% 0 0 i
PNA Countries 41.17% 34.31% 40.70% 25.14% 39.87°
Other FFA
Countries 1.98% 2.32% 17.59% 16.14% 13.19°/
DWFN 16.76% 19.23% 12.05% 44.02% 19.78°/
Other WCPFC
Members 27.70% 24.39% 15.22% 7.55% 14.48°/
Indonesia 12.39% 18.61% 11.78% 5.86% 1 1.08^
Conflict Zones
and Joint
Management 0.00% 0.00% 2.88% 1.28% 1.73°
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Bigeye tuna
2 0 0 5  H a r v e s t H a r v e s t  M o d e l S p a c e  M o d e B io m a s s  M o d e l
C o m b in e d  
M o d e l  3
E f f o r t  M o d ' 
( B I G E Y E  
A l lo c a t io n
Allocation to
artesianl Fisher 0 0 .2 1 % 0 0 0 0
Allocatin to
Secretariat 0 1 .0 0 % 0 0 0 0
PNA Countries 2 6 .9 6 % 2 7 .4 3 % 4 5 .8 1 % 2 5 .6 2 % 3 7 .8 4 % 1 2 .7 9 %
Other FFA
Countries 2 .3 1 % 2 .7 8 % 1 0 .0 6 % 5 .3 1 % 9 .5 2 % 1 4 .3 9 %
DWFN 3 9 .8 0 % 4 7 .0 0 % 1 7 .4 8 % 5 7 .5 0 % 3 1 .2 7 % 6 4 .8 4 %
Other WCPFC
Members 1 3 .9 7 % 9 .8 0 % 1 2 .1 2 % 4 .7 5 % 1 0 .3 4 % 7 .9 9 %
Indonesia 1 6 .9 6 % 1 1 .7 7 % 1 1 .7 0 % 5 .6 0 % 9 .3 4 % 0 .0 0 %
Conflict Zones and 
Joint Management 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 2 .8 3 % 1 .2 1 % 1 .7 0 % 0 %
Albacore tuna
2 0 0 5  H a r v e s t H a r v e s t  M o d e l S p a c e  M o d e B io m a s s  M o d e l
C o m b in e d  
M o d e l  3
Allocation to
artesianl Fisher 0 2 .0 9 % 0 0 0
Allocatin to
Secretariat 0 1 .0 0 % 0 0 0
PNA Countries 6 .0 7 % 3 .4 4 % 2 4 .8 1 % 1 0 .7 2 % 2 1 .5 9 %
Other FFA
Countries 2 2 .5 6 % 2 0 .3 0 % 3 5 .0 6 % 2 2 .3 9 % 2 5 .2 0 %
DWFN 6 6 .1 0 % 6 7 .1 0 % 1 2 .6 2 % 5 4 .7 7 % 2 9 .5 5 %
Other WCPFC
Members 5 .2 6 % 6 .0 6 % 2 3 .9 9 % 1 2 .1 2 % 1 7 .0 5 %
Indonesia 0 .0 1 % 0 .0 0 % 1 .7 6 % 0 .0 0 % 5 .5 6 %
Conflict Zones and 
Joint Management 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 1 .7 6 % 0 .0 0 % 1 .0 6 %
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P u rs e  S e in e  E f fo r t A c tu a l  2 0 0 5  S h a re E f fo r t  M o d e l
N a tio n a l Z on e P ercen ta g e P ercen ta g e
A u s t r a l i a 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 6 %
C h i n a 0 .7 2 % 0 .5 6 %
K o r e a 1 .5 6 % 3 .2 1 %
T a i w a n 1 .8 4 % 4 . 8 8 %
C o o k  I s la n d s 0 .0 1 % 0 .1 5 %
Fiji 0 .0 5 % 0 .0 3 %
W a l l i s  an d  F u tu n a 0 .0 1 %
I n d o n e s i a 1 0 .0 9 % 0 .0 0 %
P h i l ip p in e s 1 4 .2 7 % 4 .0 0 %
S a m o a 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 1 %
T o k e la u 0 .1 8 % 0 .3 1 %
T o n g a 0 .0 0 %
U S A 1 .3 9 % 2 .8 2 %
V a n u a tu 0 .5 5 % 0 .6 6 %
J a p a n  - D o m e s t i c  Z o n e 1 1 .0 9 % 1 7 .5 6 %
N e w  Z e a la n d 2 .1 2 % 3 .3 1 %
E U 0 .0 4 %
P N A 5 6 .0 8 %
F S M 0 .0 0 % 1 3 .5 8 %
K ir ib a t i 0 .0 0 % 1 2 .9 9 %
R M I 0 .0 0 % 6 .5 0 %
N a u r u 0 .0 0 % 3 .0 2 %
P N G 0 .0 0 % 1 8 .1 4 %
P a la u 0 .0 0 % 1 .2 3 %
S o l o m o n  I s la n d s 0 .0 0 % 4 . 9 5 %
T u v a lu 0 .0 0 % 2 .0 3 %
T ota l 100 .00% 1 0 0 .0 0 %
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PART FIVE
CONCLUSION: STUDYING THE WCPFC, IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
MAKERS AND THOSE WHO STUDY THEM
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CHAPTER 11
11 .1. Introduction
The major policy problem addressed in this thesis is how an institution designed for 
collective governance of a large-scale resource commons may adopt alternative 
governance regimes to promote sustainable use of scarce tuna resources. The secondary 
policy issues addressed was evaluating current approaches to regional tuna management 
and the extent to which they have been successful or otherwise as key insights into 
understanding what ‘policy problems' require ‘solving' by innovations in governance 
arrangements.
Accordingly, this thesis has presented a diverse collection of essays that explore in 
detail different aspects of these problems but which are drawn together through the 
common methodological rubric of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework and a policy philosophy that draws heavily on the analytical insights of the 
‘adaptive management' and ‘incentive-based' fisheries literatures. This research 
suggests that while current progress within the WCPFC is frustratingly slow, the 
framework of the Convention Text, as well as current debates within the WCPFC, form 
some of the nascent policy strategies central to an ‘adaptive’ and ‘incentive'-based 
approach. This thesis also provides novel insights into two hitherto under-researched 
areas. The first of these was Chapter 6, which explored the nature of the ‘aspirations’ 
held by Pacific Islanders that underpin their negotiating positions, along with some 
preliminary analysis of its significance to understanding WCPFC negotiation positions. 
The second was Chapter 5 that provided an historical analysis of the FFA purse seine 
treaties and argued that the success of the treaties was grounded in their ability to 
deliver political—rather than economic or conservation—benefits from cooperation. 
That chapter also provided a preliminary analysis of the Vessel Day Scheme and 
concluded that while this is a significant progress, further challenges with 
implementation remain.
In writing about these issues, several key themes began to emerge from both the 
analysis and through fruitful conversations held with other observers and policy makers 
alike. Ranging from practical issues, as well as theoretical ideas, three questions 
consistently raised were:
• Why is policy change so slow and difficult to achieve?
• How is an ‘economic approach' to fisheries management relevant to the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean tuna fisheries? And related to this, why it so difficult 
to incorporate new ideas into policy development processes?
• How can commons scholars improve effectiveness of their institutional 
analysis—in policy mode?
The aim of this chapter is to present a discussion of these issues in terms of the policy 
implications that may be drawn for use by policy makers, as well as observations that 
reflect on the research practice of common scholars. To initiate the discussion, this 
chapter starts, in Section 2, with a synthesis of key conclusions drawn from Chapters 5- 
10 in this thesis. Section 3 considers some of the key lessons learnt from the research in 
this thesis and their implications for the questions posed above, while Section 4 
identifies issues that may warrant further research.
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11 . 2 . Synthesis of key observations in this thesis
To reiterate from Chapter 3, the three research problems posed in this thesis may be 
summarized as three analytically related tasks. First, to analyse and evaluate the recent 
historical experience of collective regional fisheries management in the WCPO tuna 
fisheries, using an explicit institutional and economic framing of the policy issues. 
Second, by using the insights from the fisheries economics and the ‘adaptive’ 
management literature, to explore potential changes to governance structures in the 
WCPFC. Third, as a related task, to elaborate on potential allocation models in the 
WCPFC as one of the key tools in achieving an ‘incentive-based' approach.
11.2.1 Part Two: Background
The IAD framework actively encourages commons scholars to understand the context 
of the commons sharing situation, including the attitudes and views of participants, and 
this view provided the initial motivation for the analysis presented in Part Two of this 
thesis. Two different aspects of the ‘context' were examined. First, in Chapter 6, the 
aspirations of Pacific Islanders with respect to the tuna resources was explored with a 
view to understanding in more detail the significance of the often-used phrase 
‘maximising (economic) returns from the fishery'. ‘Aspirations’ as an idea is a fluid 
concept that shifts over time, context and personality involved, but in general broad 
consistencies were found in the attitudes across the six countries studied. In general, 
aspirations were tied up with strategies involving some combination of access fees 
(where relevant), on-shore processing and domestic-based fishing activities.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the modality chosen to realize these aspirations differed 
significantly between countries and this was largely the result of context—although 
other factors, such as historical experience, were also found to be important. The two 
key findings of Chapter 5 may be summarized as:
• The physical investments and opportunities of each country are significantly 
diverse enough that it raises questions regarding the utility of a unified 
negotiating position that the FFA group brings to the WCPFC.
• Partnerships between locally based industry and foreign partners were 
common throughout most countries’ studies and this implies a blurring of the 
distinction between FFA and DWFN nations—having implications for 
policy in the WCPFC.
Although this chapter provides important contextual material for this thesis—discussed 
below —this chapter also stands alone as a contribution to the literature on Pacific 
fisheries because it explores issues regarding aspirations, and the differences as well as 
the similarities across the FFA states— issues that are often key drivers in the 
background of internal FFA policy debates but rarely articulated nor its consequences 
for policy explored from an independent perspective. This chapter has been accepted for 
publication in Marine Policy.
Chapter 5 on the FFA Purse Seine Treaty System presents a different perspective on 
context and represents the first paper in this thesis that undertakes an explicit 
institutional analysis of regional fisheries policy in the WCPO. Preparation for this 
chapter was initially challenged by the complexity of the Treaty System which, in
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effect, is a set of five interlinked treaties, with different objectives, operated across 
different time and geographical scales, that have different histories (and different 
motivations for coming into force), and have slightly varied, although overlapping, 
memberships. Compounding the problem was the relatively ‘anecdotal’ nature of the 
performance of the treaties and a paucity of appropriate data available for measuring 
performance over the correct time periods and correct physical scales in the fishery.
A full evaluation of FFA Purse Seine Treaties System is likely to require a 
multidisciplinary approach comprising legal/political analysis, bio-economic modelling, 
econometric policy analysis and institutional analysis. Early work by Lodge and 
Aqorau, Ram-Bidisi and others developed a political-legal perspective on the Treaties, 
and Neill (2008) has began to analyse, using a bio-economic framework, the relative 
merits of the Palau Arrangement compared to the Vessel Day Scheme. Chapter 6 
initially sought to add to this through an econometric analysis but was unable to 
complete the task due to lack of appropriate data. Instead, an historical institutional 
analysis was undertaken to gain insight into how the observed growth trends in purse 
seine effort and fishing mortality on bigeye tuna and yellowfin tuna could have been 
encouraged or ameliorated by policy initiatives undertaken by the FFA states at the 
regional level.
Overall, the analysis in this paper suggests that, at least from a conservation perspective, 
these Treaties were, at best, benign, in adequately managing purse seine capacity and 
poor decisions by PNA may have increased the incentives for vessels to undertake gear 
intensification. However, decisions undertaken by the PNA states need to be evaluated 
against the scientific advice that was available at the time and the prevailing economic 
conditions that placed pressure on PNA decision makers to prioritize economic 
development over conservation. In addition, it is clear that the FFA Purse Seine Treaty 
system only brought into management scope a proportion of the active purse seine fleets 
and that other sources of over-fishing—namely the longline fleets—were not 
incorporated at all.
Nevertheless, Chapter 6 concludes that the Treaties did deliver some benefits to the 
FFA Group, namely in the form of establishing a monitoring and surveillance structure 
for vessels operating in their zones that was instrumental in assisting them to enforce 
their coastal state rights and collect access fees. Less tangibly, but potentially just as 
important, the routine of managing the Treaties also generated a history of cooperation 
and mutual support within the PNA Group which was later used to gain significant 
political power in the development, and now implementation of the WCPFC.
This paper then briefly reviews the structure of the Vessel Day Scheme to consider 
whether, a priori, its institutional structure—and therefore the incentives it creates for 
participating states and fisheries—will address some of the key policy gaps within the 
original PNA Agreement. It is concluded that while the VDS introduces some elements 
of an ‘incentive-based’ approach to fisheries management, and introduces other positive 
mechanisms to management capacity (including building strong links to broader 
regional measures through the WCPFC), its utility as a capacity management tool for 
addressing bigeye tuna stock sustainability issues is fairly limited, although the recent 
additional decisions to implement ‘technical’ measures for reducing capacity 
significantly improves the situation.
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This chapter, as a unique contribution to the literature, presents an alternative reading of 
the FFA management framework, which is typically characterized both in negative 
terms and in terms that evaluate their utility solely as facilitators for development within 
a Pacific domestic context. This analysis argues that instead, the FFA regional 
management treaties were just as important as conservation tools and, that while 
significant design problems exist, FFA attempts at regional management produced some 
positive aspects. In particular, the VDS represents an innovative and perhaps unique 
attempt in international fisheries management regime to introduce key elements of an 
incentive-based fisheries management approach.
Within this thesis, Chapter 6 directly speaks to the first research question posed in this 
thesis and contributes to the analysis in the rest of this thesis in two ways. First, it 
provides a more detailed picture of some aspects of the policy problems inherited by the 
WCPFC when it began implementation negotiations in 2005 and consequently allows 
for focused discussion of management issues in Chapter 7. Second it provides a brief 
explanation of the political strength of the PNA Group and therefore provides the basis 
for the argument in Chapters 9 and 10 that the WCPFC is subjected to significant policy 
path dependence and that existing policy structures—in particular that of the PNA— 
should form the basis of future WCPFC strategies.
11.2.2 Part Three; WCPFC as an institution
Both chapters within this section expand on the key theme of the first research question 
by examining, from two different perspectives, the institutional performance of the 
WCPFC through its early implementation period. Chapter 7 provides a broad overview 
of the WCPFC and considers the relative success of the of the WCPFC by considering 
the question that if the commission, as an institution, is consistent with good theory- 
about institutional design, why is it so difficult to implement? Three suggestions are 
proffered’.
• Like all other international collaborative resource arrangements, commission 
members have experienced difficultly in reconciling different economic and 
political interests in the fishery—which is to be expected and forms the basis of 
the ‘standard’ explanation of the success or failure of international regimes.
• The development of an RFMO is not the end point in fisheries management— 
but merely an intermediate institution for bringing together nation states within a 
‘framework’ that needs to be interpreted and implemented at the national scale 
in order to be effective.
• Day-to-day governance—that is the transaction (transition) costs of participating 
in a negotiating process are real barriers to implementation—particularly in 
regions that involve significant numbers of developing countries.
These findings of this chapter highlight that the experience of the WCPFC is mixed and 
that while some areas of concern have been raised, the commission has also been 
successful in implementing some of the key structures of an RFMO. Flowever, it also 
suggests that the implicit assumption that the ‘right’ policy frameworks and ‘right’ 
policy processes, with the ‘right’ enabling conditions can help craft successful resource­
sharing institutions, may only represent part of the picture. This chapter raises the idea 
that human physical and cognitive limitations are not just important in limiting problem 
perception—but literally inhibit the key mechanism for collaborative management—
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communication. This w ill be discussed in Section 3.3 o f this chapter. This chapter was 
accepted as part o f a collected o f edited essays by Grafton et al. (2009).
Chapter 8 builds on Chapter 7 by providing a more detailed examination o f the 
implementation o f the management measures and assesses their a priori likelihood o f 
success or not, based on the institutional— that is, incentive-creating— structure o f the 
measures. Like the previous chapter, this analysis explicitly recognizes the ‘ mid-scale’ 
positioning o f the WCPFC institution and considers whether these measures enables and 
or facilitates members to implement sustainable practices within their own domestic 
fisheries regimes, rather than whether the WCPFC policies actually have a direct 
impact. This interpretation was considered necessary in light o f the international 
dimension o f the fishery, where, under international law the WCPFC is a cooperative, 
rather than a coercive, regime.
Through the use o f the IAD  framework, and an explicit framing o f the Convention as an 
economic agreement, this chapter serves to provide an alternative to the 
legal/political/scientific assessment o f the treaty that has tended to be the most common 
analytical approach in the literature (see for example Cordonnery, 2002; Aqorau, 2001; 
Hanich, 2008). In doing so, this chapter raises two different types o f management 
challenges that have received previously little or no attention. The first o f these relates 
to the risk management aspect o f the measures and the treatment o f risk. In essence, it 
was argued that while the management measures have become more robust, and risk 
sensitive, over time from a 'technical' or ‘ scientific' management point o f view, they 
continue to take insufficient account o f non-scientific risks associated with fisheries 
management. Second it was argued that the structure o f the management measures do 
not address the underlying incentives facing stakeholders and this may be one 
explanation for why progress is so slow. Other problems discussed were those relating 
to the 'multispecies’ nature o f the fisher}', the language o f the text o f the measures 
themselves, and the issue of'exem ptions’ for small island developing state members o f 
the commission.
Together, these two chapters contribute to this thesis by providing the second and third 
chapters dedicated to explicitly consider the first research question and, by doing so, 
sets out the policy challenges that are subsequently addressed in Section Four o f this 
thesis.
11.2.3 Part Four: Governance and allocation
Part 4 o f this thesis comprised o f two explicit, and interlinked, policy proposals that 
could be considered by the WCPFC in progressing policy and addressing its 
management challenges.
Taking up the key management challenges set out in Part Three, Chapter 9 presents a 
set o f four policy proposals with the explicit aim o f exploring how the WCPFC could 
use its current set o f policies and political context to introduce key ideas in adaptive 
management and incentive-based management within its governance regime. Following 
on from Chapter 8, these issues are considered in the context o f whether they enable 
individual members to implement sustainable resource use strategies within their 
national fisheries management regimes. To summarize, these proposals are:
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• Expand the current consideration of Management Strategy Evaluation approach 
currently being explored within the Commission, to incorporate an ‘adaptive 
management’ cycle that draws on non-scientific information and data, using 
long-term biomass and short-term TAC/TAE goals to facilitate this.
• Implement a commission-wide VDS for all major gear types—use the same 
allocation procedure but ensure that allocation is a once-off process and 
allocated units are 'permanent’.
• Adopt additional 'rules in use’ for allocated units to support members in 
achieving the best economic value for them.
• Utilise key players in the tuna industry to support WCPFC conservation efforts 
by seeking an agreement that they will only purchase from vessels who can 
demonstrate compliance with relevant measures.
In considering the relative merits of these proposals within the current practice of the 
WCPFC, it was noted that some principles of adaptive management and incentive-based 
management are already part of the WCPFC policy dialogue—and this process is 
supported by the terms of the Convention Text. For example, as discussed in Chapters 6 
and 8. the VDS introduces some key aspects of the ‘incentive-based' approach and that 
the use of'reference’ points—to underpin an ‘adaptive policy cycle’ is already written 
into the Convention Text. Therefore, it can be argued that pursuing this kind of 
approach is unlikely to represent a complete radical change in the governance style, but 
rather a marginal transformation that requires a moderate re-interpretation of key parts 
of the Convention Text. Nevertheless, it is noted that while some reforms could 
potentially be relatively straightforward, others are likely to be more difficult due to the 
equity challenges they raise. This is particularly the case for the extension of the VDS, 
whose allocation mechanisms are discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.
The key objective of Chapter 9 was to explore alternative options for the governance 
mechanisms of the WCPFC by drawing links between the key insights of the scholarly 
literature and the practice of the commission as it currently stands. It thus adopts an 
explicit strategy of building on ‘what already exists’ (that is, is 'path-dependent’) but 
seeks to extend these through suggestions for moderately marginal reforms that could 
incorporate a broader range of (non-scientific) information and broader scope for 
managing risk into routine management processes. The ‘path-dependent’ element in this 
chapter was considered an important element of the analysis as the key tool in reducing 
the transactions costs associated with institutional change as well as a primary 
consideration of the political acceptability of such change.
By attempting to step beyond the usual treatment of international fisheries policy as lists 
of general things that ‘should be done’, this chapter highlights both the utility of 
‘demonstrating' the use of key concepts in the incentive/adaptive literature, and also 
some of the problems involved in ‘translating’ theoretically sound ideas into practical 
management strategies. In particular, it was found that two fundamental concepts 
required adjustment before they were considered ‘applicable' to the case of the 
WCPFC. These were the use of the MEY concept in a large scale, multi-national 
fishery, and the modifications in assumptions about vessel control within an 
international fishery regime. These issues are discussed in more detail in Section 3.2 of 
this chapter.
It was explicitly recognized in Chapter 9 that allocation of tuna resources was a critical 
component of an incentive/adaptive approach to fisheries management—and also one of
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the most politically contentious issue in the Commission. Taking up this challenge. 
Chapter 10 examines in more detail the issue of allocation and describes, elaborates and 
calculates some explicit allocation models that could be considered political acceptable 
within the WCPFC.
Motivated in part to explore the implications of a WCPFC-CA wide VDS scheme, this 
chapter explores a range of alternative allocation regimes that could provide a 
‘politically’ acceptable allocation mechanism if explicit allocation was extended across 
the entire convention area. The analysis in this chapter adopts an unambiguous ‘FFA’ 
view of allocation primarily because the strongest precedence for an allocation 
regime—the VDS—originated with the PNA subgroup of the FFA and, as discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 7, it was considered politically infeasible to consider a completely ‘new 
approach’ to this issue. However, a key result of this analysis suggests that the key 
allocation principles often advocated by the PNA and FFA states more broadly do not 
result in a uniformly positive outcome for these countries. Key reasons for this is the 
fact that there are many other coastal states within the WCPFC, and some ‘DWFNs’ 
dominate fishing on the high seas. In response, this chapter explores a range of other 
potential allocation principles and suggests that a potential way forward is to use a 
‘diversified’ allocation strategy across individual species.
11.3. Policy lessons
In considering the complex task of policy making in the WCPFC what implications may 
be draw n from the preceding synthesis of this thesis? The implications of these research 
findings for policy development— including the broader policy questions posed at the 
beginning of this chapter—are presented in this section. After a brief review of the main 
policy findings in the substantive chapters of this thesis attention is then turned to 
considering three aspects of policy analysis and development that consider some of the 
practical dimensions of policy development at the scale of the WCPFC.
11.3.1 Main lessons
Weaving together a diverse narrative across six analytical chapters, the research 
outcomes of this thesis implies three key lessons relevant to policy makers operating 
within the WCPFC. The first of these is the idea that an explicit framing of fisheries 
management agreements as incentive structures and adaptive management frameworks 
that guide fisher behaviour, can offer something ‘new’ to policy makers in terms of 
providing alternative, and novel, insights into the relative merits of current policy, as 
well as being sources of new policy ideas. Within this thesis, this perspective was used 
to offer two substantial insights into the policy-making process.
Firstly, the historical and current approaches to policy making has fundamentally not 
addressed the central incentives that drive behaviour within a common-pool/common 
property fishery and this underpins the difficulty in progressing conservation measures 
that both reflect the available scientific and economic advice and the risks involved in 
fisheries management. Thus, for example, the exemptions provided to SIDS within the 
current management measures provide an incentive to increase fishing activity within 
these countries over the short run in order to take advantage of the available fishing 
opportunities—lest they be removed in the future.
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Secondly, it may be observed, that some conservation and management measures, and 
indeed the framework of the Convention itself, have introduced into the policy mix 
some key concepts from the 'incentive-based’ approach to fisheries management and 
further development along this path appears possible. The most obvious example was 
the introduction of the Vessel Day Scheme and its elements that allow for an explicit 
allocation of fishing opportunities and the capacity to trade these. Related to this, is that 
shifting regional fisheries management towards an approach that is explicitly adaptive 
in nature, and builds in self-reinforcing mechanisms for compliance, presents a marginal 
reform rather than a radical change. This is a fortunate characteristic because it means 
that governance change within the WCPFC is supported by path-dependent processes 
rather than working significantly against them. This is particularly important because 
path dependency is strong in the WCPO and a particular form of it—day-to-day 
governance—does provide a real barrier to policy development.
11. 3.2 Scaling up: Small scale to large scale fisheries commons management
One interpretation of this thesis is to situate it within the commons literature regarding 
the ‘scaling up' of commons analysis from the small scale to the ‘larger scale’ (see 
Buck, 1998), in particular the work on cross scale linkages (see for example Berkes, 
2006; 2002; Young, 2006; or Adger et al., 2005) and broader questions of the extent to 
which large scale commons can be understood using the same analytical tools and 
concepts as small scale ones. Several chapters drew explicitly on the 1AD framework in 
their analysis and in Chapter 9, the governance framework used it to structure key 
concepts. In general, the analysis largely confirms the work of previous scholars that 
that this approach adapts well to the analysis of ‘large scale commons’ at the 'large 
scale' although several casual observations can be made:
• Institutions at the larger scale within the WCPO tend to be ‘formal' types of 
institutions, rather than evolved institutions—reflecting the size of the resource 
commons, the number of participants within the fishery and the nature of the 
agreements (international treaty).
• However, at the core of many decision-making processes are a relatively small 
number of people—that is diplomats who represent their national governments— 
who are involved in consistent and continual contact over many years. This then, 
goes some way to re-creating the ‘small’ group of decision makers—the subject of 
original study by commons scholars—that build cooperation facilitating 
relationships over time.
For its substantive content the governance framework in Chapter 9 draws substantially 
on the theoretical literatures found in fisheries economics and adaptive management 
and, as noted previously, that chapter was challenged by finding appropriate processes 
that facilitate a 'translation' of theoretically sound ideas into contextually specific and 
practical management strategies. Within this thesis, it is this translation process, rather 
than the IAD framework, that represented the significant ‘scaling up’ issues. Of more 
interest in the scaling up issue was the challenge of finding ways to adapt ideas in 
fisheries economics to the particular context of an international marine legal treaty 
where the legal basis for enacting policy is significantly different
These challenges arise primarily from the fact that many of the central ideas in the 
fisheries economics literature are derived from the experiences of national or sub­
national fisheries management regimes (see for example Sutinen, 1999; OECD, 2008;;
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Grafton et af 2006) and that these regimes are underpinned by the implicit assumption 
of centralized control—that is enforcement—by the relevant government authority. It 
follows from this that although, in practice, various forms of ‘co-management' and 
'consultation' are often central to national fisheries regimes, participant confidence in 
the management is underscored by the last-resort ability of appealing to enforceable 
national legal regimes. So, for example, fishers who detect cheating behaviour within a 
national fishery can be reassured that the effectiveness of the TAC or TAE target is not 
fundamentally undermined because such behaviour can be detected and punished and 
prevented from developing into a systemic flaw in the management regime.
In an international fisheries context, of course, such centralized control does not exist 
and, within international law, fisheries management regimes are not management 
regimes that control fishers themselves, but rather provide a basic framework for fishing 
nations, or coastal states, to coordinate the management of domestic fisheries regimes, 
within their national rights as sovereign countries (Tsamenyi, 2004). Fundamental to 
international law is the notion that sovereign states are only bound by agreements they 
explicitly choose to ratify (Treaties, 1968) and this carries with it the implication that 
the basic repertoire of incentive based approaches—and the incentives they create—do 
not necessarily find easy compatibility with the complex legal hierarchy of international 
fisheries law. Central to this is the potential changes in the incentive mechanisms—and 
possible outcomes on the fishery—as the incentive regime shifts legal basis, that is 
‘scales-up' from a national to an international basis. It may be observed that several 
international RFMOs have adopted TAC and allocations and yet the status of their 
fisheries are still raised as matters for concern (FAO, 2009). Four potential questions 
can be identified and while not seeking to resolve them, the following discussion seeks 
to highlight them with a view of proposing further research.
/ 1.3.2.1 Individual Property rights do not exist in international law 
Fundamental to the idea of property rights within fisheries management is that it 
provides an incentive for the right holder to shift their managerial gaze from 
maximizing benefits in the current period, while access is still available, to considering 
management strategies that protect the stock in the long term so that they have a 
resource that they can enjoy.
Flowever, unlike domestic fisheries regimes, the concept of ‘property rights’ does not 
exist within international law and RFMO’s can, at best, only allocate fishing 
opportunities which are then respected by participating stakeholders as de facto rights 
within the fishery (Serdy, 2006; Rayfuse, 2007). While implicit and explicit allocation 
of fishing opportunities regularly occur within RFMOs—and has occurred within the 
WCPFC—the basis of such allocations tends to carry limited tenure, rather than being 
‘permanent' as assumed by the property rights literature.
Typical for the WCPFC is to set management measures to have three year tenure or to 
be ‘reviewed* on an annual basis, with the terms of the review typically expressed as
.....The measures described above for the purse seine and longline fisheries shall be
reviewed annually in conjunction with the scientific advice to measure the impact 
and compliance with the measure. The measure shall remain in place unless the 
Commission adopts alternative measures. This review shall consider, inter alia, 
whether the measures are having the intended effect and the extent to which all
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CCMs and fishing sectors are contributing to achieving the Commission's 
conservation goals. (WCPFC, 2008).
That is, the target will be reviewed annually and thus implies that annual changes could 
be made to both the target itself and its implicit allocation patterns. These short tenures 
carry the implication that the implied (or explicit) allocation within the measures also 
carries a three-year (or annual) tenure. This, in turn, raises the question of what such 
limited tenure may imply for the ability of the WCPFC to use an incentive-based 
approach to encourage a stronger ‘stewardship' approach amongst its members. One 
may expect, for example, that limited tenure on the ‘right to fish' (or share in the 
fishery) encourages a more intensive fishing by nations as they seek to enjoy the 
benefits of the fishery while opportunities remain open and regulatory institutional 
sources that allow for this behavior to develop within the WCPO are discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 7.
Surprisingly, relative little technical analysis has been undertaken on the issue of limited 
tenure in natural resource property rights. A recent study by Costello and Kaffine 
(2008) suggests that limited tenure does not necessarily result in sub-optimal resource 
use dynamics but the outcome depends critically on key biological variables in the 
fishery such as growth rates, as well as political factors, such as the expectations of 
stakeholders about the likelihood of renewal of fishing opportunities.
It therefore remains an outstanding empirical question both within the fisheries 
literature, and more broadly, as to the extent to which limited tenure at the international 
level could significantly undermine the stewardship assumptions in a property rights 
approach. At a minimum, this implies that careful design, rather than simple politically 
expedient time lines, needs to underpin decisions regarding tenure. However, this adds 
to the complex tensions that exist between theory and practice and which are discussed 
throughout this thesis.
11.3.2.2 Legal regimes guide allocation and make it harder to satisfy the ‘participation 
rule ’ and side-payments
Within international law, the Vienna Convention—the so called ‘Treaty of Treaty 
Making"—frames compliance issues in terms of limiting obligations towards 
international treaties only to those countries who explicitly accede to the terms of the 
Treaty (Treaties, 1968). The implications for a fisheries commission is that the TAC and 
allocation process are only valid if all the relevant stakeholder countries agreed to 
respect it. Therefore, if fishing nations, or coastal states, wish to ignore RFMO 
decisions regarding TACs or an allocation regime, the ability to enforce compliance is 
significantly limited or non-existent and relies on the international political process.
The standard responses to this kind of dilemma within the international fisheries 
economics literature (see for example Munro, 2002)—and this is also widely discussed 
in the domestic fisheries literature (Grafton, 2006)—is that the structure of the 
agreement needs to be such that it is in the overwhelming interests of all relevant parties 
to be part of the agreement than to sit outside (i.e. that it is self-reinforcing, see for 
example Barrett, 2003; Lodge, 2007). That is, the payoffs to individual members 
participating must be larger than what they would receive if they did not participate—a 
task that falls primarily to the role of the allocation mechanism, the increase in value of 
the fishery due to improved conservation outcomes and the use of side-payments.
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Within a national regime, such agreements can take any form considered “acceptable’ 
although fishing history tends to dominate the construction of allocation “baselines'. 
Yet, such a freedom does not exist within international law, and it is now an accepted 
legal principle that RFMO's have no powers to allocate resources within an EEZ 
without prior consent of the relevant coastal state (Rayfuse, 2007). In effect, this 
provides the coastal states significant power to determine an allocation formula within 
an RFMO by providing them with the legal basis for declaring a share as a priority call 
above other claimants. For their part, coastal states may choose to reduce their implied 
allocation as part of a conservation measure. But coastal states may equally decide to 
select a generous—and subjective— level of fishing for their EEZs and in essence shift 
the burden of conservation of vulnerable stocks onto other stakeholders, particularly 
those operating on the high seas, as the remaining available TAC/TAE is divided 
between the non-coastal states.
This strategy—unilateral declaration of allocation and subsequent shifting of the 
conservation burden to others—has been used to great effect by the PNA in the WCPFC 
in the adoption of the Vessel Day Scheme and recent moves by the remaining FFA 
states indicate that they too, wish to adopt such an approach for the longline fleets.
This raises the challenges to the accepted economic policy approach of every agent 
being ‘just as well o ff in the allocation process because, as indicated from the results 
from Chapter 10, the proposed ‘coastal state’ approach from the FFA Group does result 
in ‘unambiguous’ losers, relative to the status quo, and such outcomes are a deliberate 
strategy in the negotiation processes. This implies that what is politically acceptable to a 
majority of stakeholders may contravene the typical ‘participation' rule that underpins 
the ‘game theoretic' approach to analysing the construction and success of international 
agreements (see for example Barrett, 2003). Within the WCPFC this is made more 
complicated by the requirement that any allocation decision must be made as a 
consensus between all Convention stakeholders.
Even if one accepts the idea that a pure version of the ‘participation rule’ could only be 
partially implemented in the context of Chapter 10, it is unclear where the compensation 
or side-payments may come from. Rather, several politically infeasible possibilities can 
be identified including:
• The PNA states compensate the major purse seine nations for loss of implicit 
allocation within the EEZs and for allocation on the high seas.
• The PNA states compensate the other FFA states for loss of longline revenue as 
a result of fishing for bigeye tuna using purse seine gears.
• That non-complying parties are subjected to trade restrictions.
From a practical and political perspective these are clearly without moral or legal 
authority: with the development of the VDS, the PNA countries did not provide any 
compensation to participating DWFN fleets who may be adversely affected and there 
remains no indication that relatively less developed PNA countries would willingly 
compensate wealthier ones (for example, Japan) or other poor countries (for example, 
Fiji or Vanuatu) within the region. While trade restriction could have a role against the 
relatively economically weaker parties (which itself raises equity issues), the highly 
concentrated nature of the destination markets for tuna (US, Japan, EU) suggests that 
the use of trade restrictions against these Commission members is unfeasible.
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While this may be the case, it does raise several awkward problems for the use of 
economic approaches in international fisheries management. Primary amongst these are 
that if side payments are difficult to use, then what can create a strong economic 
incentive for a country to participate in a TAC/ITQ scheme at the international level? 
Conventional political economy and ecological arguments—and indeed legal 
arguments—can be made regarding political pressure, trade sanctions or other trade 
measures, concern for future resources and commitment to an international process, and 
these may indeed be valid and useful. However, where economic incentives are required 
to support such conservation efforts, incentive tools, other than side payments, may be 
required. As considered in Chapter 10, the form of the incentive tools may need to 
extend beyond the traditional framing of fisheries economists and examine the potential 
for industry-based incentives—such as the market-linked compliance tool considered in 
Chapter 10.
11.3.2.3 Finding MEY, implementing it and gaining its benefits are harder
Non-compliance (that is, over-fishing the TAC/TAE) in an incentive-based system 
undermines, of course, the conservation value of the management regime, but also 
carries the additional problem of reducing the scarcity value of the TAC/TAE units to 
all other stakeholders and (potentially) reduces the value associated with the assurance 
of long term stock conservation.
Central to notion of this ‘scarcity value' is the construction and use of the ‘Maximum 
Economic Yield' concept in an international fishery target. The work of Kompas (2006) 
and of Grafton et al. (Grafton, 2007) demonstrate that calculation of MEY targets is 
theoretically possible within a complex international fishery, but their construction and 
use within the WCPFC context are likely to be more complex—and therefore more 
politically contestable—than the theory suggests. This may be most clearly seen when 
comparing the use of MEY targets in a domestic fishery. That is, within a domestic 
situation, the MEY modelling utilizes assumptions about fleet gear intensity, costs of 
fishing and fleet behaviour within a relatively consistent cultural, economic and 
political context (see for example Grafton, 1996, 2006)—all of which are considered 
relatively simplistic concepts adopted for expediency in the analysis. In an international 
fishery the range of assumptions—for example summarizing fleet costs across many 
countries—must necessarily be larger, and therefore the realism of such a calculated 
target is more open to question and debate. Presuming that such assumptions are readily 
understood and accepted by commission members, the MEY approach complicates an 
already difficult agreement-making process by expanding the range of variables that 
commission members need to consider when setting targets—for example, because they 
now have to account for, and agree to, economic parameters as well as biological ones. 
In response to this dilemma, this thesis adopts—and therefore puts forward the possible 
solution—that MEY targets are considered as strategic guidelines rather than as hard 
targets for the fishery (see Bjorndal et al., 2000 for a survey of issues arising from the 
more players involved in an RFMO).
However, even with this assumption the use of the concept of MEY, as a tool to 
increase profitability in the WCPO fishery, is made more complex by the interplay 
between how an MEY generates increasing profits and the financial mechanisms by 
which these are transmitted to the main resource owners (the FFA states and other 
developing countries). This occurs because restricting fishing activity to levels
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estimated as being consistent with MEY would, the analysis suggests, make vessels 
more profitable over the longer term (Kompas, 2006). But the decision to cut hack on 
fishing is made not by the fishers but largely by the resource owners—that is the 
participating countries with EEZs with the region. For the PNA states at least, the level 
of fishing is linearly and directly related to the level of revenue that may be collected 
from access fees (see Chapter 6 for discussion). Therefore for the resource owners to 
benefit from an MEY approach requires not just a coordinated decision to cut back on 
permitted fishing levels but also a substantial effort to renegotiate the structure of their 
long-standing access arrangements. Re-negotiation of these arrangements are indeed 
possible—and advocacy for a regional licensing regime has been put forward by many 
analyst (for example, Chand. 2003). But the fact that this has not occurred over the 15- 
year history of regional purse seine treaties suggests the existence of several ‘blocking’ 
factors, the lack of evidence for which requires the development of alternative sets of 
hypotheses. In developing the analysis for this thesis, four such hypotheses came to be 
developed, which for reasons of scope and clarity were not included in the final analysis 
but could form the basis of future research:
• Political and economic pressure from DWFN partners. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that DWFN have and continue to place significant political and economic 
pressure on Pacific states to maintain the status quo regarding accessing regimes 
(that is, bilateral licensing). This is because it allows for the DWFNs to to place 
downward pressure on percentage access fees and to undertake discretionary deals 
such as development assistance payments.
• National sovereignty issues—many Pacific Island Countries (and other countries in 
the region) are in a ‘post-colonial state’, having achieved their independence over 
the last 30 years or so. Coastal states are therefore keen at every opportunity to 
assert and emphasise their national sovereignty over their resources and their 
positioning amongst the international community. This makes them reluctant to 
agree to a regional licensing arrangement as a possible way of addressing external 
political pressures.
• Risk adverse attitudes—all of the Pacific countries enjoy access to licensing 
revenue, and many of them see this as an important—and at times critical—source 
of independent funding for government budgets. Implementing significant changes 
to the way in which this revenue is collected as a result of adopting an MEY 
approach may, therefore, represent an unacceptable risk to the budget. This may 
particularly be the case where relatively high skipjack tuna and yellowfin tuna 
prices in the Bangkok market are following through to strong access fee revenues 
which government officials are zealously guarding.
• Capacity issues in organizing and negotiating for change—reorganizing and 
renegotiating access fee arrangements can represent a substantial—and some what 
daunting—set of administrative and political tasks that can easily overwhelm the 
generally limited governance resources within domestic fisheries administrations. 
This phenomenon was observed by Hanich et al. (Hanich, 2008b) and largely 
underpins the issues discussed in Chapter 9.
In total, the issues highlighted by this set of hypotheses are important for two reasons. 
First, while they do not necessarily represent arguments against an MEY approach, 
developing a better understanding of the role they play in regional decision making
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assists in determining why MEY approaches are more difficult to implement than may 
first appear.
11.3.2.4 Implementation o f a TAC and allocation rule won ’t necessarily address excess 
capacity issues.
A fourth set of interactions between international law and economic approaches to 
fisheries management centers around the relationship between rights based management 
in managing capacity and the assumption of'agency’ within an international treaty.
Within fisheries economics, one of the major roles for rights based management is to 
provide an ‘inbuilt’ incentive for vessel owners and operators to actively manage their 
capacity by the simple expedient that the guaranteed right of access to a resources 
impels operators to minimize their capital inputs in order to maximize their profit 
margins (see Kompas, 2005). This central feature of the ITQ system is predicated on the 
assumption that vessel operators are the ones that receive and hold the ITQs and retain 
full decision power: in essence they are at the centre of the fisheries management 
system. For domestic fisheries this is unproblematic since domestic governments 
allocate to domestic fisheries operators and the implicit 'capacity control’ mechanism is 
given space to operate.
Within an international fishery, it is less clear how this automatic capacity management 
mechanism could be replicated. In Chapters 2 and 3 the framework of international law 
was discussed and represented graphically. Clearly international law recognizes agency, 
not in terms of vessels, but frames cooperative resource management solely between 
national sovereign states whose responsibility it is, in turn, to manage their domestic 
fleets and fishing within their EEZs. The provision of allocated units within the 
WCPFC, and in other RFMOs, to nation states can therefore represent a break in this 
inbuilt process of capacity control within an economic approach to fisheries 
management.
In essence this occurs because nation states remain empowered to determine their own 
use of allocations arising from an RFMO. It follows, therefore, that nation states are not 
impelled to ‘pass-on* the allocation to vessels and can simply hold their allocation in 
trust to cover all fishing activity that may occur in their fishing zones. This in turn can 
lead to an ‘Olympic’ style fishery within the domestic jurisdiction whereby national 
governments follow existing practices and ‘sell’ their fishing rights to the highest 
bidders until they reach quota. Like the experiences found in may other Olympic style 
fisheries, the use of fishing rights in this manner may not lead to a rationalization of 
capital within the fishery but rather to a race to fish and consequential increases in 
capacity. Anecdotally, the PNA countries are administering their allocations for 
bilateral access vessels under the VDS in this way, and an explicit ‘Olympic’ fishery 
has been established for the vessels operating under the FSMA, thus suggesting that 
future capacity growth will remain an outstanding management issue for the PNA and 
the WCPFC at large.
3.3 'Day-to-day' governance
In discussing the concept of 'day-to-day’ governance, Chapter 8 raises the possibility 
that this issue represents a real barrier to policy progress within the WCPFC and in
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regional fisheries management more generally—an issue that is discussed in more detail 
here.
Problems with ‘day-to-day' governance can be broadly defined as 'capacity' issue— 
which is usually equated to concepts around ‘skills shortage’ in the development and 
academic literature and have been specifically identified within the Pacific (see Hanich, 
2008b) context as including:
• Limited fisheries management, scientific and economic skills (amongst others) and 
poor budgets to adequately fund national fisheries departments.
• Poor data coordination.
• Lack of political leadership and so on.
Observations of commission meetings, regional management processes, and discussions 
with policy makers undertaken during the course of this study confirm these findings 
but also suggest that the concept of'capacity limits’ should be broadened to include the 
wider 'operational' aspects of'doing management’ on a daily basis, including activities 
such as time and resources required to organize the logistics of attending meetings, the 
time required to read, comprehend analyze and incorporate into national negotiating 
positions policy papers and ideas, and the physical ability to communicate in timely and 
effective manner and the competition for attention to fisheries governance issues from 
other responsibilities. That is, 'problems’ with day-to-day governance can arise not only 
as a 'lack of available skills’, but, even where appropriately skilled people are in the 
right jobs, problems can arise as a result of the limits imposed by limited human 
cognition and defined time budgets. For example, comments set out in Hanich (2008b) 
identify that:
Many interviewees commented that the high workloads and heavy travel 
requirements left fisheries departments/authorities with little or no capacity to 
day to day domestic task, let alone address strategic or co-ordination issues. One 
interviewee commented that their tuna management plan is due for review but 
that this was ‘... hampered by the continuous change of senior staff of the 
Ministry with new secretary and Ministers. Fisheries officials also travel far too
much and no one seems to be on the ground most of the time.....  Many
interviewees noted problems caused by staff having to fulfill many functions 
simultaneously.’ (p.214)
Although not often discussed by governance scholars or in formal policy literature, 
related research undertaken for the WCFPFC Secretariat confirmed that these issues 
were indeed real barriers to the progress of the WCPFC work program (see Parris, 
2008). In informal interviews undertaken with commission members, interviewees often 
expressed a sense of 'being overwhelmed' by paperwork and day-to-day minutiae of 
attending meetings, with specific issues raised by them included:
• Too many papers, circulated in untimely fashion and sometimes without reference 
to background material. For example, during 2007-08. the commission generated 
approximately 346 papers of variously lengths on different issues related to the 
commission’s work program alone. Some papers were considered 'too technical’ for 
a policy-related audience.
• Obtaining access to appropriate and up to date information in a timely manner.
• Website based communication does not fully exploit opportunities to support CCM 
preparation.
• Meeting logistics can hamper efforts for CCMs to comment on negotiating papers.
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• Operating in English as a second language can be difficult and raise tensions on 
contentious issues as language is considered to be used to deliberately confuse an 
issue.
Although at one level the notion that 'too much paper work' can represent a real barrier 
to changes in governance structures could be considered somewhat trivial, it is worth 
highlighting that collaborative governance is predicated on the ability for participants to 
have relatively easy and low-cost methods o f communication, so that institutional 
arrangements can be developed at a pace that effectively addresses the conservation 
needs o f the underlying resource base. Consequently, i f  these modes o f communication 
are not low cost within the policy community— as appears to be the case within the 
WCPFC— then this raises the costs o f achieving good governance outcomes, and 
significantly lengthens the time required to achieving them. This 'day-to-day’ 
governance perspective adds a new dimension to the mix: it is difficult to reach 
agreement through negotiation because the pragmatic physical process o f negotiating 
itself is difficult.
Within the transaction cost institutional literature these issues have been classed as 
‘ transition costs' and are recognized, at least in theory, as specific problems in 
institutional regime formation— and this w ill be discussed in Section 3.4. For policy 
makers within the WCPFC these observations hold two key lessons for further research.
• It provides an alternative explanation for why progress is so slow, not just 
political w ill, and identifies highlights the role o f communication— that is, it is 
not just important what is communicated, but also HOW it is communicated.
• Highlights specific actions that can address these needs to reduce these transition 
costs.
On a practical level, this issue suggests that greater attention, and resources, need to be 
directed towards dealing with modes o f communication, language, and modes o f 
interaction and that paying attention to these issues is just as important as dealing with 
the substantive aspects o f policy development.
3.4 Transactions costs and consequences for policy development
Within the transactions costs literature— as applied to institutional development and 
chang—  the concept o f 'day-to-day’ governance problems are just one aspect o f the 
'transaction’ costs that are incurred by actors seeking to change institutional 
arrangements that govern a particular range of economic activity. Challen (2000) further 
classifies 'transactions’ costs as ‘static’ costs and as 'dynamic’ costs— with the later 
subsequently divided into two components. The first type is ‘ institutional transition 
costs’ , which are defined as costs that include but go beyond the notion o f 'day-to-day’ 
governance as discussed here. The second type o f costs are ‘ institutional lock in 
costs’— which are costs that arise from recognizing that current institutional choices, to 
the extent that they generate future path dependencies, or constrain future institutional 
choice for whatever reason, increase the transition costs o f possible future institutional 
changes. That is, 'institutional lock in costs’ arise out o f the path-dependent nature of 
policy development.
Marshall (2005) elaborates on this discussion by developing a third type o f institutional 
costs associated with the choice o f institutions on ‘transformation’ (that is, production)
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costs and consequently upon choices of technology. Like Challen, he distinguishes 
between ‘static* costs (costs of operating a given technology under a given institutional 
structure) and ‘dynamic’ transactions costs, which again is divided into two parts: 
technological transition costs (the influence of a particular current institutional choice 
on individual current choice of technologies) and ‘technological lock-in costs’ that arise 
to the extent that technological choices from current institutional change create path 
dependencies in technological adoption. Bringing together this typology, six types of 
transactions costs can be identified as being:
• Static transaction costs
• Institutional transition costs
• Static transformation costs
• Institutional lock-in costs
• Technological transition costs
• Technological lock-in costs.
As sources of path-dependencies, these costs exert a two way influence on both 
technological and institutional choice in that current institutions may influence selection 
of technologies and future institutions but, as pointed out by North, the reverse is also 
true: current technologies also influence the negotiating positions that, in turn, influence 
future institutional development.
Both Challen (2000) and Marshall (2005) respond to the existence of these transaction 
costs with the suggestion that institutional development should seek to minimize these 
costs through measurement and careful cost evaluation across various options and 
categories, but concede that, in practice, this may be difficult to achieve.
In considering the experience of the WCPO tuna fisheries, and its governing 
institutions, this thesis does suggest that such path dependencies in policy making do 
exist in the sense that current policy options are likely to be constrained by previous 
institutional choices—and this was the basis of a major assumption underpinning the 
governance framework developed in Chapter 9. It is also likely to be the case that, in 
considering the source of such path-dependency creating transactions costs, such costs 
are difficult and costly to measure, although technically possible (see for example 
McCann et al., 2005), partly because they are derived from less tangible aspects of 
policy making including:
• Policy development processes, particularly those within the FFA Group of 
countries, have a long history, and significant social, political and economic 
resources at the regional and national levels have been invested in the 
implementation and operation of these structures.
• The existence of tightly interconnected policy and political networks operating 
within regional fisheries management that is often personality and relationship 
driven. This is reinforced by two factors. First, the existence of ‘super agents’ 
operating throughout the region (primarily operating through the FFA Secretariat) 
that act in quasi leadership roles in terms of framing problem perception, 
introducing new ideas and encouraging their adoption through out the region. 
Second, there is a strong cultural norm to ‘agree’ for the sake of avoiding 
disagreements and for regional solidarity (sometimes called the ‘Pacific Way’).
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• Day-to-day governance issues and the consequent feeling of 'being overwhelmed' 
by the pace and quantity of governance changes within the region.
Rather than attempting to measure, compare and evaluate these costs in a formal sense, 
Marshall instead suggests, and originally proposed by Arthur (1994), the usual solution 
to such problems is for policy makers to rely on familiar heuristics, or mental models 
and 'usual ways of doing things' to both diagnose a policy problem and to propose and 
understand a policy solution. Thus for example, in the kind of policy-making 
environment described above the costs and benefits of completely 'new’ ideas for 
policy development are evaluated not necessarily on their own merits but within the 
context and against the high value of maintaining existing relationships and existing 
ways of doing things. As discussed in Chapter 7, these factors in part, provide an 
additional explanation of why policy progress is slow within the WCPFC, beyond the 
usual claim of the 'lack of political will'.
Marshall (2005), and Arthur (1994) argue that such insight forms the basis of adaptive 
management techniques and indeed, such an approach was adopted in this thesis for this 
very reason. However it may also be argued that recognizing the existence and 
constraints of path-dependent dynamics can, like the legal framework discussed in 
Section Three of this chapter, be not only a source of limitation for progressing policy, 
but also simultaneously a source of overcoming the kinds of path-dependent tendencies 
that it tends to create. The key to this is the recognition—commonly made by scholars, 
and discussed in Chapter 7—that policy development in path-dependent contexts is 
evolutionary in nature and occurs in incremental steps. As a consequence, policy ‘ideas’ 
are not subject to freely developed formulations purely from theory or analysis but 
depend on existing institutional structures. These may be defined broadly as 
encompassing all forms of legal, economic (market) and political institutions—or, in the 
case of Chapter 9—more narrowly in the sense of actual ‘rules in use’ in a commons 
situation. More than this, current existing institutions, and the existence of transactions 
costs in evolving them over time, form a key source of policy ideas for future 
governance arrangements.
Seen from this view, policy development is more easily interpreted as an evaluative, 
reflective process for considering what may be ‘better’ compared to the status quo, 
rather than an outright statement of ‘optimal' outcomes. This implies two aspects of 
policy making that were central in the development of Chapters 9 and 10:
• The relevant policy questions become re-focused on identifying what is 
currently within the policy mix and drawing links between theoretical ideas and 
similarities within that mix. That is—current institutions are used as the basis for 
introducing new ideas.
• This emphasizes the need for governance scholars to place less focus on the 
theories of good governance and resource management theory and more on the 
context of the governance situation.
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